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Abstract 
While economic research has demonstrated that the richest 1 percent in terms of 
income (and to a lesser extent in terms of wealth) in the UK have increased their 
relative advantage since the 1980s, there is little empirical research on how these 
individuals perceive changes in economic inequality (Chin, 2014). Following in the 
tradition of research on ‘elite’ perceptions of inequality (Reis and Moore, 2005), my 
research investigates how economic inequality, measured by top income and wealth 
shares, is perceived by the top 1 percent of income earners in the UK. To understand 
these phenomena, I interviewed and surveyed 30 participants. Additionally, I analysed 
data from the Great British Class Survey (GBCS) to triangulate the findings. 
Participants’ perceptions of top income shares closely relate to their views on the 
production of top incomes. For instance, GBCS data show that respondents with the 
highest incomes tend to select meritocratic items as important for career success. 
Meanwhile, a majority of interviewees, termed ‘economic evaluators’, narrate top 
incomes as resulting from rational, economic evaluation processes (Lamont et al., 
2014), based on the idea that ‘the market’ is the best instrument for the distribution of 
resources. Intersectional privilege can be reconciled with ideas of a neutral market, 
because economic evaluative processes are gendered, ‘raced’ and classed (Skeggs, 
2004a). Due to vast absolute differences between those at the top, participants view 
inequality from the perspective of ‘relative (dis)advantage’; while recognizing their 
advantage compared to the general population they experience relative disadvantage 
(based on Runciman’s (1966) ‘relative deprivation’) compared to others higher up the 
distribution. As a result, participants overestimate top income and wealth shares. Due to 
beliefs in markets, participants’ heightened awareness of inequality does not translate 
into general concern for inequality, particularly among economic evaluators. My study 
highlights the importance of the evaluative processes narrated as constituting top 
incomes for top income earners’ perceptions of economic inequality. 
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Introduction 
Top income shares, the share of the top 1 percent as a proportion of total national 
income, have increased in the UK since the late 1970s (Piketty, 2014; Medeiros and de 
Souza, 2014; Atkinson, 2015). Meanwhile, top wealth shares, the share of the 
wealthiest 1 percent, have also increased during this time, though to a lesser extent 
(Piketty, 2014). Top incomes have risen more sharply in the US and the UK than in 
continental Europe and Japan (Piketty, 2014; Morelli et al., 2015; Cowell et al., 2016), 
highlighting the relevance of national specificity. While economists have demonstrated 
that the richest 1 percent in the US and the UK have increased their advantage over 
others1, social scientists have paid remarkably little attention to the social, and in 
particular the cultural processes which form part of the explanation for recent increases 
in top incomes and wealth (Lamont et al., 2014; McCall et al., 2014; Piketty, 2014; 
Atkinson, 2015). Specifically, “social norms regarding fairness of the distribution of 
income and wealth” might be “the ultimate driver of inequality and policy” (Piketty and 
Saez, 2014, p. 4). My research addresses the lack of attention to these cultural 
processes and contributes to the literature on possible reasons for the increase in top 
income shares by focusing on social norms regarding what level of inequality is 
acceptable to those situated at the top.  
This research therefore presents new findings on how the richest individuals, 
those situated at the very top end of the income and wealth distributions in the UK, 
perceive economic inequality, and the role they play. I therefore build on research by 
economists on top incomes and wealth, which has led to a resurgence of sociological 
‘elite’ studies (Khan, 2008). However, there is currently little empirical research 
regarding how ‘elites’ perceive increasing economic inequality (notable exceptions 
include Reis and Moore, 2005; Chin, 2015; Sherman, 2017). I address this limitation by 
sociologically investigating how individuals situated at the top end of the income and 
wealth distributions perceive economic inequality. By doing so, my research 
contributes to the emerging literature on perceptions of increasing economic inequality 
from the viewpoint of the top (Reis and Moore, 2005; Page et al., 2013; Chin, 2014). 
Specifically, the research question addressed in this thesis is: How do those with 
top incomes (many of whom also have top wealth) perceive economic inequality? To 
                                                 
1 Though see pages 217f for recent fluctuations. 
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address my research question, I analysed Great British Class Survey (GBCS) data, 
including a latent class analysis of respondents’ attitudes towards career success. Due 
to a lack of further, nationally representative data, and the suitability of qualitative 
methods for investigating cultural processes (Lamont et al., 2014), I more importantly 
collected my own data in the form of a qualitative study of 30 UK-based top income 
earners. Participants were interviewed and surveyed regarding their views on top 
incomes and wealth, and differences in incomes. A focus on those in the top 1 percent 
conceptualizes ‘elites’ as economic or wealth ‘elites’ (Bourdieu, 1998; Savage, 2015a) 
given their “vastly disproportionate control over or access to [economic] resource[s]” 
(Khan, 2012a, p. 361). To access the study’s sample, I had to overcome methodological 
challenges and mobilize the symbolic capital of the institution where I pursued my 
doctoral research, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). 
A key finding of my study is that perceptions of top income and wealth shares 
are closely related to participants’ views about the production of top incomes and 
wealth. GBCS data demonstrates that respondents with the highest incomes are more 
likely to choose meritocratic items as important for career success when compared to 
other respondents. Meanwhile, interviewees view top incomes as meritocratic, resulting 
from hard work (effort) and talent (Khan, 2011; Littler, 2013; Sherman, 2017b). While 
luck is mentioned, hard work is stressed (cf. Frank, 2016). The evaluative practices 
which participants refer to include formulas for performance pay, traders’ bonuses and 
hedge fund returns. It is precisely these practices of performance-based remuneration 
which have been shown to be associated with increased wage inequality in the US and 
the UK (Atkinson, 2015; Angeles et al., 2016).  
My research on how the rich perceive economic inequality is relevant due to the 
interdependence of top income shares and summary measures of inequality, as well as 
the relationship between inequality and poverty (Reis, 2010; Morelli et al., 2015; 
Karagiannaki and McKnight, forthcoming). Specifically, the finding that participants 
view top incomes as market-determined and derived from fair economic evaluation 
processes may add to the explanation of rising top income shares because top income 
earners pay themselves and others very high salaries (see Piketty, 2014, pp. 330-331). 
By implication, “the share available to others” is diminished (Townsend, 1979, p. 366). 
Further, the rich enjoy disproportionate political influence and power and can therefore 
impact the democratic process in their favour (Gilens and Page, 2014; Robeyns, 2017). 
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Finally, this research also contributes to reference group theory and the literature on 
attitudes to (tackling) economic inequality.  
 
Thesis outline 
In Chapter 1 A sociology of top incomes and wealth, I draw together the literatures on 
economic inequality and sociological studies of elites and social class, making the case 
for a sociology of top incomes and wealth. I justify my focus on economic studies on 
top incomes and wealth and argue that an engagement with this literature is beneficial 
for the sociological studies on inequality and social class (Keister and Lee, 2014; 
Savage, 2014). I build on distributional economic studies (Hills et al., 2010; Hills et al., 
2013; Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015) which highlight that studies of social class 
(Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004; Goldthorpe, 2010) need to take into account the 
social relations of capital markets in addition to labour markets (Savage, 2014). 
Likewise, a relational, sociological analysis of top incomes and wealth, which 
conceptualizes top incomes and wealth as constituted by and made sense of by top 
income earners based on social relations (Zelizer, 2012) and culturally shared criteria of 
evaluation (Lamont, 2012; Lamont et al., 2014), is helpful for distributional economic 
studies. Specifically, my sociological study contributes to research on the social norms 
and cultural processes which form part of the explanation for rising inequality (Piketty, 
2014; Piketty and Saez, 2014; Atkinson, 2015).  
 A key starting point for my research is the economic research on top incomes 
and wealth, which can be seen as challenging a central bias in social science. This bias 
tends to focus on issues of inequality with respect to the low incomes of the poor rather 
than the high incomes and wealth of the rich (Townsend, 1979; Orton and Rowlingson, 
2007a; Savage, 2015a). The measurement of inequality is never neutral, but a result of 
political choices (Piketty, 2014). Meanwhile, most studies on economic inequality and 
on attitudes towards inequality focus on income, even though wealth is vastly and 
increasingly important relative to income (Ibid.) and vital for perceptions of inequality, 
as my qualitative data shows. Therefore, wealth and income from capital need to be 
considered. Capital income is an important component of overall household income, 
especially for the top 1 percent, and makes up approximately a quarter of all national 
income in the UK (Nolan et al., 2014; Piketty, 2014) with important implications for 
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the study of social class, and for perceptions of richness by participants, as some of the 
rich can decommodify themselves. 
 The context for my research is framed by the literature on economic inequality 
which shows that top income shares have increased in many countries over the last four 
decades including in the UK, even if overall inequality remained unchanged by some 
measures (Piketty, 2014; Morelli et al., 2015). Even though wealth is more unequally 
distributed than income, wealth is now much more equally distributed than a century 
ago (Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015) and top wealth shares have increased less 
dramatically than top income shares (Piketty, 2014). I reflect on possible reasons for 
increases in income inequality. These start from orthodox economic theories which 
suggest that economic inequality is the result of rational, neutral market forces, 
including theories of skill-biased technological change (Goldin and Katz, 2007; Hühne 
and Herzer, 2017) and globalization (Bogliacino and Maestri, 2014). These theories 
which carry inherent moral assumptions benefit those in power (Skeggs, 2004a), cannot 
account for the specific changes at the top of the distribution (Piketty, 2014), lack a 
conceptualization of rents (Stiglitz, 2015a; McGoey, 2017) and do not account for the 
unequal distribution of capital (Atkinson, 2015). A majority of my participants refer to 
precisely this idea of neutral market forces when explaining top incomes and wealth.  
I argue for the need to bring in relational (sociological) analyses of top incomes 
and wealth which view inequality as resulting from unequal social relations of social 
class (Goldthorpe, 2010; 2012), gender, ‘race’ and other dimensions of inequality 
(Skeggs, 2004a). In the sociological perspective, inequality is seen as resulting from 
interacting members of a social entity in relation with each other (Atkinson, 2015). 
Hence, inequality is socially constructed. Research which provides evidence for this 
view shows that inequality has risen in Anglo-Saxon countries due to changes in 
politics and policies, including with respect to taxation (Volscho and Kelly, 2012; 
Alvaredo et al., 2013; Tóth, 2014), due to shifts of power to capital (Atkinson, 2015) 
and due to cultural changes, including the rise of performance-based pay practices, 
which are associated with increasing wage inequality (Lemieux et al., 2009; Atkinson, 
2015; Angeles et al., 2016). My study on how the rich view top incomes and wealth 
addresses the cultural processes and social norms surrounding the distribution of 
income and wealth, particularly its concentration at the top (Atkinson, 2006).  
The key cultural process which I focus on is that of evaluation (Fourcade, 2011; 
Lamont, 2012). Narratives include that participants pay very high salaries to themselves 
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and others in social relations with them, as a result of the cultural process of evaluation, 
which is based on economic criteria (Fourcade, 2011; Lamont, 2012; Lamont et al., 
2014). The idea is that the market determines merit. Economic evaluative practices 
such as the assessment of performance-based pay are viewed, by a majority of 
participants, as capturing individuals’ economic and therefore social contribution. As in 
the neoclassical marginal productivity theory of the income distribution, economic 
reward is seen as a reflection of social contribution (McGoey, 2017; Stiglitz, 2015a). 
Hence, pay is seen as deserved when it is a share of the ‘value created’, i.e. a part of 
achieved increases in the value of capital, generated for clients, investors and 
shareholders (Van der Zwan, 2014). Therefore, I argue based on Bourdieu (1998) that 
the legitimating purpose of contemporary economic ‘elites’ is ‘service to capital’. In 
addition to legitimation, the cultural processes of evaluation includes categorization 
(Lamont, 2012; Lamont et al., 2014). Likewise, classification is a form valuation 
(Skeggs, 2014). Participants who evaluate individuals’ contributions based on 
economic criteria can reconcile the intersectional, white, male and privately educated 
privilege at the top with ideas of a neutral, merit-determining market because economic 
evaluative processes are gendered, ‘raced’ and classed (Crenshaw, 1989; Skeggs, 
1997). Based on classifications some people are seen as economically more valuable 
than others (Skeggs, 2004a). Consequently, inequalities are naturalized (Bourdieu, 
2010 [1984]).  
 In the last two sections of the literature review, I address perceptions of and 
attitudes towards inequality. I aim to overcome the divide whereby the social 
psychology literature focuses on the former and the social policy and sociological 
literatures, on the latter. Perceptions of inequality are relational; social comparisons are 
made relative to others (Runciman, 1966; Irwin, 2015). Hence social comparisons can 
provide insights into how inequality is experienced (Irwin, 2015). Runciman (1966) 
argued that inequality in twentieth century England was sustainable as people were 
unaware of the full extent of inequality because they made narrow-ranging social 
comparisons and hence experienced little relative deprivation. In contrast, I argue that 
due to vast economic inequality at the top of the distribution, top income earners in the 
twenty-first century make economically wide-ranging social comparisons with socially 
close and distant others who are doing even better economically. Therefore, 
participants experience relative disadvantage (based on relative deprivation). 
Participants look up to and admire the economic achievements of others due to 
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economic evaluation; those who do best economically are seen as the best. They aspire 
to further accumulation to reduce their relative disadvantage.  
I reflect on the fact that the literature on attitudes includes a limited amount of 
research which shows how the public views high incomes and the rich (Dean and 
Melrose, 1999; Orton and Rowlingson, 2011; Bamfield and Horton, 2009; McCall, 
2013), but there are very few studies which address how the rich themselves view their 
privilege, as well as high incomes, richness and the unequal distribution of income and 
wealth (Sherman’s 2017 and Chin’s 2015 work are notable exceptions). Further, the 
literature on attitudes generally focuses on the distribution of income, and rarely 
addresses the unequal distribution of wealth even though attitudes towards wealth may 
be distinct from attitudes to earnings and income (Orton and Rowlingson, 2011). My 
study addresses these limitations, however further nationally-representative research on 
top income earners and the rich is recommended.  
In Chapter 2, I discuss my methodology and methods. Due to the preoccupation 
in the social sciences with poverty and the dividing line between the middle and the 
working class, there is a lack of nationally representative data on the rich, a challenge 
for research on ‘elites’ (Savage and Williams, 2008; Savage, 2015a). The GBCS survey 
is an exception; its advantage for my purposes is that it has attracted many rich 
respondents. As the GBCS is a non-random and non-representative online survey, I 
compare my findings to data from the nationally-representative Understanding Society 
(USoc) survey, which shows that USoc does not offer strong tools for my purposes. 
Due to the absence of suitable quantitative data and the advantages of qualitative 
methods for studying cultural processes “and micro level practices that constitute them” 
(Lamont et al., 2014, p. 24), I have collected qualitative interview data of 30 top 
income earners in the UK, a majority of which are also top wealth holders. The 
interviews were followed by a short survey questionnaire, and supplemented with field 
notes. 
My analysis of GBCS data which I discuss in Chapter 3 A descriptive portrait 
of ‘the top’ includes an outline of the social characteristics of individuals situated at the 
top of the income distribution, including their occupations, social class, age, gender and 
ethnicity. I find that the main distinction between economic ‘elites’ and all other 
households are their vast amounts of wealth, their geographic location and awareness 
that they belong to an advantaged social class. In addition, I analyse what can be 
inferred about GBCS respondents’ views towards inequality. The data shows that the 
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rich hold more meritocratic views than everyone else, even though these views are 
strong throughout the distribution of GBCS respondents. 
In Chapter 4 Meritocratic top incomes: Economic evaluation by ‘the market’ I 
discuss qualitative findings on participants’ views on the causes of inequality. I argue 
that participants’ narratives demonstrate that their views about top incomes are closely 
related to how they view the processes through which top incomes are produced. As 
discussed, a majority of participants narrate top incomes as resulting from rational, 
economic evaluation processes (Lamont et al., 2014; Fourcade, 2011) based on the idea 
that ‘the market’ is a neutral and fair instrument for the distribution of resources. 
Hence, most participants perceive top incomes as meritocratic, resulting from hard 
work (effort) and talent (Littler, 2013). The income and capital gains of entrepreneurs 
are seen as truly market determined and hence as most deserving. Instead of 
distinguishing between more deserving ‘top managers’ and less deserving ‘rentiers’ as 
suggested by Piketty (2014, p. 264), participants draw on distinctions between 
deserving entrepreneurs and not necessarily deserving employees, including managers 
and CEOs. 
I show how economic, quantifiable ‘value’ is seen as enmeshed with moral, 
cultural ‘values’ (Skeggs, 2004a; 2014). For a majority of participants, the ‘economic 
evaluators’, money is a measuring rod for worth (Fourcade, 2011). Economic 
evaluation processes are rational in the Weberian sense and include evaluative practices 
which determine top incomes such as formulas for performance pay, hedge fund returns 
and bonus payments. Simultaneously, these evaluative practices rationalize top incomes 
in the Freudian2 sense because the supposed meritocratic process makes the outcome, 
vast inequality, seem fair (Bourdieu, 1998). Yet, a minority of participants are ‘social 
evaluators’ whose focus is on values over economic value (Skeggs, 2004a). These 
participants question whether top incomes reflect social contribution, often with 
reference to social comparisons with others who are perceived to be working in more 
‘socially valuable’ occupations.  
Further, I emphasize that the picture at the top and in particular the very top of 
the distribution is one of white, male, privately educated privilege. Hence, privilege is 
‘intersectional’ (Crenshaw, 1989; Skeggs, 1997). In Chapter 5 Economic evaluation as 
                                                 
2 Freud’s concept of rationalization is defined as “an ex post facto mechanism invoked after an action to 
hide the secret, unconscious, unacceptable, unknown but ‘real’ motive” (Cohen, 2000, p. 58). 
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gendered, ‘raced’ and classed, I discuss that participants can reconcile intersectional 
privilege at the top with ideas of a neutral, merit-determining market because economic 
evaluative practices are gendered, ‘raced’ and classed (Skeggs, 2004a). Some 
participants are seen as economically more valuable and structural inequality is 
individualized through economic evaluative processes. 
I discuss the perspective from which inequality is viewed in Chapter 6 Relative 
(dis)advantage: The perspective from the top. Due to vast absolute differences within 
the 1 percent, participants view inequality from the perspective of ‘relative 
(dis)advantage’; while recognizing their advantage compared to the general population 
they experience relative disadvantage, based on Runciman’s ‘relative deprivation’, 
when ‘looking up’. As economic evaluation processes mean those at the top are seen as 
meritorious, relative disadvantage is seen in a positive light, as aspirational. Further 
research is necessary to investigate whether relative (dis)advantage constitutes a driver 
of top incomes. 
In Chapter 7, I show that participants perceive high incomes and richness to be 
‘relative’ concepts, specifically based on comparisons with other rich people instead of 
comparisons with the living standards of the general population, as conceptualized in 
authoritative definitions of relative poverty (Townsend, 1979). Therefore, participants’ 
perceptions of high incomes and richness are very skewed towards the right tail of the 
distribution. Narratives include that participants explain that they engage in a ‘struggle’ 
for economic capital, specifically London property, and cultural capital, in the form of 
private schooling. Further, participants explain that richness to them means freedom 
from worrying about money and further accumulation, or as not needing to work. These 
aspirations for decommodification need to be seen in the context of the liberal welfare 
state of the UK, which offers limited decommodification to its citizens and stresses 
individual responsibility (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This idea of richness as 
decommodification and the related desire to release oneself from the strain of the 
labour market is in contradiction to the meritocratic idea of top incomes as a result of 
hard work.  
In the final empirical chapter, Perceptions of economic inequality and policies 
to tackle it (Chapter 8), I discuss my findings of participants’ perceptions and attitudes 
on economic inequality in general, and on top incomes and wealth in particular. I also 
address their views toward policies to alleviate economic inequality. As discussed, in 
contrast to Runciman (1966) who argued that relative deprivation was limited due to 
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narrow-range social comparisons, resulting in a lack of awareness of the full extent of 
inequality, my study shows that top income earners experience relative disadvantage 
due to economically wide-ranging social comparisons (which may occur with socially 
close others). As a result of relative disadvantage, interviewees overestimate top 
income and wealth shares. This finding is in contrast with views of the general 
population which has been shown to underestimate levels of economic inequality 
(Orton and Rowlingson, 2011). Due to strong beliefs in markets, this heightened 
awareness of inequality does not however translate into vast concern for inequality or 
agreement with the view that the government should reduce income differences3, 
particularly among economic evaluators. 
Economic evaluators view inequality as the result of market forces and 
therefore as inevitable; the market is best suited to determine top income and wealth 
shares and hence government interference in markets is opposed. Therefore, economic 
evaluators explain that they cannot state how high top income and wealth shares should 
be. A majority explain that it is not a good idea to measure inequality with top income 
and wealth shares, or that inequality is not an issue. Many participants do not want to 
engage with issues of the unequal distribution of resources, but stress that as long as the 
process is fair, the outcomes are not relevant or that we should focus on absolute living 
standards at the bottom.  
Participants are less likely than the general population to view the gap between 
rich and poor as an issue and less likely to agree that the government should reduce 
income differences than the general population. However, participants are more likely 
to favour redistribution, due to beliefs that poverty is more important than inequality 
(Rowlingson et al., 2012). The literature shows that attitudes towards redistribution are 
a combination of self-interest and values. Correspondingly, I find that economic 
evaluators, who stress that the market rewards hard work and talent and are not 
concerned about top income and wealth shares, are much less likely to agree that the 
government should reduce income differences and redistribute compared to social 
evaluators. 
                                                 
3 This survey question was interpreted by participants as referring to market incomes. 
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Chapter 1 A sociology of top incomes and wealth 
A relational analysis of top incomes and wealth 
There is currently a stand-off between the analysis of top income and wealth in the 
disciplines of economics and sociology. My thesis seeks to redress this and develop a 
better dialogue between these two disciplines. Even though economic and sociological 
studies on inequality focus on the distributional and relational aspects of inequality, 
respectively (Goldthorpe, 2010; Bruch, 2017), I will argue that the two are 
complementary (Atkinson, 2015). Specifically, distributional economic studies of top 
incomes and wealth have important implications for the study of ‘elites’ and social 
class, and relational, sociological studies such as my own can contribute to the study of 
reasons for increasing top income and wealth shares by focusing on cultural processes, 
comparisons with reference groups and attitudes towards inequality.  
 
The study of economic inequality in economics and sociology 
In sociology, the study of inequality is focused on unequal social relations, while 
economists focus on the unequal distribution of economic resources. Specifically, the 
study of inequality in sociology concentrates on the analysis of social class and status4 
(Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004; Goldthorpe, 2010; 2012), as well as gender and 
‘racial’ inequalities and their ‘intersections’ with social class (Crenshaw, 1989; Skeggs, 
1997; Skeggs, 2004a). The study of economic inequality sits firmly within the realm of 
the discipline of economics and has largely been driven by economists and social 
policy researchers (Williams, 2011). Economic inequality is not a key focus in 
sociology in the UK. In the US, sociologists are more involved in the study of 
economic inequality, including research on top incomes and wealth (DiPrete et al., 
2010; Keister, 2014; McCall et al., 2014). However, even here the field remains a core 
domain of economists (McCall and Percheski, 2010). Conversely, the sociological 
literature on social class in the UK pays little attention to income inequality, and even 
less to income concentration at the top of the distribution, and inequalities of wealth 
and capital income (Savage, 2014). My thesis seeks to redress this balance by providing 
a sociological account of how economic inequality, overall and as measured by top 
                                                 
4 Even though status is acknowledged as conceptually different to social class, it is correlated with social 
class (Goldthorpe, 2010) and not addressed further in this thesis. 
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income and wealth shares, is perceived by the rich and very rich in London and the 
UK5.   
I argue that the unequal distribution of resources at the top of the distribution 
and how this inequality is understood by those at the top, is important for the wider 
analysis of social relations. Equally, I discuss how a sociological lens, which focuses 
on unequal social relations, can add to distributional conceptualizations of social 
inequality. Hence, I address the established sociological distinction between relational 
and distributional analyses (Bruch, 2017), also referred to as relational and 
substantialist analysis (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]) or as treating inequality in a relational 
or attributional sense (Goldthorpe, 2010; 2012). The distributional perspective, 
associated with economists’ analyses of the unequal distribution of income and wealth, 
is currently more prominent; however, some sociologists (Goldthorpe, 2010; Bruch, 
2017) argue that this approach is merely descriptive and does not address the unequal 
social relations which explain sustained inequality. I argue that the two approaches are 
mutually beneficial. I do so by firstly highlighting the advantages of distributional 
studies on top incomes and wealth for my study and for the study of ‘elites’ (Savage, 
2014; Khan, 2015) and secondly discussing how my relational analysis contributes to 
research on the social norms and cultural processes which form part of the explanation 
for rising inequality (Piketty, 2014, p. 331; Piketty and Saez, 2014; Atkinson, 2015). 
 
The distribution of income and wealth and its implications for the study of ‘elites’ and 
social class relations  
Historical studies of the distribution of economic resources, which focus on the 
evolution of top income and wealth shares (Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014; 
Alvaredo et al., 2015) challenge a bias in social scientific research on inequality. 
Historically, this research focused on poverty, and the distinction between the middle 
and working classes (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007a; Khan, 2008; Savage et al., 2014; 
Savage, 2015a). The history of social science includes a concern for regulating the poor 
and their income, reflecting a moral bias and preoccupation with situating issues of 
                                                 
5 A majority of respondents are living in London, particularly West London, though some live outside of 
London. 
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inequality with the poor and the working class (Skeggs, 2014)6. For instance, Charles 
Booth’s (1984 [1889]) seminal study of poverty in London included defining people in 
the poorest streets, the “black” category, as “vicious, semi-criminal” (Savage, 2016). 
Seebohm Rowntree’s (1901) research on poverty in York derived the influential 
‘primary poverty’ definition based on the concept of subsistence as well as the concept 
of ‘secondary poverty’, “a state in which income was in theory enough to maintain 
physical efficiency but was misspent” on “drink, betting and gambling; ignorant or 
careless housekeeping and other improvident expenditure, the latter often induced by 
irregularity of income” (Townsend, 1979, p. 565, citing Rowntree, 1901, pp. 141-2). 
The legacy of these influential studies by rich industrialists may explain why the focus, 
which still persists today, was on poverty and how little the poor earn, rather than how 
much the rich own and receive as income from capital or labour7.  
Distributional analyses demonstrate that top income and wealth shares have 
increased since the 1970s (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014; Alvaredo et al., 
2017). Thanks to this body of literature, social scientists now recognize the importance 
of studying the rich rather than the poor (Khan, 2015). Until recently, the ‘rich’ have 
been an understudied group in sociology. Even though class is seen as relational, the 
focus has been one-sided, on deprivation and poverty (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007a; 
Khan, 2011; Savage, 2015a). Distributional research on top incomes and wealth, which 
estimates the share held by the richest decile, the richest 1 percent and the richest 0.1 
percent in terms of income or wealth (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2011; Alvaredo et al., 2013; 
Piketty, 2014), challenges this bias. 
Sociologists have not always been uninterested in the ‘rich’ and in ‘elites’. 
Historically, social theorists viewed elites as important for understanding social 
dynamics (Savage and Williams, 2008). Around the start of the twentieth century, a 
period with high levels of inequality (Atkinson et al., 2011), scholars were quite 
interested in elites (Khan, 2008). From the mid-1970s onward, at a time which was 
preceded by falling levels of inequality8 (Piketty, 2014, Figure 9.2, p. 315), the study of 
‘elites’ became deeply unpopular due to the rise of post-structuralist social theory as 
well as positivist or neo-positivist social science which insisted on the nationally-
                                                 
6 For instance Malthusian theory from the 18th century (Skeggs, 2014; Sandmo, 2015). 
7 Tawney’s work would be an exception to this focus. 
8 As measured by top income shares (Piketty, 2014). 
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representative sample survey as a central research tool (Savage and Williams, 2008). 
As elites are not accounted for in large enough numbers to warrant statistical inference, 
the rise of the sample survey has contributed to the demise of elite studies (Ibid.). This 
methodological issue does not apply to recent work on top income and wealth shares, 
which has revived interest in the study of ‘elites’, because economists rely on 
administrative taxation data (Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015). 
There is considerable debate surrounding what constitutes the ‘elite’ and how 
they should be defined (Khan, 2012a). My research focuses on the top 1 percent of the 
income distribution in the UK, many of whom (as I will show) also own top wealth.  
Hence, participants of this study can be conceptualized as economic or wealth ‘elites’ 
(Bourdieu, 1998; Mears, 2015; Savage, 2015a) because of their “vastly 
disproportionate control over or access to a resource” (Khan, 2012a, p. 361). 
Resources, in this definition of ‘elites’ by Khan (2015, p. 99) include “social, cultural, 
symbolic [and] economic [capital]”. I justify the focus on economic capital with 
reference to Bourdieu (1986) who argued that economic capital is at the root of all 
other capitals. My focus on an economic ‘elite’ is compatible with the approach of Reis 
and Moore (2005, p. 2) who define elites as those “who control the key material, 
symbolic and political resources within a country”. However, rather than 
operationalizing elites in institutional terms, as those occupying “commanding 
positions within the set of institutions that are most salient to national political 
influence and policy-making” (Ibid.)9, my focus is on material advantage. My 
conceptualization differs from Scott’s (2008) who insists that ‘elites’ are only those 
groups who hold a certain degree of power10. Due to the ambiguity of the term and the 
meritocratic connotation of the word ‘elite’, I use it with inverted commas following 
Bourdieu (1998). 
My research contributes to the emergent field of ‘elite’ studies (Savage and 
Williams, 2008; Khan, 2008; 2011). However, many studies in this tradition do not 
engage with economic inequality directly11. Notable exceptions include research by 
                                                 
9 However, there may be significant overlap between institutional and economic elites and it has been 
shown that economic elites in the US have disproportional influence on policy making (Gilens and Page, 
2014). 
10 However, economic capital can be seen as a form of power. 
11 Sociological research includes a body of work which focuses on ‘elites’ based on membership in ‘elite’ 
occupations such as central bankers (Lebaron, 2008), non-executive directors (Froud et al., 2008), board 
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Savage and colleagues who conceptualize a new ‘elite’ social class which is 
distinguished by its vast amounts of economic capital (Savage et al., 2013; 2014; 
Cunningham and Savage, 2015). Further, studies which specifically address elite 
perceptions of economic inequality include Reis and Moore’s (2005) seminal, 
comparative study of countries in the South, research by Schimpfossl (2014) on the 
Russian upper classes, studies on how elites in the US make sense of their privileged 
position by Khan (2008; 2011; 2015) and Sherman (2017), as well as research by Chin 
(2014; 2015). Similar to my study, Chin’s research also focuses on perceptions of 
economic inequality by the 1 percent in the US. Important recent work genders ‘elites’ 
(Mears, 2015; Glucksberg, 2016a). My research follows in the footsteps of above ‘elite’ 
studies, aiming to draw together research on ‘elites’ and on economic inequality at the 
top of the distributions.  
Long-run distributional analyses of economic inequality by economists helpfully 
challenge occupational conceptualizations of social class in the UK (Savage, 2014). 
The economic literature which shows that “capital is back” (Piketty and Zucman, 2014, 
p. 1255) because it increased its relative power compared to income, and that wealth is 
much more unequally distributed (Piketty and Saez, 2014; Piketty, 2014, pp. 222; 244), 
offers an instructive challenge to sociological conceptualizations of social class which 
generally do not account for wealth and capital income differentials (Savage, 2014; 
though see Townsend, 1979 and Savage et al., 2013; 2014). A notable exception is 
Savage et al. (2013; 2014) who account for wealth and income in their theory of social 
class, and conceptualize an ‘elite’ social class based on latent class analysis of the 
GBCS (Cunningham and Savage, 2015). Generally however, social class is treated as if 
separate from wealth (Townsend, 1979). This is a significant oversight, because in 
2010 in the UK the ratio between capital and income was approximately 5 to 1, and 
income from capital made up approximately one quarter of all national income, a figure 
which has increased between 1970-2010 (Piketty, 2014, p. 25). In addition, social class 
analysis largely ignores variation at the top of the income distribution. As my 
                                                 
members of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (Griffiths, 2010) or the members of 
the House of Lords (Bond, 2012). This research often uses piecemeal data which is publically available 
and social network analysis demonstrating the interconnectedness of ‘elites’. There are fewer social 
science studies which have addressed elites directly by collecting primary data due to methodological 
issues (McDowell and Court, 1994; McDowell, 1997; Ho, 2009). 
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qualitative data shows variation at the top is very important for how top income earners 
perceive inequality.   
Distributional economic studies highlight that theories of class structure which 
are exclusively based on “social relations within labour markets and productive units”12 
(Goldthorpe, 2012, p. 137; Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004) are limited in reach. They 
miss important aspects of the social relations of economic life (Savage, 2014). Other 
theories which focus on cultural capital in the Bourdieusian tradition sometimes neglect 
economic capital (Flemmen, 2013). Taking wealth into account allows a theorization of 
class which acknowledges that social class plays out in households and family life as 
well as in labour markets; a public sphere historically associated with male 
breadwinners (Savage, 2014). A focus on wealth inequality also sheds light on the 
intersection between class and ethnicity, by drawing attention to the inheritance of 
economic exploitation of slavery and colonialism (Piketty, 2014, p. 159). Distributional 
analyses highlight that the study of social class needs to be broadened beyond unequal 
relations in labour markets and take into account the unequal distribution of wealth and 
capital income (Savage, 2014; Skeggs, 2014; Townsend, 1979). My qualitative data 
provides evidence that wealth is important for perceptions of inequality and what it 
means to be rich.  
So far, the most established approach to social class in the UK, what Crompton 
(2008, p. xiii) termed the ‘employment aggregate approach’, whereby individuals are 
categorized into class groups on the basis of their occupation13, does not take top 
incomes, income from capital and wealth into account. In this school of thought “class 
positions are seen as deriving from social relations in economic life, or, more 
specifically, from employment relations” (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004, p. 1). 
Economic inequality is not part of this conceptualization of social class, but an 
outcome, or a dependent variable which can be explained by someone’s class position. 
Class position is conceptualized as employment relation, and operationalized as 
occupation. The resulting class schema, the new British National Statistics Socio-
                                                 
12 This approach to social class analysis distinguishes between employers, the self-employed and 
employees, and different types of employees. 
13 Or in the case of women, this categorization into class groups was also applied by default, on the 
basis of their partner’s occupation. This idea, criticized by feminist scholars, rested on the assumption 
that the class of the household can be derived by the class of the main breadwinner (Crompton, 2008). 
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Economic Classification (NS-SEC)14 is widely used, in particular in social mobility 
research (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004).  
When studying social mobility, sociologists therefore focus on intergenerational 
occupational class mobility whereas economists are concerned with intergenerational 
income mobility15 (Bukodi et al., 2015; Laurison and Friedman, 2016). Recent research 
by Laurison and Friedman (2016) demonstrates the benefit of combining measures of 
social class and earnings inequality. Specifically, they find that there is significant 
variation in earnings among those in higher professional and managerial employment, 
i.e. the highest occupational class group (NS-SEC1), and that a substantial part of the 
differences between individuals can be explained by their class origin; those from 
working class backgrounds earn 17 percent less, on average, than individuals from 
privileged backgrounds. This research demonstrates the value of combining measures 
of income and occupational social class. 
Another prominent approach to the analysis of social class, based on an 
Anglophone application of Bourdieu’s (1986; 2010 [1984]) class theory, equally does 
not place economic inequality at the centre of analysis even though Bourdieu (1986) 
himself argued that economic capital was at the root of all capitals. Bourdieu’s theory, 
sometimes referred to as ‘cultural class analysis’, sees people’s distribution in social 
space as based on the “global volume” and “composition” of their social, cultural and 
economic capital, and “evolution in time of the volume and composition according to 
their trajectory in social space” (Skeggs, 2004a, p. 17). Bourdieu’s theories influenced 
the Capital, Assets, Resources (CAR) approach to social class analysis by Savage et al. 
(2005); an alternative to occupational approaches to social class. I concur with 
Flemmen’s (2013, p. 325) critique of recent developments in this tradition of class 
analysis. Specifically, the focus on the multiple forms of capital, in particular cultural 
capital, shifted attention away from “the relations of power and domination founded in 
the economic institutions of capitalism as a crucial element of what class is”. 
Bourdieu’s writing needs to be considered in historical context; written “at a time when 
indeed economic capital has been weakened” (Savage, 2015b, in conversation with 
Piketty). Hence, Bourdieu who was concerned with the reproduction of advantage does 
                                                 
14 This scheme was introduced in 2001, and followed what was variously known as the Goldthorpe, 
Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero or CASMIN schema (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004). 
15 Bukodi et al. (2015) note that research by sociologists is neglected in the public discussion of social 
mobility compared to those by economists. 
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not focus sufficiently on economic capital, but on cultural and social capital legitimized 
by symbolic capital, which needs to be modified by today’s economic conditions.  
Distributional studies which demonstrate that economic capital has been 
strengthened in recent decades, challenge sociologists to reassess their theories of 
social class (Savage, 2014). Research on economic ‘elites’ generally “has not cross-
fertilized with class analysis” (Savage and Williams, 2008; Savage, 2015a, p. 232). 
However, “[a] full analysis [of ‘elites’] demands a sociological analysis of how to 
theoretically link elites to class analysis” (Savage, 2015a, p. 233). My data on how the 
rich perceive inequality, high income and richness, suggests one avenue to do so. The 
unequal distribution of wealth and capital income, as well as its concentration at the 
top, informs my theorization of social class and how elites are situated within it. I 
theorize that economic ‘elites’ can be seen as a social class, by employing the concept 
of ‘decommodification’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990). I argue that those with wealth high 
enough to derive capital income which allows them to disengage with the labour 
market (Atkinson, 2006) are part of a ‘decommodified class’. This conceptualization 
draws on Atkinson’s (2006, p. 3) definition of the ‘rich’ as those with wealth high 
enough to “live off the interest at an average standard of living” and my findings that 
richness is often equated with decommodification. In the words of my interviewees, the 
rich enjoy “freedom” from the labour market; they are decommodified based on the 
sheer income-generating capacity of their wealth.  
Building on Atkinson (2006), I propose a complementary definition of richness 
from the perspective of the 1 percent. The cut-off for decommodification is based on 
participants’ narratives of richness. Due to their disproportional ideological and 
political influence, it is important to take the views of the rich into account (Page et al., 
2013; Wisman, 2013). Townsend (1979, p. 367) argued that the rich play a powerful 
role in shaping what styles of living are acceptable in a society and that they “influence 
public attitudes to what is accepted as ‘deprivation’ or ‘poverty’”. Similarly, the rich 
may influence public attitudes on what it means to be rich. As the research participants 
did not consider an average standard of living as adequate because they seek to lead the 
lifestyle of the rich, I suggest a definition of ‘extreme richness’ (richness from the 
perspective of the rich). The extremely ‘rich’ or the ‘decommodified class’ are a social 
class who can or could live off their financial and property assets at the average 
standard of living of someone whose income places them just within the top 1 percent 
of the income distribution. Decommodification matters because access to capital 
 27 
income is unequally distributed, and the time and efforts involved in deriving income 
from labour or from capital are clearly different (Keister, 2014). Hence, sociologically, 
and for many participants, there is a fundamental difference between those who depend 
on their labour and those who can live off income from capital.  
 
The contribution of this study to research on reasons for increasing top incomes and 
wealth  
While distributional economic studies are important for my PhD thesis, my sociological 
study also adds to the distributional literature on reasons for increasing inequality by 
focusing on the social norms and cultural explanations for recent increases in top 
incomes and wealth. Social norms of what is seen as fair and what is not, are important 
for the evolution of inequality (Atkinson, 1997; Alvaredo et al., 2015; Piketty, 2014, p. 
331). I view inequality as socially constructed, and top incomes and wealth as resulting 
from and made sense of based on social relations (Zelizer, 2012) and culturally shared 
criteria of evaluation (Lamont et al., 2014; Lamont, 2012). A majority of participants 
view top incomes and wealth as market determined, by neutral and fair market forces, 
and therefore as legitimate.  
Economics is often presented as the most scientific discipline within the social 
sciences, one that is defined by ‘scientific’ methods, ‘neutrality’ and ‘objectivity’. The 
‘value-free’ reputation of the discipline of economics relates to its institutional power16. 
This dedication meant that the study of the income distribution has at times been 
situated somewhat outside the mainstream of the discipline because economists 
preferred to pursue ‘value-free’ research areas (Sandmo, 2015; Atkinson and 
Bourguignon, 2015). Recently though, the subject of income inequality has been 
brought in “from the cold”; and the subject moved from a position outside the 
mainstream economic debate to taking centre stage in the last 15 years (Atkinson, 1997, 
p. 297; Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015). There has been less focus on wealth 
inequality, but this is changing with publications such as Hills et al. (2013), Piketty 
(2014) and Alvaredo et al. (2015). Historically, the classical economists have been 
quite interested in the distribution of income and the role of social relations (Sandmo, 
                                                 
16 For instance, Savage (2014, p. 592) observes that the reason why Piketty’s (2014) book commanded 
the influence it did was precisely that it was written from “the highground of economics”.   
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2015). Specifically, they focused on the ‘functional distribution of income’, i.e. how 
income was distributed between the main factors of production. These were labour, 
capital and land, with respective incomes from wages, profits and rent (Atkinson, 1997; 
Sandmo, 2015). Hence, the classical economists envisioned three separate social 
classes; workers, capitalists and landlords (Atkinson, 2015). However, with the 
‘marginal revolution’ which marked the birth of neoclassical economics, economic 
theory of the income distribution shifted away from structural explanations and focused 
on the individual (McGoey, 2017). Hence, there is no account of social structure and of 
“the divisions in society as described by the sociologists” in the standard theories of the 
income distribution (Akerlof, 1976, p. 617). According to the marginal productivity 
theory of the income distribution, influential in economics, income from capital and 
income from labour are seen as the result of differences in marginal productivity and 
therefore the social contribution of individuals (McGoey, 2017; Stiglitz, 2015a). While 
the theory appears to be value free, it serves the interests of the powerful (Skeggs, 
2004a). It is this bias which I seek to correct here. 
 
Economic inequality 
Inequality has many dimensions including economic inequality, the focus of this thesis 
(Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015). I study how individuals situated at the top of the 
income and wealth distributions perceive economic inequality; specifically economic 
inequality as measured by top income and wealth shares. My analysis focuses on 
perceptions of economic inequality and how they relate to inequalities of gender, ‘race’ 
and social class (Skeggs, 2004a). In the following literature review, I define income 
and wealth, discuss the relationship between the two concepts and available 
distributional statistics, justify my focus on top incomes and wealth and highlight 
measurement and data issues. Next, I situate the case study of the UK in an 
international and historical perspective. Then, I engage with the debate on reasons for 
increased economic inequality at the top. Building on the discussion of relational and 
distributional approaches to inequality, I discuss two approaches to explaining 
inequality; inequality as socially constructed (the perspective taken in this thesis) and 
inequality as reflecting contribution (the marginal productivity theory of the income 
distribution). Based on this perspective, I argue that my research contributes to the 
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study of cultural processes which form part of the explanation for rising top income and 
wealth shares.  
 
Defining income and wealth 
Research on economic inequality is most often concerned with monetary inequality. 
Economists distinguish between monetary and nonmonetary inequality. While the 
former is “associated with the economic activity of an individual or a household 
(earnings, income, consumption expenditures, and wealth)”, the latter “addresses 
broader dimensions of economic life such as well-being or capability” (Atkinson and 
Bourguignon, 2015, p. xxi). Economic inequality is intrinsically important because it 
“violates principles of social justice” (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015, p. xvii). In 
addition, the level of economic inequality in a society can have negative consequences; 
including higher crime, health problems, and mental illness, lower educational 
achievements, social cohesion and life expectancy (Stiglitz, 2012; Pickett and 
Wilkinson, 2010). Economic inequality, “the unequal distribution of financial resources 
within the population” (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007b, p. ix), can refer to both unequal 
endowments of wealth and differences in incomes. Conceptually, income and wealth 
“are important for identifying and understanding the 1 percent but are often not 
distinguished carefully in academic writing or public discourse” (Keister, 2014, p. 
16.2).  
In the literature, the focus of research on monetary inequality has typically been 
on income inequality (Salverda et al., 2009). It is necessary to further distinguish 
between income17 and earnings; whereas income is generally measured on a total 
household basis, earnings are typically considered on an individual basis (Atkinson and 
Bourguignon, 2015)18. Earnings refer to individual wages and constitute only a part of 
income (Ibid.)19 whereas income is “the sum of income from labor and income from 
capital” (Piketty, 2014, p. 242). Further, capital income includes rents, dividends, 
                                                 
17 “Income may be defined in a variety of ways: post tax (or disposable) income, pretax income allowing 
for deductions, such as interest paid (confusingly, this is often called “net income” in official statistics), 
or pretax income before deductions” (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015, p. xxxiv). 
18 These are covered by two largely separate literatures (Salverda and Checchi, 2015). 
19 Williams (2011, p. 39) distinguishes between income inequality (including pay from employment and 
other sources of income) and wage inequality, noting that “other sources of income include income 
from property, shares, investments, and the like”. 
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interest and realized capital gains (Alvaredo et al., 2013). Depending on the source 
from which income originates, there can be different implications for well-being 
(Keister, 2014). Therefore, the distinction between income from labour and income 
from capital is important for my thesis. 
In addition to income inequality, inequalities in wealth are an important aspect 
of this research because of wealth’s increasing importance compared to income, its 
highly unequal distribution and its ability to generate capital income which creates 
additional wealth (Hills and Bastagli, 2013; Piketty, 2014, p. 25). The accumulatory 
nature of wealth is fundamental for the analysis of social class (Savage, 2014) and for 
perceptions of inequality. From a Bourdieusian (1986) perspective capital income is 
important, due to the free time it provides to owners of wealth who can focus on 
accumulating cultural or social capital instead of labouring. The lives of landowners 
and capitalists, whose incomes from rents, profits and dividends were analysed by 
classical economists, alongside incomes from labour, were therefore very different 
from that of labourers (Atkinson, 2015; Sandmo, 2015). Further, the accumulated stock 
of wealth is a key economic resource related to political power at the top of the 
distribution (Salverda et al., 2009; Gilens and Page, 2014). Wealth is associated with 
inequality of income, gender and ‘race’ (Piketty, 2014, p. 158), educational attainment 
(Hills and Bastagli, 2013), occupational opportunities and social influence (Keister, 
2014). Hence, focusing solely on income (or earnings) inequality reveals only part of 
the story (Salverda et al., 2009; Hills and Bastagli, 2013). Consequently, research 
which narrowly focuses on attitudes towards income inequality therefore only 
addresses one part of perceptions towards economic inequality, a limitation which I 
seek to address. 
Whereas income is a flow over a specified time frame (usually annually), 
wealth is a stock measured at a given point in time (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015). 
Private “wealth is usually measured as net worth (total household assets[20] less total 
liabilities and debts)” (Keister, 2014, p. 16.3). Wealth can also include private and 
public pension rights (Hills and Bastagli, 2013; Cowell et al., 2016). National wealth 
                                                 
20 “Assets include real assets (e.g., the home or primary residence, other real estate, business equity, 
vehicles) and financial assets (e.g., transaction accounts, certificates of deposit, bonds, stocks, mutual 
funds, retirement accounts). Debts include mortgages, consumer debt, student loans, and other 
liabilities.” (Keister, 2014, p. 16.3). 
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consists of private wealth and public wealth; in most countries private wealth accounts 
for nearly all of national wealth (Piketty, 2014, p. 145). I use capital and wealth 
interchangeably following Piketty, acknowledging that there are critics of this approach 
(Stiglitz, 2015a; Stiglitz and Kanbur, 2016). Piketty (2014, p. 45) defines capital as “the 
sum total of nonhuman assets that can be owned and exchanged on some market”. 
Capital can be seen as a measure of control over resources (Stiglitz and Kanbur, 2016). 
Hence, wealth is of fundamental importance for this thesis. 
The unequal distribution of wealth, and in particular financial wealth, results in 
a concentration of capital income at the very top. Considering financial wealth is 
particularly important for understanding wealth concentration because it is even more 
highly concentrated than real assets (Keister, 2014). “Financial wealth is total financial 
assets, a measure of relatively liquid assets such as stocks and bonds that, for most 
households, refers to nonhousing wealth” (Keister, 2014, p. 16.3). At the very top of 
the wealth distribution however, property forms part of investment portfolios 
(Glucksberg, 2016b). As I will demonstrate, wealth and income from capital are 
important for participants’ conceptualizations of richness and perceptions of inequality. 
 
Relationship between inequality of (labour) income and inequality of wealth  
It is important that a careful distinction between income and wealth inequality, and the 
interaction between the two, is drawn. Wealth and income are inextricably linked, and 
not just via capital income. As Hills et al. (2013b, p. 220) explain: “Inequalities of 
wealth and savings are a product of inequalities in annual incomes, as well as one of the 
factors feeding into them”. Inequality of labour income and inequality of capital 
ownership interact; for instance rising inequality in labour earnings can lead to 
increased wealth concentration (Piketty, 2015). At the household or individual level, 
there is a positive relationship between income and wealth. Those with higher incomes 
tend to have more wealth and vice versa. Keister (2014) estimates that US total 
household income and total household net worth have been correlated at about 0.50 to 
0.60 between 2001-201021. Recent research on the joint distributions of income and 
wealth by Cowell et al. (2016, p. 3) highlights the importance of “interactions between 
increasing top income shares and the concentration of wealth and income from wealth 
                                                 
21 Using data for 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010. 
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towards the top”. Hence, the relationship between income and wealth is particularly 
relevant at the top of the distributions (Ibid.). 
The top deciles or percentiles are not the same for the distributions of labour 
income and capital ownership (Piketty, 2015, p. 73). In some societies  
 
… the top shares of income and wealth might be highly correlated, while in other 
societies they may represent entirely different social hierarchies (as in traditional 
patrimonial societies). The extent to which these two dimensions of inequality differ give 
rise to different representations and beliefs systems about social inequality […] (Ibid.).  
 
My findings show that a majority of participants view income inequality as resulting 
from differences in merit as predicted by Piketty (Savage, 2014). I find that even 
though top incomes are viewed as more deserving than top wealth shares, wealth is 
nevertheless seen as deserved if it is derived from income. Wealth is perceived as 
particularly deserved if derived from entrepreneurship; “wealth creators” are admired. 
Participants do not draw moral distinctions between top managers and rentiers, who 
derive income from capital (contrasting with Piketty, 2014). While inherited wealth is 
mentioned as undeserved if accumulated over generations, participants generally aim to 
provide an inheritance for their children. 
At the national level, capital became more dominant relative to income in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France (Piketty and Zucman, 2014; 
Piketty, 2014, p. 25). By benchmarking the different kinds of capital (private and 
public) against national income (Savage, 2014), Piketty (2014) highlights the 
persistence and recent resurgence of capital since the 1970s, as well as an increase in 
private capital. Piketty (2014, p. 164) shows that in Britain, national capital today 
represents approximately five or six years of national income. This capital/income ratio 
is only slightly less than it was “in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and right up 
to the eve of World War I (about six or seven years of national income)”.  
 The way Savage conceptualizes Piketty’s (2014) work on capital/income ratios 
for sociological theory is of key importance for my research. Savage (2014, p. 595) 
argues that Piketty’s tracing of the evolution of capital/income ratios is of profound 
theoretical and empirical interest for sociologists as it “allows a way of investigating 
the ‘inheritance’ effect, ‘the power of the past’ and ultimately, the relationship between 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’”. With this argument, Savage (Ibid, p. 597) opens up an 
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important space for a critique of “epochalist thinking” including social theory which 
proclaims to have shifted “variously, to a globalized, post-modern, neo-liberal, 
informationalized, cosmopolitan” world order. Piketty’s work which highlights that in 
Britain the capital/income ratio was high from 1870 until World War I, after which it 
fell until the resurgence post 1970, shows that when controlling for economic growth, 
the recent decades have not been marked by deep and profound epochal change but in 
fact, “we are reverting to much older patterns” (Savage, 2014, p. 598). In addition to 
accumulated capital representing the past, I argue it also represents the promise of 
future capital income and therefore security and time. Participants in my sample refer 
to “the freedom” that capital provides. They aim to free themselves from the strains of 
the market through capital accumulation. I argue that a ‘decommodified’ social class 
can exert an exceptional level of control over their time as well as the time of future 
generations.  
 
Measuring economic inequality: Distributional statistics 
I will now return to the economics literature. Measuring economic inequality is “never 
neutral” and economists have shown how the choice of measurement will determine the 
aspect of inequality that gets analysed (Palma, 2011; Piketty, 2014, p. 269). 
Researchers working on inequality need to make a multitude of choices including 
whether wealth or income is measured22, whether income inequality incudes income 
from capital, what time period and region is chosen (for instance inequality in a city, 
country, or globally (Anand and Segal, 2017; Milanovic, 2016)), which data set is 
consulted (such as survey data or data from tax records) and between whom inequality 
is measured (households, individuals who are working, all individuals). Measurement 
requires assumptions23. 
 There is a range of distributional statistics available for analysing the 
distribution of income and wealth. The choice of statistic will affect which part of the 
distribution gets highlighted. As discussed, inequality is often studied with a focus on 
                                                 
22 Or income and consumption, which I do not address in this thesis (Morelli et al., 2015). 
23 For instance, in much work on income inequality at the household level, it is assumed that income is 
distributed evenly among the household (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015); a problematic assumption 
from a feminist perspective. 
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poverty24, but there are also measures of overall inequality, and more recently 
researchers have focused at the top of the distribution. Percentile ratios focus on 
specific aspects of the distribution. For instance, the P90/P10 ratio measures the ratio of 
income at the ninetieth percentile to that at the tenth percentile (McCall and Percheski, 
2010)25. Percentile ratios such as the P90/P10 and P90/P50, also referred to as 
interdecile ratios, “represent “high” income levels (from the 90th percentile of the 
distribution in this case) as some multiple of “low” income (the 10th percentile of the 
distribution) or “middle” income (the median)” (Morelli et al., 2015, p. 621). These 
ratios which often appear in official reports on inequality, most notably the P90/P10, 
completely “ignore[] the evolution of the distribution beyond the ninetieth percentile” 
(Piketty, 2014, p. 266). Hence, Piketty argues that “the methodological decision to 
ignore the top end is hardly neutral: the official reports of national and international 
agencies are supposed to inform public debate about the distribution of income and 
wealth, but in practice they often give an artificially rosy picture of inequality” (Piketty, 
2014, p. 268).  
Distributional statistics which summarize the whole distribution in one number 
include the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index26. The Gini coefficient is visually 
represented as “the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the perfect equality 
line divided by the total area below the perfect equality line”. Meanwhile, the “Lorenz 
curve is a graphical representation of the cumulative distribution of income” (Morelli et 
al., 2015, p. 620). Similarly, the Atkinson index also summarizes the whole 
distribution, however its advantage is that it “can be decomposed to identify different 
groups of income sources making different contributions to inequality” (Morelli et al., 
2015, p. 621). 
The issue with using the Gini coefficient27, “one of the more commonly used 
synthetic indices of inequality” (Piketty, 2014, p. 266), is that it appears to be 
summarizing all there is to know about inequality and is hence over-aggregated and 
unspecific. Using only the Gini coefficient to measure “changes over time carries the 
                                                 
24 Poverty measures include absolute, relative and anchored poverty (Morelli et al., 2015). There are 
also poverty gaps. 
25 There is also the variance (Salverda and Checchi, 2015). 
26 There are also generalized entropy measures, including Theil’s T and Theil’s L (World Bank, 2005). 
27 The Gini coefficient is “named for the Italian statistician Corrado Gini (1884-1965)” and “by 
construction, it ranges from 0 to 1: it is equal to 0 in case of complete equality and to 1 when inequality 
is absolute, that is, when a very tiny group owns all available resources” (Piketty, 2014, p. 266). 
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risk of missing some important changes ‘inside’ the income distribution” (Tóth, 2014, 
p. 12). As the coefficient is more sensitive to changes occurring around the middle of 
the distribution rather than within the tails, important information of where inequality is 
changing, such as increases in top income shares, will not be obvious (Ibid.). Hence, it 
is questionable “how useful the Gini index is as an indicator of overall income 
inequality”, as the index best reflects distributional changes in the middle of the 
distribution, where they “are least likely to occur” (Palma, 2011, p. 105). Therefore, to 
research inequality between the bottom and the middle of the hierarchy, as well as 
between the middle and the top, or between the top and the very top, it is preferable “to 
analyze inequalities in terms of distribution tables indicating the shares of various 
deciles and centiles in total income and total wealth” (Piketty, 2014, p. 266). This is 
because the Gini does not tell us which part of the distribution contributes most to 
inequality; distribution tables on the other hand allow us to compare the different parts 
of the distribution. 
Recent research by economists Anthony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and several 
dozen colleagues has compiled and analysed historic data on the evolution of the 
distribution of income and wealth (Alvaredo et al., 2017). They provide distribution 
tables, specifically the shares taken by the top of the distribution. The focus is on the 
shares of the top decile, the top 1 percent, and top 0.1 percent. Finally, there are also 
inequality statistics which are ratios derived from distribution tables. The S80/S20 
represents a ratio of the shares of total household income received by those in the top 
quintile of the distribution and those in the bottom quintile. Similarly, the Palma Index 
(Palma, 2011) “divides the share of income held by the highest 10 percent of the 
distribution by the share of income received by the lowest-income 40 percent of the 
distribution” (Morelli et al., 2015, p. 621).  
 
Justifying the focus on top incomes and wealth 
The choice of using top income and wealth shares as a measure for economic inequality 
is justified for my research because these measures provide a good indication of the 
situation at the top of the respective distributions (Keister, 2014). Further, top wealth 
shares have increased (Piketty, 2014, p. 344), top income shares have increased 
substantially in Anglo-Saxon countries since the 1980s (Cowell et al., 2016) and the 
literature on inequality demonstrates that a lot of the change in inequality has been 
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driven by the top of the distribution (Morelli et al., 2015). Increasing top income shares 
“raises concerns about the social inclusiveness of economic growth” (Morelli et al., 
2015, p. 651) and may be socially, politically and economically damaging (Stiglitz 
2012). Further, “[t]op incomes represent a small share of the population but a very 
significant share of total income and total taxes paid” (Atkinson et al., 2011, p. 3). The 
increasing shares of income and wealth accounted for by the top 1 percent have 
attracted considerable political interest (Gilens and Page, 2014) and shifted the issue of 
inequality from poverty to the rich. My study includes an analysis of participants’ 
views towards overall inequality, but the focus is on their views of top income and 
wealth shares. Hence, I study how those situated at the top perceive inequality as 
measured by the shares held by the top 1 percent of the distribution, which includes 
themselves. 
There is considerable political debate regarding whether primacy should be 
given to the reduction of inequality or (absolute or relative levels of) poverty. This 
debate is taken up in the literature, as well as by the participants of my study. I argue 
that it is misguided to consider poverty, inequality as measured by the Gini, and top 
income shares as completely separate phenomena; they are different aspects of the 
same distribution. Top income shares are an aspect of the upper tail of the distribution, 
poverty is an aspect of the lower tail of the distribution (Tóth, 2014), and the Gini and 
other summary statistics measure the distribution overall. Hence, there is a positive 
relationship between top income shares and other measures of inequality which capture 
the overall distribution (Morelli et al., 2015) and between these measures and poverty 
(Karagiannaki and McKnight, forthcoming). Morelli et al. (2015) show that there is a 
strong correlation between relative poverty and inequality across 38 nations28 (the 
correlation is over 91 percent, see also Karagiannaki and McKnight, forthcoming). 
Comparing the trajectories of 30 countries over 30 years, Nolan et al. (2014) however 
demonstrate that the relationship between poverty and inequality differs between 
countries; in some they run parallel, in other countries a rise in inequality is 
accompanied by falling or unchanged poverty (Tóth 2014). In the UK, large increases 
in top incomes coincided with efforts to reduce poverty (Ibid.), which may be due to 
                                                 
28 The data for this study is from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) using the Gini coefficient for DHI. 
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the legacy of New Labour’s policies which focused on reducing poverty rather than 
inequality (Joyce and Sibieta, 2013).  
Increasing top income and wealth shares mean that relatively speaking, there is 
less income or wealth available for the rest of distribution. My study investigates how 
those at the top of the distribution perceive these distributional changes. By focusing on 
top income and wealth shares as a measure of inequality, I analyse how the rich 
perceive the turning of the tables in the social sciences. Specifically, how do they see 
the shift away from conceptualizing the problem of inequality predominantly as the 
problem of poverty to one which includes the rich? I discuss these questions in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 8. 
 
Measurement and data issues 
Household income distribution data is derived from national household surveys and 
registers, while top income data is usually based on taxable income and income tax 
units. The advantage of administrative data of tax records is that they are less affected 
by survey data issues including “sampling errors, which depend on the size and 
structure of the sample, and nonsampling errors caused by non-response and 
underreporting” (Morelli et al., 2015, p. 601). As a result, “the upper tail of the income 
distribution tends to be unsatisfactorily covered in sample surveys, unless the rich are 
oversampled and reporting errors are minimized” (Ibid.). Therefore, the literature on 
top incomes relies on data from administrative archives, including income tax records 
(Atkinson and Piketty, 2007). However, there are also data issues with income tax 
records “including the incomplete coverage of those with incomes below the tax 
threshold, inability to adjust for household size, and the tendency to underreport certain 
types of income” (Morelli et al., 2015, p. 601). Data from income tax records is based 
on market income (which excludes transfers), whereas national survey data allows 
accounting for redistribution (and household composition) as it is possible to compute 
equivalized disposable household income (DHI) after taxes and transfers. As data is 
derived from national income tax statistics, the trends in top income shares which I will 
discuss are typically based on tax-paying units. One household can include multiple tax 
units (as in the UK the tax-paying unit is the individual). Recently, scholars have begun 
to bridge the divide between top income and household income distribution data 
seeking to combine the advantages of both data sources (Jenkins, 2017).  
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Wealth inequalities are even more difficult to measure, because there are few 
wealth taxes which could provide administrative data regarding the top of the 
distribution29. Further, while estimates based on inheritance tax data provide better 
coverage of the top of the distribution, they may “be incomplete for the bottom and 
middle of the distribution” (Hills and Bastagli, 2013, p. 3). At the same time, surveys 
including the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) or the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), do not provide a complete picture of the very top of the distribution (Ibid.) In 
addition, cross-country differences in national household surveys and tax records mean 
that it is impossible to achieve full comparability across countries (Morelli et al., 2015). 
Hence, the study of the concentration of wealth is very challenging. Data sources about 
the distribution of wealth are insufficient, but “the method that infers wealth from the 
resulting income flows, the income capitalization method developed by Saez and 
Zucman (2014), produces probably the most reliable estimates we have” (Piketty, 2015, 
p. 84). Therefore, it is important to recognize that data on top wealth shares are 
estimates. Research by Alvaredo et al. (2015) show that Piketty’s findings on wealth 
inequality in the UK may have been overestimated. Further, the findings by Saez and 
Zucman (2014) show that the recent rise in US wealth inequality is higher than Piketty 
(2014) estimated. Even though progress is being made in measuring wealth inequality, 
the data are seriously incomplete and require significant investment for researchers to 
be able to draw reliable conclusions from them (Alvaredo et al., 2015; Cowell et al., 
2016). 
 
Situating the case of the UK in the international context: Gini coefficient, ratios, top 
incomes and top wealth shares 
I will now briefly situate the UK in the international context, referring to data on the 
Gini and other summary statistics of income inequality, followed by a discussion of the 
evolution of top income and wealth shares. In a literature review of inequality in rich 
and middle income countries (from 1970 until 2010/11), Morelli et al. (2015) find that 
the US and the UK, as well as Israel, are among the most unequal of the rich nations. In 
2010/11, the level of inequality as measured by the Gini was 0.33 in the UK, with 
                                                 
29 This is why in his book, Piketty (2014) presents data on wealth inequality for only four countries 
(France, Britain, Sweden and the US).   
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similar levels in Australia and Canada30. By contrast, in the Nordic (Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark and Finland) and Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg), it was between 0.23 and 0.28. These countries have the least unequal 
income distribution, as do Austria and some Eastern European nations. 
When ranked based on the S80/S20 interquartile share ratio and the P90/P10 
interdecile ratio, there are similar country rankings to that of the Gini coefficient. In the 
UK, these numbers were 5.3 and 4.0, respectively (for comparison, these numbers were 
7.9 and 6.1 in the US)31. This means that in the UK in 2010/11 the average income of a 
household situated in the top quintile was approximately 5 times higher than the 
average income of a household in the bottom quintile. At the same time, a household 
situated at the 90th percentile of the distribution had an income which was 
approximately 4 times higher than a household at the 10th percentile. The Palma Index 
(S90/S40) was 1.56 (Morelli et al., 2015), meaning that the share of income received by 
the highest decile was just over one and a half times higher than the share of income for 
the lowest 40 percent of the distribution32. Using the Palma Index, the rank order of 
countries is very similar to those obtained using more common statistics. Hence, using 
the Gini index, interquartile shares, interdecile ratios and the Palma Index, inequality in 
the early 2010s in the richest EU and OECD countries was highest in the US, Israel, 
Spain, Japan, Australia and the UK (Morelli et al., 2015). 
 Since the 1970s33, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient 
increased in most rich countries34 (Morelli et al., 2015). The US and the UK in 
particular “experienced large increases in inequality in the late 1970s and 1980s and 
modest increases in the second half of the 1990s35 [however] in both countries the level 
of inequality in 2010 was similar to the levels experienced in the early 1990s”36 (Ibid. 
                                                 
30 This data is from EU and OECD country summary statistics and rankings and refers to equivalized DHI 
(Morelli et al., 2015). 
31 This data is for equivalized DHI and from Eurostat. 
32 This data  is from Morelli et al.’s (2015) analysis of LIS project data using equivalized DHI. 
33 Atkinson (2015) demonstrates that inequality in income in the US has increased earlier. 
34 At the same time, there have been improvements in gender and ‘racial’ equality (Khan, 2008). 
35 The US had the highest levels of inequality in 1970 and in 2010; although there is substantial 
divergence in the inequality trends in Anglo-Saxon countries (US, UK, Ireland, Canada and Australia) 
(Tóth, 2014). 
36 This data is from equivalized DHI data from OECD and statistical agency data; as well as from The 
Chartbook of Economic Inequality (see Morelli et al., 2015). In other countries (including Canada, the 
Nordic countries, and Germany), inequality increases occurred later; in the 1990s and early 2000s 
(Morelli et al., 2015). 
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p. 619). On the basis of the Gini coefficient, it appears that inequality in the United 
Kingdom has levelled off since the early 1990s after substantial increases during the 
Thatcher years. However, looking at top income shares, inequality increased between 
1990-2010 (Piketty, 2014, p. 315). Looking at cross-national trends shows that despite 
40 years of mostly rising inequality, the rank ordering of countries according to their 
inequality level remains unchanged (Morelli et al., 2015). The UK is an exception 
because its distribution of income was among the least unequal countries in the mid-
1970s but moved to become one of the most unequal since the early 1990s.  
I now situate the case of the UK in the international context, focusing on top 
income shares. Research on top incomes highlights a remarkable pattern of change in 
income inequality in most rich countries (Bogliacino and Maestri, 2014). Top incomes 
“tend to increase everywhere, even where overall inequality is seen to be stable” (Tóth, 
2014, p. 12). Research by Atkinson et al. (2011) showed that over the last 30 to 40 
years, top income shares have increased substantially in Western English speaking 
countries as well as in India and China, but increases in continental European countries 
and Japan have been more modest. Top income shares in the UK have risen more 
sharply than on continental Europe between the late 1970s and 2012; though to a lesser 
extent than in the US37.  
In the UK the share of the top 1 percent in total income increased from 5.9 
percent in 1979 to 13.9 percent in 2014 (Alvaredo et al., 2017). While the share of the 
top 1 percent increased strongly throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it was about as high 
in 2014 as it was in 2000 (when it was 13.5 percent; Alvaredo et al., 2017). In the 
period following the financial crisis, top incomes shares have decreased from 15.4 to 
12.7 percent (2009-2012)38. This seems to be temporary as top income shares may 
quickly return to their expected, upward path (Morelli et al., 2015). Even a major crisis 
like the financial crisis in 2007/2008 will not reverse the increasing trend in income 
concentration at the top unless strong changes are made in the political and institutional 
                                                 
37 In most Anglo-Saxon countries, a significant portion of these gains is due to an unprecedented rise in 
top wage incomes leading to a shift towards the ‘working rich’ (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007). 
38 Recent data maybe skewed by the increasing ability of the wealthy to hide their wealth and capital 
income in tax havens (Zucman, 2015). At the same time, capital incomes may have been affected by 
lower interest rates over the period. Even though top income shares are based on pre-tax figures, net 
top income shares should have risen too due to decreases in top income marginal taxes rates 
(Bogliacino and Maestri, 2014) and because governments are less likely to be taxing capital and capital 
income (Nolan et al., 2014). 
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framework (Ibid.). Top income shares offer a better understanding of the post 1970s 
income distribution and challenge economists’ conventional explanations of rising 
inequality (Morelli et al., 2015). I will turn to these explanations in the next section, 
highlighting the contribution of my study. 
Wealth has historically been, and still is, more concentrated than income 
(Piketty, 2014). The concentration of wealth “was high in the eighteenth to nineteenth 
centuries up until the First World War, dropped during the twentieth century, but has 
been rising again in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries” (Atkinson and 
Bourguignon, 2015, p. i). Hence, the decades of low inequality after World War II were 
a historic exception. As estimated by Piketty (2014, p. 344), in 2010 in the UK the 
share of the top 1 percent of total wealth was approximately 28 percent and the share of 
the top 10 percent of wealth was approximately 70 percent, while in 1970 the 
respective figures were 23 and 64 percent. As data about the UK concentration of 
wealth after 2000 are “seriously incomplete” Alvaredo et al. (2015, p. 20), top wealth 
shares can only be approximated. More recent estimates by Alvaredo et al. (2015, p. 
19), which are also based on ‘estate-based estimates’ (official HMRC estimates using 
estate tax data), “allowing for under-statement of concentration”, “suggest that the 
share of the top 1 percent is between a fifth and a quarter of total personal wealth”. To 
sum up this section, wealth is much more concentrated than income; however, income 
inequality has increased more steeply since the 1980s than wealth inequality. 
 
Explanations for increases in wealth inequality 
There is a lot of debate about what explains the evolution of income inequality, and 
some debate about explanations for changes in wealth inequality. I will start by 
discussing the latter, followed by reasons for increasing income inequality, particularly 
at the top of the distribution. I will argue that my study contributes to the literature on 
reasons for the increase in top income shares, by focusing on ‘social norms’ and the 
cultural processes of what level of inequality is seen as acceptable. Even though 
inequalities of income and wealth feed into each other, the reasons for increasing 
wealth inequality are different from those of increasing income inequality (Piketty, 
2015).  
In Britain, wealth inequality declined dramatically from 1910-1970 and slowly 
increased again from 1980-2010. Referring to international historic data, Piketty (2014, 
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p. 15) posits that institutional changes and political shocks played important roles in the 
distribution of wealth in the past, including the effects of the World Wars and policies 
such as progressive income taxation. An important factor for studying wealth inequality 
is the relationship between r and g. Piketty (2014, p. 571) argues that the private rate of 
return on capital, r, can be significantly higher for longer periods of time than the rate 
of growth of income and output, g, and that this difference has important implications 
for wealth inequality. He terms this the central contradiction of capitalism and argues 
that this  
 
… inequality r > g implies that wealth accumulated in the past grows more rapidly than 
output and wages. This inequality expresses a fundamental logical contradiction. The 
entrepreneur inevitably tends to become a rentier, more and more dominant over those 
who own nothing but their labor. Once constituted, capital reproduces itself faster than 
output increases (Piketty, 2014, p. 571).  
 
This inequality may lead to an ‘endless inegalitarian spiral’ if no intervention such as a 
progressive annual taxation of capital is introduced (Ibid.) Piketty (2015) stresses that 
this inequality, r > g, is not the only factor relevant for the study of wealth inequality 
and that it is certainly not useful for studying inequality of labour income.  
Based on his historical analysis, Piketty (2014; 2015, p. 79) expects a high gap 
between the net of tax rate of return and the growth rate, due to “three forces”: “global 
tax competition”, “growth slow-down and technical change”, and most importantly, the 
“unequal access to high financial returns”. Piketty (2015) acknowledges that r > g as a 
tool to study changes in the distribution of wealth needs to be seen alongside 
institutional changes and political shocks. In fact, it is the interaction between the r > g 
effect and the institutional and public policy responses which are important for the 
distribution of wealth. Piketty’s analysis of wealth inequality is important because it 
highlights the tendency of wealth to concentrate and for wealth inequality to increase 
unless policies are in place to address this issue. 
 
Explanations for increases in income inequality, specifically top income shares 
I will now turn to the reasons for the recent rise in top incomes, highlighting my 
concerns with analysing the social norms of what level of inequality is acceptable to 
those at the top (Piketty, 2014, p. 331). I address the cultural processes, specifically 
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evaluative processes, such as performance pay, which participants narrate as important 
for the production of top incomes. The evolution of inequality “is shaped by the way 
economic, social, and political actors view what is just and what is not, as well as by 
the relative power of those actors and the collective choices that result” (Piketty, 2014, 
p. 36). Therefore, the views of top income earners are important; not only because they 
have disproportionate economic as well as political power (Gilens and Page, 2014; 
Nolan et al., 2014; Laurison, 2015), but also because they are in a position to determine 
others’, and in some cases even their own, high pay (Piketty, 2014, p. 330). Hence, top 
income earners influence the concentration of income, demonstrating the importance of 
studying their views on what level of inequality is acceptable.   
The literature on explanations for rising income inequality includes 
considerable debate regarding the causes of and potential remedies for inequality 
(Bogliacino and Maestri, 2014; Alvaredo et al., 2013; Atkinson, 2015). Researching the 
factors which explain variation in income inequality across countries is a major 
challenge (Tóth, 2014), and studies on the evolution of top income shares present a 
challenge for conventional explanations (Morelli et al., 2015). The literature includes 
two main strands of thought; one conventional field which focuses on neutral market 
forces and differences in productivity and another which views economic inequality as 
socially constructed resulting from political struggle and unequal power relations 
(Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015; Stiglitz, 2015a). The former is part of the mainstream 
economics literature and includes the conventional explanations for rising inequality, 
globalization and skill-biased technological change (Morelli et al., 2015). Theories 
which see inequality as socially constructed are seen as heterodox. They include the 
argument that a shift to a pro-market policy consensus based on neoliberal ideas led to 
decreases in top marginal tax rates, and taxes on wealth and inheritance, creating 
incentives for top incomes, wealth accumulation and the intergenerational transmission 
of wealth (Atkinson et al., 2011; Bogliacino and Maestri, 2014). Hence, in the 
traditional economics approach, inequality is an outcome of efficient, neutral market 
forces (Sandmo, 2015).  
Inequality, as conceptualized in this thesis, is ‘socially constructed’, and the 
result of unequal social relations and political power. Economic activity is social 
activity, based on social relations between people (Zelizer, 2012). For instance, in his 
economic analysis of slavery in the US, Piketty demonstrates that capital and what can 
be considered capital is socially and historically constructed (Savage, 2015b). In this 
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extreme case, human beings were considered to be economic capital. Piketty’s work 
challenged the value-free study of the income distribution by taking a long-run 
historical approach including politics, institutions, war and slavery. Unsurprisingly, this 
attracted quite a lot of criticism, in academia (e.g. Mankiw, 2013) as well as in the 
press39. The evolution of inequalities hence depends on how inequalities are perceived 
in societies and on the institutions and policies which are put in place to tackle them 
(Piketty, 2014). My research extends on this perspective by exploring how inequalities 
are perceived by those at the top.  
Conventional economic theories of the income distribution, skill-biased 
technological change and globalization, are based on the neoclassical theory of the 
marginal productivity of income distribution. I will briefly outline the history of 
economic thought on the income distribution, discussing the origins of this theory 
(McGoey, 2017; Stiglitz, 2015a). Highlighting that these traditional explanations do not 
accurately account for changes at the very top of the distribution (Morelli et al., 2015; 
Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015), as they cannot explain cross-country variations in top 
incomes shares, I take a relational, sociological approach and focus instead on politics, 
policies and ideology, as well as rent seeking, social norms and cultural processes.  
 
The neoclassical theory of the marginal productivity of income distribution 
In classical economics the positive study of distribution revolved around the functional 
distribution of income; rent “was the income of the landowners40” (Sandmo, 2015, p. 
11). The classical economists were quite interested in rent extraction and questioned the 
moral legitimacy of wealth accumulation (Sandmo, 2015). Marx’s labour theory of 
value, for instance, posits that the value of a commodity is determined by the socially 
necessary labour time it takes to produce it, plus surplus value. Marx argued that 
capitalists derive profits because they exploit workers through appropriating their 
surplus value (McGoey, 2017). The concern for the morality of wealth accumulation 
and the distribution of income between landowners, capitalists and workers waned with 
                                                 
39 The latter included an unfortunate critique by an FT journalist who argued that ONS survey data was 
a better representation of wealth inequality than Piketty’s data based on estate tax data (McGoey, 
2017). As Alvaredo et al. (2015, p. 19) explain “household survey data cannot be used on their own to 
investigate concentration at the top”. 
40 The income from landowners was “defined as the rental rate per unit of land times the number of 
units in the possession of the individual landowner” (Sandmo, 2015, p. 11). According to Sandmo 
(2015), the most influential theory of rent was outlined in Ricardo’s Principles (1817). 
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the marginalist revolution of the early 1870s which shifted economic theory from 
classical to neoclassical economics (Sandmo, 2015; McGoey, 2017). The ‘objective’ 
labour theory of value by Karl Marx was superseded by ‘subjective’ conceptualizations 
of the value of commodities by the neoclassical economists (McGoey, 2017) in which 
“commodities are basically worth their market price” (Fourcade, 2011, pp. 1721-1722). 
Economic theory hence conceptualizes “what people are willing to pay […] as a good 
enough indicator of the value of things”, creating the idea of money as a metric of 
worth. This idea is fundamental for analysing perceptions of the distribution of income 
and wealth as participants conceptualize top incomes as reflecting contribution, 
measured by increases in the value of capital ‘created’ (Skeggs, 2004a; 2014). 
Neoclassical theory is not value free. Theories about the income distribution are 
always entangled with morality. Skeggs (2014, p. 3) argues that there is “a slippage 
between value and values”. Historically, there has been an enmeshment between value 
which “is economic, quantifiable and can be measured [and] is primarily monetized, 
but as with education, not always” and values, which “are moral, cultural, qualitative 
and difficult to measure” (Ibid.). With reference to John Dewey’s theory of valuation, 
Skeggs (2014, p. 5) demonstrates “the ambivalence inherent in the meanings of value/s, 
for instance, praise, prize and price are all derived from the same Latin word ‘pretiare’ 
which means to value”. Skeggs’ (2003; 2014) work highlights that this enmeshment is 
reflected in liberal theory with its ideal of  
 
Mr Homo Economicus, the representation of the possessive individual of seventeenth 
century contract theory (which became the Liberal social contract), by which ‘the 
individual’ was defined through his capacity to own property in his person (Skeggs, 
2014, p. 7, emphasis in original).  
 
This entanglement between economic value and social values is reflected in the 
nineteenth century neoclassical theory of the income distribution; though it seeks to be 
value free, it takes a moral position which benefits those with top incomes and wealth 
(Skeggs, 2004a). 
In the neoclassical perspective, “differences in income are related to differences 
in the social contributions individuals and the assets that they control make” (Stiglitz, 
2015a, p. 30). John Bates Clark, a pioneer of the mariginalist revolution, created a 
theory of the marginal productivity of income distribution suggesting that the income 
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of both labourers and owners of capital “is directly proportionate to the amount of 
wealth that they create” (McGoey, 2017, p. 262). Challenging Marx’s theory of surplus 
value, Clark (1899, cited in McGoey, 2017, p. 263) argued that based on a “natural 
law”, “free competition tends to give to labor what labor creates, to capital what capital 
creates”. (McGoey, 2017, p. 263) argues that  
 
[Clark’s theory of the marginal productivity of income distribution] helped to 
indoctrinate a sentiment that has become entrenched in neoclassical theories of 
distribution since: the idea that remuneration levels are an accurate reflection of one’s 
economic contribution. 
 
Clark’s defence of the profits earned by capital owners eliminated the issue of “rent 
seeking by positing that under ideal market conditions, rent seeking cannot exist: all 
proceeds to capital owners are a natural reflection of the economic contribution they 
have made” (McGoey, 2017, p. 264). Clark’s theory is of fundamental importance for 
my thesis. Firstly, it is part of a tradition upon which the discipline of economics builds 
for their conceptualization of economic inequality. Secondly, it informs how many 
participants with top incomes and wealth perceive economic inequality. Clark’s 
theories have been criticized by other neoclassical thinkers, including Paul Samuelson 
and Joseph Schumpeter, who argued Clark was “conflating a theory of income 
distribution with a theory of morality” (McGoey, 2017, p. 265). Certainly, opponents of 
marginalism also critiqued Clark’s work and they were influential in microeconomics. 
However in macroeconomics, Clark’s contested theory continues to be taught to this 
day, influencing students41, policy makers (McGoey, 2017), economists, and how those 
with top incomes make sense of top incomes and wealth.  
 
Skill-biased technological change (and globalization) 
Two conventional explanations of rising income inequality, globalization and skill-
biased technological change, rest on neoclassical theorizations of supply and demand 
                                                 
41 For instance, Mankiw’s textbook claims “[i]f all firms in the economy are competitive and profit 
maximizing”, “then each factor of production is paid its marginal contribution to the production 
process” (2013, p. 49 quoted in McGoey, 2017,  p. 269f). Hence according to Mankiw’s framework, for 
the marginal worker, “a person’s earnings equal the value of his or her marginal productivity” (Mankiw, 
2013 cited in McGoey, 2017, p. 270). 
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and individuals’ marginal productivity (Bogliacino and Maestri, 2014). It is assumed 
that globalization, an unclear and contested concept, reduces the bargaining power of 
unskilled labour and therefore increases inequality (Bogliacino and Maestri, 2014). As 
this concept does not account for changes at the top of distribution, it is not further 
discussed. The concept of skill-biased technological change (Katz and Goldin, 2008; 
Bekman et al., 1998) is generally accepted among economists as an explanation for 
increasing wage gaps since the 1980s between more and less-educated workers in 
developed countries (Hühne and Herzer, 2017). Changes in the relative demand for 
more educated workers in the twentieth century, driven by technological change which 
is skill-biased, is argued to have increased the wages of more-educated workers. 
Specifically, the argument is focused on the interplay between skill-biased 
technological change, which increases the demand for skills, and the rate of increase in 
the supply of skills; the ‘race’ between technology and education (Katz and Goldin, 
2008). Hence, increases in wage inequality are explained by the relative skills or 
“scarce and unique talents” of those at the top, which enhanced their marginal 
productivity (Kaplan and Rauh, 2013, p. 52). Therefore, differences in income are 
argued to be resulting from the neutral market forces of supply and demand, a theme 
common in my interviews. 
The issue with skill-biased technological change is that it cannot explain the 
evolution of top income shares, and it is precisely changes at the top of the distribution 
which contributed to increases in income inequality in rich countries42 (Piketty, 2014, 
p. 313; Stiglitz, 2015b; Morelli et al., 2015). Firstly, skill-biased technological change 
does not account for capital and capital income (Atkinson, 2015). Secondly, “[t]op 
labour incomes have not risen much more rapidly than average wages simply because 
unique skills and new technology have made these workers much more productive” 
(Piketty, 2014, p. 314). This is because individuals situated at the upper end of the 
income distribution are generally highly educated, and not just those at the very top. 
Hence, education and skills cannot account for the vast wage differences between those 
at the top, and those at the very top (see Stiglitz, 2015a). Further, the skill-biased 
technological change argument is difficult to sustain given cross-national data which 
                                                 
42 Particularly in the US (Piketty, 2014). However, increases in inequality have not only occurred in top 
income shares. For instance, in the UK, the 90:10 ratio also increased in the 1980s (while top shares 
continued to rise until 2008) (Hills et al., 2010; Morelli et al., 2015). 
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demonstrates that very high wage increases at the top of the distribution are an Anglo-
Saxon phenomenon (Ibid.). This finding points towards the importance of accounting 
for cross-national differences in politics and policies, and associated cultural 
differences, and country specific social norms.  
 
Politics, policies and ideology 
Previous research demonstrates the importance of politics and policies for rising 
inequality levels since the 1980s. Policies include lowering marginal tax rates for high 
earners, reductions in taxes on capital and capital income, removal or reductions in 
inheritance tax and reductions in social policies (Nolan et al., 2014). Changes in 
taxation policy (specifically lower marginal tax rates for top incomes) are argued to 
have contributed specifically to the international rise of the income shares of the top 1 
percent. Empirical evidence for this claim demonstrates that top tax rates are strongly 
negatively correlated with the evolution of pre-tax income concentration (Alvaredo et 
al., 2013). However, commentators such as Mankiw (2013) argue that taxes can distort 
incentives, hence falling top tax rates may have stimulated entrepreneurial potential and 
the hard work of exceptionally talented individuals. In this scenario falling top tax rates 
increase both pre-tax shares at the top and overall GDP making the rise in top income 
shares both predictable and not undesirable. Alvaredo et al. (2013. p.11) acknowledge 
this supply-side argument; however they argue that a lack of correlation between cuts 
in top tax rates and growth rates in real per capita GDP across countries provides 
evidence for the story that falling top tax rates have led to rising pre-tax top incomes 
“due to increased bargaining power or more individualized pay at the top, rather than 
increased productive effort”.  
Changes in policies and tax rates are based on political changes. In the US, the 
liberal market economy with the highest increase in top income shares, inequality was 
an outcome of political change (Stiglitz, 2012; 2015b). Political changes, including 
shifts in the US Congress to the Republican Party, a decline in labour unions and lower 
tax rates on high incomes in the US contributed significantly to the increased income 
share accrued by the top 1 percent of tax units (Volscho and Kelly, 2012). This research 
which highlights the importance of politics and policies provides evidence that 
inequality is socially constructed. 
It is important to consider the ideology which underpins political changes in the 
US, including financial deregulation and large cuts in top marginal tax rates which have 
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contributed to rising income inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2013). Between the 1980s and 
2000s there has been a liberalization in many markets associated with what is termed 
‘neoliberal’ ideology (Bogliacino and Maestri, 2014). Economic and political ideology 
shifted from Keynsianism towards a laissez faire approach (Wisman, 2013). It is argued 
that the very rich increased not only their share of income and wealth, but also their 
command of ideology, because of their increased access to “more resources with which 
to influence public opinion and policy” (Ibid., p. 936). Over the three decades prior to 
2008, the dominant ideology included the core belief that increasing inequality is either 
not relevant or a necessary by-product of economic growth. The idea was that “if 
everyone is becoming materially better off, the size of shares is unimportant” (Ibid., p. 
940). This view, rooted in neoclassical economics, is relevant for my study as many 
participants refer to this idea.  
 
Rents 
Related to arguments on cross-country differences in politics and policies, Weeden and 
Grusky (2014) argue that a potential reason for vast increases in inequality in liberal 
market economies is increases in rent seeking at the top of the distribution, specifically 
occupational, educational, managerial and capital rents. Their argument challenges 
much theorizing on ‘liberal market economies’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 8), which 
argues that it is unfettered market competition in these countries which drives up 
inequality. Theorizing rents as an explanation for rising inequality requires the 
acknowledgement that inequality is the result of unequal social relations, social power, 
exploitation and political struggle (Skeggs, 2004a; Stiglitz, 2015a). In this perspective, 
high pay can result from rent seeking, in contrast to neoclassical theory where rents do 
not exist (McGoey, 2017).  
Recently, scholars have started to focus on rents as an important explanation for 
rising inequality. Social scientists have argued that a theory of and tools for measuring 
rents are necessary to understand growing inequality (Weeden and Grusky, 2014; 
Stiglitz, 2015a; Stiglitz and Kanbur, 2016; McGoey, 2017). A dominant contemporary 
definition is rent “as returns on an asset (e.g. labour) in excess of what is necessary to 
keep that asset in production in a fully competitive market” (Weeden and Grusky, 
2014, p. 474). Weeden and Grusky (2014) for instance refer to capitalist rent, defined 
as the part of capital gain which previously went to workers. Due to the absence of a 
theory on rents in neoclassical economics, it is unclear which part of capital gains is 
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rent seeking and which is not. Rents, for Stiglitz (2015a, p. 3) include “land rents, 
exploitation rents43, and rents on intellectual property”. For instance, Stiglitz argues 
that monopoly rents may have played an important role among the Forbes 100 (Ibid.). 
Another example of how rent seeking may contribute to inequality is that the highest 
paid CEOs were able to increase their executive pay beyond market efficiency (DiPrete 
et al., 2010).  
 
Social norms and cultural processes at the top of the distribution 
Taking a relational approach to top incomes, I argue that it is top earners who set pay, 
rather than the forces of supply and demand of a neutral market44 (Zelizer, 2012). 
Hence, addressing the views at the very top of the distribution by investment bankers, 
(hedge) fund managers, owners and executives of financial companies and barristers, 
are important. Many participants not only earn top incomes, but also set the top 
incomes of others based on beliefs about the economic contribution of individuals 
(Piketty, 2014, p. 23). I chose my sample because the “vast majority of top earners are 
senior managers of large firms” (Ibid.) and financial sector workers45 (Bell and Van 
Reenen, 2013), and because much of the increase in pay at the top of the US (Wójcik, 
2012) and UK income distributions is due to the financial sector and in particular 
bankers’ bonuses (Bell and Van Reenen, 2014). The financial sector is a significant 
contributor to inequality (Atkinson, 2014).  
As it is impossible to objectively measure top earners’ marginal ‘productivity’, 
i.e. their contribution to the firm’s output, due to highly imperfect available information 
(Piketty, 2014), “it is inevitable that [the remuneration and pay setting] process yields 
decisions that are largely arbitrary and dependent on hierarchical relationships and on 
the relative bargaining power of the individuals involved” (Piketty, 2014, p. 332). 
Hence, top incomes are the result of relationships and negotiations between managers, 
                                                 
43 Exploitation rents “include discrimination, taking advantage of the imperfections in corporate 
governance laws and of asymmetries in bargaining power between workers and firms, and a variety of 
forms of exploitation by the financial sector, including market manipulation, insider trading, predatory 
lending, and abusive credit card practices” Stiglitz (2015a, p. 30). 
44 Though market forces certainly have an effect on pay (Atkinson, 2015). 
45 Financial intermediaries account for the majority of the gains at the top between 1998/1999 and 
2007/08 (Bell and Van Reenen, 2013). 
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their hierarchical superiors, executives, corporate compensation committees46, staff, 
investors and other stakeholders including shareholders47 (Ibid.). These actors share an 
incentive to agree on high incomes and view their marginal productivity favourably 
(Ibid.). My interview data includes narratives of the micro-level social relations and 
negotiations, which participants explain are important for top incomes. These relations 
can be theorized as constituting the economic actions that produce top incomes 
(Bandelj, 2009; Zelizer, 2012). Top incomes result from social relations and 
negotiations; during which actors rely on shared cultural understandings of evaluation.  
The economics literature on explanations for recent rises in top incomes and 
wealth does not focus on cultural aspects even though some economists argue that 
social norms may be the ultimate driver of inequality (Piketty and Saez, 2014; see also 
Atkinson, 1997). An exception is research which addresses cultural changes away from 
set pay scales towards performance pay, particularly at the top of the distribution 
(Atkinson, 2015), which has contributed to the increase in top income shares (Lemieux 
et al., 2009; Atkinson, 2015; Angeles et al., 2016). Angeles and colleagues (2016) show 
that US multinational corporations exported US-style remuneration practices to other 
advanced economies via US multinational companies’ investments. The authors argue 
that this explains why top income shares have increased more strongly in liberal market 
economies than in corporatist countries. In the US in the 1980s and 1990s, major 
companies adopted inequality-increasing ‘meritocratic’ remuneration practices, 
including equity-based pay and performance-related bonuses (Angeles et al., 2016). 
Politically, equity-based pay was seen as a palatable way to pay high executive 
remuneration, allegedly aligning executives’ and shareholders’ interests. Remuneration 
practices were exported directly through US investments and the introduction of US-
style pay practices within the subsidiaries of US multinational companies abroad 
(Ibid.). These remuneration norms also had an indirect, spill-over effect to other (non-
US owned) companies in the same economy; increasing competition for top managers, 
                                                 
46 The creation of top incomes is also guided by country specific “corporate governance” (Piketty, 
2014). 
47 “In some companies, shareholders can vote at annual meetings whether they agree with 
compensation packages but the number of posts subject to such approval is small, and not all senior 
managers are covered” (Piketty, 2014, p. 331). Shareholders often include institutional investors 
(including financial corporations and pension funds) represented by fund managers who also earn 
comparable salaries to the executives over whose pay they vote on. Bell and Van Reenen (2013, p. 153) 
however show “that firms with a large institutional investor base provide a symmetric pay-performance 
schedule, while those with weak institutional ownership protect pay on the downside”. 
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as well as changing cultural legitimization of higher salaries (Ibid.). These effects were 
strongest in the finance sectors of affected countries (Angeles et al., 2016). My 
qualitative analysis (Chapter 4) shows that economic evaluative practices based on 
ideas of meritocracy and neutral markets (mainly performance pay and profits) are 
narrated as legitimizing extremely high pay. 
 
Cultural processes 
Even though cultural processes are mentioned by leading economists as potentially 
important explanatory factors for rising inequality (Atkinson, 1997, p. 199; 2015; 
Piketty, 2014; Piketty and Saez, 2014), they are often missing in research on 
inequalities (Lamont et al., 2014; McCall et al., 2014, although see Angeles et al., 
2016). Cultural processes are important for how participants make sense of inequality 
and provide insights into rising inequality. To address cultural processes, I turn to 
Bourdieu’s (1986; 1998; 2010 [1984]) work on how material inequality is reproduced 
and legitimized by cultural and symbolic distinction, and Fourcade (2011) and Lamont 
and colleagues’ (2014) theorization of the cultural process of (e)valuation. The 
evaluative practices48 through which participants make sense of top incomes and wealth 
are fundamentally based on economic principles, hence I refer to “economic 
[e]valuation” (Fourcade, 2011, p. 1721).  
 
The reproduction of economic inequality through cultural and symbolic distinction 
Bourdieu’s research focused on the social relations between dominant and dominated, 
hence it was not biased towards a focus on the disadvantaged. Bourdieu researched 
cultural elites (Savage and Williams, 2008) and the French political, intellectual, 
bureaucratic and economic ‘elites’ (Bourdieu, 1998). Bourdieu (1986) criticized 
economists’ exclusive focus on the distribution of material resources, which he argued 
overlooks important aspects of the reproduction of advantage. Nevertheless, he viewed 
economic capital as at the root of all other capitals (Bourdieu, 1986). Building on Marx 
and Weber, Bourdieu showed that material inequalities are legitimized by the unequal 
distribution of symbolic and cultural resources which make the unequal distribution of 
                                                 
48 Lamont (2012) distinguishes between evaluation and the related evaluative practices, such as ratings 
and rankings. 
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economic resources appear natural and based on the talents of the advantaged (see 
Khan, 2008; 2011). Therefore, Bourdieu’s theories are helpful for analysing how 
‘elites’ make sense of their economic advantage.  
 Material inequality in Bourdieu’s framework is reproduced and made sense of 
through classed cultural and symbolic capital. Bourdieu’s conceptualization of class “is 
based on ‘capital’ movements through social space” (Skeggs, 1997, p. 8). The social 
space is “historically generated” and structured “by the distribution of various forms of 
‘capital[49]’” (Ibid.). Arbitrarily distributed economic, cultural and social50 capital, 
legitimized by symbolic capital, reproduce structural class differences (Bourdieu, 1998; 
2010 [1984]). Cultural capital is ‘embodied’, objectified and institutionalized in various 
ways that make class hierarchies seem ‘natural’; legitimized by symbolic capital as a 
form of power. Bourdieu (1986, p. 49) explains that cultural capital  
 
… manages to combine the prestige of innate property with the merits of acquisition. 
Because the social conditions of its transmission and acquisition are more disguised than 
those of economic capital, it is predisposed to function as symbolic capital, i.e., to be 
unrecognized as capital and recognized as legitimate competence, as authority exerting 
an effect of (mis)recognition.  
 
Hence, cultural capital functions as symbolic capital. The same applies to social51 and 
economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Skeggs, 1997). Symbolic capital “is the form the 
different types of capital take once they are perceived and recognized as legitimate” 
(Skeggs, 2004a, pp. 16-17). The acquisition and accumulation of capitals is facilitated 
and legitimized by ‘symbolic’ capital. Symbolic capital is, in effect, ‘power’ based on 
capital; however symbolic capital is not recognized as capital but as a legitimate 
demand for recognition, thereby disguising economic and political interests and 
legitimizing the unequal distribution of resources52 (Bourdieu, 1986). This process is 
theorized as misrecognition by Bourdieu. Building on Bourdieu, Khan (2008) 
                                                 
49 Building on Marx, Bourdieu (1986, p. 46) argues that “[c]apital is accumulated labour (in its 
materialized form or its ‘incorporated’, embodied form)”. 
50 Social capital is “linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Ibid., p. 51) and includes ‘the old boys’ network 
and titles of nobility. 
51 Bourdieu (1986, p. 46) asserted: “It goes without saying that social capital is so totally governed by 
the logic of knowledge and acknowledgement that it always functions as symbolic capital”. 
52 Note: The accumulation and conversion of capital takes time (Bourdieu, 1986). 
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concluded that misrecognition (re)produces ‘elite’ privilege. A focus on meritocracy 
(Khan, 2011; Sherman, 2017a) allows ‘elites’ to explain their positions of advantage 
through hard work and their perceived talents. Khan (2012b, p. 480) argues “what 
‘groups’ [‘elites’] is the fact that they have worked hard and gotten ahead; they are the 
cream that has risen to the top. And by embracing this rather than a class narrative, 
elites think of themselves as meritocrats”. Many of my participants similarly argue that 
top incomes are meritocratic.  
 
The cultural process of evaluation 
The specific cultural process which is fundamental for how those with top incomes 
make sense of top incomes is evaluation. Based on my interview data, I will argue that 
participants’ perceptions of top incomes are closely related to how they perceive the 
production of top incomes; specifically, the evaluative practices which determine top 
incomes. These practices, which include performance pay, are narrated as meritocratic 
because they are viewed as resulting from neutral, efficient markets, as in neoclassical 
economic theory of the marginal distribution of income (McGoey, 2017). As discussed, 
in this theory, economic reward reflects social contribution. My study addresses 
whether this logic extends to top incomes and wealth, i.e. whether the remuneration of 
‘supermanagers’ (Piketty, 2014, p. 264) or CEOs (DiPrete et al., 2010) is seen a 
reflection of their economic value or their ability to ‘seek rent’ (Weeden and Grusky, 
2014). This is the subject of intense debate in the social sciences. I find that a majority 
of participants view top incomes as resulting from the creation of economic value; 
however, a minority applies different evaluative criteria of social worth and societal 
contribution. The latter question the legitimacy of economic evaluative processes which 
produce top incomes.  
Many participants explain that “the market” determines top incomes based on 
merit. The market is conceptualized as a benevolent force. According to sociologists 
Fourcade and Healy (2007 p. 286), “[e]conomists need no convincing that competitive 
markets constitute the best possible arrangement for the satisfaction of individual needs 
and the efficient allocation of resources”. These views are based on much earlier 
arguments by Adam Smith and Leon Walras, respectively (Ibid.). Economic theory, 
formalized by neoclassical thinking, includes implicit moral assumptions (Fourcade 
and Healy, 2007; Skeggs, 2004a). Economic discourse and narratives of many 
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participants includes “praise for the moral benefits of market society” (Fourcade and 
Healy 2007, p. 287). Markets are seen as producing economic and social harmony 
(Adam Smith), provide personal and political freedom (Hayek), limit economic 
inequality (Kuznets, 1955) and to unleash creativity by offering incentives for 
innovation (Schumpeterian creative destruction) (Fourcade and Healy, 2007). Fourcade 
and Healy (2007, p. 286) term this “the liberal dream” which is in contrast to the 
Marxist view of “destructive markets” (Fourcade and Healy, 2007, p. 299f). It is 
important to point out however, that many contemporary economists in the field of 
distribution have challenged the idea that market forces lead to a reduction in inequality 
and emphasised the importance of politics, policies and the role of the state (e.g. 
Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015; De Agostini et al., 2017).  
Due to strong beliefs in market outcomes, only 48 percent of participants agree 
with the statement that it is the government’s responsibility to reduce income difference 
between the rich and the poor (compared to 69 percent of the general population). 
However, a slight majority (55 percent) agrees that the government should redistribute 
income from the better-off to those who are less well off (compared to just 41 percent 
of the general population), demonstrating that there is some acknowledgement of the 
role of the state to intervene and reduce gross income inequality. The writing by social 
scientists (e.g. Hall and Lamont, 2013) who have pointed out that our current period is 
marked by a “neoliberal” perspective which includes the centrality of market 
mechanisms, the privatization of risk and the emphasis on self-reliance (and associated 
explicit moral  evaluations) is crucial for understanding participants narratives of top 
incomes. 
Evaluation and other cultural processes are “ongoing classifying 
representations/practices” which operate “in micro-level interactions between actors 
through the application of meso-level scripts and frames, [but are] also instantiated at 
the meso-level through the practices of organizations, firms and institutions” (Lamont 
et al., 2014, pp. 14; 22), in my case the hedge funds, investment firms, asset managers 
and barristers’ chambers where participants work. A focus on economic evaluation 
shifts attention away from an individualized approach and towards social relations 
(Zelizer, 2012). Evaluation, “the negotiation, definition and stabilization of value in 
social life”, “involves several important sub-processes, most importantly categorization 
[…] and legitimation” (Lamont et al., 2014, p. 21). Evaluation requires categorization 
and may also involve legitimation. These sub-processes are “difficult to differentiate” 
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(Lamont, 2012, p. 21.6); participants’ narratives of categorization are often enmeshed 
with legitimation.  
Evaluation, together with standardization, is part of the wider cultural process of 
rationalization. Rationalization as a sociological concept was developed by Weber 
(2003 [1905]) who viewed modernization and the rise of capitalism as based on the 
emergence of ‘rational’ principles. These were “intended to maximize efficiency” and 
“generally perceived as ‘neutral’ and ‘fair’ (based on merit)” (Lamont et al., 2014, p. 
19). Weber was writing after the second industrial revolution, at a time of rapid 
modernization, with economic growth rates exceeding 1 percent in Western Europe, 
higher than they had ever been previously (Piketty, 2014, p. 85).  
Almost a century later, Bourdieu (1998, p. 387) critiqued Weber’s conception 
of rationalization and merged it with Freud’s, asserting that “while there is progress in 
“rationalization,” it is in the sense of Freud, more than Weber; the mechanisms that 
tend to “rationalize” practices and institutions, by layering them with justifications 
likely to conceal their arbitrariness, become increasingly effective”. Therefore, 
Bourdieu saw virtue in combining the sociological concept of rationalization with 
Freud’s psychoanalytical conceptualization, which refers to “an ex post facto 
mechanism invoked after an action to hide the secret, unconscious, unacceptable, 
unknown but ‘real’ motive” (Cohen, 2000, p. 58). Specifically, Bourdieu (1998) 
conceptualized rationalization as a sociological, cultural process which reproduces but 
also legitimates inequality in a psychoanalytical sense (Lamont et al., 2014). Following 
Bourdieu (1998), I conceptualize rationalization as a cultural process which reproduces 
and generally legitimizes inequality (Lamont et al., 2014). Participants’ narratives 
include that top incomes are the result of rational, evaluative processes used to assess 
the economic contribution of individuals. I view these evaluative processes as ‘rational’ 
in the Weberian sense, but simultaneously as ‘rationalizing’ top incomes in the 
Freudian sense, because the process is perceived as based on neutral and fair principles. 
I show that the evaluative process of how economic value is assigned to 
individuals is classed, ‘racialized’ and gendered (Bourdieu, 1998; Skeggs, 2004a). In 
this respect, I highlight the significance of private schooling for top incomes in the City 
of London because of the “confidence” it provides. Participants make sense of top 
incomes based on their experiences of the evaluative processes which produces them, 
and via cultural distinctions based on misrecognition (Bourdieu, 1986; 1998; 2010 
[1984]).  
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The experience of economic inequality at the top needs to be analysed by 
considering individuals’ struggle for and the total volume and composition of the 
various forms of capital. Savage (2014, p. 600) argues that “all agents, differentially 
positioned within society, develop sensible (in their own terms) strategies to secure and 
advance their position”. This requires researching perceptions from their point of view. 
As Savage shows, this framing allows an understanding of ‘elite thriving’ in a highly 
unequal environment where agents are theorized as sensibly striving to accumulate 
economic as well as cultural, social and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986; 1998; 2010 
[1984]). Even though Bourdieu did not engage with social psychological theory 
(Lamont et al., 2014), his work on capitals illuminates micro-level perceptions. 
Participants’ perceptions of economic inequality are shaped by their own history of 
accumulation as well as their aspirations for future accumulation and need to be 
analysed in the context of the history and future aspirations of their family, friends and 
colleagues. This framing means that ‘elite’ struggle for economic capital is a necessary 
part of the analysis. However, focusing solely on economic aspects would be limited. 
Participants also strive for social relationships, cultural and symbolic capital. 
Specifically, I take seriously “desires for moral worth and legitimacy in an unequal 
world” (Sherman, 2016, p. 30). 
Piketty and Bourdieu respectively focus on the accumulation of economic and 
cultural capital rather than on exploitation (Savage, 2014). The advantage of this 
approach is that it facilitates nuanced empirical investigations of ‘elites’ and recognizes 
longer term processes. ‘Elite’ accumulation strategies can nevertheless produce 
structural inequalities (Ibid.) and exploitation (Skeggs, 2004a). The disadvantage of 
focusing on accumulation is that potentially exploitative effects of ‘elite’ accumulation 
strategies remain unaddressed. Specifically, I did not research how the financial 
companies which facilitate the top incomes and wealth of my participants derive 
economic value from their global supply chains (Bear, 2015) and how the finance 
industry, whose primary purpose is facilitating the accumulation of economic capital, 
increases inequality (Atkinson, 2014). These are limitations of focusing on 
accumulation. However, as my study concerns perceptions of economic inequality, this 
approach is justified. 
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Perceptions of top incomes and wealth: Reference group theory and relative 
deprivation 
I now turn to my main concerns: how attention to cultural processes and social 
comparisons with others are important for how inequality is perceived. Following Reis 
and Moore (2005), perceptions are a combination of “evaluative and non-evaluative 
understandings of a situation”. The latter refers to cognitions while evaluative 
understandings include “norms (internalized ideas about appropriate roles); and values 
(ideals about what might be)” (Ibid. p. 3). “Thus, to look for elite perceptions about 
[inequality] is to search for the cognitive and normative views those at the top hold” 
(Reis, 2005, p. 31). I focus on the social norms and values (perceptions) of economic 
inequality; however I also analysed opinions, or attitudes towards economic inequality 
to complement my analysis. As discussed, evaluation is a cultural process, hence 
cultural processes are important for perceptions.  
Perceptions of inequality are relational; top incomes and wealth are produced 
and made sense of in the context of social relations and social comparisons with others. 
A focus on the social relations, interactions and comparisons which those at the top 
make in the context of vast inequality helps to explain how they make sense of top 
incomes and wealth. Therefore, distributional analyses which highlight vast economic 
inequality at the top are fundamental (Hills and Bastagli, 2013; Piketty, 2014; Morelli 
et al., 2015). The theoretical tools I turn to are reference group theory (Merton, 1968) 
and the related concept of relative deprivation (Stouffer, 1949; Runciman, 1966). The 
social psychological theory of relative deprivation has largely been abandoned by 
sociologists as the theory is often seen as too psychological and drawing away attention 
from structural factors (Pettigrew, 2015). I nevertheless build on this theory because 
social comparisons with reference groups are useful for my study because perceptions 
of economic inequality are influenced by our available comparisons (Irwin, 2015).  
 
Reference group theory, relative deprivation and attitudes to social inequality  
In an influential sociological study on attitudes to social inequality, Runciman (1966) 
found that individuals in twentieth century England tended to make comparisons with 
people similar to themselves and therefore do not appreciate the full income range and 
the extent of inequality (Rose, 2006). Runciman applied reference group theory and a 
related social-psychological concept, ‘relative deprivation’. Stouffer (1949) introduced 
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this concept in his empirical study of American soldiers. He argued that relative 
deprivation explained why soldiers in units with slow promotions were more satisfied 
than those in units with rapid promotions; as satisfaction is relative to the comparisons 
available to us (Stouffer, 1949; Pettigrew, 2015). Merton (1968) built on Stouffer to 
conceptualize a theory of reference groups which posits that reference groups provide a 
frame of comparison through which people evaluate themselves and others and that we 
compare ourselves to others who are similar to us on some dimension (Merton, 1968; 
Pettigrew, 2015). Runciman (1966, p. 11) defined relative deprivation as follows:  
 
A is relatively deprived of X when (1) [s/]he does not have X, (2) [s/]he sees some other 
person or persons, which may include [herself or] himself at some previous or expected 
time, as having X (whether or not this is or will be in fact the case), (3) [s/]he wants X, 
and (4) [s/]he sees it as feasible that [they] should have X. Possession of X may, of 
course, mean avoidance of or exemption from Y.  
 
Relative deprivation therefore requires comparison. Runciman (1966) argued that 
relative deprivation is limited when the comparative reference group of an individual is 
the same or similar to their membership group. Examining levels of income 
satisfaction, his survey found little evidence of relative deprivation because individuals 
used a restricted range of reference groups with which they compared themselves 
(Rose, 2006). For instance, a retired labourer compared himself with other labourers 
who retired later and therefore had a higher pension (Runciman, 1966, p. 199). 
Runciman assumed that the most important reference groups are social classes; 
therefore his study took a macro-sociological approach, focusing on the manual versus 
non-manual divide (Rose, 2006). By contrast, I apply this theory to the top of the 
distribution, taking into account changes in inequality levels in the UK.  
 
Relative (dis)advantage and economic concentration within the top 1 percent 
There is vast economic inequality at the top of the income distribution with stark 
internal differentiation among those with top incomes and wealth (Savage, 2014; 
Piketty, 2014, p. 319). Given that distributional analyses show that there is a lot of 
variation among top income earners, and the rich more generally, this means that the 
person or group of comparison (their comparative reference group) may be very 
different in economic terms compared to themselves. Hence, assuming that participants 
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compare themselves with others at the top, we would expect that they engage in social 
comparisons with others who are vastly dissimilar in economic terms.  
Building on the social psychological concept of ‘relative deprivation’ (Stouffer, 
1949; Runciman, 1966) and research on economic inequality at the top, I propose that 
top income earners experience relative deprivation when they compare themselves to 
others at the top who are economically even more advantaged. As the concept is 
adapted to the specific case of those who are most economically advantaged, I term it 
‘relative disadvantage’ because the term ‘relative deprivation’ would be inappropriate. 
While Runciman was concerned with limited relative deprivation among the working 
class as explaining how inequalities can be sustained, I focus on relative disadvantage 
among the rich as a potential driver of economic inequality at the top of the 
distribution. My focus reflects changes in the structure of class and inequality in the 
UK since Runciman’s (1966) study.  
I conceptualize relative disadvantage as follows. Top income earners are in 
social contact with, or aware of others who are likewise situated at the top. In their 
daily lives, they are surrounded by vast absolute income inequality because the 
differences between top income earners are much higher than those between 
individuals situated in the middle of distribution. For illustration, in 2010, the average 
income in the UK (gross before tax) among the top 1 percent, the top 0.5 percent and 
the top 0.1 percent of income earners was £267k, £392k and £990k, respectively 
(Figure 1.1). This compares to an average income of £15k for adults situated in the 
bottom 90 percent of the income distribution (figures from Alvaredo et al., 2015). The 
implication is that the incomes of the top 1 percent are more dispersed, and increasingly 
so, compared to the rest of society.  
Assuming that people compare themselves to a reference group of individuals in 
similar social positions, I expected that participants experience relative disadvantage 
compared to others in the top 1 percent of the income distribution due to vast absolute 
differences at the top. In their social world, for instance at work or among their 
friendship groups, participants at the top are in regular contact with economically-
distant others. I will provide an example using income cut-offs to illustrate this. A 
junior investment banker earning £120k pounds (in 2012), whose income is just within 
the 1 percent of the distribution in the UK, might work for someone whose income is 
£400k pounds and therefore close to being within the top 0.1 percent (Alvaredo et al., 
2016). The absolute difference of £280k pounds may give rise to a feeling of relative 
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disadvantage for the less highly paid person, even though that person is highly 
advantaged too. The same principle applies for wealth inequality at the top. 
 
Figure 1.1 Average UK adult income by income group 
 
Data source: The World Wealth & Incomes Database by Alvaredo et al. (2017). Data inflation 
adjusted using the UK ONS CPI. Note: This graph highlights the fall in real incomes of the top 
0.1, 0.5 and 1 percent between 2005 and 2010 (after the 2007–2008 financial crisis). 
 
The concept of relative deprivation was originated to denote “feelings of 
deprivation relative to others” in one’s comparative reference group (Runciman, 1966; 
Lister, 2004, p. 22). However, Townsend (1979, pp. 47-48) argued in his work on 
poverty that relative deprivation should instead refer to “conditions of deprivation 
relative to others”, stressing the ‘objective’ aspect of the concept (Lister, 2004, p. 22). 
Therefore, I argue that top income earners experience feelings of relative disadvantage 
when they compare themselves to others in their reference group, but they are also 
disadvantaged in their material condition relative to those who earn more or are richer 
than them, due to the vast absolute differences among the 1 percent. I view the concepts 
of advantage and disadvantage (like poverty and deprivation) not as ‘absolute’, but as 
inherently relative because their conceptualization is socially, culturally and historically 
conditioned (Townsend, 1979; Lister, 2004).  
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Participants are aware of the vast and increasing fragmentation at the top of the 
income and wealth distributions and experience relative disadvantage (in contrast to 
Runciman’s (1966) survey of the general population in the 1960s). Nevertheless, 
participants are also aware that they are advantaged compared to what they call “the 
[person] on the street” or “the average person”. Therefore, I argue that participants 
experience ‘relative (dis)advantage’; relative advantage compared to the general 
population alongside relative disadvantage compared to others at the top. Hence the 
experience of relative disadvantage is mediated by an awareness of personal advantage 
and social inequalities. The experience of relative disadvantage is shaped not only by 
an individual’s position in the distribution of income, but also by their position in the 
distribution of wealth. This has important implications for the literature on attitudes 
towards economic inequality which generally only focuses on income. Gender and 
age53 are important for the experience of relative (dis)advantage. Relative 
(dis)advantage is useful for explaining why participants overestimate inequality: this is 
due to the vast inequality around them. Further, only one-third of participants explain 
that top income shares should be lower and that there is something to be done about 
inequality. These findings are in line with Chin’s  (2015) work in the US.  
Relative (dis)advantage may explain changes in social norms and reinforce 
economic inequality at the top. Specifically, the experience of relative disadvantage 
may constitute a driver of economic inequality at the top, because individuals strive for 
further ‘accumulation’ (Savage, 2014) as a result of social comparisons. For instance, 
my data shows that the experience of inequality at the top is narrated as a highly 
‘relative’ dynamic; specifically, high incomes and richness are described as relative to a 
person’s social circle, life and career stage, aspirations and, crucially, to where they 
live. Participants refer to the vast inequality in London and its exorbitant property 
prices as skewing perceptions of what it means to have a high income or to be a rich 
family. As a high income and richness is narrated as relative; I develop a relative 
definition of richness akin to a relative definition of poverty. 
While Runciman (1966) saw economic inequality as sustainable because limited 
relative deprivation meant that there was limited awareness of inequality, Bourdieu 
acknowledged that individuals are aware of social inequalities. However, for Bourdieu 
                                                 
53 I acknowledge that age and wealth are of course related (Cowell et al., 2016). 
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(2010 [1984]), inequalities are sustainable because they appear to be the natural result 
of perceived differences in competence between different social classes. My findings 
are in line with Bourdieu; those at the top are aware of vast inequality (McCall and 
Chin, 2013; Page et al., 2013); in fact they tend to overestimate inequality (Chin, 2014) 
due to economically wide-ranging social comparisons. Therefore, studying how 
differences in income are culturally legitimated is important. It is not enough to rely on 
an analysis of micro-level social comparison processes to study how those at the top 
make sense of inequality; cultural processes are also important (Lamont et al., 2014).  
Social comparisons are not made in a cultural vacuum; actors rely on culturally-
shared evaluative criteria. Considering cultural processes is important to avoid moving 
“directly from intra-individual cognitive processes to macro-level patterns of inequality 
with insufficient consideration of, or analytic precision regarding, what lies between 
those levels” (Lamont et al., 2014, p. 8). Although reference groups frame how people 
evaluate themselves, we need to consider cultural processes to understand on what 
basis they evaluate themselves. What is the measuring rod used for evaluation, and are 
income and wealth even relevant? Top earners make sense of the unequal distribution 
of economic resources not only by comparisons with others, but also by relying on 
culturally-shared evaluative criteria. 
 
Attitudes towards economic inequality 
The literature on attitudes towards economic inequality and policies to address 
inequality is generally based on quantitative surveys, relying on data sources which 
include the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey, the European Social Survey (ESS), 
the World Values Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP); there are few qualitative studies (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007b). While there is 
a rich comparative literature on attitudes towards inequality and redistribution, due to 
space constraints, these studies will not be discussed here (Svallfors, 1997; Tóth et al., 
2011; 2014; Tóth, 2014). Additionally, although there is some research which 
investigates how the general public views high incomes and the rich (Dean and 
Melrose, 1999; Bamfield and Horton, 2009; Orton and Rowlingson, 2011; McCall, 
2013), there are very few studies which address how those at the top of the distribution 
view economic inequality, specifically as measured by top incomes and wealth 
(Sherman, 2017; Chin, 2014, respectively). Further, the literature on attitudes towards 
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inequality focuses on the distribution of income, and rarely addresses wealth inequality 
(Orton and Rowlingson, 2007b). Therefore, my research adds substantially to the field 
by qualitatively and quantitatively exploring top income earners’ attitudes towards 
income and wealth inequality, as well as policies to tackle inequality.  
 
General attitudes towards economic inequality 
Research on attitudes towards economic inequality in the UK shows that a clear 
majority indicates that the gap between those with high incomes and those with low 
incomes is “too large”. However, those on higher incomes are significantly less likely 
to believe this54 (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007b). In 2012, 82 percent of respondents 
stated that the gap is too large, with just 14 percent agreeing that the gap is “about 
right” (Pearce and Taylor, 2013, p. 40). This figure increased from 75 percent in 2008 
and 2010, possibly due to “well-publicised cases of bankers’ bonuses and big increases 
in chief executive remuneration packages in recent years” (Ibid.). In 1987 (when 
inequality as measured by top income shares was still lower), 79 percent of the 
population indicated that the gap between those on high and low incomes is too large.  
 Nationally-representative studies including the BSA only allow comparisons of 
income decile groups, and do not have enough respondents to allow for a more granular 
investigation at the very top of the distribution. Hence, I refer to McCall and Chin 
(2013) who draw on SESA (Study of Economically Successful Americans) data. The 
authors found that the differences between the general public and the top 1 percent 
were particularly strong regarding preferences for levels of earnings inequality. Critical 
perceptions of earnings inequality, income inequality and economic opportunity are 
greater among the US public than is commonly assumed and are heightened relative to 
the top 1 percent (residing in the Chicago area). My research also finds that top income 
earners are less likely than the general population to indicate that the gap between the 
rich and poor is too large. 
 
                                                 
54 Orton and Rowlingson (2007b) cite data from 2012 which shows that in the UK, 74 percent of 
respondents with household income £38,000 or higher indicated that the gap between those with high 
and those with low incomes is too great, compared to 86 percent of those with household income 
£20,000–£37,999. 
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Attitudes towards tackling economic inequality (redistribution) 
Attitudes towards government redistribution do not mirror concerns about the income 
gap among the UK population (Rowlingson et al., 2012). Data from the BSA shows 
that the percentage of those who support redistribution is smaller than the percentage of 
those who perceive the income gap as too large. BSA data from 2012 shows that while 
a majority of 82 percent views the gap between those on high incomes and those on 
low income as too large only 41 percent support redistribution (Pearce and Taylor, 
2013). Rowlingson et al. (2012) explain that this discrepancy may be due to self-
interest, beliefs about the causes of inequality (for instance the idea that hard work 
leads to success) or the possibility that people support other ways of reducing 
inequality rather than redistribution. For instance, the public may wish to see a more 
equal, fair distribution of market incomes. My interview findings show that the 
question of whether it is the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences 
was generally interpreted as a question about “market incomes” rather than 
redistribution. I found that participants are less likely to agree with this question than 
the general population, possibly due to strong beliefs in markets. 
Most empirical studies find that higher income individuals are less likely to 
agree that it is the government’s responsibility to reduce incomes differences and that 
they prefer less redistribution (Tóth et al., 2014). For instance, data from the ESS 
(2012) showed that those in the highest income decile group in the UK are half as 
likely as respondents in the lowest decile group to agree or strongly agree that the 
government should reduce differences in income levels. Rowlingson et al. (2012) show 
that in 2009, 48 percent of those in the lowest quartile group agreed with this question, 
whereas only 28 percent of those in the highest quartile group did so. There is no data 
available regarding how the top 1 percent perceives redistribution of income (let alone 
wealth) or of attitudes towards wealth distribution in the UK, but SESA data by Page et 
al. (2013) show that the wealthiest 1 percent in the US are much less likely than the 
general public55 to agree with the statement “Our government should redistribute 
wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (17 percent compared to 52 percent respectively). 
Further, in line with my findings, the wealthiest in Page and colleagues’ study were 
                                                 
55 Page et al. (2013) take Gallup 3/09 data to compare their data on the wealthiest 1 percent with data 
about the general public. 
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also less likely to agree that it is the government’s responsibility to reduce differences 
in incomes (87 percent disagreed with this statement). However, while most studies 
find that higher earning, and wealthier individuals are less likely to favour 
redistribution than others, my study does not find this. 
 
Explaining attitudes: Self-interest and underlying values 
Research on attitudes towards economic inequality needs to focus on the underlying 
drivers of what motivates attitudes. One of the debates on underlying attitudes towards 
(tackling) economic inequality is the role of self-interest compared to underlying values 
(Orton and Rowlingson, 2007b). Theories based on self-interest as a key driver are 
popular in economics whereby people are expected to support redistribution if they 
personally benefit (Ibid.). Under the assumption that individuals are rational, self-
interested individuals, this theory posits that individuals assess their current situation, 
but also expectations about their future material position to decide on their preferences 
towards redistribution (Tóth et al., 2014). Findings from the BSA and empirical studies 
which show that those with the highest incomes are less likely to be in favour of 
redistribution seem to confirm this (Ibid.). A multivariate study by Tóth et al. (2011, p. 
7) found that redistributive preference “while mostly derived from rational self-interest 
(material position, labour market status, expected mobility), is also driven by general 
attitudes about the role of personal responsibility in one’s own fate and by general 
beliefs about causes of poverty and the like”. Hence, income is not the sole decisive 
factor56 (Ibid.). On the contrary, Sefton (2005) argued that values and beliefs about 
inequality are more important than material self-interest57. In sum, these studies suggest 
that attitudes towards redistribution result from a combination of factors, including self-
interest, values and beliefs (Tóth et al., 2014; Rowlingson et al., 2012). 
An issue with the self-interest argument is that it assumes that individuals have 
a good awareness of the extent of overall inequality and their position in the income 
and wealth distributions. However, BSA survey research found that knowledge about 
                                                 
56 As is assumed in the political science Meltzer–Richard model, which argues that as inequality rises 
(and average income moves away from median income) demand for redistribution increases as it will 
be in the interest of the median voter (Tóth et al., 2014).  
57 Specifically, Sefton distinguished between Samaritans, Club Members and Robinson Crusoes. 
Samaritans held the most collectivist views and were most likely to support redistribution, whereas 
Robinson Crusoes held the most individualist views and were least likely to support redistribution. 
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income inequality, the tax system and its redistributive impact is limited among the 
general population (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007b). People’s perceptions of inequality 
may not be accurate (Tóth et al., 2014). Research by Gimpelson and Treisman (2015) 
claims that inequality is misperceived by the general population, arguing that it is the 
perceived level of inequality, rather than the actual level which correlates strongly with 
demands for redistribution. Consequently, both knowledge and perceptions of 
inequality may be distributed unevenly across segments of the income and wealth 
distributions. Comparing US survey data, McCall and Chin (2013, p. 17) found that the 
top 1 percent of income earners were more informed about pay, and disparities in pay, 
than the general public “yet this knowledge will not necessarily translate into more 
critical views about income inequality” because this group might be influenced by a 
material interest in maintaining their current position. Related to this, I find that 
participants actually overestimate inequality, and perceive inequalities as positive, as a 
driver to do better.  
Attitudes towards redistribution are not only shaped by self-interest but also by 
underlying values and social background. Piketty (1995, pp. 552-553) referred to data 
showing that “parents’ income class determines one’s political attitudes almost as much 
as one’s current income, whereas straight economic rationality should imply that only 
current income and not past family income should determine one’s interests in 
redistribution”. Further, the concept of self-interest as the main driver of attitudes 
towards redistribution is limited because some people on high incomes still support 
redistribution. For instance, Bromley (2003) argues that those on high incomes may 
favour redistribution as they view inequality as a problem for altruistic reasons.  
Views about the causes of inequality are strongly related to whether or not 
people support redistribution (Rowlingson et al., 2012). For instance, individuals who 
have been economically successful might attribute their success to their experience of 
hard work. Furnham (1982, cited in Orton and Rowlingson, 2007b, p. 38) found that 
“people who score highly on attitude scales measuring the ‘Protestant Work Ethic’ tend 
to be much less supportive of welfare benefits and less sympathetic to people who 
receive them”. Orton and Rowlingson (2007b) found that those who believe that hard 
work leads to success are less supportive of redistribution, because attitudes towards 
inequality and redistribution are affected by beliefs about the importance of birth, luck 
and effort. My research replicates this finding for those with top incomes.  
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In the US, the differences between the general public and the top 1 percent were 
particularly strong regarding awareness of constraints towards economic opportunity: 
“only 1 percent of the top 1 percent believes that coming from a wealthy family is very 
important for getting ahead, whereas 20 to 30 percent of the public believe this” 
(McCall and Chin, 2013). Rowlingson et al. (2012, p. 15) found that the most common 
answer to whether some people have higher incomes than others was that they “work 
hard” (47 percent), and that those in the highest income quartile group were slightly 
more likely to share this view (53 percent). My participants were even more likely to 
indicate that “hard work” is important for high incomes (two-thirds did so). Less than 1 
in 10 of BSA participants attribute high incomes to structural explanations (injustice); 
and those who do are more likely to support redistribution (56 percent). The impact of 
beliefs about the causes of inequality, specifically whether high incomes are seen as 
meritocratic, is evident in my data.  
Judgments of the fairness of economic outcomes are important for researching 
attitudes towards redistribution. Bamfield and Horton (2009, p. 5) qualitatively 
explored “three concepts which seem relevant to people’s judgment of fairness in 
economic outcomes and welfare policy: need, desert (i.e. how deserved someone is) 
and entitlement”. To this end they conducted focus groups in addition to opinion 
surveys which were selected to be representative of the population. They found that 
attitudes towards inequality were expressed within the context of a belief in fair 
inequality on the basis of ‘desert’. Pay differentials were viewed as reflecting a 
hierarchy in talent and ability and considered to be necessary to incentivize hard work. 
Similarly, a majority of my participants’ narratives are in line with this finding. 
Attitudes towards the justification of high incomes were even more favourable than 
what would be expected based on this idea of fair inequality. Bamfield and Horton 
(2009, p. 5f) argue that this is due to “misperceptions of the existing income 
distribution (leading people to view high salaries as more ‘usual’ than they were)” and 
“cognitive ‘coping strategies’ whereby participants would invent or exaggerate the 
virtues (and therefore desert) of those with high incomes in order to justify existing 
inequalities”. Bamfield and Horton also argue that at other times, participants raise “the 
belief that inequality was inevitable in order to avoid considering questions of fairness” 
(Ibid.). Further, the authors found that it was the ‘super-rich’ rather than ‘the rich’ who 
attracted most condemnation; even more so after the onset of the recent financial crisis. 
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The importance of beliefs in meritocracy, and the tendency to think that higher incomes 
are more common than they are was replicated in my interview and survey data.  
 
Explaining attitudes: Subjective self-placement 
Where individuals see themselves and how they judge their position in society (or 
within the economic distribution) will shape their attitudes towards economic 
inequality. Subjective social location, also referred to as subjective social status (Evans 
and Kelley, 2004), is therefore important for this research. Subjective social location is 
expected to be influenced by comparisons with reference groups. Evans and Kelley 
(2004)  analysed survey data from 21 countries and observed a tendency for individuals 
to see themselves as being in the middle of the social hierarchy in all societies under 
study. This phenomenon is also evident in data from the ISSP (2009) which indicated 
that respondents from all backgrounds tend to see themselves towards the middle of 
society. This finding was replicated in qualitative work by Bamfield and Horton (2009) 
who found that their participants viewed themselves as ‘in the middle’, regardless of 
their own position, which suggests ‘dis-identification’ with the actual distribution. 
Correspondingly, Dean and Melrose (1999) identified an ‘othering of riches’ in their 
qualitative research, as even privileged respondents tend to position themselves as ‘in 
the middle’. In relation to ambivalent class identities, Savage et al. (2010) and Savage 
(2015c) found a similar phenomenon. Middle-class respondents tend to stress their 
‘ordinariness’. Hence, people tend to situate themselves in the middle of the social 
hierarchy, in line with reference group theory.  
The ‘reference group hypothesis’ is a special case of the ‘availability heuristic’ 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973); the tendency to build one’s image of the larger society 
by generalizing from one’s own experience (Evans and Kelley, 2004). The core idea of 
‘availability bias’ is that the homogeneity of our reference groups (the similarity among 
our family and friends in education, occupation and income) results in a distorted 
‘subjective sample’ from which we generalize to the wider society and draw our 
conclusions about levels of inequality and our own subjective location (Ibid.). Applying 
this theory to the study of elites, Khan (2015) argues that similarly to other individuals, 
‘elites’ are affected by availability bias. ‘Elites’, argues Khan, view the world 
differently, for instance they see opportunities and wage growth; their (economic) 
world is largely separated from others.  
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However, Evans and Kelley (2004, p. 27) demonstrate that there are important 
differences between individuals arguing that “the reference-group effect does not 
completely block out veridical perceptions of social structure”. Their cross-national 
study found that “educational attainment is important for subjective social 
identification, with more educated people placing themselves higher in the social 
structure” (Ibid., p. 3). Hence “there is a tendency to see oneself towards the middle as 
predicted by reference-group theory but, at the same time, there is a clear effect of 
actual location in the social structure” (Ibid.). In addition to the objective position of 
individuals, GNP per capita and the national level of unemployment also had 
substantial effects on the subjective status of respondents (Evans and Kelley, 2004).  
I anticipated that self-placement in the social hierarchy is relevant for 
participants’ perceptions of economic inequality, hence I asked them to identify where 
they place themselves. Only one-third of participants saw themselves as in the top 
group (out of 10 groups) in society, and only half of those with incomes in the top 1 
percent of the distribution indicated that their own income is high. In comparison, of 
the general population, 4 percent perceive their own income as high58 (Rowlingson et 
al. 2012). I find that there is a positive relationship between participants’ subjective 
location and favourable attitudes towards redistribution. Hence, participants with a 
more realistic perception of their subjective social location, and by implication the 
extent of inequality in the UK, are more likely to support redistribution. 
In this literature review, I have proposed a relational analysis of top incomes 
and wealth. Distributional analyses are fundamental for studies of ‘elites’ and social 
class, and my relational, sociological analysis of how top incomes are perceived by top 
income earners can provide insights into the cultural processes and social norms 
underpinning recent increases in top incomes. Specifically, I draw on Savage’s (2014; 
2015a; 2015c) theorisation of rising inequality and social class, on Bourdieu, whose 
theories explain how material inequality is made sense of and legitimized through 
cultural and symbolic capital, and on theories of evaluation based on economic criteria 
(Fourcade, 2011; Lamont, 2012; Lamont et al., 2014). As inequality is made sense of 
through social comparisons with others, I further build on the concept of relative 
deprivation (Runciman, 1966) to study participants’ attitudes towards inequality. 
                                                 
58 Using data from the 2009 BSA. 
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Chapter 2  Methodology and methods 
In this chapter, I outline my methodological considerations and the methods I chose to 
tackle the research question how do top income earners perceive economic inequality? 
Specifically, I focus on top income earners in the UK, and economic inequality as 
measured by top income and wealth shares. As there are many methodological issues 
with studying ‘elites’, social science studies which have collected primary data to 
research ‘elites’ are limited in number. Reasons include methodological and practical 
issues such as access and difficulty in defining and locating the very wealthy (Barnard 
et al., 2007; Harvey, 2011). Hence, I explored the options to analyse secondary data 
about top income earners and their attitudes in the UK. Due to the absence of nationally 
representative data, I explored the GBCS, to provide a picture of the social 
characteristics of respondents with top household incomes and their attitudes towards 
what matters for career success. However, to address my research question specifically, 
I had to collect original data. I gathered primary, qualitative data in the form of semi-
structured interviews (and explorative focus groups) because qualitative research is 
most suited to study cultural processes as well as accounts of experiences (Lamont et 
al., 2014). In this chapter, I will in turn discuss my methodology, data issues with 
quantitative data on top income earners, the GBCS as a data source, my choice of 
interviewing and surveying participants, the limitations of my study and my reflexivity 
and ethics. 
 
Methodology 
I aim to bridge objectivist, quantitative, distributional studies of inequality and 
constructivist, relational approaches to studies of ‘elites’ and their perceptions of 
inequality. Despite the various issues with their measurement, I believe that economic 
inequalities are real phenomena which can be known, analysed and understood. 
However, I view economic inequality as socially constituted (Bandelj, 2009; Zelizer, 
2012). Top incomes and wealth are created through social interaction and relations. 
They are constantly revised and negotiated. At the same time, social actors continually 
construct meanings of inequality; participants’ understanding of top incomes and 
wealth are constantly created. Therefore, my methodological perspective is a ‘subtle’ or 
‘critical’ realist approach (Seale, 1999; crediting Hammersley, 1992). 
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From a critical realist perspective, external social reality exists, but the 
researcher is also engaged in constructing knowledge of social reality. Hence, there is a 
reality to be known, but it cannot be neutrally observed (Loeschner, 2017). In the case 
of interviews, the production of knowledge is co-produced by the researcher and 
participants. The subtle realism approach “involves maintaining a view of language as 
both constructing new worlds and as referring to a reality outside the text, a means of 
communicating past experience as well as imagining new experiences” (Seale, 1999, p. 
470). I seek to interpret participants’ accounts following their world view in their own 
terms but reject a “pure constructivist view that states there is no possibility of knowing 
a real world that exists separately from language” (Seale, 1999, p. 470). The knowledge 
presented in this thesis is based on my construction of it.  
 
Research methods 
Acknowledging different epistemological underpinnings of research methods, I pursued 
a complementary mixed-methods approach (Bryman, 2008, p. 603). I analysed GBCS 
as well as USoc data and collected primary data by interviewing and surveying 
participants with top incomes. During the period of fieldwork, I took detailed notes of 
the research process. The methods for this thesis were chosen to research top income 
earners’ attitudes towards and perceptions of economy inequality, specifically top 
incomes and wealth shares. To support this research question, I also pursued a 
descriptive portrait of the people at ‘the top’ of the income and wealth distributions, as 
not much is known about them (Keister, 2014).  
 
Quantitative analysis  
Quantitative data and economic ‘elites’: Surveys and tax records 
At the beginning of my PhD work, I explored options to quantitatively research ‘elite’ 
perceptions of inequality and their socio-demographic characteristics using secondary 
data. My exploration demonstrated that there is no nationally representative data in the 
UK on how top income earners understand inequality. This finding reflects a ‘bias’ in 
the construction of social science surveys. Historically, social science was implicated 
with monitoring and regulating the poor (Skeggs, 2004b). In contemporary quantitative 
datasets, there is a politics of data (Takala, forthcoming) whereby the focus is on 
measuring poverty rather than inequality at the top. For instance, there is the 
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“Households Below Average Income” dataset, and the “Understanding Society” dataset 
which has an “ethnic minority booster sample”, but no “rich booster sample” to account 
for the underrepresentation of the rich among the survey. While the poor and their 
behaviour and opinions are monitored in surveys, the rich escape from view (Savage 
and Williams, 2008)59. This reflects policy makers’ focus on poverty rather than 
inequality as measured by top incomes and wealth shares.  
Quantitative research describing ‘elites’ or top income earners is severely 
limited because nationally representative surveys do not contain large enough numbers 
for statistically significant analysis (Savage and Williams, 2008; Keister, 2014). 
Nationally representative surveys in the UK do not specifically account for sampling 
issues at the top end by oversampling rich households (Jenkins, 2016). In addition to a 
lack of individuals with top incomes and wealth in each cell, those individuals who are 
included in surveys may not be representative due to non-response (Atkinson, 2015). 
Therefore, economists use taxation data to calculate top income shares (Piketty, 2014; 
Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015).  
Taxation data, though exceptionally valuable for economic analyses of 
inequality because they have better coverage of the top, larger sample sizes and less 
measurement error (Jenkins, 2016), do not offer detailed socio-demographic 
characteristics and no attitudinal data of the rich. This is because tax data include only 
the information necessary for the administrative process of the income tax system 
(Atkinson, 2015; Jenkins, 2016). They are neither “purpose-designed” for the study of 
economic inequality (Atkinson, 2015, p. 51) nor for sociologists studying the rich. Data 
from tax records “refer to gross taxable (or after-tax) income of tax units (which in the 
UK refer to individuals since 1990)” (Jenkins, 2016, p. 138) and the most detailed data 
from the Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI) refer to taxpayers rather than to the full 
population (Ibid.). Researching attitudes of those at the top is even more challenging 
than describing their socio-economic characteristics because taxation data does not 
include attitudinal information and there is a lack of attitudinal, nationally 
                                                 
59 The HBAI data covers the whole distribution but does not cover the top 1 percent adequately. 
Therefore, the official series corrects for this using HMRC data from the SPI, the ‘SPI adjustment’. 
Burkhauser et al., (2016) discuss the imperfections of this approach and reconcile household survey 
data (used for official statistics) and tax return data (used in the top incomes literature), offering a more 
extensive approach. These achievements of combining household survey data (which has poor 
coverage of the rich) and tax return data powerfully advances our understanding of income inequality 
trends. However, they do not offer insights into the behaviour and attitudes of the top 1 percent. 
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representative data such as the BSA or the ISSP for the top. Hence, there is no 
nationally-representative data on top income earners’ views towards economic 
inequality. 
 
The Great British Class Survey 
The GBCS is a unique dataset collected via an online survey about social class in 
Britain, hosted by the BBC’s Lab UK. The dataset includes “the largest sample of the 
very rich of any British data source” (Savage et al., 2018). Respondents could self-
select to fill in a web questionnaire on their economic, social and cultural capital60 
(Burrows and Savage, 2014). The GBCS data was used by Savage and colleagues to 
derive a new model of social class in the UK, including an ‘elite’ social class (Savage 
et al., 2013; 2014). As the relatively well-educated and economically advantaged were 
disproportionally more inclined to participate in the online survey, the dataset offers an 
exceptionally large number of individual respondents with high household income, 
savings and house value for which most nationally-representative data sets do not have 
enough respondents to analyse meaningfully (Savage and Williams, 2008; Laurison, 
2015). Therefore, the GBCS is suitable for my research purposes. 
The GBCS, although not nationally representative, includes a large number of 
respondents with very high household incomes, and extensive socio-demographic and 
attitudinal data relevant to my research question61. The overall sample size of both 
waves of the GBCS was 325,000; the first wave was collected between 25th January 
and 23rd June 2011 (n = 161,400), and the second wave between 24th June 2011 and 
5th July 2013 (Devine and Snee, 2015; Friedman et al., 2015; UK Dataservice, 2017; 
Laurison and Savage, 2015). Following Friedman et al. (2015, p. 264), all those under 
22 years and in full-time education were excluded from analyses, “as these respondents 
are unlikely to have transitioned into stable occupational pathways”62. Non-UK-based 
participants were also excluded from the analysis. My final sample size is 233,175. Of 
                                                 
60 Therefore, the GBCS is a conventional social survey collecting accounts of social action rather than Big 
Data based on transactional data (Burrows and Savage, 2014). 
61 Specifically, the following GBCS question is relevant: “Here is a list of things that are sometimes said 
to be important in helping people to get a good job and achieve career success. Please indicate which, 
in your opinion are the three most important”. 
62 The rationale of Friedman et al. (2015) to use 22 as a cut-off age is that this is the age by which most 
students finish undergraduate study.   
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these participants, 22,173 have household income after taxes of £100k or higher (9.5 
percent, highlighting the vast skew of the GBCS towards those with very high 
household incomes).  
Even though the GBCS offers data on a large sample of rich participants, it does 
not provide a representative sample of individuals in households with top incomes, i.e. 
households in the top 1 percent. The data are skewed towards the economically 
advantaged. For instance, those with higher managerial and professional occupations 
(NS-SEC1 occupations) are overrepresented. This group “make up 35 percent of the 
GBCS sample, whereas the figure is 11.7 percent in the follow-up GfK survey and 10.3 
percent according to the Office for National Statistics in April 2011” (Friedman et al., 
2015, p. 264). Comparing respondents in elite occupations in the GBCS to those in the 
nationally representative Labour Force Survey, Friedman et al. (2015, p. 264) find that 
“[w]hile the overall averages differ (the GBCS is much more educated, younger, and 
reports far higher incomes than the population as a whole), the relationship between 
age, gender, education, income and occupation is fairly similar across the two 
populations”. Further, Friedman et al. (2015) found a similar class pay gap using GBCS 
and nationally representative Labour Force Survey (LFS) data.  
Hence, in the absence of nationally representative data on the rich, I follow 
Friedman and colleagues’ (2015) pragmatic view that it is useful to analyse the 
relationship between GBCS respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics and their 
attitudes. Further, I compare the findings with nationally representative Understanding 
Society (USoc) data, bearing in mind that the latter is not designed to provide an 
accurate representation of UK top income earners. It is precisely the group which is 
overrepresented in the GBCS which is of interest for this study: those who are 
economically advantaged, highly educated and occupationally successful (Friedman et 
al., 2015). As the GBCS data is not based on a random sampling frame, I cannot 
statistically infer the findings to the UK population. However, no other survey offers 
such a large sample of high income earners alongside details of their socio-
demographic characteristics and attitudinal measures. The findings from the analysis 
are presented in Chapter 3. I find that those with top incomes are even more likely to 
hold meritocratic views than those with merely high incomes; however meritocratic 
views are common throughout the distribution of GBCS respondents.  
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Qualitative interviews and participant survey 
To answer my research question, collecting primary data was necessary. Interviews are 
particularly suitable for this research because they allow the study of “the micro-level 
practices that constitute” the cultural processes which produce inequality (Lamont et 
al., 2014, p. 24). I collected the data for this research using in-depth interviews 
combined with a short survey questionnaire. The 30 interviews were semi-structured 
with open-ended discussion-style questions which took up the majority of time (45-50 
minutes), and were followed by a short survey questionnaire63. Interviews were 
scheduled for an hour (average length 64 minutes; median length 61 minutes) and held 
between May 2015 and March 2016. The average interview transcript consisted of 
10,453 words. Interviews were conducted in participants’ organizations (15), in cafés 
or restaurants near participants’ work places (7), in university meeting rooms (3) or by 
way of a phone conversation (5). Chin (2014) has compiled an impressive dataset with 
comparable data for the US; however, generally there are few social science studies 
focusing on views of the wealthy directly (Chin, 2015; Sherman, 2017a). Therefore, my 
dataset is unique in the UK context due to the specific focus on top incomes and wealth 
and the extremely high incomes and net worth of the participants. 
It shall be noted here, that I also conducted initial focus groups; however due to 
the difficulty of recruiting top income earners for these events, this method of data 
collection facilitated only limited insights for my study. The idea behind the focus 
groups was that interviews alone provide limited means for researching situated, lived 
experience (Rapley, 2001) and social processes (Skeggs, 2001). I tried to create a 
‘natural’ environment for ‘elites’ by inviting them to discuss top incomes and wealth on 
the roof top terrace and meeting rooms at the New Academic Building at LSE which 
offers stunning views over London. There, I organized a focus group event called “LSE 
Sociology Autumn reception on top incomes and wealth”. LSE Advancement assisted 
the recruitment. An issue with the focus groups was the difficulty in recruiting people 
with top incomes (the focus group respondents were representative of the top decile, 
rather than the top percentile group). Therefore, I will not refer to the results of these 
                                                 
63 In sum, 31 interviews were conducted, including an early interview with a partner of a top income 
earner. As I decided to focus on views of top income earners themselves, I did not include this interview 
for detailed analysis. However, there were no apparent differences in the discourses in this interview 
compared to all others. 
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focus groups directly in this study. The lesson from the focus group was that ‘elites’ 
require a prolonged recruitment process, involving their executive assistants or a 
personal introduction, and may generally prefer to be invited for a personal interview, 
rather than a focus group. In this sense, my research experience provides insights into 
research methods for studying elites. Further, as I will discuss, I established two 
personal contacts as a result of conducting the focus groups which aided the 
recruitment process of two interview participants. In the sections that follow, a 
methodological discussion of the qualitative interviews and participant survey is 
provided. I will justify the focus on the top 1 percent, discuss access and participant 
recruitment, describe the achieved sample, the topic guide and questionnaire as well as 
my practice of taking fieldnotes, document my method of qualitative data analysis and 
describe how I employed a quantitative text analysis software as a robustness check for 
my qualitative coding. Finally, I discuss the limitations of the qualitative interviews and 
participant survey. The sample is not random and not representative, hence it is not 
possible to generalize the findings (Sherman, 2016). Nevertheless, qualitative studies 
offer “conceptual and empirical insights that are theoretically important in themselves” 
which can inform further representative research (Sherman, 2016, p. 7). 
 
Focusing on the top 1 percent 
I collected data by interviewing 30 top income earners, defined as those with an annual 
income which places them within the top 1 percent of the distribution64. Sampling top 
income earners is justified because a significant portion of the gains accruing to the top 
1 percent was due to an unprecedented rise in top wage incomes, rather than income 
from capital, which lead economists to conclude that there has been a shift towards the 
‘working rich’ (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; McCall and Percheski, 2010). Note 
however, that there is a relationship between top incomes and wealth, and that research 
on this issue is ongoing (Cowell et al., 2016). The rationale for focusing on the top 1 
percent, like Majima and Warde (2008), is that these individuals have disproportionate 
control over economic resources. As discussed, participants were therefore 
operationalized as economic ‘elites’ (Khan, 2012a; Savage, 2015a). A different strategy 
would have been operationalizing ‘elites’ institutionally (Reis and Moore, 2005) or 
                                                 
64 I acknowledge that elite status is ascribed by the researcher (Littig, 2008). 
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based on their ‘power’ (Scott, 2008). As my study focuses on perceptions towards 
economic inequality, an income-based measure to select my sample is justified.  
According to the World Wealth and Income Database, the threshold for the 1 
percent of income earners was £118,419 before tax in 2012, which was the most 
recently available year of data when I started my fieldwork65. My criterion for inclusion 
was £120k before tax; however, all participants have individual incomes of £140k or 
higher before tax, apart from one participant whose income in the previous years was 
well within the 1 percent and one participant who indicated their income before 
bonuses which was just under the threshold. However, it is assumed that accounting for 
capital income, which I did not ask for specifically in the interviews, both participants 
have incomes which place them within the top 1 percent of the income distribution 
(their net worth is between £2.5m and £10m). Even though the top 1 percent is a 
somewhat arbitrary definition with previous research highlighting that the ‘elite’ 
encompasses a much wider group (Savage et al., 2013), I have chosen this cut-off as 
the selection criterion for my sample as it is a measure common in the economic 
literature on inequality, and certainly captures an economically very-advantaged group. 
 
Access and participant recruitment 
It is notoriously challenging to access ‘elites’ for research purposes (Reis and Moore 
2005; Page et al. 2013; Sherman, 2016). It is difficult to locate them as there are no 
publicly available sampling frames, and even when ‘elites’ are identified they are a 
hard-to-access group to interview. Therefore, identifying and interviewing a 
representative sample of the top 1 percent is “extremely difficult”, as Page et al. (2013, 
p. 52) explain in the context of the US. If there was a sampling frame, it would be 
straightforward to select a random sample of that list, but such a publicly available list 
does not exist (Reis and Moore, 2005; Page et al., 2013). In the UK, there is no publicly 
available list of names of the top 1 percent of income earners. In 2015, there were 31.16 
million people in work in the country; 22.77 million were working full-time (according 
to the Office for National Statistics (2017) referring to seasonally adjusted LFS data 
from January - March 2015). Hence, we know that there were 311,640 individuals 
                                                 
65 At the same time, data from HMRC from the Survey of Personal Incomes stated that the threshold 
was £140k before tax and £92k after tax in the tax year 2010/11. 
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whose income was within the top 1 percent of all those in work, and 227,670 
individuals whose income was within the top 1 percent of all those working full-time. 
Due to the challenges of recruiting a sample of the 1 percent, I employed three 
approaches. Participants were recruited through personal contacts, referrals or 
introductions (n=10), were invited by cold-call to take part based on their economically 
successful position in the City of London (n=11) or were recruited through snowballing 
(n=9). Given the difficulties of accessing ‘elites’, the use of personal links and 
recommendations as well as snowball sampling is justified (Reis and Moore 2005; 
Chin, 2014; Sherman, 2016). The list of potential participants to cold-call was derived 
from profiles which are available on public records and the financial media including 
individuals on the rich list, people in senior managerial positions in financial 
corporations and financial entrepreneurs. For confidentiality reasons, I cannot provide a 
detailed depiction of my approach of sampling the participants which I cold-called. The 
response rate for the cold-call strategy was approximately 40 percent (11 people out of 
29 accepted the invitation for interview). Page et al (2013, p. 53) had a similar response 
rate (37 percent) and commented that this was “remarkably high”.  
Without doubt, the prestigious reputation of the LSE well as my familiarity with 
the field and its language, due to my former employment as an Audit Assistant in a “big 
four” accounting firm, has aided the recruitment process (Lamont, 1992). The 
experience of having conducted the focus groups at LSE further aided the recruitment 
process, because a contact established there acted as a gatekeeper and helped me to 
recruit a participant (who recommended a further three participants to interview). 
Though the contact was established at LSE, the participants recruited were not LSE 
graduates. Through circumstances which cannot be detailed for confidentiality reasons, 
the focus group experience aided the recruitment of a further participant. 
It is difficult to contact the rich and it can take months of efforts and 
engagement with gatekeepers before an interview is arranged (Page et al. 2013). In my 
case, the personal assistants of entrepreneurs and financial executives were extremely 
helpful. Prospective participants, or most often their executive assistants, received a 
phone call and an invitation to participate. The invitation was sent via email and 
included a link66 with information about the research which was displayed on the LSE 
                                                 
66 http://www.lse.ac.uk/sociology/pdf/LSE-research-Katharina-Hecht.pdf 
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Sociology departmental website. This information leaflet signalled to prospective 
participants that the research project was legitimate. It also informed participants up 
front that the interview purpose was to talk about top incomes and wealth because I did 
not want to achieve access through deception. I offered to interview participants in-
person, via phone-call or Skype, to make the interview process as convenient as 
possible. If I did not hear back from prospective participants or their personal assistants 
after some time, I made sure to send a follow-up email to try and set up an interview 
date. Participants were kind and generous with their time. I was concerned that access 
would be difficult given that I was straightforward about the interview purpose; 
however, I found that while top incomes and wealth are problematic for social 
scientists, they are often viewed with a sense of success or achievement for participants 
(Khan, 2008).  
 
Sample 
Approximately half of the interview participants have a gross annual income between 
£140,000-400,000 (n=16), and half have incomes of half a million pounds and higher 
(n=14) (Table 2.1). The threshold for the 0.1 percent of income earners was £402,586 
before tax in 2012, the most recently available data at the time of data collection 
(Alvaredo et al., 2015)67. As I collected my data between May 2015 and March 2016, 
this data does not allow me to place participants’ incomes accurately into the top 1 and 
the top 0.1 percentile. However, in very broad terms, half of the participants are 
approximately situated in the ballpark of the top 1 percent of the distribution 
(specifically the bottom 90 percent of the top 1 percent), and the other half are situated 
within the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution.  
Many of the research participants also have high levels of wealth; 7 participants 
have a net worth of at least £50 million and of those, 5 have fortunes greater than £100 
million. Further, 3 respondents indicated that they are on the Sunday Times Rich List. 
The threshold for inclusion in the 2015 Sunday Times Rich list was £100m (Arlidge, 
2015). Of the sample, 20 have wealth higher than £1.4m. In 2008-10, only 1 percent of 
households had more than £1.4m (Hills and Bastagli, 2013). Note that I asked 
                                                 
67 In 2017, percentile thresholds are no longer available on the World Wealth and Income database 
(Alvaredo et al., 2017). 
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participants for their personal wealth. I have not collected information on participants’ 
house values, their pension rights or details about their investment portfolios; only of 
their overall net worth. Notably, participants often gave vague, approximate figures. 
For instance, participants stated that they are worth “£100m plus” or earn “between 
£5m and £10m”68. Participants with less income were much more precise. The 
interview participants are clearly among the most economically advantaged in the UK. 
As expected, there is a positive relationship between participants’ wealth and income 
(Figure 2.1) (Cowell et al., 2016). 
 
Table 2.1 Distribution of income and wealth among participants 
 Income % n   Wealth % n 
£140-400k 53% 16   <£1.4 million 31% 9 
£401k-<1m 17% 5   £1.4-4.9 million 24% 7 
£1-<5m 10% 3   £5-49 million 21% 6 
£5-50m 20% 6   £50-250 million 24% 7 
  100% 30     100% 29 
Note: For income (mean= £4.16m; median = £346k), 2 cases were estimated to be within the 
£140-400k category. For wealth (mean = £37.1m; median = £2.9m), 1 case with missing values 
was omitted. 
 
Figure 2.1 Relationship between top income and wealth of participants (log scale) 
 
Note: Data from the survey of research participants. R=0.85. 
                                                 
68 I recorded this information as £100m and £7.5m respectively, highlighting how the data is 
approximate. 
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Participants also belong to the highest occupational social class and many have attained 
the highest levels of education. The vast majority obtained degree-level education, and 
many have postgraduate degrees or have been educated at an Oxbridge college or at a 
London-based Russell Group University (Table 2.2). All participants are either 
employers (n=10), employed (n=15) or self-employed (n=5) in higher managerial and 
professional occupations in finance or law. Focusing on the financial industry is 
justified as much of the increase in pay at the top of the UK distribution is due to the 
financial sector and in particular bankers’ bonuses (Bell and Van Reenen, 2014). The 
sample of participants reflects the underrepresentation of women and ethnic minorities 
among the top 1 percent (Keister, 2014).  
The ‘conditions of possibility’ to be a top income earner are intersectional 
(Keister, 2014; Crenshaw, 1989). There is an intense gender bias among ‘elites’ (Reis, 
2005). Atkinson et al. (2016) found that only approximately 1 in 6 among the top 1 
percent of the income distribution in the UK are female. Hence, I consciously sought to 
find women to interview. Among the research participants, 22 are male (20 white, 2 
Asian) and 8 are female (7 white, 1 Asian). Glucksberg’s (2016a) research on ‘elite’ 
women documents patriarchal family relations at the top of the wealth distribution and 
acute power differences among couples with high net worth. Patriarchal 
conceptualizations of women as beautiful ‘girls’ (Mears, 2015) or dedicated mothers 
responsible for the transmission of cultural, social and economic capital (Glucksberg, 
2016a) may explain the underrepresentation of women at the top of the income 
distribution. It may also explain the gendered differences in the family situations of my 
sample. Of the male participants, 19/22 (86 percent) have children, but of the female 
participants, only 3/8 (38 percent) have children.  
 
Topic guide, questionnaire and fieldwork notes 
The topic guide for the semi-structured part of the interviews was compiled guided by 
previous research (see Appendix 1 which includes the source and rationale for each of 
the questions). Instead of directly asking respondents about ‘economic inequality’, I 
specifically asked participants about top incomes and wealth shares. I was interested in 
how participants view these measures as this has received considerable attention 
recently, in the media. I also asked participants why they believe there are differences 
in incomes. This approach is suitable as the term ‘economic inequality’ needs 
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Table 2.2 Sample of research participants 
Industry 
Gross income 
before taxes 
(grouped) £ 
Net worth 
(grouped) £ Age  Graduate 
Finance 140-400k below 1.4 million   30s  Oxbridge 
Consulting 140-400k below 1.4 million   40s  London 
Finance 140-400k below 1.4 million   30s  Oxbridge 
Finance 140-400k below 1.4 million   30s  Other 
Law 140-400k below 1.4 million   30s   Oxbridge 
Law 140-400k below 1.4 million   20s  London 
Finance 140-400k below 1.4 million   40s  London 
Finance 140-400k below 1.4 million   30s  Other 
Finance 140-400k 1.4-4.9 million  50s   Oxbridge 
Finance 140-400k 1.4-4.9 million  40s  Other 
Law 140-400k 1.4-4.9 million  30s  Oxbridge 
Finance 140-400k 1.4-4.9 million  40s   Other 
Law 140-400k 1.4-4.9 million  20s  Oxbridge 
Finance 140-400k 5-49 million   50s  Oxbridge 
Finance 140-400k 5-49 million   60s  Other 
Finance 140-400k 5-49 million   30s  Other 
Finance 401k-1m below 1.4 million   30s  London 
Finance 401k-1m 1.4-4.9 million  40s   Other 
Finance 401k-1m 1.4-4.9 million  30s  Other 
Finance 401k-1m 5-49 million   60s   Other 
Finance 401k-1m 50-250 million   50s   Oxbridge 
Finance 1-5m NA  60s  Other 
Finance 1-5m 5-49 million   60s  London 
Finance 1-5m 50-250 million   50s  Oxbridge 
Finance 5-50m 5-49 million   60s  Oxbridge 
Finance 5-50m 50-250 million   40s  Oxbridge 
Finance 5-50m 50-250 million   40s  Oxbridge 
Finance 5-50m 50-250 million   50s  Oxbridge 
Finance 5-50m 50-250 million   50s  Other 
Finance 5-50m 50-250 million   30s  London 
 
Note: The table is sorted by gross income before taxes (grouped) and secondly by net worth 
(grouped). Gender and ethnicity are not included in the table for confidentiality reasons. 2 
participants with income within the £140-400k category have indicated lower incomes but are 
estimated to be in this bracket considering capital income. Though I have asked participants 
about their incomes, they might have only indicated their earnings. Further, participants 
without a university degree were assigned to the “other” category for confidentiality reasons. 
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unpacking (Bamfield and Horton, 2009). Further, I asked participants what a ‘high-
income’ means to them and what they consider to be a ‘rich’ family. Following 
Runciman (1966), I asked participants whether any other people are doing noticeably 
better than themselves, and if so, what sort of people.  
Interviews were followed by a short survey questionnaire, which included 
questions relating to subjective social location, attitudes to the gap between low and 
high incomes, views on government redistribution policies, individual’s income and 
wealth, knowledge of the income distribution and socio-demographic characteristics 
(see Appendix 2). The questions I asked are derived from the BSA and ISSP surveys, in 
order to compare my findings with the general population (consistent with Toynbee and 
Walker, 2008).  
As I conducted my interviews, I spent time in the locations where the interviews 
took place to observe the environment and people present and observed how 
participants related and interacted with each other and with myself. I call this period 
‘fieldwork’ even though the research was primarily focused on collecting interview 
data and included only limited participant observation. In my write up, I will include 
fieldwork vignettes, to describe the world of top income earners, the polish, shine but 
also understatement, the famous artwork and general comfort of their offices. I try to 
describe the confident manner and the general, relaxed ‘ease’ (Khan, 2011) of 
participants, despite the sometimes challenging interview questions. I narrate the 
restrained masculinity on the predominantly male trading floor. I try to take the reader 
along on the research journey, to provide a sense of the world in which top incomes are 
produced.  
 
Qualitative text analysis  
After the recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim, the data was analysed using 
thematic analysis, “a process for encoding qualitative information” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 
4). Thematic analysis is “well suited to understanding individuals’ conceptualisations 
of the phenomenon one investigates” (Loeschner, 2017, p. 80). I pursued a hybrid 
approach using deductive and inductive codes because I expected to derive thematic 
codes from the research questions and the related theoretical framework, as well as 
from themes which emerged spontaneously (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). I 
developed my collection of codes based on my research question and related theoretical 
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framework which guided my research. I adjusted this code collection based on 
emergent themes.  
The process of coding was iterative; I coded, re-coded, merged and divided my 
codes based on new information from additional interviews (see Appendix 3 for a list 
of codes). The analysis presented in this chapter was computer-assisted by Excel and 
NVivo. I found that Excel has a superior functionality to NVivo for comparing and 
filtering participants’ narratives as well as for the identification of patterns and 
variation in the sample. I chose representative quotes for the write-up of the research, 
and quantified how representative they are. Further, I analysed the contrary or ‘deviant’ 
cases (Bryman, 2008, p. 539; Seale, 1999, p. 78 respectively), i.e. the social evaluators, 
to investigate variation in the data.  
For the analysis of the interview data, it is important to dismiss the idea of 
gaining access to the intimate interior of a person, and instead focus on what the 
interviews contain in terms of performativity and discourse (Rapley, 2001). Back 
(2010, p. 9) made this point by referring to Silverman’s (2007) statement that even 
‘manufactured’ interview data can be useful if understood as an “activity awaiting 
analysis and not as a picture awaiting a commentary”. Therefore, I analyse my data as a 
performed conversation between a researcher, immersed in the social science literature 
on top income and wealth inequality, and participants, immersed in the discourses of 
their professions but interested in the interview topic.  
 
Robustness check with quantitative text analysis  
As a robustness check, to make sure that important themes in the interview data are not 
overlooked and to aid the identification of group differences, I used a quantitative text 
analysis tool, QDA Miner with WordStat, for an exploratory cluster (mapping) 
analysis. These findings are useful in combination with the findings derived from 
manual, conceptual coding using NVivo. Figure 2.2 displays 40 clusters of the most 
frequently occurring words; each colour stands for a separate cluster. Key clusters 
include what I term ‘elite accumulatory struggle’ regarding private schooling for 
children (yellow cluster on the right) and London housing specifically “nice London 
property or houses” (orange cluster on the left). The latter cluster also includes the 
word “depends” which I discuss in relation to the concept of ‘relative richness’, which I 
will propose in Chapter 7 High incomes and richness as ‘relative’ concepts. There is 
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also a cluster including “hard work” and being “good” at work (as well as one 
including “spend[ing]” “[a lot of] hours a day [working]”; see bright green bubbles) 
which I will discuss with reference to ideas of meritocracy (the pink cluster in the 
middle) in Chapter 4 Top incomes as meritocratic. Another cluster, which I discuss in 
Chapter 4 as ‘economic evaluation’ includes “risk [taking]” by a “guy”, financial 
investment and entrepreneurship (purple cluster at the top and bottom). We also see 
“the market”, “the finance sector”, “capital income”; “number” and “success”. 
 
Figure 2.2 Word map (40 clusters) of all interviewee data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The circles surrounding particular clusters were added manually to highlight themes 
which overlap with the key themes derived from manual coding. Computation settings which 
derived this cluster map included: add words with frequency larger than 60; remove items with 
case occurrence less than 5; derive 40 clusters. Data included in the WordStat analysis: all 30 
interviews excluding interviewer data.  
 
I used the WordStat data clouds to compare different sub-samples with each 
other. The word cluster for males compared to the one for females (Appendix 4) 
highlights that “guys taking risk” is a common theme for the former but not for the 
latter. This could be because some of the highest earners were male entrepreneurs. I 
asked participants whether gender makes a difference to one’s chances of earning a 
high income. The WordStat analysis shows that while women talk about “women and 
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men”, men talk about “women” only when asked about gender. However, both female 
and male participants refer to hard work (pink cluster) in line with Sherman’s (2017) 
findings. 
In addition, I compared those with incomes below and those with incomes 
above £1m (Appendix 4b). “Private School” is missing from the world cloud of those 
earning over £1m; this could be because they do not report any struggle regarding 
affording schooling; instead they explain how happy they are that they can provide the 
best education for their children (another cluster among those highest earners is “kids, 
happy”). The richest also refer to “the average person”. As those with highest incomes 
are mainly men, we can see again that these participants refer to “women” rather than 
“men” and “women” when talking about gender, reflecting gendered assumptions.  
 
Limitations  
As with much qualitative work, my sample is not representative and I cannot generalise 
the findings to the population of top income earners. However it is possible to deduce 
useful hypotheses and implications for future work (Khan, 2008; Sherman, 2016). 
Possible biases in the data include sampling bias and social desirability bias; 
individuals who view top incomes and wealth as worthy of discussion were probably 
more likely to agree to be interviewed (self-selection bias), and respondents may have 
been more likely to justify their earnings in discussion with a sociologist. Unlike with 
the focus groups however, there is no LSE bias among the interview sample (only three 
qualitative interview participants are LSE graduates). 
Further, my focus on top income earners excludes perspectives of partners of 
top income earners who may not necessarily be top earners themselves, as researched 
by Glucksberg (2016a) and Sherman (2017). As participants have been sampled based 
on the criterion of earning top incomes (through employment, self-employment or 
entrepreneurship), my sample also does not include rentiers who exclusively derive 
their income from capital. Additionally, as discussed, there are other ways of 
operationalising ‘elites’ including the institutional approach, whereby elites are “people 
who occupy commanding positions within the set of institutions that are most salient to 
national political influence and policy-making within a country” (Reis and Moore 
2005, p. 2). Though there is some overlap between my sample and institutional elites 
(because large companies and business organizations also yield political influence), my 
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sample does not include a variety of institutional elites, such as members of 
representative political institutions, the civilian public bureaucracy, the armed forces, 
the police and others. However, due to the focus of this study on perceptions towards 
top incomes and wealth, sampling ‘economic elites’, operationalized as the top 1 
percent, is justified. 
A further limitation of the research design is that my use of thick description of 
the perspectives of the research participants is necessarily limited compared to 
ethnographic approaches to the study of ‘elites’ (Khan, 2011; Mears, 2015; Glucksberg, 
2016a; Nichols and Savage, 2017). I take seriously Jerolmack and Khan’s (2014, p. 
236) warning of the “attitudinal fallacy”, the misguided idea that reported attitudes are 
equivalent to situated behaviour. Unlike ethnographic work, my study does not focus 
on potential illuminating differences between participants’ accounts and their actions 
(Khan and Jerolmack, 2013). However, as this research focuses on individuals’ 
perceptions towards income inequality, rather than on what actions are taken, the 
choice of methodology is justified. Nevertheless, it is a serious limitation of my 
interview study, compared to ethnographic research, that I was unable to analyse 
whether and how participants’ opinions change or evolve over time (Skeggs, 1997; 
2001).  
Though my study was not ethnographic, I engaged with financial news, and 
paid attention to ‘elite’ voices in the media to familiarize myself with the research 
setting (this data could provide data for a study of its own if systematically analysed).  
‘Elites’ are more vocal in the press, the political process and in social science research. 
For instance, those with highest household income and wealth, as well as highest levels 
of education were disproportionally participating in the GBCS. Hence, elite voices are 
more commonly available than sometimes assumed in methodological discussions on 
‘elites’. I also immersed myself with top income earners in my private life; leading to 
close friendships with people in the finance industry. The choice of interviews for this 
study is justified because negotiating access is less difficult and facilitates the 
comparison of narratives by participants from different industries, occupations and 
organizations. Further, interview data are useful for investigating the social 
comparisons and cultural processes that participants draw on, with implications for the 
explanation of social action (Lamont, 1992).  
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Reflexivity 
My research was motivated by a personal concern with inequality; globally and in the 
UK (Atkinson, 2015). As a result, I am not a disinterested, objective observer. To 
demonstrate this, I tried to write myself into the study (Khan, 2008). For instance, 
during my fieldwork, I noticed homeless individuals in the City of London on my way 
to interviewing a hedge fund manager, demonstrating how present vast inequality is in 
my research setting. Importantly, part of the ethics of research is what is worthy of 
knowing (Skeggs, 2001). Therefore, I reflexively reflected on my wish to shift the 
focus of studies on social class and inequality away from a preoccupation with the 
occupations and low incomes of the poor, to an analysis of the capital accumulation of 
the rich (Savage, 2015a).  
The co-production of interview data can include participants who produce 
themselves as competent interviewees, and a researcher who tries to perform a 
‘competent’ interviewer-self (Rapley, 2001). Instead of dismissing these social 
processes as contaminating the data, they are analysed with respect to what they entail 
about the processes under study. This requires reflexivity regarding my positionality 
and an acknowledgement of how the research is situated in contemporary power 
relations. My positionality includes that I am a researcher concerned about inequality; 
immersed in social science literature which problematizes economic inequality. This is 
different from my interviewees who are immersed in the financial industry, a sector of 
the economy which produces inequality (Atkinson, 2014).  
 
Ethics 
Ethics need to inform all stages of the research process, including choice of research 
topics and participants, access, interpretation and representation (Skeggs, 2001). This 
requires reflexivity throughout the research process, from choice of topic to writing 
research. Further, knowledge is produced through encounter. Participants enabled me to 
do research, and allowed me to gain academic legitimacy (Skeggs, 1997).  
Issues of no-harm, autonomy and informed consent are seen as less central 
when dealing with ‘elite’, articulate participants. However, these issues are very 
important; vulnerabilities exist. For instance, the highest net worth individuals in the 
sample were incredibly concerned about their privacy. Hence, I took confidentiality 
very seriously throughout the research process. I prepared an information leaflet and an 
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informed consent form so that participants were fully informed about the research 
purpose, the researcher and why they were invited to take part. I followed the LSE 
research ethics guidelines. I explained the research purpose to participants before the 
interview, assured them of confidentiality (stressing that neither their name, nor the 
name of their company or competitor companies would be divulged) and asked them 
for written consent. I took particular care to protect research participants’ data and to 
anonymize accounts of respondents in the research write-up.  
Further, there is a lot of criticism of ‘the 1 percent’, or ‘elites’ in the media, as 
well as in some academic research presented at conferences. Though my perspective 
includes a strong concern with inequality, I do not view approaches which present rich 
individuals as generally bad, greedy and arrogant individuals as helpful from a social 
scientific point of view. Instead, it is analytically advantageous to try and understand 
the viewpoint of participants, following through the logic of their world view in their 
own terms (Savage, 2014). Analysing the accumulation strategies of ‘elites’ from their 
perspective, from which they are useful and sensible, without importing assumptions, is 
helpful for understanding how they view economic inequality. In sum, addressing my 
research question required methodological pluralism, overcoming challenges of 
accessing participants, reflexivity about the research limitations and my own role as 
knowledge producer, as well as ethical concerns for participants’ confidentiality and 
legitimacy. 
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Chapter 3 A descriptive portrait of ‘the top’ in the Great British Class 
Survey: Wealth and meritocracy 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I set the scene by describing the socio-demographic characteristics of 
those at the top of the income distribution, as well as explore the data we have on their 
attitudes towards inequality. Specifically, I analyse the views of Great British Class 
Survey (GBCS) participants with top household incomes towards what is important for 
career success, distinguishing between ‘meritocratic’ and ‘social reproduction’ items 
(part of these findings are published in Savage et al., forthcoming). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, there are few quantitative explorations of the top, due to lack of data 
and numerous data issues. In the absence of nationally-representative data on the 
characteristics and attitudes of those with top incomes, I analyse the GBCS dataset 
which includes an unusually large sample of high income earners, their characteristics 
and attitudes. Even though the GBCS data is not representative of the general 
population, it is useful precisely because it was predominantly the economically 
advantaged and highly educated who completed the survey (Friedman et al., 2015). 
Their disproportionate participation in the GBCS can be seen as performative of their 
‘eliteness’ (Savage, 2015a; Cunningham and Savage, 2015).  
The focus of my findings is on the concept of ‘meritocracy’ to which I will 
return repeatedly in this thesis. Meritocracy is the idea “that whatever our social 
position at birth, society ought to offer enough opportunity and mobility for ‘talent’ to 
combine with ‘effort’ in order to ‘rise to the top’” (Littler, 2013, p. 53). This concept is 
important for understanding how the economic ‘elite’ perceive economic inequality. 
Nevertheless, I also find that the idea of meritocracy is important for how most GBCS 
respondents think about what is important to achieve career success. As I will discuss 
in Chapter 4, the nineteenth century distinction drawn by the classical economists 
between workers, capitalists and landlords as three social classes, who derive income 
from labour, profits and rents respectively (Atkinson, 2015; Sandmo, 2015), is not so 
clear-cut anymore; top income earners have caught up with or overtaken those living 
off capital income, pointing towards a shift in the composition of ‘economic’ elites 
away from a land-owning, aristocratic or capitalist rentier ‘elite’ to a ‘meritocratic’ 
financialized economic elite (Savage et al., 2018), away from aristocratic ‘entitlement’ 
towards ‘meritocratic’ privilege (Khan, 2008).  
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Meritocracy was coined just over 60 years ago by sociologist Alan Fox, who  
used it as part of a socialist critique of the reproduction and legitimation of social 
stratification (in 1956; see Littler, 2013). Michael Young (1994 [1958]), who is more 
commonly seen as having introduced the term, describes ‘meritocracy’ as produced 
through the formula I + E = M; intelligence combined with effort equals merit (Littler, 
2013). Young made the case for meritocracy as an alternative to inherited privilege, but 
provided a dystopian vision of a society in which new and unjust social divisions are 
justified based on meritorious grounds (Ibid.). In 1973, Daniel Bell offered a positive 
interpretation of meritocracy and argued for ‘equality of opportunity’ rather than 
‘equality of result’. The former was argued to be in line with a liberal position while the 
latter was seen as socialist (Littler, 2013). This ‘equality of opportunity’ perspective is 
close to the contemporary use of meritocracy, in particular by ‘elites’. In contrast, many 
social scientists (e.g. Hills et al., 2010; Atkinson, 2015; Savage, 2015c) agree that 
inequality of outcomes matters as it directly affects the equality of opportunity for the 
next generation.  
Meritocracy is important for how the top views economic inequality. ‘Elites’ 
are argued to make sense of or justify their position with reference to meritocracy, and 
in particular through a performance of ‘hard work’ (Khan, 2011; Littler, 2013; Khan 
and Jerolmack, 2013; Sherman, 2016). Khan (2008; 2011) argues that old ‘elites’ relied 
on entitlement by birth while new ‘elites’ embrace meritocracy because it allows them 
to frame their advantaged position as the result of their skill and hard work. Given that 
those at the top are seen as winners by merit, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
privileged are more likely to believe in meritocracy (Littler, 2013). In this chapter, I 
will investigate GBCS participants’ attitudes towards economic inequality and social 
class, exploring whether those with highest household incomes hold more meritocratic 
attitudes than all others. 
 
Presentation of findings: Comparing ‘the top’ to ‘all others’ 
I explored the GBCS to find out more about the socio-demographic characteristics and 
attitudes of GBCS participants who indicated that they live in high-income earning 
households, have high savings or own property of high value. I present descriptive 
statistics including bivariate relationships. Specifically, I compare the responses of 
GBCS respondents with the highest net household incomes and those with highest 
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assets (savings and house value) to ‘all others’. The precise question used to categorize 
participants in the GBCS by their income is What is the annual income of your entire 
household after taxes? The top categories are £200k or higher, £150-199k, £100-149k, 
and £45-99k. ‘All others’ are those with annual household income after taxes below 
£45k. For house value, the top category is £500k and for savings the top category is 
£200k or higher (Table 3.1)69. 
The GBCS data presented here is not equivalized; i.e. it does not account for 
differences in household composition, meaning differences between the living 
standards of a single person, a couple or a couple with children. Therefore, I have to 
approximate, that the three highest categories correspond to the top 1 percent of the 
distribution of household incomes in the UK (or the two highest depending on 
household composition)70. Dorling (2014) estimates, with reference to a report by the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, that for a household to qualify to be a member of the top 1 
percent in the UK, an income of approximately £115k a year from all income sources 
after income taxes is needed in 2011–12 (or £147k before tax). Dorling (2014, p. 2) 
notes that “this estimate is for a childless couple. Should you be single, you can enter 
the 1 percent with a little less; should you have children, you’ll need a somewhat higher 
household income”. According to national statistics from HM Revenue & Customs, 
estimated from the SPI, the 99th percentile point on the income distribution (i.e. the 
threshold of the top 1 percent) for an individual was £100k after tax in the tax year 
2011-12. Pre-tax data from the WWID which refers to the income of individuals 
(Jenkins, 2016) indicated that the income threshold of the 99th percentile in 2011 was 
£120,147 (Alvaredo et al., 2015). 
I compare those with the highest household incomes after taxes in the GBCS 
and USoc to ‘all others’ which I defined as those with net household income below 
£45k. According to Household Below Average Income (HBAI) statistics, the cut-off 
                                                 
69 This compares to Keister’s (2014) research which focused on the top 1 percent of US individuals by 
total household income (before taxes) and the top 1 percent of wealth owners in the 2010, with 
thresholds of inclusion of approximately $600k and $6.8 million respectively. 
70 The GBCS data does not include data about how many children live in the household (data necessary 
to fully equivalize household income). Question 39 of the GBCS asks participants about their marital 
status and number of children, but there is no data on how many children live in the household. 
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point for the top decile in net equivalized71 household income from all sources was 
approximately £45k in 2011/2012 (£46k in 2012/2013, Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2014)72. However, since GBCS participants’ household income data is not 
equivalizable, it is not possible to place participants’ income on the distribution of 
household incomes in the population. Hence, I compare GBCS data to the non-
equivalized household income of the nationally representative USoc. An annual non-
equivalized net household income of £45k represents the income of the top quartile of 
the household income distribution in USoc. In other words, the household income of 
‘all others’ in the GBCS refer to approximately the bottom 75 (rather than the bottom 
90) percent of the net household income distribution. These individuals are 
underrepresented in the GBCS, because they only make up 51 percent of the sample 
(n=120k). 
I compare the findings from the GBCS with the 1 percent of households in the 
largest general British representative panel survey, USoc, which has a sample size of 
40,000 (31,821 after accounting for sampling weights). Even though USoc is a 
nationally representative dataset, it also does not provide representative data for 
individuals with top household incomes. I compare the findings of the GBCS with data 
from the Survey for Consumer Finances (SCF) in the US (Keister, 2014). Keister’s 
(2014) work is based on the 2010 US SCF and therefore ahead of data in the UK, 
because a comparable dataset in which high-income households are oversampled to 
address issues with representativeness is not available in the UK. Nevertheless, apart 
from basic demographic traits for top income earners and wealth holders, little is 
known about the top 1 percent of US households as measured by income or net worth 
(Ibid.).  
 
Socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics at ‘the top’ 
The most striking differentiation between the top and all others is the sheer amount of 
the former group’s assets. Participants with household incomes after taxes of £200k and 
higher are 34 times more likely to own property worth higher than £500k and 16 times 
                                                 
71 The data are equivalized to account for differences in household size using the so-called modified-
OECD equivalence scale (Jenkins, 2016). This scale assigns a value of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to 
each additional adult member and of 0.3 to each child (OECD, 2017). 
72 This figure is derived from the spreadsheet accompanying Chart 2.4 (BHC) in Department for Work 
and Pensions (2014); the weekly cut-off for the top decile (in £10 intervals) is £880 (880*52= £45.75k). 
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more likely to have savings higher than £200k than are all others (Table 3.1). Those 
with top household incomes (£200k or higher) are also distinct in regard to their 
occupation; as I will discuss. Focusing on differences between those with highest 
amounts of savings and all others, as well as between those with highest property value 
and all others, we can see that the associations are broadly similar (though less strong) 
than those between participants with highest household incomes and all others. 
 
Table 3.1 GBCS respondents’ household incomes, property values and savings 
 
Notes: All figures are percentages except age and number of individuals. 
* Due to missing values there is a difference of 2 between the number of individuals who have 
indicated their household income and those who indicated savings and property value. 
** Aside from value of house. 
*** Others are assigned to either the established middle class, or technical middle class. 
Source: GBCS, waves 1 and 2 (Savage and Devine, 2015). 
£200k+ £150-199k £100-149k £45-99.9k All others Sav>200k All others Prop>500k All others 
Male 67.1 60.3 61.4 53.4 48.4 66.7 50.1 59.7 50.8
Age 42.0 41.7 41.3 40.0 39.5 51.0 38.7 46.4 39.1
Ethnicity
White - British, Irish, other 88.8 90.1 90.6 91.9 92.3 92.8 91.8 91.7 92.0
Asian/Asian British 3.0 3.4 2.9 2.1 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.3 1.7
Rather not say 2.6 1.7 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.1
Other ethnic group 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1
Chinese/Chinese British 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7
Mixed race - other 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7
Mixed race - White a. Asian/Asian Brit. 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Middle Eastern/Middle 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Black/Black British 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.8
Mixed race - White a. Black/Black Brit. 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3
Married/living with partner 81.6 81.4 80.8 81.1 56.9 82.5 67.3 84.4 67.0
Having children 64.0 60.1 58.3 52.7 43.8 69.9 46.5 72.2 46.2
Education
Degree-level Education 86.9 86.2 84.6 78.7 66.5 79.7 72.4 82.7 72.0
Postgraduate degree 46.4 45.1 43.3 38.1 27.0 40.5 32.2 42.0 32.0
Undergraduate degree 40.6 41.1 41.2 40.6 39.5 39.2 40.2 40.8 40.0
Occupation
Senior managerial 45.4 43.1 36.7 22.0 8.9 36.7 14.9 36.5 14.8
Traditional professional 32.6 30.1 28.2 21.8 13.3 26.0 17.3 26.4 17.3
Family background (occupation)
Senior managerial 38.9 34.1 30.7 21.7 14.9 28.4 18.3 32.6 17.8
Traditional professional 26.3 24.7 23.2 18.8 13.9 22.5 16.2 24.2 16.0
GBCS elite class*** 100.0 99.9 91.7 27.7 8.9 92.3 17.1 91.4 16.9
Value of property >500k 76.1 56.2 38.2 11.1 2.2 44.4 6.5
Value of savings** >200k 68.8 40.2 27.1 10.2 4.3 42.9 6.1
% of GBCS sample 1.9 1.8 5.8 39.5 51.0 9.84 90.16 10.19 89.80
Number of individuals* 4,521 4,239 13,413 91,998 119,004 22,949 210,224 23,772 209,401
Key 5% 50% 95% 233,175
Socio-demographic
characteristics
Household Income after taxes Savings** and property value
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Relationship between income and wealth 
As expected, there is a positive relationship73 between income and wealth among 
GBCS respondents (Cowell et al., 2016). The data shows that of respondents with 
household incomes of at least £200k, 76 percent also own property assets worth more 
than £500k, and 69 percent have savings larger than £200k. In comparison, those with 
household incomes between £100-149k are approximately half as likely to do so (38 
and 27 percent, respectively). This highlights stark wealth differentials among 
participants with highest household incomes. I will return to this finding in Chapters 6 
and 7, where I discuss my qualitative finding that wealth, including property assets, 
investments and “liquid assets”, is crucial for top income earners’ perceptions of 
economic inequality and for how they explain what a high income and a rich family 
mean to them. 
 
Socio-demographic characteristics and family life 
GBCS participants with the highest household incomes are 5 times more likely to work 
in a senior managerial position and approximately 2.5 times more likely to work in a 
traditional professional occupation than are all others. In addition to working in more 
advantaged professions themselves, they are also approximately 2.5 times as likely to 
have a senior managerial background (39 percent vs 15 percent), and twice as likely to 
have a traditional professional background compared to all others (26 percent and 14 
percent respectively). Those with highest household incomes are also distinct in regard 
to their education; specifically, it is postgraduate degrees which distinguish those with 
top household incomes from all others (46 percent hold these degrees compared to 27 
percent of all others) (Table 3.1).  
These findings are in line with Keister (2014, p. 16.10) who finds that the 1 
percent in the US tend “to have at least a college education, and to be employed in the 
professional and managerial occupations74”. Comparing GBCS data to findings from 
USoc shows that there are similar associations in USoc and GBCS; in regard to 
                                                 
73 As Keister (2014) estimates from the US SCF, the correlation between total household income and 
total household net worth has been about 0.50 to 0.60 since 2001. This correlation is reasonably high. 
The categorical GBCS data does not allow the computation of a correlation. 
74 For the top 1 percent of income holders and top 1 percent of net wealth holders respectively, the 
average age is 55 and 60 years; the percentage of individuals with college or graduate level education is 
92.2 and 86.4, and the percentage of those in managerial/professional occupations is 84.3 and 72.9. 
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occupation, family background and degree-level occupation75 (Table 3.2). The 
association between level of education and household income is even stronger in the 
USoc data, whose nationally representative respondents are generally less highly 
educated than those in GBCS (Table 3.2). USoc respondents with household incomes 
of £200k are 3 times as likely to have degree-level education as are all others. 
GBCS respondents with highest household income are slightly older on average 
and more likely to be male than all others. Only 33 percent are female. USoc 
respondents with high household income are less likely to be male than are those from 
the GBCS or the SCF (Table 3.2); only 51 percent with highest household income after 
taxes (£200k or higher) are male. However, there are differences in occupations by 
gender: men are more likely to be large employers or to be employed in higher 
management than women (11 percent vs 4 percent) and more likely to work in higher 
professional occupations (30 percent vs 16 percent). Women with highest household 
income in USoc are more likely to be in lower managerial and professional occupations 
(30 percent vs 24 percent of men) and much more likely to work in intermediate 
occupations (18 percent vs 1 percent of men) (not shown).  
In the US SCF, those within the 1 percent of highest incomes are much more 
likely to be male than those with highest incomes in the GBCS (98 vs 67 percent). The 
reason for this finding maybe due to differences in survey methodologies. In the GBCS, 
we do not know whether a respondent is the main earner whereas in the SCF it is 
assumed that male respondents (in case of a mixed-sex couple) or the older respondent 
(in a same-sex couple) are the economically dominant person in a household (Federal 
Reserve, 2014). Given that in 2013 only 18 percent of those within the top 1 percent 
highest individual incomes in the UK were female (Atkinson et al., 2016), it is likely 
that a higher percentage of male than female GBCS participants with highest household 
incomes are the main earners. However, the SCF methodology, which is not compatible 
with feminist conceptualizations, is likely to underestimate the proportion of women 
among the 1 percent.  
In regard to their family life, GBCS participants with highest household income 
are approximately 40 percent more likely to be married or living with their partner than 
are all others, even though the former are on average only 2.5 years older. Those with 
                                                 
75 Net household income has been coded so that it corresponds to the GBCS annual household income 
brackets. 
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highest household incomes are also 50 percent more likely to have children. Just over 
80 percent of both male and female GBCS participants with highest household incomes 
are married or living with their partner compared to just under 60 percent of all others. 
In the US, the 1 percent are also “disproportionally […] married [or living with a 
partner]” (Keister, 2014, p. 16.10). Of the top 1 percent in the US, a striking 93.2 
percent are married or living with their partner76 (Ibid.). Of the 4,521 GBCS 
participants with highest household incomes, 54 percent are men who are married or 
living with their partner, 13 percent are men who are not married or living with their 
partner, 27 percent are women who are married or living with their partner, and 6 
percent are women who are not married or living with their partner77. I address the 
family life of economic ‘elites’ in Chapter 5. For many of my interview participants, 
top income occupations are not seen as compatible with a couples’ wish to combine 
dual-earning careers and having children. 
GBCS respondents with top incomes are not distinctive in regard to their ‘race’ 
or ethnicity compared to all others (Table 3.1). They are ever so slightly less likely to 
be white than all other respondents (89 vs 92 percent) and slightly more likely to be 
Asian/Asian British, Chinese/Chinese British and Middle Eastern/Middle Eastern 
British compared to ‘all others’. USoc respondents with highest household income on 
the other hand are more likely to be white than those in the GBCS (94 compared to 89 
percent). Similarly to the GBCS respondents, individuals from highest income 
households in USoc (£100k and higher) are predominantly white, but slightly more 
likely to be Asian/Asian British than all other households. In contrast, Keister (2014) 
shows that of the 1 percent in the US, 91 percent are white (non-Hispanic) compared to 
69 percent of the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution78. Only 0.2 percent of 
the top 1 percent in the US are African American, compared to 15 percent of the 
bottom 90 percent of the distribution. These numbers highlight stark racial inequalities 
in the US. In the GBCS, 0.5 percent of those with highest household incomes are black 
                                                 
76 These findings are similar for those of the top 1 percent of net worth holders (n=3,253), 95.8 percent 
are male, 92.5 percent are white (non-Hispanic) and 90.5 percent are married or living with a partner 
(Keister, 2014). 
77 Therefore, a majority of GBCS respondents with household incomes after taxes of £200k or higher 
who are not married or living with their partner are male (68 percent). 
78 Keister (2014, p. 16.10) states that these patterns have not changed much from 2001-2010 and the 
demographic patterns do not vary much when wealth is defined as financial wealth rather than net 
worth. Further, “the patterns are almost identical for the top 0.5 percent of income earners and wealth 
owners”. 
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compared to 0.7 percent of all others. However, as the GBCS is not representative of 
the UK population, and data from USoc does not provide a good representation of the 
top 1 percent of the distribution, we need to be cautious in comparing these data 
directly.  
Like the 1 percent in the US, most GBCS respondents with top household 
incomes are employed; however, they are much more likely than all others to be self-
employed; 32 percent of those with highest household incomes are self-employed. This 
is approximately 3 times as likely as are all others (not shown in the table). Keister 
(2014) explains that that entrepreneurship is an important way for individuals to move 
up in the wealth distribution. 
 
Table 3.2 Understanding Society respondents’ household incomes  
 
Source: Understanding Society wave 4 (Data collection in 2012-2013) (University of Essex 
Institute for Social and Economic Research and National Centre for Social Research, 2014). 
Note: n = 31,979. 
 
 
£200k+ £150-199k £100-149k £45-99.9k All others
 Male 51% 53% 50% 52% 47%
 Age 53.3 53.9 48.1 46.4 53.1
 Ethnicity
 White 94% 95% 89% 91% 93%
 Mixed 1% 0% 1% 1% 1%
 Asian 4% 5% 7% 5% 3%
 Black 1% 0% 2% 2% 2%
 Other ethnic group 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Married/living with partner 85% 92% 83% 84% 61%
 Education
 Degree-level Education 63% 58% 57% 43% 21%
    University higher degree 28% 31% 31% 20% 8%
    first degree or equivalent 35% 27% 26% 23% 13%
 Occupation (NS-SEC)
 Large employers & higher management 8% 16% 13% 9% 3%
 Higher professional 24% 16% 21% 13% 7%
 Lower management & professional 30% 28% 33% 37% 26%
 Intermediate 8% 9% 12% 12% 15%
 Small employers 20% 22% 14% 10% 11%
 Lower supervisory 2% 1% 3% 6% 9%
 Semi-routine 5% 5% 5% 10% 19%
 Routine 3% 3% 1% 4% 11%
 Number of individuals 130 110 457 7,417 23,708
 Socio-demographic 
 characteristic
Household income after taxes
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Geography 
GBCS respondents with highest household incomes are the most distinct from all 
others firstly in regard to their wealth, secondly by their ‘elite’ social class and their 
self-identification as upper middle class, and thirdly by indicating that they live in large 
houses in a city (Table 3.3). Living in large houses in a city is the modal category for 
respondents with household incomes of £150k and higher, followed by detached family 
homes and flats in the inner city. Of those with highest household incomes, 37 percent 
indicate they live in large houses in the city compared to 3 percent of all others. The 
former are disproportionately located in London; 44.2 percent of those with household 
incomes of £200k or higher, 35.9 percent of those with household incomes of £150-
199k, and 33 percent of those with household incomes of £100-149k live in London 
(Table 3.3). This compares to 13.6 percent of all other respondents. USoc respondents 
with highest household incomes are less disproportionally located in London than 
GBCS respondents. However, they are twice as likely to reside in the capital and 
almost twice as likely to live in the South East as all others (Table 3.4). 
These findings chime with Savage’s argument that the ‘elite’ social class is one 
of urban property. Reviewing the implication of Piketty’s (2014) work for social 
change, Savage (2014, p. 600) suggests that “[t]he most fundamental shift is that from 
capital tied up in agricultural land to that tied in housing”. Piketty demonstrated that 
property assets are taking up an increasing share of overall wealth and that housing is 
the largest source of capital in all countries apart from the US (Savage, 2014). The high 
likelihood of the ‘economic elite’ to live in large houses in a city or in flats in the inner 
city are interesting in light of Piketty’s (2014) empirical findings. Further, in their 
analysis of the GBCS, Cunningham and Savage (2015) argue that living in London can 
be seen as part of what it means to be ‘elite’. Piketty (2014) finds that in order to buy 
property in London or Paris without having inherited money, individuals need to be 
situated in the top 2-3 percent of the income distribution. I will return to the centrality 
of property in London for the participants of my qualitative interviews in Chapter 7. 
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Table 3.3 Geographic location of GBCS respondents 
 
Source: GBCS waves 1 and 2.  
 
Table 3.4 Geographic location of USoc respondents 
 
Source: Understanding Society wave 4 (Data collection in 2012-2013) (University of Essex 
Institute for Social and Economic Research and National Centre for Social Research, 2014). 
 
Class consciousness and self-identification  
The vast majority of participants in the highest income brackets are assigned to the 
‘elite’ social class by the latent class analysis (LCA) of Savage et al. (2013; 2014) 
(Table 3.1). Very high economic capital was indeed most important in the LCA by 
Savage et al. (2013) for determining whether participants belonged to the ‘elite’ social 
class. In regard to their attitudes, the starkest differences between the top and all others 
relates to self-identification with an advantaged social class. Those at the top are 12 
£200k + £150-199k £100-149k £45-99.9k All others Savings>200kAll others Property>500kAll others 
 Region
 London 44.2 35.9 33.0 21.3 13.6 22.5 18.3 35.4 16.9
 South East 20.6 22.6 21.7 18.7 15.1 22.5 16.6 26.3 16.1
 East of England 10.1 10.1 10.5 10.1 9.3 11.1 9.5 10.9 9.6
 South West 4.7 5.9 6.4 8.5 10.7 9.6 9.4 8.1 9.5
 Scotland 4.2 5.2 5.7 7.3 8.2 6.5 7.7 3.5 8.0
 North West 3.7 5.3 6.0 8.4 10.1 6.8 9.2 3.9 9.6
 Yorkshire and The Hum 3.6 3.4 4.6 6.9 9.0 5.6 8.0 3.1 8.2
 West Midlands 3.4 4.5 4.3 6.3 7.5 5.4 6.8 3.5 7.1
 East Midlands 2.8 3.7 3.9 6.0 7.2 5.0 6.5 2.5 6.8
 North East 1.0 1.5 1.5 2.6 3.5 1.9 3.1 1.0 3.2
 Wales 1.0 1.7 1.8 3.0 4.5 2.5 3.7 1.4 3.9
 Northern Ireland 0.7 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.3 0.7 1.2 0.4 1.2
 Indicated living in Neighbourhood
   large houses in city 36.7 26.8 20.0 8.3 3.4 21.8 5.8 29.4 4.8
   Detached family homes 22.2 24.7 25.5 20.2 11.1 30.3 14.4 30.8 14.3
   Flats in inner city 20.4 18.3 16.8 12.9 11.4 10.8 12.8 13.2 12.5
Household Income after taxes Savings and property value
 Geography
£200k+ £150-199k £100-149k £45-99.9k All others
Region
London 22% 11% 27% 16% 10%
South East 19% 25% 22% 16% 12%
East of England 10% 11% 11% 10% 10%
East Midlands 10% 6% 3% 6% 8%
North West 9% 9% 8% 10% 12%
West Midlands 8% 6% 8% 9% 8%
Scotland 5% 10% 5% 8% 8%
Wales 4% 4% 4% 4% 5%
South West 4% 4% 6% 8% 10%
North East 4% 4% 3% 3% 5%
Yorkshire and the Humber. 3% 9% 3% 7% 9%
Northern Ireland 2% 0% 1% 3% 3%
Geography Household income after taxes
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times more likely to self-identify as upper middle class compared to all others and 28 
times more likely to self-identify as upper class79 (Figure 3.1). Participants with highest 
household incomes are slightly more likely to view themselves as belonging to a social 
class compared to all other individuals (Table 3.5). When prompted to choose which 
class they think they belong to, a majority of respondents with highest household 
incomes indicate they feel that they belong to the upper middle class (53.6 percent). 
Strikingly, a significant minority (5.9 percent) indicates they belong to the upper class 
(this compares to 0.2 percent of all other respondents). Therefore, self-identification as 
part of an advantaged ‘upper’ or ‘upper middle class’ increases disproportionally at the 
top of the distribution (Figure 3.1). Economic ‘elites’ as defined by their household 
income, savings or property, disproportionately identify with advantaged social classes 
(middle and upper) (Table 3.5). Hence a majority of GBCS participants with highest 
household incomes are aware of their advantaged class position (compare with Khan, 
2012b).  
 
Figure 3.1 Percentage of self-assigned social class by household income after taxes 
(GBCS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GBCS waves 1 and 2.  
 
 
                                                 
79 Those with highest household incomes are 4.5 times more likely to know an aristocrat than are all 
others, and 4 times as likely to frequent the opera. By contrast, the top are only 1.2 times as likely to 
see hard work as important for career success. 
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Table 3.5 Self-assigned social class by household income after taxes (GBCS) 
 
Source: GBCS waves 1 and 2. 
 
Latent Class Analysis: Attitudes towards what matters for career success 
I will now turn to what can be inferred from the GBCS about attitudes towards 
economic inequality. Inferred needs to be stressed, as specific data on views towards 
economic inequality is not available, hence proxy measures including attitudes towards 
what is important for career success and whether social mobility is seen as easier, are 
referred to. Specifically, I analyse responses to the GBCS question “Here is a list of 
things that are sometimes said to be important in helping people to get a good job and 
achieve career success. Please indicate which, in your opinion are the three most 
important” as a proxy for views on economic inequality. This question included 17 
response options; hence LCA on these items was run to identify response patterns, i.e. 
which items were chosen together80. USoc data does not include comparable attitudinal 
data; however, I compared the distribution of answers in the GBCS to the one of the 
small GfK surveys connected with the GBCS81.  
GBCS respondents were most likely to pick ‘level of education’ as one of their 
three choices (58 percent). ‘Level of education’ was also the most popular first choice 
(25 percent picked it first). The next most frequently chosen items were ‘hard work’, 
‘personal ambition’ and ‘natural ability’ (Figure 3.2). I term these items ‘meritocratic’ 
                                                 
80 I conducted the Latent Class Analysis as part of the MY555 Multivariate Analysis and Measurement 
course at LSE (the assignment was awarded a first). I am very grateful for Dr Sally Stares for her helpful 
advice.  
81 The GfK data is not based on a random sample but on a quota sample. Therefore, this data cannot be 
used to make inferences to the population which is why I focus my analysis on the GBCS data which has 
the advantage of having a much larger sample size. Nevertheless, there is a striking similarity between 
the distributions of GfK and GBCS responses. The first three most mentioned items occur in the same 
order, and the five most mentioned items are the same. Therefore, I proceed to analyse the GBCS data 
acknowledging that it is not representative of the population. 
£200k+ £150-199k £100-149k £45-99.9k All others Sav>200k All others Prop>500k All others 
 Identification with social class
Think they belong to a class 55.4 55.2 55.0 52.3 48.7 56.4 50.1 59.0 49.8
 Self-identify as blonging to
   Upper middle class 53.6 39.4 29.3 11.7 4.7 32.0 8.1 36.3 7.5
   Middle middle class 31.4 43.0 48.0 42.8 27.0 46.5 33.5 47.0 33.4
   Upper class 5.9 1.7 0.9 0.3 0.2 2.1 0.2 2.0 0.2
Attitudes to social class
Household Income after taxes Savings** and property value
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following Friedman and Taylor (2015)82. The items related to social class or ‘social 
reproduction’ (‘being born into a wealthy family’, ‘having been to private school’, 
‘having good social connections’, ‘having a family business to go to’, ‘having the right 
accent’, and ‘class’) are much less likely to be picked as important for career success 
and getting a good job. This is very interesting given that the survey was advertised as a 
survey about class in Great Britain; in a society in which class is said to be important 
(Savage et al., 2013). It is a somewhat ironic finding that only a small minority (4 
percent) of the 325,000 participants, who were inclined to fill in an online survey about 
social class in Great Britain, actually indicate that “class” is important for career 
success. When combing all response options related to social class or ‘social 
reproduction’, the probability of GBCS respondents to choose any of these responses 
rises to 35 percent, still a minority. 
LCA is a long-established technique developed by Lazarsfeld in 1950 “in which 
the observed associations between a set of categorical variables, regarded as indicators 
of an unobserved typology, are accounted for by a small number of latent categories” 
(Evans and Mills, 1998, p. 92). I used LCA to explore the associations between the 
three response options to reach a description of the latent variable ‘attitude towards 
what is important for career success’. The LCA was conducted on the 17 items and 
two-, three- and four-class models were fitted to the GfK and GBCS data. I analysed 
the probabilities of mentioning any item irrespective of the order of choice83. The 
patterns of response probabilities were inspected to reach an interpretation of the 
‘contents’ of classes to assess whether there are response profiles which favour either 
‘meritocratic’, ‘social reproduction’ or ‘other’ criteria.  
                                                 
82 Friedman and Taylor (2015, p. 19-20) state that “[t]he first, which we label ‘meritocratic’ criteria, 
consists of the categories ‘hard work’, ‘ambition’, and ‘natural ability’. The second set, which we label 
‘social reproduction’ criteria, consist of ‘being born into a wealthy family’, ‘having been to private 
school’, ‘having good social connections’, ‘having the right accent’, and ‘class’. This leaves the more 
ambiguous and amorphous categories of ‘luck’, ‘level of education’, ‘good looks/appearance’, ‘your 
ethnic group’, ‘being a man’, ‘having good health’, ‘being a woman’, and ‘social skills’, which we simply 
term ‘other’ here”.  
83 Therefore, I recoded the 17 response options corresponding to the relevant survey question into 
binary variables. 
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Item
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
Personal ambition 0.186 0.512 0.166 0.621 0.373 1.000 0.000 0.150 0.632
Hard work 0.118 0.689 0.117 0.744 0.593 0.500 0.683 0.102 0.764
Natural ability 0.143 0.449 0.113 0.000 1.000 0.174 0.501 0.106 0.576
Level of education 0.465 0.615 0.445 0.709 0.505 1.000 1.000 0.401 0.000
Social connections 0.552 0.161 0.561 0.213 0.111 0.080 0.199 0.574 0.218
Wealthy family 0.423 0.034 0.444 0.046 0.025 0.021 0.053 0.473 0.045
Class 0.185 0.015 0.195 0.021 0.010 0.010 0.025 0.208 0.017
Right accent 0.048 0.007 0.050 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.053 0.010
Private school 0.264 0.011 0.280 0.016 0.009 0.010 0.017 0.301 0.016
Family business 0.095 0.009 0.101 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.108 0.015
Ethnic group 0.031 0.003 0.033 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.035 0.004
Good looks 0.074 0.024 0.076 0.031 0.016 0.010 0.024 0.079 0.037
Being a man 0.082 0.008 0.087 0.012 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.093 0.011
Being a woman 0.007 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.001
Social skills 0.134 0.284 0.125 0.364 0.183 0.136 0.282 0.119 0.378
Luck 0.178 0.162 0.185 0.170 0.148 0.042 0.162 0.174 0.251
Good health 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.026 0.010 0.006 0.020 0.019 0.026
('prior') class 
probabilities 0.220 0.780 0.202 0.439 0.359 0.217 0.292 0.181 0.309
Legend (categorization of items based upon hypothesized and observed latent class models)
Meritocratic
Education
Social reproduction
Ascriptive
Social Skills
Other items
Two-class Three-class Four-class
Figure 3.2 GBCS responses to “the three most important things” for “helping people to 
get a good job and achieve career success” in percent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GBCS wave 1. 
 
Table 3.6 Response probabilities for each ‘mentioned’ item conditional on class (GBCS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Models with 17 variables. Cells highlighted in grey if response probability > 50 percent.  
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All latent class solutions derive a majority of respondents who selected meritocratic 
items and education, and a minority who pick education and social reproduction items 
as important for career success and getting a good job. Even among this minority, 
participants’ probabilities to choose ‘class’ as important for career success are only 
about 20 percent. As discussed, these observations are quite extraordinary given that 
the survey was about social class. Respondents’ views are at odds with research which 
demonstrates that Britain is not an education-based meritocracy (Bukodi et al., 2016), 
and that social class background has a substantial effect on earnings even controlling 
for a variety of important predictors (Laurison and Friedman, 2016). 
All LCA analyses (two-, three- and four-class solutions) identified a majority of 
respondents who chose meritocratic items alongside level of education and a minority 
who chose social reproduction items alongside level of education (Table 3.6). 
Specifically, the two-class solution divides the GBCS sample into a vast majority (78 
percent) of individuals with highest probabilities for choosing ‘personal ambition’, 
‘hard work’ and ‘level of education’, and a minority (22 percent) with highest (though 
moderate) probabilities for choosing the ‘social reproduction’ items ‘social 
connections’ and ‘wealthy family’ alongside ‘education’. 
 The three-class solution includes a minority of individuals in class 1 (20 
percent) who are most likely to choose ‘social connections’, ‘wealthy family’ as well as 
‘level of education’ (with probabilities around the 45-50 percent mark for each of these 
items). The largest class (44 percent) accounts for high probabilities of choosing 
‘personal ambition’, ‘hard work’ and ‘level of education’. The second largest class (36 
percent) is again most likely to choose meritocratic items, with a probability of 1 for 
choosing ‘natural ability’, of 0.59 for choosing ‘hard work’ and of 0.51 for education. 
Finally, the four-class solution also identifies a minority (18 percent) with moderate 
response probabilities of mentioning ‘social reproduction’ items (with probabilities 
around the 50 percent mark for ‘social connections’ and ‘wealthy family’) and 
‘education’ (0.40). On the other hand, the remaining three classes which constitute the 
majority of participants have high probabilities of selecting a combination of 
meritocratic items and education.  
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The latent class allocations were not used for posterior analysis84, because the 
LCAs were unable to identify a coherent latent typology of response patterns and 
because inspection of the latent class allocations of the ‘best’ fitting four-class model 
showed that while some responses can be ‘cleanly’ assigned to a latent class, many are 
ambiguous; with probabilities of around 0.5. Therefore, even though the LCA clearly 
highlighted that there is a distinction between a minority ‘social reproduction’ and a 
majority of one or more ‘meritocratic’ latent classes across the two samples (GBCS and 
GfK85), as well as across the fitted models (two, three and four-class solutions), the 
latent class allocations were not applied in further analysis.  
Participants with highest household incomes are more likely to choose 
meritocratic items, and less likely to pick ‘social reproduction’ items as one of the three 
possible choices of what they view as most important to get a good job and achieve 
career success. Descriptive statistics of response options conditional on household 
income after taxes highlight that there is a clear economic gradient in participants’ 
response choices (Figure 3.3; see Table 3.7 for figures). GBCS respondents are more 
likely to name ‘meritocratic’ items including ‘hard work’, ‘level of education’, 
‘personal ambition’ and ‘natural ability’ as their household income band increases, as 
well as less likely to select ‘social reproduction’ items. Specifically, respondents with 
household incomes of £200k and above are 20 percent more likely to mention ‘hard 
work’ as important for success, 10 percent more likely to select ‘level of education’, 15 
percent more likely to choose ‘personal ambition’ and 32 percent more likely to pick 
‘natural ability’ than are respondents with household income below £45k. At the same 
time, the highest earners are 37 percent less likely to choose any item related to ‘social 
reproduction’86.  
Similarly, my qualitative interview findings include that a majority of 
participants stress hard work as important, and that only about one-third of participants 
indicates that social class is important for a person’s probability of earning a high 
income (unprompted). Meritocratic views are prominent, including the view that 
structural disadvantage can be overcome with talent and determination (Littler, 2013). 
 
                                                 
84 The model also did not have a good fit. 
85 Results which are not presented here.  
86 They are also less likely to pick ‘social skills’, ‘looks’, ‘gender’ or ‘ethnic group’ as well as ‘health’. 
There is no economic gradient for the category ‘luck’. 
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Figure 3.3 What is important for career success by household income (GBCS) 
 
Source: GBCS wave 1. 
Note: The social class/background category refers to the ‘social reproduction’ criteria, 
consisting of ‘being born into a wealthy family’, ‘having been to private school’, ‘having good 
social connections’, ‘having the right accent’ and ‘class’. 
 
Table 3.7 What is important for career success by household income (GBCS) 
 
Source: GBCS waves 1 and 2. 
 
The GBCS data provides some support for Khan’s (2011) and Sherman’s (2016) 
assertion that wealthy ‘elites’ attribute their privileged position to their own hard work 
and talent. However, it is important to highlight that all participants regardless of their 
household income, are likely to indicate that hard work and level of education are 
important. These ‘meritocratic beliefs’ are strong among all GBCS respondents, not 
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only for the economic ‘elites’. ‘Elites’ are most distinctive compared to all others 
because of their wealth, their belonging to the ‘elite’ social class, their housing (in large 
houses in the city) and their self-identification as upper middle class. They are not as 
distinctive when it comes to their attitudes towards what matters for career success, 
although they are more likely to hold meritocratic views and less likely to indicate that 
items related to social class are important. 
Do participants’ attitudes vary by social background? There are slight 
differences in responses to what is viewed as important for career success, conditional 
on household income between respondents with and without NS-SEC1 backgrounds87. 
Individuals with household incomes of £200k or higher who are from advantaged NS-
SEC1 backgrounds are slightly less likely than those from less advantaged backgrounds 
to select ‘meritocratic’ items, and slightly more likely to choose ‘social reproduction’ 
items as important for career success (Figure 3.4). GBCS respondents with household 
incomes below £45k on the other hand, are generally less likely to pick meritocratic 
items and more likely to indicate that social class or background are important for 
career success. However, the effect of having a NS-SEC1 background is the opposite 
among those with lower household incomes: those with NS-SEC1 backgrounds are 
slightly more likely to select ‘meritocratic’ items, and slightly less likely to choose 
‘social class/background’ as important for career success than those without. Hence, 
differences in views towards what is important for career success among those with 
highest and lowest household incomes, conditional on social class background, are 
small.  
 
Attitudes towards social mobility and political influence 
A further question in the GBCS measures attitudes towards social mobility: “Compared 
to your parents’ generation, do you think it is easier or harder for people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds to be upwardly socially mobile?”88 GBCS respondents 
with highest household incomes are only slightly more likely (12 percent more so) to 
indicate that upward social mobility became easier or a little easier than are all others 
                                                 
87 More precisely, I use an approximation of NS-SEC1 following Friedman et al. (2015). The GBCS survey 
included a question on the occupation of the main income earner when the respondent was 14 years 
old. 
88 With response options: ‘A lot easier’, ‘a little easier’, ‘no difference/don’t know’, ‘a little harder’ and 
‘a lot harder’. 
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(Table 3.8). There is also an economic gradient in responses as to whether respondents 
feel they can influence political decisions, with individuals with highest household 
incomes being 50 percent more likely to indicate that they feel they can influence 
decisions affecting Britain compared to all others (see also Laurison, 2015 on the 
political efficacy of GBCS ‘elites’). Therefore, those with highest household incomes 
are slightly more likely to indicate that social mobility became easier, and substantially 
more likely to feel that they can influence decisions affecting Britain. 
 
Figure 3.4 What is important for career success by socio-economic background (GBCS) 
 
Source: GBCS waves 1 and 2. 
 
Table 3.8 Attitudes of GBCS respondents by household income, savings and property 
value 
 
Source: GBCS waves 1 and 2. 
 
Conclusion 
Firstly, I will reiterate the limitations of analysing the GBCS, a self-selected online 
survey (Friedman et al., 2015). It is not possible to infer these findings to the general 
population. Nevertheless, there is “no reason to suspect that the people who responded 
to the survey have different sets of relationships among their attributes than do non-
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respondents” hence “it is unlikely that the patterns we see are solely the result of 
selection bias” (Ibid, p. 282, emphasis in original). In addition, given the lack of 
quantitative data on economic ‘elites’ in the UK, an analysis of the GBCS is justified 
due to its rich data on a large number of respondents with top household incomes. 
The main finding from this exploration of the GBCS is that those with top 
household incomes are distinct from all others based on their vast amounts of wealth 
(their savings and property), their self-identification as upper middle or upper class and 
their location in large houses or flats in the city. In addition, they are much more likely 
to be working in a senior managerial occupation, or have a senior managerial 
background than are all others. Respondents with highest household incomes are less 
distinctive in regard to their attitudes. Even though they are more likely to indicate that 
‘meritocratic’ items are important for career success, these items are popular among all 
GBCS respondents. The LCA demonstrated that a majority of respondents selects 
meritocratic items and education and only a minority chooses education and social 
reproduction items as important for career success and getting a good job. GBCS 
economic ‘elites’ are especially likely to hold meritocratic views (Khan, 2012b), 
however most GBCS participants view meritocratic items as important for career 
success. I will now turn to my interview findings, discussing the role of meritocratic 
views for perceptions of economic inequality89. 
                                                 
89 Part of these findings have been presented in an LSE International Inequalities Institute working 
paper (Hecht, 2017). 
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Chapter 4 Meritocratic top incomes: Economic evaluation by ‘the 
market’ 
Introduction 
Interview participants’ perceptions of high incomes, and top income and wealth shares, 
are closely related to how they view the production of top incomes, specifically the 
evaluative practices which are used to assess the economic contribution of individuals. 
The evaluative practices, described in the interviews, are fundamentally based on 
economic principles; hence, I refer to the cultural process of ‘economic evaluation’. 
Evaluation is a cultural process because it is based on shared understandings of how 
value is ascribed (Lamont, 2012). For participants, this shared understanding is that the 
yardstick of worth is money, and that evaluations of worth are based on market 
performance (Fourcade, 2011; Lamont, 2012). Top incomes are narrated as being 
determined by competition in the market. The ‘market’, narrated as a neutral 
instrument, is viewed as best suited to determine the economic value of individuals and 
the distribution of economic resources (see also Khan, 2015; Wisman, 2013). 
I argue that inequality is made sense of as well as ‘rationalized’ through 
economically ‘rational’ evaluative practices (Fourcade, 2011; Lamont et al., 2014; 
Bourdieu, 1986). An important rational, evaluative process used to determine the 
economic value of individuals is the assessment of performance pay, which includes 
hedge fund compensation structures, ‘formulas’ for traders and staff rankings. 
Economic evaluative practices determine how profit is divided up within firms and 
departments. These practices are standard in the top income-generating organizations 
where participants work including fund managers, investment banks, hedge funds and 
barristers’ chambers.  
Top income earners envision a certain market ideology, one of neutrality and 
meritocracy. Participants view differences in income as resulting from the market 
forces of supply and demand, as taught in basic economics courses (Atkinson, 2015). 
Market competition is viewed as determining merit. Hence, interviewees explain that 
top incomes, and in the case of entrepreneurs, also top wealth, are meritocratic. The 
discourse of neutral market forces as the best instrument to distribute resources stems 
from economic theory, rooted in neoclassical thinking (McGoey, 2017). The cultural 
process of economic evaluation can be traced to the theory of the marginal productivity 
of income distribution by neoclassical economist John Bates Clark, which posits that 
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under the assumption of free competition, incomes from labour as well as capital reflect 
their respective social contributions (Stiglitz, 2015a; McGoey, 2017). Hence, 
“neoclassical theory sees differences in income as related to differences in the social 
contributions individuals and the assets that they control make” (Ibid., p. 30). It 
becomes clear that a theory which includes “the idea that remuneration levels are an 
accurate reflection of one’s economic contribution” is enmeshed with moral 
considerations, suggesting that workers and capitalists deserve their rewards (McGoey, 
2017, p. 263). As discussed, McGoey (2017) argues that Schumpeter criticised Clark 
for entangling a theory of income distribution with a theory of morality. Nevertheless, 
prominent contemporary economist Mankiw (2013, p. 29f), describing marginal utility 
theories of income distribution as the “economist’s standard framework” claims that 
“[i]n the standard competitive labor market, a person’s earnings equal the value of his 
or her marginal productivity”. Mankiw’s suggestion that the high incomes of the top 1 
percent mostly reflect their high productivity includes an implicit moral claim about 
desert. 
However, not all participants explain that market outcomes reflect social 
contribution; there is variation in the sample. While a two-thirds majority are 
‘economic evaluators’ who perceive market outcomes as deserved, a significant 
minority are ‘social evaluators’ who question evaluative practices based on money as a 
metric of worth and do not view market outcomes as reflecting contribution. Notably, 
both economic and social evaluators acknowledge social relationships as important for 
determining top incomes, and criticize those at the very top as playing a ‘game’ or 
coming together in a ‘cabal’ to exploit shareholders and clients. This finding supports 
the perspective of top incomes as socially constructed, and challenges views which see 
top incomes as result of economic productivity (Mankiw, 2013). 
In this chapter, I will firstly provide context by discussing the narrative that 
there has been a social shift away from inherited entitlement to meritocratic privilege 
(Khan, 2011). Then, I discuss the key emergent themes; top incomes as resulting from 
hard work and long hours (Khan, 2011; Sherman, 2017a), the idea of a trade-off 
between high incomes and a work-life balance, and equality of opportunity. I then 
develop my argument that participants make sense of top incomes through the 
economic evaluation processes which bring about top incomes. Market competition is 
assumed to ensure that economic reward reflects contribution. Therefore, top incomes 
are narrated as deserving if they are derived from a share of the value “created” for 
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clients, investors and shareholders (Van der Zwan, 2014). Hence, I argue, building on 
Bourdieu (1998), that contemporary economic ‘elites’ in the financial industry 
legitimate top incomes, and therefore inequality, through ‘service to capital’. Lastly, I 
discuss the notion ‘competition’ as narrated in my sample, discussing the 
characteristics of social and economic evaluators. 
 
From inherited entitlement to meritocratic privilege 
Research on economic inequality is instructive for sociological shifts of economic 
advantage. This literature highlights a shift from an aristocratic landed class towards a 
financialized meritocratic wealth ‘elite’ with top incomes and wealth (Piketty, 2014; 
Savage, 2014; Atkinson, 2015). As discussed in Chapter 1, income inequality has 
increased substantially in the UK since the 1980s, and top income shares are currently 
moving towards the extreme heights of those in the early twentieth century (Piketty, 
2014, p. 315). By contrast, the ownership of wealth has changed dramatically over the 
past century and is now much more equally distributed than in the Victorian era 
(Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2015). The nineteenth century distinction between the three 
social classes of workers, capitalists and landlords (the aristocracy and nobility) are not 
so clear-cut anymore because wealth is shared more widely; a person may receive 
income from all three sources, and because those with the highest incomes from labour 
can accumulate wealth and increasingly have high capital incomes (Atkinson, 2015). 
Hence, the economic ‘elite’ in the UK has changed. There has been a shift away from 
inherited entitlement by aristocrats, such as the landed gentry, who derived income 
from rents, towards a global financialized ‘elite’ who derive income from labour as 
well as capital and can therefore legitimize their advantage in ‘meritocratic’ market 
terms.  
Whereas old ‘elites’ relied on inherited entitlement, new ‘elites’ rely on their 
privilege; the simultaneous performance of hard work and ease (Khan 2008; 2011). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the rise of the idea of meritocracy in the last half a 
century went alongside increases in top incomes. As I will discuss in the next chapter, 
perceived changes are not just related to economic inequality and social class, but also 
in regard to gender and ‘race’, with elites being seen as more ‘open’ (see Khan, 2008). 
However, despite all the differences between old entitled and new privileged elites, 
there is one key similarity between these groups of crucial importance for the 
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conceptualization of social class. As I will discuss in Chapter 7, both the aristocracy 
and new elites are decommodified; their capital income frees them from the need to 
engage with the labour market. However, many of the ‘meritocratic’ new elites, 
including those with top incomes in finance or inheritors, choose to work even though 
they do not need to (Godechot, 2016; Sherman, 2017a).  
In my interviews, participants at the height of their careers in senior positions 
reflected on this change “from landed aristocracy” to a “merit-based” system, as well as 
on the sudden financial deregulation of the Big Bang in 1986. This shift, which is 
perceived to have coincided with the rise of the American investment banks, was 
generally described as desirable as it allows people to “change their position in the 
world” (Interview transcript 6). For instance, a hedge fund manager with income of 
approximately £5-50 million explains that current levels of inequality are “a lot better 
[…] compared to the class system”: 
 
Basically, it mattered hugely 100 years ago if you’re born into an aristocratic family 
versus… I mean, it didn’t matter how smart you were; people from the place I was born 
in would be working at the mill at 14, and do I think that’s wrong?  Of course I do, who 
doesn’t? [laughs] (Interview transcript, 16). 
 
This narrative highlights than in general, the shift at the top of the social class structure 
is perceived as positive. The change towards a meritocratic system is also embraced by 
another participant; an executive of a large financial institution (income group £401k-
£1m). He explained how the City of London embraced a merit-based system, imported 
from the US through American companies: 
 
I joined [prestigious accounting firm] because I loved this notion of meritocracy that 
they talked about - I loved it! This idea that actually the only thing that mattered was 
whether you were good at what you did and the fact that people were constantly going 
to be evaluating whether you were good at what you were asked to do and if you 
were you could get on... I loved that... I loved the fact that they had glass-fronted offices 
so you could see people, so the people who are running the firm weren’t hiding […] it 
was so un-English (Interview transcript 6, emphasis added). 
 
This interview excerpt shows the participant’s enthusiasm for the notion of 
meritocracy. He embraced the ethos that instead of social background, it was 
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individuals’ performance, constantly evaluated, which now mattered for career success. 
The building design in the City of London reflects this notion of meritocracy; glass-
fronted offices facilitate constant evaluation of staff. During my fieldwork, the notion 
of meritocracy seemed embedded in the architecture of the City of London, with its 
numerous glass fronts and open plan offices. As I will show, constant evaluation of 
merit is key for how top incomes are made sense of.  
 Before we had taken our seats for the interview, while turning down the meeting 
room temperature the same senior executive explained that he does not like people to 
get too warm and comfortable in meetings. As we were sitting in the chilled, glass-
fronted office for the interview, he also expressed concern about the current levels of 
economic inequality which seem to have come along with this shift towards 
meritocracy: 
 
Growing up in a country that was still very class driven, I am on the one hand delighted 
that the country has opened up and that it is now possible within one generation to, if you 
are successful, to actually, emerge and have a different position in the world. […] On the 
other hand, it would […] be odd if I thought that all we needed to do was to replace 
one class system with another... and that must be the risk, the risk is that in the last 30 
or 50 years we have replaced our traditional sort of landed aristocracy based upon title, 
and all of those things, with a new ruling power, which is based upon the City of 
London [and or the media industry etc.]. Because clearly what society needs [is] for 
every generation to feel that they have the opportunity to succeed and to enjoy the 
benefits of success. And that’s a [difficult] balance […] I’m not sure we got it right at the 
moment (Interview transcript 6, emphasis added). 
 
Hence, like the hedge fund manager, this senior executive welcomes a meritocratic 
system over an aristocratic one and values the liberal concept of equality of opportunity 
(Littler, 2013), but also questions whether a meritocracy can deliver just outcomes.  
 A couple of other participants noted that the UK has not only imported 
meritocracy from the US, but also increasing inequality and greed. One financial 
adviser, privately educated with an Oxbridge degree, reflects back on this issue 
explaining: 
 
I worked for [name of bank] that was […] very American and I liked all that 
meritocracy stuff... I mean I really liked it, much more than the stuffy English kind 
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of establishment type approach […] I liked that Americanism, but the problem was 
that the Americans, once they worked out how to enrich themselves at other people’s 
expense, it all just went; it got completely out of hand, it went mad. It did not start like 
that, but it became like that, and that’s why we had the financial crisis because the City 
was just full of these people [who have a] smugness and unpleasantness [about them] 
(Interview transcript 8, emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, even though participants generally embrace the change towards meritocracy, 
they also raised concerns about the results of meritocracy, either vast inequality at the 
top or the unfortunate side-effect that the meritocratic culture of American firms 
allowed some people to only enrich themselves (as in above quote). 
 
Key emergent themes: Meritocratic top incomes  
Meritocratic beliefs are common when participants narrate what explains inequality. I 
asked participants why they think there are differences in income between individuals, 
why some people have higher incomes than others and what kind of people earn high 
incomes. Key emergent themes in the data include that participants stress hard work 
and long working hours, that top incomes are a choice and a trade-off; as well as the 
importance of talent or ability, and ambition and drive. In addition, education is 
viewed as important, specifically academic achievement, degrees from prestigious 
universities and the acquisition of social skills or confidence afforded in private 
education. In this narrative, education is a baseline; a necessary though not sufficient 
condition for earning top incomes. I will discuss these findings in turn demonstrating 
that inequality is generally perceived as the result of a meritocratic process.  
 
Hard work and long hours 
A key and recurrent theme in the data is hard work and long hours (Khan, 2008; 
Sherman, 2017a). Quantitative text analysis of my interview data, discussed in Chapter 
2, identified hard work and education (private schooling), as important narratives. Two-
thirds of participants refer to either their hard work ethic, or that working hard, 
efficiently or smartly is important for economic success (n=20). This is similar to the 
GBCS data, where approximately two-thirds (67 percent) of participants with 
household incomes higher than £200k indicate that hard work is important for career 
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success (compared to 56 percent of those with household income after taxes lower than 
£45k). Both the GBCS and the interview data highlight that hard work is viewed as 
important for career success by individuals with highest (household) incomes. 
An example of the many, many instances in which hard work is referred to during 
the interviews, includes a financial entrepreneur’s explanation of how he finds good 
traders. During the interview, in his grand City office furnished with colonial style 
decor, I often felt that this participant was providing me with career advice of how to be 
successful. For instance, he advised that it is always beneficial to go out and meet 
people for lunch, to learn about markets, rather than having lunch at the desk. He 
explains that discerning a hard work ethic is important for selecting traders for 
recruitment: 
 
If they have no energy - forget about it.  They’re gonna be no good and they’ve got to be 
really driven and they have to work, they have to think seven days a week. […] No rest.  
And you have to work on Sunday night. That’s my other secret. Then you’re ahead of the 
whole world (Interview transcript 18).   
 
Hence, hard work and long hours are viewed as necessary for succeeding in finance. A 
hedge fund manager, in a modern office, not too far from the other entrepreneur, 
although he holds very different political views, similarly explains that hard work is 
key for achieving top incomes in his industry: 
 
You’re not gonna get money from doing this unless you work your absolute socks off 
[…] I mean if you’re committed to a career in something like this to earn money, you 
know, you’re committed to working very, very hard basically. So, lifestyle is kind of 
what falls out of it at the end but certainly initially you don’t have time to spend any 
money because you are working so hard. Ahm, and if you’re not [working hard] you are 
not interested enough to stay in your job basically (Interview transcript 15). 
 
Therefore, both entrepreneurs, by talking about their staff as well as their own 
experiences, view hard work as essential for top incomes. Personal stories of long 
working hours are common among respondents; for instance, a young, married 
entrepreneur with small children describes his career trajectory with lengthy references 
to working hours: 
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I was working 14 hours a day in the office, I very rarely… you’d count on one hand in a 
month the number of times I got the tube home, cos the firm only paid for a taxi if you 
went home after 9 or 10 o’clock (Interview transcript 12). 
 
This story of taxi rides, very familiar to me as a former auditor, reflects a contradiction 
in the elite narrative of hard work (Khan, 2008). Saying you took a taxi home means 
you signify that you have been working hard, even though taking taxis is a comfortable, 
effortless way to get home, and is used as an incentive by corporations, alongside free 
dinners and snacks, to keep their junior staff working longer hours. Later on in the 
interview, held in an imposing café near his workplace, the type place with attentive 
staff, a Viennese-style coffee menu and chandeliers, the young entrepreneur asserts that 
even though background certainly affects people’s chances in life, working hard is the 
most important thing for success: 
 
There’s always going to be inequality […] there is no panacea, and it’s my firmly held 
belief that if you work hard and you’re ambitious and you’re willing to make the 
appropriate sacrifices to get ahead in life; you’ll get ahead in life. Simple as (Interview 
transcript 12). 
 
He strongly embraces the idea that as long as you work hard, it is possible to get ahead 
even without the privileges available to those who are more advantaged. Inequality, is 
what it is, but can be overcome through hard work. Similar to the young entrepreneur, 
many participants stress that where people come from does not predict where they end 
up, the idea of hard work leading to social mobility and success is cherished and often 
referred to. In the following chapter, I discuss how this view can flourish despite visible 
structural inequalities.  
 
Trade-off between high income and work life balance: High income as a choice 
A theme related to hard work is that participants explain that there is a trade-off 
between high income and having time off; half of participants referred to this idea 
(n=14). The senior executive who prefers chilled meeting rooms, critically reflects on 
his motivations for his own career. He makes up for the chilly room by telling personal 
stories, explaining how he fell into his career in finance because he sought to impress 
the family of his future wife. His reasoning highlights that the concept of a trade-off 
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refers to a temporal choice between comfortable working hours or working hard now 
which will provide a “more enjoyable life” in the future: 
 
It’s a reasonable question isn’t it… what is it that drives you to work those unreasonable 
hours... what is it that drives you to take those risks, because you do take risks... is it so 
that you can live a more comfortable life, a more enjoyable life? Or is it because you 
actually want to provide for the future of your children? (Interview transcript 6). 
 
This narrative highlights the contradictory nature of the idea of hard work (Khan 2008; 
2011); two of which I will focus on. Firstly, seeking to earn in order to provide for 
children and grandchildren (n=5) contrasts with the meritocratic idea that those 
individuals who work hard should be rewarded. Secondly, the motif of meritocratic 
hard work also diverges from some participants’ aspirations to effectively 
decommodify themselves from the labour market as ‘rentiers’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Atkinson, 2006; Piketty, 2014, p. 21) and from narratives of richness as being able to 
live off one’s capital. Though the meritocratic market is cherished, it is also a source of 
anxiety. Therefore, participants seek a release from the strains of the market, for 
themselves and their children. I will more fully discuss these contradictions in Chapter 
7.  
Further, a fund manager, whom I interviewed on the phone, refers to this trade-
off by comparison with those on low incomes: 
 
So, even those with less income; they may be perfectly happy in another particular peer 
group and certainly for others with lower income they probably spend more time with 
their families and they make other trade-offs that they are very comfortable with 
(Interview transcript 11). 
 
This view, that top income earners have chosen to earn while others decided to spend 
more time with their families begs the question if top income earners actually work 
hard? Khan (2011) finds that the privileged students he studied did not work very hard; 
rather they engaged in a performance of hard work. Engaging in this performance with 
lightness and ease is central for being elite. Khan derived this finding because he was 
able to contrast what people say they do with what they actually do; a methodological 
advantage of ethnography (Jerolmack and Khan, 2014). This was not possible as part of 
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my study; however, five participants stressed that they enjoyed their work and the 
intellectual stimulation it provided, in particular entrepreneurs with extreme top 
incomes. In fact, four participants mentioned that work for them is not like work at all 
but more like a hobby. One of them is a hedge fund manager, who during an interview 
in his modern, comfortable office says happily: 
 
I love what I do, because I find it so interesting, and so for me it’s no trade-off at all 
because it’s like a hobby if you see what I mean because I, my big obsessions in life are 
politics and economics and history and they all come together in this job (Interview 
transcript 15).  
 
Another entrepreneur, impeccably dressed and interested in Foucauldian theory, 
reflects on his own top income and why it is possible for him to pay his staff a lot less: 
 
I do work very hard, but people in my company who are paid £25,000, work 
incredibly hard too. And, yes, I have responsibilities, but […] over the years I’ve kind 
of dealt with the layers of stress that you get […] it feels like something that’s not really 
a burden now […] So, with my role, so I have busy days and weeks, where I have to 
work very intensively, and, I think skilfully, but, generally, it’s not really hard work 
and it doesn’t feel like hard work. Therefore, kind of, my hours are less than much 
lower paid people in my company. My work is a lot more fun because I get to meet a lot 
more people and go to lots of events and have lunches and just travel […]. Yeah, so I 
don’t subscribe to it, but I can quite cynically go along with [playing this game]… 
because I’ve also got calls on my income and responsibilities, family responsibilities, 
too, yeah (Interview transcript 3, emphasis added). 
 
This narrative shows that there is some awareness for the misrecognition (Bourdieu, 
2010 [1984]) inherent in the ‘elite’ narrative of hard work (Khan, 2011). An example 
from the above quote is the entrepreneur questioning his own power of being able to 
pay his staff much less than he pays himself, acknowledging that hard work is not what 
explains differences in pay. 
 
Equality of opportunity: Talent, ambition and education 
A minor theme which emerged was that participants stress that talent and ability are 
important predictors of success (n= 5; 4). This theme includes the idea that differences 
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in income reflect a hierarchy in talent and ability, as found by Bamfield and Horton 
(2009). Additionally, participants also mention that one needs to have the drive or 
hunger to want more, an ambition and determination. Particularly, participants in more 
junior positions stress that they need to be self-starting and motivated in their jobs. 
Those more advanced in their careers explain that these are qualities which they look 
for in their staff. A socially mobile, financially successful entrepreneur in the City of 
London discusses differences in incomes, highlighting the importance of talent and 
education: 
 
Well, some people are, naturally smarter than others... the work we do here you gotta 
be pretty intelligent; I think natural intelligence, education obviously makes a big 
difference, the people that embrace education. I think is very important, I don’t believe 
the thesis that there is, there are no opportunities for lots of people in this country, I think 
there are opportunities... well I came from a very poor background and came through 
the state school system along with everybody else, and I didn’t see any obstacles […] 
for me to develop my career in a way that I wanted, and maybe I was lucky (Interview 
transcript 13, emphasis added). 
 
This quote highlights a preference for equality of opportunity related to the meritocratic 
view that natural ability and educational success are a prerequisite for career success 
(as discussed, many GBCS respondents with top incomes also held meritocratic views). 
The narrative also introduces another, minor theme which shows that luck is 
acknowledged, as I will discuss. 
For most interview participants, education explains differences in income and is 
seen as a necessary, though not sufficient condition for becoming a high income earner 
(two-thirds). Some participants explain that those with top incomes also have top 
education; 3 participants mention that they themselves have a top 1 percent education. 
Often, participants refer to their own educational qualifications, particularly Oxbridge 
degrees and private schooling. Of the participants, 13 were educated at Oxbridge and a 
further 5 at elite London universities. Meanwhile, 15 participants have undergraduate 
degrees; 13 have postgraduate degrees and only 2 have no degree-level education. 
However, these data are not representative and might be a reflection of my sampling 
strategy. Hence, like Savage and colleague’s participants, many interviewees succeeded 
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in the education system before they entered “the cut-throat world of high-level 
professional and managerial employment” (Savage, 2015c, p. 323).  
Private schooling is a key issue which I will discuss in Chapter 8. It was 
common for participants to mention that they have themselves been to private school 
even though I did not include this question in my topic guide, and never specifically 
asked for it. As I will discuss, the privately educated hold different views on the 
legitimacy of economic evaluative practices. As participants acknowledge that private 
schooling bestows advantages, it is seen as an imperative for their children. 
 
Hard work and luck 
Many participants explained that luck is an important element of success and described 
themselves as having been lucky (16/30). Hence, the interview participants were much 
more likely than GBCS respondents to mention luck90. For instance, talking about why 
some people have top incomes, a participant explains it is due to: 
 
Luck! So if you just happen to be in the right place at the right time, and I attribute a lot 
of my ability to earn a high income to lucky breaks, lucky decisions that I have made 
(Interview transcript 5). 
 
Hence, this participant acknowledges the important role of luck. Other participants 
stress that it is a combination of hard work and luck, which explains their economic 
success. For instance, a financial professional explains: 
 
There’s luck in falling into it [a high paying industry like finance], but then [...] I’ve 
worked hard since I’ve been here, to take the opportunities that I’ve had, that [name of 
company] presented me with (Interview transcript 30). 
 
Therefore, while luck is seen as a part of what is required to earn top incomes, it is hard 
work which is stressed. In the words of an entrepreneur: “you make your own luck to a 
degree” (Interview transcript 13). Further, like Sherman’s (2017) interviewees, 
participants often mentioned luck when they referred to their structural advantage. 
                                                 
90 However, in the GBCS participants could only select 3 items which they deemed most important for 
career success. 
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Attributing their economic position to luck, means their economic advantage is 
arbitrary, rather than the result of structural advantage (Ibid.) For instance, participants 
mentioned that they are lucky to have been born into families which valued education. 
Hence, many of the rich individuals in my sample acknowledge the role of luck (cf. 
Frank, 2016). However, referring to luck can also be a way of not acknowledging 
structural advantages (Sherman, 2017a). 
 
Economic evaluation: The ‘neutral’ market forces that legitimize inequality 
The emergent theme that participants refer to hard work and talent to explain their 
position is already well-established among elite scholars (Khan, 2011; Sherman, 
2017a). The fresh contribution of my study is that I address why this is the case for top 
income earners. These meritocratic ideas are sustained by the rational, evaluative 
practices which participants explain are important for how incomes in financial or 
related organizations come about (Lamont, 2012). Participants’ organizations 
(investment banks, hedge funds, barristers’ chambers) are the context in which 
economic evaluation and other relational, inequality producing processes unfold 
(Tomaskovic-Devey, 2014). The evaluation of individuals’ economic performance is 
crucial for pay setting and particularly relevant for “practices of performance and merit 
pay” at the top of the distribution (McCall et al., 2014, p. 618). 
I argue that the evaluative processes which participants explain as bringing 
about top incomes are fundamental for how participants make sense of top incomes and 
wealth. Evaluative practices based on economic principles are viewed as being 
meritocratic in nature, and reinforce meritocratic beliefs. A key evaluative process 
concerns the assessment of performance-based pay, which has been shown to 
contribute to rising top income shares (Angeles et al., 2016; Atkinson, 2015). What 
signifies merit at the top end of the income distribution is narrated as being determined 
by the market, a neutral, rational instrument. Specifically, evaluative practices 
conceptualize the value of individuals as based on increases in the value of capital. That 
is why the idea of hard work is so meaningful for top income earners, because they 
evaluate merit quantitatively based on the “creation” of wealth. Hence, performance 
pay is narrated as evidence for productivity.  
Two-thirds of participants explain differences in incomes, or their own high 
incomes, with narratives relating to the conceptual theme of economic evaluation based 
 125 
on neutral market forces91. Though what follows is a lengthy quote by a senior 
executive of a large financial firm (annual income bracket £5-50 million), it merits 
being quoted in full as an example of how participants explain that the process of 
economic evaluation brings about and justifies top incomes. The executive explains 
that we should not focus on “the number” (high bonuses in the financial sector, or the 
share of the top 1 percent of income earners) but whether “the process”, i.e. the 
evaluative practices which determine top incomes, are “inherently right”. Hence, if 
extremely high bonuses constitute a share of “value” generated for investors, clients or 
shareholders, the rational evaluative process which produces bonuses explains, 
legitimizes and ultimately rationalizes extremely high pay. Talking about top incomes, 
he explains: 
 
It’s about the contribution; it’s measured in a variety of ways. The firm has an overall 
profitability. The remuneration committee will decide how much is allocated towards 
um… bonuses if you like. Now, there is a lot of talk about bonuses in the City. […] So, 
people get paid a salary, which… might I say it’s small… it’s not small in the context of 
all of us, but nobody gets paid a salary of millions of pounds a year...  they can earn a lot 
of money but that’s based on the profitability of the firm, the contribution of the part of 
the firm that they work in, the contribution of the team that they work in, and the 
contribution of their role within that team… so it’s a multi-level [process]. Okay, so, and 
look, there’s a big focus on compensation and how people earn money at the moment 
[…] it’s the focus on a number that people have a feeling that (stresses these words 
with a feeling of discomfort) a certain number is an uncomfortable number or is it 
the process that drives the number? To me, if you have a process that is aligned to 
success, I think it is entirely right that [people who] make a valuable contribution... 
should feel that [they have the] ability to earn more money (Interview transcript 4). 
 
This quote highlights that economic rewards are seen as reflecting contribution 
(marginal productivity). Therefore, the participant cannot relate to public concerns 
about excessive bonuses; for him the number of a bonus payment is not important; 
instead it is the evaluative processes which determine top pay and the fairness of these 
                                                 
91 This theme was derived inductively and deductively; there were many references, to metrics and 
rankings as well as evaluative practices in the data. Later, I came across the theoretical work on 
evaluation by Lamont et al. (2014) and Lamont (2012) which aided the analysis of the interview data.  
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processes which matter. If the pay-setting process is the result of a share of “value 
created” for clients and shareholders, then the process is fair and therefore how high 
bonuses are should not matter. He adds that he would be concerned however; if the 
process which results in high bonuses is unfair, for instance if someone does a “bad 
job” for which they get fired, but still gets highly rewarded. Therefore, the economic 
evaluative processes are what matter, not bonuses or top incomes. 
 
Money as a yardstick of worth 
Many participants narrate money as an appropriate yardstick for worth, value or 
success (Fourcade, 2011). This finding is perhaps unsurprising given that participants 
work in finance or related industries92. For instance, a barrister, who deals with 
financial clients, explained the hierarchy among chambers by turning to his computer 
and logging onto a website with industry rankings. He explained that his barrister’s 
chamber is ranked “one of the top three or four in the country” because the financial 
value of the legal services provided is an important measure93 of who is doing the 
“best”, “most desirable” and “most important work”. Chambers are ranked based on 
market performance: 
 
Certainly, to some degree, you can use money as indices of how important the work is. 
But that’s not unreasonable, right? If someone has a case that’s worth £500 million, then 
the people they choose, they’re going to choose very carefully […] that’s the market and 
the advisors and the reputation judging who does the market consider is good enough to 
do [that] case. And so, when I say the top three or four, what I mean is when you have a 
case that’s important to someone, they [the clients] will choose the same [barristers’ 
chambers] more often than others (Interview transcript 19). 
 
This narrative highlights that the market is viewed as determining how an organization 
is ranked, and that this ranking affects the perception of the economic value of their 
staff. Another example is that participants refer to shared understandings of investment 
banks’ rankings. They explain there is the “gold standard” Goldmans [Goldman Sachs], 
                                                 
92 Many also have degrees in economics, business or finance (n=13). 
93 The participant acknowledges though that the definition of success for a barrister could also be who 
is providing the best international criminal advocacy. 
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followed by JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley. Rankings, in contrast to ratings, are zero-
sum, resulting in winners or losers (Lamont, 1992). A former investment bank CEO 
explains: “[W]ould people at RBS ever attract people from Goldman Sachs? No”. 
Therefore, the symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1998) of a financial company is viewed as 
important for top incomes. An investment banker for instance explains that one of the 
reasons for his high income is the brand value of the bank for which he works. 
Companies will hire his team because “no one is going to look stupid if they made a 
decision based on [investment bank’s] advice”. Therefore, he views his work as fairly 
remunerated, even though the bank only pays him a “small share” of the economic 
value he ‘creates’. This idea that market-based remuneration in highly-ranked 
investment banks accurately reflects employees’ economic value is somewhat 
challenged by another participant: 
 
What successful people will forget is that if you work for Goldman Sachs, you have to 
get in. That’s a tough challenge, but when you are in [it is questionable] how much of 
that success of that person, on an M&A transaction, is due because of Goldman Sachs or 
due because of the quality of that person? (Interview transcript 10). 
 
Hence, there is awareness of the symbolic capital of certain investment banks, and that 
the economic value of a financial service might be due to that symbolic capital rather 
than the marginal productivity of the individual involved.  
In addition to economic evaluative practices between firms, there are also 
evaluative practices designed to decide on the distribution of material resources within 
firms (Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2016). I have demonstrated this previously with the 
narrative of the senior executive who explained that bonuses are a reflection of 
individuals’ economic contribution. Similar to comparisons between firms, 
comparisons within firms are based on evaluative practices guided by the liberal 
economic conceptualization of money as a metric of worth. Participants routinely refer 
to ‘the market’ as an explanation for top incomes and wealth, and income differences 
more generally. The market, consisting of investors, clients and shareholders, is viewed 
as a legitimate judge of worth (see Fourcade, 2011). A focus on market performance as 
an evaluative metric for definitions of worth has been termed ‘neoliberal’ (Harvey, 
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200794; Hall and Lamont, 2013; Lamont et al., 2014). These ideas can be traced to 
liberal economic theory (McGoey, 2017; Sandmo, 2015).  
Economic evaluative practices within firms include formulas to calculate 
bonuses for investment bankers or traders (performance-based pay). Formulas are 
narrated as market based because they consist of a share of “value” created for clients, 
investors or shareholders. The market is narrated as a legitimate judge of worth which 
distributes rewards meritocratically, based on skill and effort. The closer someone’s 
work is to the ideal of being “market-determined”, the more legitimate and deserving it 
is. For instance, whether one is categorized as a “revenue generator”, and therefore 
eligible to receive high bonuses, or as a support function, has important implications for 
one’s pay. Many participants internalize these market-based evaluations of personal 
worth. For instance, a senior investment banker explains differences in incomes with 
“the value that [people] are bringing”: 
 
Companies will pay for me to help them because I help improve shareholder returns by 
saving companies quite a lot of money [on] their financing cost. So every year I have a 
sheet of how much revenue I brought to the bank, and it’s always very difficult to 
attribute to who brought what because we all work in big teams. But I generate, I am 
associated with $150-200 million of revenue per year but I get a small proportion of that. 
The amount of money I save companies; it’s probably 20 times that $200 million. So it’s 
probably $4 billion a year (Interview transcript 1). 
 
Therefore, consistent with the marginal productivity theory of income distribution, he 
views his own income as a share of the economic value generated for the firm, and 
hence as his contribution and therefore merit based. Likewise, the evaluative practice of 
paying traders using a performance-based formula makes traders internalize a market 
logic. This is done intentionally so traders are ‘incentivized’ to produce higher returns. 
A former investment bank CEO explains how formulas for traders work: 
 
The bank will calculate your cost which is square meters you use, the desk, the chair, the 
system, being Bloomberg, Reuters, whatever you have, your phone, your newspaper, 
plus a few costs that will be linked to some of the services you need, like research or 
                                                 
94 Harvey (2007) defines neoliberal ideas as those which view the market as an instrument capable of 
governing all human action. 
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other things. That costs equivalent, let’s say, to $1 million. For anything above $1 
million you have a formula, you make money. And you could make 20 or 30 percent of 
that amount. So the first million is for nothing, and then a million to 10 [million] you 
may make 20 percent, if you make over 10 million you make another 30 percent 
(Interview transcript 10). 
 
Traders’ formulas mean that top incomes from trading are viewed as reflecting the 
economic contribution of traders. This is how the legitimation of top incomes is 
socially constructed. The fact that some staff receive performance-based compensation 
and others are paid fixed salaries, means that the ‘value created’ is vastly unequally 
distributed. Those on formulas benefit while others in the firm, including personal 
assistants, who dealt with my interview requests in an incredibly efficient way, lose out 
in the distribution of revenue across the firm. 
 
Performance pay and the culture of (economic) performance 
Participants draw on “monetary distinctions” (Zelizer, 2012, p. 156) between so-called 
performance pay (including bonuses in the finance industry) and other forms of 
payment. Performance pay is viewed as market based, meritocratic and therefore 
legitimate. For instance, a chief executive at an investment firm who expressed 
concerns about rising inequality explains that he “paid a lot of people [a lot of money] 
while [he] was a partner at [investment bank]” but this seemed legitimate because 
performance pay was directly linked to the creation of financial value:  
 
I know how ruthless that was based upon performance and I know that they were 
actually generating a lot more money for the partnership than we were paying them, so I 
didn’t feel bad about that at all, and at the end of the day the partners earned what was 
left [and they only earned money in years when the firm made a profit] (Interview 
transcript 6). 
 
Therefore, top incomes are legitimate if they consist of a share of the value created for 
the firm, i.e. if they are seen as reflecting economic contribution.  
Constant evaluation is part of the culture and architecture of the City of London. 
One-third of participants referred to the performance culture including evaluative 
practices used to determine performance-based pay. These practices are standard in 
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many high-paying professions in the City of London, and include assigning members of 
staff to revenue streams and publicly ranking employees against each other. The 
following field note and quotes illustrate this. A young investment banker reflects back 
on entering the industry, stressing that “it was a shock to me sort of how competitive it 
was […] the hours and […] the demands” (Interview transcript 14). While we sit in a 
café next to his workplace for the interview, he is constantly checking his phone for 
updates; something which more senior participants rarely did; they put their phone 
away and focused their full attention on the interview. Before we started our 
conversation, the junior investment banker explained that he may have to run off during 
the interview, in case he receives an important call. As narrated by another participant, 
the idea is to “always [be] on call” (Interview transcript 2).  
Similarly, a high-flying investment bank executive, an avid story teller, narrates 
how the performance culture affects his children. With this story, he tries to convey 
how entrenched the performance culture is in all aspects of social life, including dinner 
time with family:  
 
[His children] work in banking and at the moment, the only thing they talk is about how 
am I gonna be judged in performance in order to be paid. And we are in June. Bonus is 
paid in March. And yesterday I had dinner with my son, we spent half of the dinner 
talking about the way his boss is going to rate him because that will have a link to how 
much he is gonna get paid. And he is [young]. And he works like crazy, crazy hours, but 
we are in the middle of June and he’s, for me, another four months maybe five away 
from the decision [of how his performance is evaluated] (Interview transcript 10).  
 
This story highlights ‘elite’ anxiety about how they will be evaluated in economic 
terms. In addition to creating anxiety about evaluation, the performance culture 
includes aspects of hire and fire practices, which create a sense of insecurity for many 
participants as they know they can be fired at any time. As Sherman (2017) explains, 
particularly sole providers suffer from ‘elite’ anxiety. Firing people and getting rid of 
fund managers for bad performance, plays an important role in legitimating top 
incomes. At a time when individual responsibilities are stressed, anxiety might explain 
participants’ aspirations towards capital accumulation for rentier purposes (which I will 
discuss in Chapter 7). Hence, while the market is narrated as a neutral instrument for 
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the allocation of resources, the labour market can be a source of anxiety, and a strain to 
escape from. 
Those whose performance is most closely linked to the market are 
entrepreneurs. Their performance is not evaluated by their manager, but directly by the 
market. Hence, their top incomes are viewed as the most legitimate. For example, 
hedge fund managers derive their income from a standard financial evaluation of their 
firm’s revenue based on a widely accepted formula (‘2 and 20’). Analogies to (white, 
male) footballers or other sports starts are common among participants with 
exceptionally high earnings (as I will discuss in Chapter 6). The explanation of a hedge 
fund manager is in line with some of the economics literature (Mankiw, 2013), which 
relates increasing inequality to superstar talent95: 
 
If you’re someone like [English footballer] Wayne Rooney, you can go to Man United 
and say ‘pay me £200,000 a week or I’m gonna go to somewhere else’ and Man United 
just say ‘yeah, fine’ because he’s got unique pricing power if you like. And if you are a 
successful hedge fund manager, if you make money for your clients, you also have 
unique pricing power because the fees that we receive. We get a management fee of 2 
percent a year on the money we manage, but we also get 20 percent of all of the 
investment gains, and most of that goes to me personally, because I own this company 
and I take all the […] investment decisions, and my clients pay for me, and so it’s not 
like in a normal company where say the company earns X amount of money and it’s then 
divided by 30,000 employees and 20,000 shareholders. I make this money and it’s 
divided by, we have [number] partners, and I’m the principal partner. And, that’s the 
way it works basically (Interview transcript 15). 
 
Hence, top incomes are the result of market competition. While footballers compete on 
the field, hedge fund managers compete in the market. Footballers win matches, and 
hedge fund managers aim to outperform their competitors financially. As I will show, 
merit is competitively defined, and ‘natural’ skills can only be identified as a result of 
this competition. 
 
                                                 
95 In addition to changes in technology. 
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Service to capital 
The remuneration of employees and entrepreneurial profit is narrated as legitimate if it 
is based on “performance” and “making money” for shareholders, clients and investors, 
i.e. if reward consists of a share of “value created” for clients, investors or 
shareholders. Participants refer to legitimating discourses of finance professionals 
whose performance-based pay genuinely serves ‘shareholder value’ (Van der Zwan, 
2014) and “wealth creating” entrepreneurs96. The direct linkage or “alignment” 
between the value of labour and increases in the value of capital serves as legitimation 
of top incomes. Building on Bourdieu’s (1998, p. 379) assertion that “public service is 
the hereditary vocation of the nobility” and “service to the state is the soul of the 
parliamentary body”, I argue that the vocation of contemporary economic ‘elites’ is 
‘service to capital’.  
The commitment to capital accumulation by economic ‘elites’ has implications 
for increasing wealth inequality because participants are dedicated to increasing the r in 
Piketty’s (2014) r > g formula (r = return to capital; g = growth rate). As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the “inequality r > g implies that wealth accumulated in the past grows more 
rapidly than output and wages” (Piketty, 2014, pp. 571-572), which may lead to an 
“endless inegalitarian spiral” if no intervention such as a progressive annual taxation of 
capital is introduced. This prediction has its critics, including many among my 
interview participants. Nevertheless, Piketty (2015) expects a high gap between the net 
of tax rate of return and the growth rate, due to three forces: global tax competition, 
growth slow-down and technical change, and most importantly, the unequal access to 
high financial returns. Therefore, ‘elite’ capital accumulation through the pursuit of 
financial returns is related to increasing inequality. 
 
Top incomes as relational and socially constructed 
The economic evaluative practices which produce top incomes are inherently based on 
social relations and are therefore socially constructed. Top incomes are narrated as 
produced through formal negotiations which can be contractually fixed as in the 
example of the trader’s formula, or informally as in the example of the investment bank 
                                                 
96 This is reminiscent of McDowell (1997) who used the term ‘capital culture’ to describe the culture of 
the City of London. 
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revenue sheet. Participants’ narratives include that top incomes are produced by actors 
with culturally-shared ideas about who generates ‘economic value’. A top investment 
bank manager explains that bonus payments are the result of decisions: 
 
... hours in front of an Excel page trying to justify why Sophia should have this, Andrew 
should have that, how much is the department. You try to do some amazing formula to 
calculate all of that and at the end of the day, the [bonus] pool is always too small 
(Interview transcript 10). 
 
Hence, it is the manager who determines bonuses based on the personal relationships 
with their team, rather than the market. As I will discuss in the next chapter, the 
economic evaluative practices used by individuals to determine top incomes 
demonstrates that these processes are gendered, as well as classed and ‘racialized’ 
(Skeggs, 2004a; Mears, 2015; Glucksberg, 2016a). White privileged males are narrated 
by some participants as finding it easier than others to position themselves as close to a 
revenue stream in order to increase their economic value.  
A surprising finding emerging from the interview data is that one-third of 
participants refer to top incomes as a result of a “game” or as produced by ruthless, 
unethical, cheating, unpleasant, morally-repugnant, self-serving people, particularly at 
the very top. These narratives are in contrast with the idea that top incomes are based 
on performance in a neutral market. However, they are in line with the notion that merit 
has to be ‘tested’ competitively in a ruthless competition, in order to be viewed as 
legitimate. Narratives include that income at the very top is arbitrary or resulting from 
“gaming the system”, from a “cabal” of people who conspire to rip off shareholders and 
clients. These stories are often narrated as explaining the financial crisis. They 
highlight that there is awareness among the sample that top incomes are not necessarily 
merit based, but based on social relations. 
For instance, a financial director questions whether market outcomes are always 
meritocratic, even though he generally refers to evaluative ideas of an economic nature. 
Reflecting on his own career path, he explained that he previously thought that hard 
work is what matters, and what makes you successful; however: 
 
Watching my dad’s career […] and then having that experience in my own career, I 
realize how arbitrary things become when you get into the most senior levels of 
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organizations, and when you become earning the big bucks as it were, it’s almost a 
game… I’ve now been close enough to them that to understand that what you give up is 
frequently at least as much as, or more than I would be willing to give up, to reach where 
they are. Sometimes the skills [required] are actually morally repugnant, to be 
brutal about it. I think  that there are some skills, including, like a real case of moral 
indifference, that leads people to these higher echelons, so for instance, if you’re a 
person that is seen as, ah, a guy that just gets things done […] I’ve been called this 
before […] it has a very good connotation in this culture […] but what I am realizing 
more and more […] once you get up into the top levels in this organization, sometimes 
what has to happen in order for you to get things done, runs up against your moral 
code […] your code of ethics. And sometimes it goes too close to where you just go, I 
am just not happy doing this anymore (Interview transcript 2, emphasis added). 
 
This transcript highlights that rather than viewing top incomes as a result of neutral 
market forces, the participant narrates the competitive culture at the top of the 
distributions, where people ruthlessly try to become the winners of the game. Another 
finance professional describes the people in his industry with high incomes in a 
similarly critical light: 
 
I would say there is a significant proportion, especially in finance, were you need to be 
ruthless, unethical, unpleasant... I mean, that is a generalism of course… I think 
banking in particular has been full of these thoroughly obnoxious people who’ve seen an 
opportunity to line their own pockets at other people’s expense. [At an investment bank] 
they had management meetings were they would say ‘how are we going to rip off our 
customers’ […] and ‘how are we gonna rip off our own shareholders’. I was at those 
meetings. I couldn’t believe it… it blew my mind […] they got a cabal to get there... and 
you either bought in and you got paid a lot or you didn’t buy in and you got sacked […] 
I’d say the junior levels were all very hard working and honest […] but if you want, once 
you got to the cabal [...] like organized crime, you had to buy into the ethic and you just 
were not allowed to see anything or say anything... it’s on their terms… like the mafia. 
Just never tell it as it is (Interview transcript 8, emphasis added).  
 
While many participants narrate top incomes as a result of neutral market forces, 
competition and individuals’ productivity; some also explain that top incomes are 
enjoyed by self-interested individuals in social relationships with each other. Instead of 
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neutral market forces assessing the merit of individuals, the competition described in 
these narratives is unceasing, ruthless and unethical. 
  
Challenges to economic evaluation: Variation in the sample 
There is important variation in the sample however, with a significant minority, about 
one-third of the participants, who question whether economic evaluation practices, 
which are designed to increase the value of capital, reflect individual social 
contribution. These participants challenge the view that ‘the market’ is an appropriate 
and morally adequate instrument for the evaluation of individuals’ contributions, and 
ultimately the distribution of resources.  
There are two ‘ideal types’. A majority of participants (two-thirds) are devoted 
to economic evaluation based on a ‘neutral’ market and view market outcomes as 
reflecting contribution. I term these ‘economic evaluators’. A significant minority of 
participants on the other hand, which I term ‘social evaluators’, actually questions 
evaluative practices based on money as a metric of worth and/or views market 
outcomes as unfair. Social evaluators do not consider economic reward as equivalent to 
contribution. They are considering values and value; whereas ‘economic evaluators’ 
focus primarily on value (Skeggs, 2014). I could have also termed these ideal types as 
‘classical’ and ‘neoclassical’, or ‘socio-economic’ and ‘economic liberal’ evaluators 
respectively. However, for reasons of simplicity, I refer to ‘social’ and ‘economic 
evaluators’.  
Economic evaluators view economic reward as reflecting contribution. The 
following account of a hedge fund manager who “would really like a private jet, but 
can’t afford one”, illustrates this view of the market as rewarding talent: 
 
If a very, very small proportion of people get very wealthy, then everyone else just gets 
wealthier over time. I mean what’s wrong with that? That’s like me complaining, and I 
use the football analogy again, that’s like me complaining because Ronaldo is a better 
footballer than me, and he keeps getting better than me or Chris Froome is just a much 
better cyclist than I am because he is in the 0.001 percent of cyclists who can cycle up 
eternally at 30 kilometres an hour, and I can’t do that. Inequality in cycling is just going 
up because Chris Froome is getting better and better. It’s just not a very sensible way to 
think about the world (Interview transcript 17).  
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With reference to the achievements of sportsmen, this economic evaluator established 
that top incomes are a reflection of talent and a reward resulting from market 
competition, akin to achievements in a sport competition. Therefore, he views 
inequality as measured by top income shares as not relevant.  
Social evaluators on the other hand, question the view that evaluations of worth 
based on a market logic are necessarily fair. These participants engage in self-critique, 
questioning their own ‘value’ with comparison to the much larger “social contribution” 
by doctors, nurses and teachers. They question the market logic and believe in values 
beyond economic value (Skeggs, 2014) with an evaluative metric which is moral rather 
economic (Lamont, 1992). Therefore, as I will discuss in Chapter 8, social evaluators 
are concerned about inequality. A finance professional for instance questions: 
 
Something I find very hard to reconcile is how much more I get paid from a fireman or a 
nurse or a doctor; they clearly do something that’s much more important, in my 
perspective, my value order. [My income] could pay for seven teachers […] Why does it 
happen? Why do these people get paid so little, and people like me get paid so much? Is 
it right? And therefore does the government have a role in equalizing that? I certainly 
don’t think I’m worth 140 grand, that’s the truth (Interview transcript 9). 
 
Hence, reflecting on her income, this participant questions whether economic reward 
reflects social contribution. Therefore, social evaluators do not view economic reward 
as fair or reflecting social contribution. In Chapter 8, I will discuss how social and 
economic evaluators perceive economic inequality. Participants were asked how high 
top income and wealth shares should be to assess their views on the distribution of 
resources. In general, economic evaluators explain that they cannot say how high top 
incomes or wealth shares should be or that “the market will find a level for inequality”. 
By contrast, social evaluators state that top income and wealth shares are a social issue 
and should be lower. 
 
Characteristics of social and economic evaluators 
An analysis of the characteristics of social and economic evaluators shows that there is 
no difference based on their sources of income (5/15 who derive their income from 
labour, 2/5 of those in self-employment and 3/10 of entrepreneurs are social evaluators) 
or gender (3/8 female participants, and 7/22 male participants are social evaluators). In 
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regard to participants’ wealth and income, I find that those with lower incomes and 
wealth are twice as likely to be social evaluators. Specifically, 7/16 of those with 
incomes which are approximately in the bottom 90 percent of the top 1 percent (income 
between £140k and £400k), but only 3/14 with incomes in the top 0.1 percent of the 
income distribution (incomes higher than £400k) are social evaluators. Further, while 
7/16 of participants with wealth below £5m are social evaluators, only 3/14 with wealth 
between £5-250m fall into this category.  
As those with highest incomes and wealth tended to be older, age differences 
were also analysed. Participants in their 50s and 60s are least likely, and those in their 
40s are most likely to be social evaluators (1/10 vs. 5/7). Participants in their 20s and 
30s are in between the two extremes (4/13). We may expect that those who hold 
degrees in business or economics are more likely to be economic evaluators. Many 
participants hold degrees in these fields (13/28 of degree holders). However, 
notwithstanding the small sample size, participants with business and economics 
degrees are actually more likely to be social evaluators (5/13) than those with law (2/6), 
science (1/6) or no degrees (0/2). Humanities graduates are most likely to be social 
evaluators (2/3).  
There is no difference between participants who indicated that they have been 
socially mobile and those who explain they have not been socially mobile (7/20 vs 
3/10). However, participants who mention unprompted that they have been to private 
school, are distinctive; strikingly only 1 out of 8 participants who told me they attended 
private school (or whose public profile reveals they did) are social evaluators. In regard 
to political orientation, I find that those who make references in favour of the 
Conservative party (or whose online profile reveals that they support the party 
financially) are all economic evaluators; while those who are in favour of the Labour 
party are almost all social evaluators (4/5). In sum, those with highest incomes and 
wealth, private education, a preference for the Conservative party and degrees in 
sciences or no degree are more likely to be economic evaluators. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that top incomes are made sense of through the very 
economic evaluative processes which participants explain as producing top incomes. 
Evaluation is a cultural process, based on culturally-shared understandings of value(s) 
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(Skeggs, 2014). For most participants, the yardstick of worth is money; as in the liberal 
economic tradition (Fourcade, 2011). Hence, the evaluation processes are economic in 
nature. The market, a neutral, rational instrument is viewed as the best way to evaluate 
value(s). For many participants, returns to labour and capital are perceived as reflecting  
social contribution, consistent with the neoclassical economic theory of the marginal 
productivity of income distribution (McGoey, 2017).  
The evaluative practices, in the finance industry and the organizations where 
participants work, are built on sociological rational principles (Weber, 2003 [1905]) 
which rationalize extremely high incomes in the psychoanalytical sense (Bourdieu, 
1986, building on Freud). Top incomes are viewed as legitimate if they constitute a 
share of “wealth created” for clients and shareholders. Hence, I argue that the purpose 
of financialized ‘elites’ is ‘service to capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986). However, there is 
variation in my sample; whereas a majority are economic evaluators, a significant 
minority of participants (one-third) questions whether market outcomes based on 
economic evaluative practices are a reflection of social contribution. Participants who 
support the Labour Party, who do not mention that they themselves have been to 
private school, whose incomes and wealth are on the lower end of the sample, and who 
have degrees in humanities and the social sciences, are more likely to be social 
evaluators.  
The data shows that social and economic evaluators narrate situations which 
demonstrate that top incomes are the result of social relations (Zelizer, 2012). I will 
return to this theme in the next chapter where I discuss how beliefs in economic reward 
as reflecting contribution can be sustained alongside visible structural inequalities. 
Participants question their own income or assert that “it is a game” at the very top, 
sometimes by referring to individuals who are ruthless and unethical. Hence, market 
competition is not only presented as a neutral, benevolent force, but on the contrary, as 
a ruthless, unethical game. This theme relates to the actor imagined in neoclassical 
theory, an objective, male, calculative agent in service of capital; demonstrating that 
women miss out in this culture, as they are expected to attend to the family instead 
(Glucksberg, 2016a). Participants aspire and struggle to advance their position, because 
those who create the most economic value are viewed as the best. In Chapter 7, I will 
discuss how economic evaluations of worth relate to who people look up to, resulting in 
relative (dis)advantage. In Chapter 8, I will demonstrate that participants’ evaluative 
metrics affects their view towards inequality, and their policy preferences. Economic 
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evaluators who see the market, a seemingly neutral and rational instrument, as best 
suited to evaluate merit have different views and policy preferences when compared to 
social evaluators. 
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Chapter 5  Economic evaluation as gendered, ‘raced’ and classed 
Introduction  
Participants view differences in income as resulting from the market forces of supply 
and demand; envisioning a certain market ideology of neutrality and meritocracy. In 
this chapter, I will build upon the analysis in the previous chapter on narratives 
explaining inequality by now discussing whether and how structural explanations are 
acknowledged97. In line with neoclassical economic theory, many participants favour 
individualistic explanations of the distribution of income (Khan, 2008; 2011; Skeggs, 
2004a). Only a minority are acutely aware of structural inequalities. A majority of 
participants mention the importance of luck and the absence of structural disadvantage 
for economic success; but many view the latter as something over which hard work and 
ambition, seen as most important factors for economic success, can triumph98 (Littler, 
2013). These views are in contrast to other narratives of how economic value is 
assigned to individuals in social relationships, based on categorizations rather than 
economic productivity (Skeggs, 2004a; Rivera, 2012; Zelizer, 2012).    
Focusing on relationships highlights how economic activity is not simply about 
profit-maximizing economic transactions, but includes the negotiation of gendered, 
‘raced’ and classed social relations (Skeggs, 2004a; Zelizer, 2012). Participants explain 
that relationships are important for the evaluation of an individual’s economic 
performance. Half (n=15) mention the importance of networks, social contacts and 
relationships (much more than the approximately 25 percent of GBCS respondents who 
choose ‘having good social connections’ as important for career success). Evaluation of 
an individual’s economic value is a product of social relationships (Skeggs, 2004a). 
Further, (e)valuation as a cultural process includes the sub-process of categorization99, 
which itself includes classification (Lamont, 2012). Therefore, “[c]lassification is 
valuation” (Skeggs, 2015). The classifications addressed in this chapter relate to 
gender, ethnicity and social class100 (Skeggs, 2004a; Lamont, 2012).  
                                                 
97 I focus on participants’ attitudes to structure, rather than structure itself. 
98 This discourse is in line with the Conservative Party in the UK; for instance former Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s “aspiration nation” (Littler, 2013) and current Prime Minister Theresa May’s pledge to 
make “Britain the world’s Great Meritocracy” (The Conservative Party, 2017). 
99 Categorization is defined as “determining in which group the entity [...] under consideration belongs” 
(Lamont et al., 2014, p. 21, citing Lamont, 2012, p. 206). 
100 There are many alternative classifications including sexuality, disability, religion, among others. 
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Building on the concept of economic evaluation I will show that for many 
participants there is no tension between structural inequalities and beliefs of 
meritocracy. This is because middle class or privileged backgrounds and positions, 
masculinity and Anglo-Saxon whiteness (and Asianness which is racialized as 
enmeshed with quantitative skills) are seen as bound up with economic value (Skeggs, 
2004a). As a result, participants can reconcile visible, structural advantage in the 
finance and related industries with the idea of a neutral, meritocratic market. Structural 
inequalities can become obscured because structure is naturalized (Bourdieu, 1998; 
2010 [1984]; Butler, 1999; Khan, 2008; Savage, 2015a).  
As I have argued, participants explain that an employee’s ‘performance’ is 
evaluated by, and negotiated with hierarchical superiors, for instance the partners or 
managing directors of a company. Therefore, it is crucial to consider who evaluates, 
because evaluators have power to decide on the criteria of evaluation (Skeggs, 2004a). 
Evaluators at the top of the income distribution, are generally male (Atkinson et al., 
2016) and intersectionally privileged.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I will argue following Crenshaw’s 
theory of intersectionality (1989) and Skeggs’ (1997; 2003) Formations and theory of 
Class, Self, Culture that the picture at the top of the economic distributions is 
intersectional; economic privilege is disproportionately white, male and privately 
educated. Hence, the conditions of possibility to move to the top are intersectional. 
Therefore, the intersections of class, gender and ‘race’ are fundamental for this study. I 
will then discuss how participants reconcile visible gender, ‘race’, and class inequality 
in top income professions with meritocratic beliefs. It is because economic evaluation 
processes are gendered, ‘raced’ and classed101 (Skeggs, 1997; 2003). Trust and integrity 
are narrated as entangled with family background. Further, and very importantly, 
private education is viewed as providing children with ‘confidence’ and soft skills 
which are seen as economically valuable. Building on the distinction between social 
and economic evaluators discussed in the previous chapter, I find that almost a third of 
individuals in the sample expressed nuanced awareness of their intersectional privilege 
and structural advantages, and that almost all of these participants are social evaluators.  
 
                                                 
101 Note that in the interviews, I used the language of “ethnicity” and “socio-economic” or “family 
background” because these where the categories used by participants.  
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Intersectionality theory: White, male, privately educated privilege 
I take a broad perspective of ‘intersectionality’ arguing that the concept is helpful for 
the analysis of marginalization (Crenshaw, 1989), as well as for economic advantage. 
Inequalities of gender intersect in important ways with inequalities of ethnicity. As 
discussed, Keister’s (2014) study highlights the overrepresentation of white men among 
the household heads of the 1 percent in the US (in terms of income as well as wealth). 
In addition, inequalities of gender intersect in important ways with inequalities of class 
(Skeggs, 1997; Rivera and Tilcsik, 2016). In the UK, the ‘class pay gap’ between the 
upwardly mobile and the intergenerationally stable employed in NS-SEC1 professions 
(the highest occupational group) is exacerbated for long-range upwardly-mobile 
women, who face a significant double disadvantage based on class origin and gender 
(Laurison and Friedman, 2016). Their “predicted earnings are about 25 percent less 
than those of otherwise similar intergenerationally stable men” (Ibid., p. 685). Further, 
a CV audit study of large US law firms showed that fabricated CVs which include 
high-class origin signifiers provide an advantage for men but not for women. Higher-
class male applicants received significantly more call-backs than did higher-class 
women, lower-class women, and lower-class men (Rivera and Tilcsik, 2016). The 
authors conclude that higher-class status women do not benefit from their higher social 
class background because they are stereotyped as less committed to intensive careers 
than their male counterparts. These studies demonstrate how economic advantage is 
intersectional. 
The intersections of gender, ‘race’ and class (Crenshaw, 1989; Skeggs, 1997) 
were clearly visible through my fieldwork in the finance offices and barristers’ 
chambers in the City of London, as well as in interview narratives. There is some 
awareness of intersectional privilege; gender, class and ethnicity are not thought of in 
isolation. As I will show, many participants point to changes to more meritocratic 
forms of evaluation in their industries, or in the City of London more generally, which 
leads to some stating that gender and ethnicity do not constitute barriers to high 
incomes. Only a few participants address their own white, male privilege in the 
interviews. For instance, asked whether gender or ethnicity plays a role in the 
probability of having a high income, a hedge fund manager explains: 
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I think so, yeah. I mean it’s a lot easier being a middle-aged old white man, than it is 
being a 23 year old black women. I do get that. I understand that. I mean as I always say 
to people, I completely agree that there is this, there are glass ceilings, there are barriers 
to entry for different ethnicities, but they are not my fault. I mean, I don’t cause them. 
But certainly my route was easier or was made marginally easier by the fact that I am a 
white man (Interview transcript 17). 
 
Even though the hedge fund manager names structural barriers for women and ethnic 
minorities, they are not recognized as meaningful. By acknowledging that his career 
route was marginally easier, he positioned himself as modest and distanced himself 
from the issue. The successful can afford to portray their career trajectory with 
narratives of ‘modesty’ as they are in the privileged position of not having to explain 
why they did not do better (Miles et al., 2011; Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). While structural 
advantages are mentioned by socially-mobile participants, suggesting a ‘modest’ 
reflection on their career, structural barriers are often portrayed as something 
participants have overcome through their rational, strategic take-up of opportunities.  
On the other hand, structural disadvantages are also acknowledged. For instance, 
an investment professional describes his workplaces in the finance industry as “stale, 
pale and male”, acknowledging that being white and male is advantageous for a career 
in finance. He elaborates that he finds it easier to build relationships: 
 
[…] because people aren’t accustomed to seeing women, or accustomed to seeing blacks, 
there becomes a natural distrust from the beginning of the relationship, and it takes a 
while for that person to prove […] but until that point you’re behind the eight ball, you 
are always pushing, whereas I think for this kind of face [draws square in shape of a 
frame over face], actually I am lucky in that people seem to trust me, to begin with and 
then it is mine to lose, as opposed to mine to gain (Interview transcript 2). 
 
Hence, the participant is aware that masculine whiteness is the trusted norm which 
matters for building social relationships. He knows that he is evaluated as trustworthy, 
and therefore as economically valuable, by looking the same as most of those who 
evaluate him. Similarity is important for evaluation and facilitates trust and bonding 
(Rivera, 2012). Interestingly, this structural advantage is described as luck, and 
therefore as random, which is common among elite respondents (Sherman, 2017, 
referring to Rivera, 2015).  
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Some participants are aware that male participants are more likely to have top 
incomes, and particularly those who have been privately educated, suggesting 
awareness of the intersections of gender and class. For instance, a barrister explains that 
if there are women or ethnic minorities who make it to the top of the profession, they 
are very privileged in terms of class backgrounds. Discussing the type of people who 
get the chance to interview at his chambers, he explains:  
 
There are so many privileged women who are so much more privileged than many men 
[…] You imagine the women who went to top private schools, our chambers is full if 
anything, of women like that... well, not full, we still have way more men than women. 
But the women we have are very privileged. So the bigger challenge is to find people 
who [are from non-traditional backgrounds] […] It’s almost worse for ethnic minorities. 
If you […] look at the Black and Arab people at the Bar, they’re often at the commercial 
Bar. Very, very, very highly privileged people. Many of them went to Eton or something, 
it’s not just privileged as in they come from good fam… it’s often exceptionally wealthy 
(Interview transcript 19).  
 
In the above excerpt, non-traditional background, used as a euphemism for working 
class, shows that even though class is not directly spoken about, evaluations are 
classed, such as the idea of “good families” (Skeggs, 2004a). Law is a field with 
intersectional privilege at the top; “[o]f 108 high court judges in England and Wales, 
[who are disproportionately privately educated] only 21 are women and just three are 
recorded as being from minority ethnic backgrounds” (Bowcott, 2015, para 4).  
Another interview narrative of intersectional advantage is by a managing director 
in an international, London-based finance company. In her personal experience, women 
face barriers to being promoted to senior levels of organizations. As a young woman at 
the start of her career, she did not fit into the middle-aged white male environment. 
However, she explained that her private education at a public girls’ school gave her the 
confidence which helped her to build relationships, and therefore function in the 
finance industry:  
 
I think that my education […] gave me great confidence, I think it gave me skills 
whereby I feel comfortable walking […] being a young woman, which is, you know, it’s 
difficult in an industry like financial services but [I was] comfortable talking to people of 
all different ages, all different geographical, err, backgrounds […] I can build 
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relationships with anyone I might meet, I am not usually intimidated by, you know, the 
systems. And so I think actually entering the organization; the reality of 15 years ago and 
those things are changing. Until today it was a very educated middle-aged white male 
environment and I think that […] my education background prepared me to be able to 
operate in that environment (Interview transcript, 26). 
 
Apart from highlighting intersectional privilege, her narrative introduces two key 
themes in the data; the first is the ‘confidence’ ascribed to private education, 
reminiscent of Khan’s (2008; 2011) ‘ease’ and Bourdieu’s embodied cultural capital, 
which will be discussed in the section on social class. The second theme, already 
introduced in the previous chapters, is that the City has become, or is becoming, more 
meritocratic.  
 
Perceived change towards a more ‘meritocratic’ City  
A key theme from my interviews is that “things are changing” (n=16) and that the City 
of London, or specifically the professions of finance and law, are becoming more 
‘open’ and ‘meritocratic’ with respect to gender and ‘race’ (see McDowell, 1997). 
These beliefs are in contrast to evidence that there is very limited change, if any. 
McDowell (2010) argues that there have been no significant improvements in terms of 
the gendered culture of the financial sector since the 1990s. This is consistent with 
national statistics which show that there is a vast gender disparity among the top 1 
percent of income earners (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015; Atkinson et al., 2016; 
Jenkins, 2016). Women are systematically and similarly under-represented at the top of 
the distribution in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Spain and 
the UK. In these countries, women make up approximately 15-20 percent of the top 1 
percent. In the UK in 2013, only 18 percent (approximately 1 in 6) of the top 1 percent 
of the income distribution are women. This underrepresentation increases the higher 
one looks up the income distribution; only 9 percent (approximately 1 in 11) of the top 
0.1 percent are female (Atkinson et al., 2016). Even though the percentage of women in 
the top income groups has increased over time, there has been no change at the very 
top. While the share of women among the top 1 percent increased from 10.7 to 17.8 
percent in the period 1995-2013 (almost 20 years), the share among the top 0.1 percent 
in the same period remained the same (approximately 9 percent). Hence, even though 
there is some change, it is very small.  
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While there is limited data on the gendered dimension of top incomes, there is a 
paucity of data on top pay and ethnicity (Ram, 2017). According to a review of board 
diversity, ethnic minority directors make up 8 percent of FTSE 100 board members. 
This figure falls to 1.5 percent if only UK citizens are counted, compared with ethnic 
minorities’ 14 percent share of Britain’s population (Parker, 2016). Further, of all FTSE 
100 companies, over half (53) do not have any directors of colour. In spite of this data, 
the narrative of change is the most frequently occurring code related to gender and 
ethnicity. For some participants, the narrative of change includes views that there are 
no more structural barriers for women or ethnic minorities (and by implication for 
female ethnic minorities). An example is the junior investment banker, who keeps 
checking his phone for updates, who states:  
 
The City is a different place to what it was maybe 20 years ago when, you know, perhaps 
being an English male was a massive advantage. But no, to me certainly it’s [changed]. 
Some people might have a different view but I certainly don’t (Interview transcript 14).  
 
A quick look at the website of his investment bank highlights that even though the firm 
prides itself on their diverse workforce, the board of directors represents a picture of 
intersectional privilege. Meanwhile, during a discussion on whether gender or ethnicity 
matters for people’s chances to earn a high income, a financial entrepreneur explains 
that there are no impediments in the finance industry, that being smart and working 
with integrity is more important: 
 
Well, it’s clearly a fact of life [that in finance] most of the senior positions are held by 
men, and most of those men are white Anglo-Saxon people, but it’s changed a hell of a 
lot in the time I’ve been involved, which is a long time, and I don’t perceive any blocks 
whatsoever in the industry to women or people of different religions, races or whatever. 
[…] there’s so many smart people whether they are men, women or whatever race, and 
people [...] work with people that are smart, and work with integrity all those other 
values, that I’ve mentioned before which I think are very important, integrity, building 
up a relationship with trust (Interview transcript 13). 
 
This reflects the narratives of many participants; that meritocratic efforts or talents are 
more important than ascribed characteristics (as found by Khan, 2008; 2011). However, 
like many other participants he stresses the importance of social relationships and 
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contacts. Recall the previous narrative of the young professional who explained how 
building trust with others is easier for some (white, male) people than others (who 
deviate from this norm). Other participants also view equality for women and 
individuals from different class and ethnic backgrounds as a state yet to be reached. A 
barrister, who is convinced that the bar in the UK is a merit-based system, explains that 
even though it may still advantage “old boys”, in theory it should not: 
 
Yeah our profession has certainly changed to the kind of absolutely meritocratic system 
whereas it used to be an old boys school kind of system where you know someone and 
you get in and so on and certainly we’ve at least consciously moved away from it, I don’t 
know whether it still goes on, I suspect sometimes it does, but it shouldn’t (Interview 
transcript 25). 
 
Similarly, a former high-flying fund manager who currently sits on the board of a few 
companies explains: 
 
The chauvinist based type of companies to me are, they’re the dying breed and they 
should be [Chuckles] (Interview transcript 22). 
 
Hence, many participants highlight that there have been significant changes towards a 
more ‘open’ system, though some acknowledge the continued existence of structural 
disadvantages. 
 
Gender: Economic evaluation as gendered 
Throughout my field work in the City of London, I was repeatedly struck by the 
gendered nature of top income workplaces. For instance, upon arrival for an interview 
with an executive at a hedge fund, I was welcomed by two ‘well-presented’ female 
receptionists102, and then led across the hallway to the glass-fronted meeting room 
passing by the completely open and principally male trading floor. The 
underrepresentation of women at the top of organizational hierarchies and in top 
income professions more generally, was clearly visible throughout my fieldwork and 
                                                 
102 On 11 May 2016, a BBC article reported that a temporary receptionist was sent home without pay 
for not wearing heels (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-36264229). 
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was viewed as an issue by some respondents. Roughly one-third of all male participants 
(n=8/22) either referred to the low proportion of women within their profession and at 
the top of their organization, or saw this as a challenge. However, there were some 
male participants who perceived no barriers for women.  
For many participants, there seems to be no contradiction between meritocratic 
narratives and the underrepresentation of women at the top. I argue that this is the case 
because evaluative processes which assign economic value to subjects are inherently 
gendered (Skeggs, 2004a). As discussed in the previous chapter, economic evaluation 
processes which assign value to individuals at the micro-level of interactions, informed 
by meso-level shared cultural understandings of evaluative criteria, are key for how top 
incomes and wealth are understood (see Lamont et al., 2014, p. 21). I argue that the 
process of economic evaluation is fundamentally gendered because “negotiating, 
defining and stabilizing one’s [economic] value”103 is difficult to align with the 
classification of femininity. Those who perform femininity are evaluated as less 
economically valuable. In the City of London, a particular, masculine performance is 
more highly valorized than other forms of being in the workplace (McDowell, 1997; 
2010). Masculinity aligns with the performances of privilege; the simultaneous display 
of hard work and ease (Khan, 2008). Further, evaluations of who receives top incomes, 
high bonuses and promotions, are made from the perspective of intersectional privilege. 
As white males are more likely to be at the top of organizations in the City of London, 
they are more likely to act as evaluators of others.  
 
Gendered performances of privilege and economic value 
Performances of gender naturalize differences in income. Butler (1999) theorizes that 
social categories are not simply existing “things” but instead a kind of performance: 
“such performances serve to create an implied interiority to social categories of 
distinction (gender); in constantly performing gender we create the illusion that gender 
is a natural quality within us” (Khan, 2008, p. 168). The performance makes gender 
appear natural. Building upon Butler’s ‘performativity’ and Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’, 
which explain how a social product (gender and class, respectively) appears to be 
inherent and therefore natural, Khan conceptualizes the “performativity of privilege” 
                                                 
103 The quote refers to Beckert and Musselin’s 2013 definition of evaluation (Lamont et al., 2014, p.21). 
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(Khan, 2008, p. 189). Elites “do privilege” by performing hard work simultaneously to 
‘ease’ (or ‘confidence’ in the words of my respondents). As a result:  
 
those who are advantaged by this social product are seen not as having systematic 
advantages, but instead as having “talents”, “skills”, or “capacities”. Those who are 
disadvantaged are seen as lacking these qualities (Khan, 2008, p. 190). 
 
I argue that the performance of privilege (Khan, 2008) is highly gendered as well as 
classed (Skeggs, 2004a). The following quote demonstrates how the performance of 
privilege is narrated as gendered and classed. It also highlights a crucial aspect of the 
performativity of gender; that gender is performed under the assumption of a power 
relation, whereby masculinity is viewed as the norm and as superior to femininity 
(Ibid.). The participant explains: 
 
[Your gender] definitely does [make a difference], still, unfortunately, because […] some 
of it’s quite farcical in that you put on this act about being a, you know, a tall man 
wearing a suit, and… a lot of people in corporate finance still play on maybe a public 
school education or the way they dress and that, their innate confidence, in order to be 
successful. And in some professions, I think being a male, being a man does count 
more, does matter more; it makes you more successful than if you’re a woman 
(Interview transcript 3, emphasis added). 
 
This quote introduces the theme that the performance of masculinity blends in 
seamlessly with the performance of privilege, but that the performance of femininity 
can be in stark contradiction with privilege (Khan, 2008). Khan (2008, p. 188) shows in 
the context of an elite boarding school “that for boys there are far fewer contradictions 
than there are for girls in embodying gender and embodying privilege”. There is a 
tension between femininity and ‘elite’ privilege because “girls display performative 
acts that contradict the performativity of privilege” (Khan, 2008, p. 173). The 
contradiction is that in contrast to male students at the high school, female students’ 
sexuality is not natural ease, but self-conscious regulation (for which they are 
responsible). Unlike masculinity, femininity is not symbolically dominant, it is a form 
of regulation instead of domination (Skeggs, 2004a). Therefore, femininity does not 
easily fit with inhabiting privilege. 
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In my interview data, there are narratives of a contradiction between the 
performance of privilege and femininity. For example, the performance of femininity 
includes caring for others (Perrons, 2014; Loeschner, 2017). In addition, participants 
discussed female ‘softness’, self-doubt, and concern for the social rather than the 
economic, as well as social skills over technical, mathematical skills which are seen as 
masculine and hence evaluated as of higher economic value. For instance, a barrister 
who is very interested in issues of gender explains that being a woman does not 
constitute a hindrance in her profession. Instead, the socially expected performance of 
femininity can be an advantage: 
 
If anything, depending on what case you’re doing the client says oh I do want the woman 
because it makes me look kind of nicer and it makes me look softer and you know kind 
of, depending what type of case it is they think a woman can just present it much better 
(Interview transcript 25).  
 
However, the participant reflects that being a woman and therefore less self-confident 
can make it more difficult to do good work as a barrister: 
 
Where the crucial difference lies is, I think, women are a lot harsher, a lot more [self-] 
critical and therefore on a job like ours might not always be best suited because our job is 
based on being confident and once you’ve made a decision sticking with it, so asking 
yourself have I really made the right decision? on a daily basis is actually not conducive 
to doing the best type of work (Interview transcript 25). 
 
This assessment shows how performing femininity, including being nice and soft with 
others but self-critical, can be harmful for and in contradiction to performing 
confidence which is pertinent to economic success as a barrister. Even though this 
gendered evaluation is narrated as advantageous; women have “no choice” about 
whether they are evaluated as female workers with feminine traits, which are seen as 
economically less valuable (Skeggs, 2004a, p. 74).  
Another illustration of the contradiction between economic value and femininity 
stems from an interview with a barrister who was chatting to me about the stereotypical 
differences between barristers and solicitors. Intellectualism and analytical problem 
solving are viewed as important for succeeding at the Bar. The contradiction between 
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performances of femininity and of intellectualism is narrated as being more critical for 
barristers who “look like professors; they will all have like messy hair, and thick 
glasses” than for solicitors who “look like bankers” (Interview transcript 19). Talking 
about gender the participant explained: 
 
It’s much easier for me to picture the […] solicitors, the beautiful people who look like 
bankers who are rich and good looking […] being half female [than the barristers with 
their] nerdy thick glasses […] when I think about the people I know who are really 
driven by intellectual problems and things like that, more… who knows why, whether 
it’s a social… I’m not saying it’s natural. But in terms of my experience I would say I 
know more men like that than women. Maybe it’s because of the pressures on women 
not to look like that, right? […] I think there’s self-selection factors (Interview transcript 
19). 
 
Hence, performing intellectual dedication through bodily representations (Bourdieu, 
2010 [1984]) is perceived as potentially contrasting with performing “well-presented” 
(Interview transcript 19) femininity104. While this is often portrayed as women’s 
choice, in reality, not being evaluated by their appearance is not an option for women. 
Their bodies are the visible minority in the City of London (McDowell, 2010). As 
intellectual and analytical skills are important for a barrister, performing femininity can 
have a negative effect on the evaluation of their economic value. It is precisely this 
process of economic evaluation which I will address in the next section.  
 
Economic evaluation of performance 
It is important to consider not just how individuals perform, but how their performance 
is evaluated. The question is who is the performance for, who evaluates it, and who 
benefits (Skeggs, 2004a). The classification of others limits possibilities for our 
performance. For instance, it is not possible for women, to play this ‘act’ of privilege 
by wearing a suit because doing so does not have the same effect of authority, and 
economic value. In contrast to masculine self-assured value creation, performances of 
femininity include underestimating one’s own (economic) value and contribution. This 
                                                 
104 This chimes with Khan’s (2008) work which found that there are more options for opting out 
available for male than for female students, including being ‘nerdy’. 
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is evidenced by how the women in the sample perceive their subjective location105. 
Women in the sample consistently self-rate their social location as lower than men with 
similar incomes (Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1 Subjective social location of participants by income and gender 
 
 
Performances of privilege (Khan, 2008; 2011), of being a top earner or a wealth creator 
tie in seamlessly with performances of masculinity. Historically, women have been 
excluded from property rights (Skeggs, 2004a). Women are viewed as self-selecting out 
of pursuing top income jobs and wealth; hence naturalizing their economic 
disadvantage. Being categorized as a woman presents a contradiction to asserting one’s 
“leadership skills” and economic value in the financial industry. For instance, a former 
fund manager explains how working in a team and for a strong leader rather than being 
a leader themselves just “sits” better with women: 
 
It’s a terrible expression but there’s this thing, “Alpha Females” you know, women who 
in business are almost more aggressive than the men […] asserting their leadership skills 
                                                 
105 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, participants were asked the following ISSP survey question: In our 
society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the 
bottom. Here is a scale that runs from top (10) to bottom (1). Where would you put yourself now on this 
scale? 
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[…] but from my experience women... We’re very good at being “Number Twos”. Does 
that make sense? (Interview transcript 22). 
 
Her account demonstrates that gendered performance is a response to gendered 
evaluation. Performing “confidence” which is aligned with economic value has a bad 
connotation when it is performed by women. Similarly, another successful participant 
explained to me that as a woman, one needs to be “confident, but not too confident”. 
Masculinity is narrated in tandem with discourses of wealth creation and cold decision 
making which are valued in the finance industry, and in particular the quantitative 
industry sub-sector. For instance, a finance professional working for a quantitative 
hedge fund explains that it is great working for his current employer: 
 
[…] because it’s all systematic, everything is computer trading, there’s no human 
emotion […] it’s all programmatic […] with investment decisions you’ve got to be cold 
and clinical and analytical […] as opposed to being emotional (Interview 7, emphasis 
added). 
 
It is precisely these masculine traits of “cold” and “analytical” decision making which 
are seen as economically valuable. The pursuit of money and the creation of economic 
value are narrated as aligning with masculinity, whereas the social, and caring are 
viewed as aligned with femininity106 (Perrons, 2014). Only men are seen as measuring 
success in terms of money. For instance, a barrister explains that women are less likely 
to measure success in monetary terms than men; providing the example that within her 
network, acquiring a Porsche by age 30 seems to be a male goal; her male partner 
would like a Jaguar car while she would like to buy a family home. Similarly, the 
former fund manager with the impressive track record explains that money is not the 
be-all and end-all for women; flexible work hours which allow family time are equally 
important. When discussing policy solutions to inequality with me (to be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 8), she explains that she struggles with government redistribution but 
supports change in attitudes away from a masculine obsession with making money: 
 
                                                 
106 In classical, and neoclassical economic theory, the envisioned, rational actor is male; work such as 
cooking for your family are excluded from analysis as this is not seen to have any economic value (see 
Marcal’s (2015) feminist discussion of Adam Smith’s work). 
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I think that having more women actively involved in the workplace […] I’m an optimist 
... to me it would have a benefit in society in a sense that we would be less obsessed with 
making money. It would be more about a lifestyle and being a productive member of 
society […] And it won’t be all about money and money […] you won’t have this 
thing like, basically, it’s... you need higher financial incentives to compensate for what 
you’re losing out on. The work/life balance will become more sort of aligned and 
therefore less dependent on the money (Interview transcript 22, emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, women are viewed as less focused on economic value. Another area where 
gendered categorizations have important implications for economic evaluation is the 
theme of risk. Taking risk is narrated as key for entrepreneurialism and the creation of 
economic value; hence, it is put forward as important for deservingness. Consequently, 
risk taking is an important theme for meritocracy. It is men who are evaluated as good 
with risk (and hence the creation of economic value). In interviews with male 
respondents, “guys taking risk” is a key emergent theme, but not females taking risk; 
and taking risk is not a key theme in interviews with female respondents (as established 
using the quantitative text analysis software WordStat). A barrister explains that there 
are fewer women in the profession because: 
 
[…] being self-employed means you take a big risk, I think risk-taking is probably 
something which men are more willing […] Er …it’s quite isolated, it’s less sociable [at 
the Bar] (Interview transcript 19). 
 
This narrative demonstrates that the theme of risk taking, which is economically 
valuable, is viewed as masculine. Hence, the underrepresentation of women at the top, 
for instance among entrepreneurs, is explained via women’s individual choices, 
ignoring structural disadvantages for self-employed women or female entrepreneurs. 
For instance, Alesina et al. (2013) find that female entrepreneurs in Italy pay more for 
credit than men because banks charge different rates to male and female borrowers. A 
related aspect, which is not addressed when participants explain the importance of risk 
taking for entrepreneurship, is the positive relationship between personal wealth (in 
particular financial wealth) and the propensity to start a new business. Sauer and 
Wilson (2016) investigate this relationship, and find that this observation can be partly 
explained by the fact that single women have a lower likelihood to obtain formal loans 
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due to their lower rates of home ownership. These findings highlight the 
intersectionality of who is able to take risk in order to obtain top incomes and wealth. 
While gender is performed, evaluation processes are likewise gendered. Some 
female participants explain that it is not only more difficult for women to recognize the 
economic value of their own contribution, but also to convince others of it. These 
participants explain that it is more challenging for women to negotiate pay and to 
demonstrate that they are associated with a revenue stream which would allow them to 
gain legitimacy for higher pay. For instance, a high-flying managing director, whom I 
interviewed on the phone while she was boarding a plane to the US, explains how 
women lose out in a discretionary bonus environment. As demonstrated earlier with 
reference to the low representation of women in the 1 percent, those who evaluate their 
own, and other people’s economic value at the top of the distribution, are generally 
male. Reflecting on the way that “all these organizations are set up so that [the] 
privately educated, affluent white middle-aged male operates [well in it]” because they 
are the ones who “aggressively […] advocate for themselves” she explains: 
 
There are some places where it’s very formulaic, right so you sell this much, you will 
receive x percentage of it, that’s not the environment I work in which is very much 
discretionary. So your manager decides how much you’re gonna get based on, you know 
some key numeric metric, but there is some subjectivity involved and that’s when I think 
women miss out [because it is more challenging for them to advocate strongly for 
themselves] (Interview transcript 26).  
 
This insight illustrates how the evaluation of performance pay is not a neutral market-
based process where “you sell this much, you will receive x percentage of it”, but based 
on the process of gendered evaluation. Rather than attributable to productivity, as 
marginal productivity theory posits, pay is derived from negotiations between parties in 
a social relationship with each other, in which participants negotiate gender relations 
(Zelizer, 2012). In an evaluative environment which is designed for and by those 
performing masculinity, it is unsurprising that those who are evaluated as “the best” are 
often male: “we’ve just now hired someone and he’s male but he’s literally the best 
person for the job… and that’s all we can do” (Interview transcript 1). In the next 
section, I will pick up on the description of top income work environments as a 
reflection of privately-educated, affluent white middle-aged males. 
 156 
The masculinity of the performance culture  
Gender classifications are inherently bound up with how evaluation in the performance 
culture works. In this culture, masculine performances of sacrificing your family life 
for excruciatingly long hours at work are admired for what a chief executive narrates as 
“dedication to the job” (Interview 4). What is valued in the field is gendered, designed 
mainly for and by men. The senior executive explains that he sometimes checks on who 
of “the guys” is still working late in the evening; I picture him as he walks through the 
aisles of his elegant office building. It is difficult to assess whether the “guys” he refers 
to are actually more economically productive than other workers; however, their boss 
thinks they are, which is what matters for their performance review and their bonus 
payments.  
The performance culture, does not “sit” well with performances of femininity in 
particular if families are involved. Women are classified, and evaluated as more 
focused on family life than men. Talking about women who leave careers in finance 
early due to a lack of work-life balance, a financial professional explains: 
 
Maybe in the end they are the smart ones! […] because I have heard of several cases of 
ladies that just say… we are reaching the stage that there is no family life, and you say, 
yeah, I know, I mean that’s why you get paid the money […] And they kind of go that’s 
wrong, and they don’t want to do that. So they are more keen to raise their hand and say 
I’m out whereas the males, they feel a little bit more, whether it is that they feel more 
ah… they have a right to do that, or they feel like oh that’s fine they are willing to 
sacrifice their home life... I don’t know (Interview transcript 2). 
 
Due to gendered expectations, women are more likely to opt out of the family 
unfriendly environment of top income organizations. The pressured nature of top 
income organizations means that those participants who specifically address family 
structures in the interviews advocate a single-earner family (n=5/5). As Loeschner 
(2017) argues, professional workplaces are still set up with a single-earner family in 
mind, consisting of a provider (usually male) and a homemaker (usually female). 
According to my interview data, this ideal is dominant at the top of the income 
distribution, as described by Glucksberg (2016a). As the performance culture and long 
working hours legitimize top incomes by making them appear merit based, opting out 
to perform femininity means women’s work is assigned less (economic) value. Some 
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respondents maintain that it is possible for a woman to pursue a career and keep their 
top income job whilst having children (n=3); referring to friends and acquaintances. 
However, they note that this is only possible if the woman’s partner “stays at home”. 
Having children and two top income earners in the family is generally viewed as 
undesirable due to the time commitment associated with top income jobs: 
 
[I’ve got] some friends of mine whereby the women are the “bread winner” and the 
husband stays at home and he focuses more on dealing with the children […] And that 
allows her to achieve more so it’s a sense of change of the natural gender-based roles 
[…] I think most people have realized having two very high achieving members of 
family and children it is difficult to create a harmonious family life. I mean I think it’s 
possible but very, very [chuckling] challenging (Interview transcript 22). 
 
Given that economic evaluation practices favour men, it is unsurprising that in many 
cases, it is women who take on their “natural” caring responsibilities in the home.  
 
Self-selection and individual choice 
This idea of self-selection (n=9), that women choose not to work as investment 
bankers, hedge fund managers or barristers, is common among respondents. Narratives 
of choice individualize structural inequalities. Often participants explain that “the 
biggest challenge is finding females who want to work for us” (Interview transcript 1, 
investment banker) the reason “frankly, is that most applicants are male” (Interview 
transcript 16, hedge fund manager). Some, including the fund manager who loves his 
job, stated their intention to hire more women “I’m desperate to recruit outside bloody 
men, basically” but concluded that “it’s almost becoming impossible” having “tried 
everything” because “it seems to be, there’s clearly a perception amongst women in my 
view that hedge funds are nasty, really nasty places to work basically” (Interview 
transcript 15). Structural advantage is individualized; women are viewed as choosing to 
self-select out of competitive industries. 
Reasons for self-selection away from top income careers, as described in the 
interviews, include that hedge funds are seen as methodical, mathematical places, that 
quantitative investment companies recruit mainly “computer scientists, physicists, 
statisticians, mathematicians” (Interview transcript 23) which are predominantly male 
fields, or that “the nature of the work [of a barrister], the long working hours certainly 
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deter” (Interview transcript 25) female applicants. At the same time, participants note 
that it is not quite clear to them how this self-selection works in practice: “Is there a 
barrier to entry? No there isn’t, but there seems to be something in practice that means 
the numbers are not equal and we currently don’t know what that is” (Interview 
transcript 25). Self-selection away from top income environments relates to 
individualistic explanations of top incomes as a ‘choice’. Women are described as 
being able to ‘choose’ to either have a career or to have children. The narrative of 
choice highlights again the contradictions between expected performances of 
femininity and being a top income earner. Often gender is portrayed as not constituting 
a restriction unless the partners decide to have children. A fund manager demonstrates 
how women need to adapt to gendered evaluations of economic value: 
 
I think gender’s not in itself a restriction. Having a family is. Being a mother is an issue 
because you do... not all women ... but I’d say the majority of us when we want a family 
have a stronger bond or desire to be able to have a flexible time to spend with your 
family and I went to a four-day week, which was great. They paid me twenty percent less 
and I got the job done. So I did the same job in four days for twenty percent less pay. But 
that was fine for me (Interview transcript 22). 
 
Assuming that her self-evaluation, of having done the same job in four days instead of 
five is correct (it is, judging from her performance statistics), and following the logic of 
marginal productivity theory, her pay should have remained the same. However, the 
gendered criteria of evaluation, which are designed by men and include a glorification 
of long hours, meant that she was now paid less. Now, I turn to ‘race’ as a classification 
and its role in the evaluation of economic value. 
 
Ethnicity: Racialized assignment of value 
Similarly to gender, participants explain that the City has changed a lot (n=7) in regard 
to the impact of ethnicity on a person’s likelihood to have a high income. They explain 
that there is more diversity, and that work environments have become more 
international. Whereas some respondents are critical of their environment being “pale 
and male” or explain there are barriers (n=5) or implicit racism (n=4), others assert that 
ethnicity “plays no role at all” (n=6). Interestingly, participants had much less to say 
about ethnicity than gender. All except 3 participants are white and whites sometimes 
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claim that they cannot comment on whether ethnicity is important for earning high 
incomes, similarly to how male respondents explain they cannot discuss gender. Whites 
do not see their own whiteness in this way (Carangio, forthcoming). Whiteness does 
not have specific expectations assigned to it; it is viewed as the norm. Racial 
stereotyping generally excludes whites, who make up the majority in the City of 
London. For instance, an entrepreneur looks back to when he first started working in 
the City:  
 
I suppose things were different, and it [gender and ethnicity] mattered; nowadays […] 
you’re competing against people from all over the world (Interview transcript 16).  
 
International, diverse work environments are part of the wider discourse of competition 
and meritocracy. Another entrepreneur who runs a quantitative financial company 
stresses that they recruit internationally or globally in an attempt to recruit the best: 
 
I’m very proud at, you know, of how ethnically kind of diverse [his company] is. I mean 
it’s remarkable, really remarkable. You know it’s not even something… all we are after 
is [the] best candidate we can possibly find, very straight forward (Interview transcript 
23). 
 
These narratives relate to the idea that the free market eliminates discrimination. A 
further example is the narrative of a financial entrepreneur, who states that in his view 
it may be more difficult for ethnic minorities or for women to succeed in the 
workplace; however, for entrepreneurs [like himself], who compete in a (neutral) 
market, there are no barriers. On the contrary, the interview data shows that 
categorizations of non-white, racialized bodies are evaluated with “expectations 
assigned to ‘races’”. Continuing the narrative of the entrepreneur who recruits the “best 
candidate we can possibly find”, introduces the most commonly coded theme (n=9), 
apart from ‘change’, in relation to ethnicity, which is that Asian, Chinese and other 
individuals are stereotyped as having cognitive and quantitative skills and dispositions 
which make them successful in finance: 
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The good thing is I think over the course of the last [many years], we found that some of 
our brightest, smartest and most successful individuals have been, you know, Chinese, 
South American, Eastern European (Interview transcript 23). 
 
This theme links Asian, Chinese and others who are seen to possess better quantitative 
skills to the creation of (economic) value. Participants explain that assigning 
quantitative skills to certain individuals advantages them. This perceived “almost 
reverse racism” (Interview transcript 2) was addressed in an interview with a fund 
manager who explains that recruitment in investment banks… 
 
… in recent years has been driven by high numeracy skills, and maths and physics and 
that sort of thing, so there’s quite a premium put on that initially, rather, and that 
certainly favours people who’ve kind of come from a cultural background or a country 
that has a very high focus on that sort of learning (Interview transcript 11). 
 
Even though white participants stress that stereotyping individuals with Asian bodies 
has positive aspects for those so evaluated, stereotypical expectations include 
derogative connotations (n=2). For instance, an entrepreneur states: 
 
We have a lot of Chinese here… who people recognize, they’re low on imagination but 
good at maths and we have (laughs)… um different people are good at different things 
(Interview transcript 18).  
 
Recruiting non-whites can serve the purpose of masking structural inequalities and 
signal meritocracy (Khan, 2008; 2011). The following quote, in which a financial 
professional refers a change in the industry towards valuing quantitative skills assigned 
to certain ‘races’, demonstrates awareness of tokenism and racism in the “financial 
world”: 
 
There’s also an expectation assigned to ‘races’, for better or for worse, generally for 
worse; I think an interesting development ethnicity wise, in the financial space these 
days is the impact of Far East, of Orientals, because there is […] almost reverse racisms, 
in terms of [Chinese individuals are seen as quantitative experts] but […] when it comes 
to Blacks I think, and in America, Hispanics... there’s still a huge amount of racism that 
comes from… (pause) social networks, comes from people not being integrated […] 
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[There is no equality because] you can have a Russian, you can have a Chinese. Those 
are the only acceptable ones, otherwise […] this is the normal face, the white guy is the 
normal face (Interview transcript 2). 
 
This narrative, in contrast to the previous racist comment, highlights awareness of 
structural disadvantage based on ‘race’. In addition, some participants emphasize that 
there is an underrepresentation of black individuals at the top. In regard to this 
underrepresentation, some participants including a barrister highlight that they are 
aware of the intersections between ‘race’ and economic disadvantage: 
 
I don’t know what explains [the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities studying law at 
Oxbridge]… well maybe I do know what explains it in some senses […] there are 
probably fewer ethnic minorities in private school I guess, that might be a function of 
wealth or something […] I don’t feel there’s any discrimination in the sense that I 
haven’t come across I’ve never heard anyone be racist, I never heard anyone say to my 
memory that white people or black people are better at particular things (Interview 
transcript 20). 
 
This quote highlights awareness of the intersection between social class or wealth, and 
ethnicity. It is this issue of socio-economic background, and how private schools 
translate economic capital into educational credentials which will be discussed in the 
next section.  
 
Social class: Economic evaluation as classed 
Was social class background107 viewed by participants as important for achieving 
economic success and high incomes? I will address this question as well as the 
potential tension between background, advantage and inheritance (Savage, 2014; Dean 
and Platt, 2016) on one hand, and motifs of meritocracy (Savage, 2015c) on the other. 
Some participants are clearly aware of the effect of family background on life chances; 
however narratives of meritocracy are generally enmeshed with accounts of advantaged 
backgrounds (see Glucksberg et al., forthcoming). Privileged individuals are viewed as 
                                                 
107 While participants generally refer to socio-economic background, family background or privileged 
families, I refer to social class. 
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more economically valuable. For illustration, in a study of professional services firms 
in the UK, Ashley and Empson (2017, p. 213) argue that privileged employees are seen 
as a marker of status, legitimacy and therefore offer a “competitive advantage” to firms. 
In line with this finding, for many participants there is no contradiction between 
meritocratic beliefs and the overrepresentation of those with privileged socio-economic 
backgrounds at the top, because structure becomes naturalized (similarly to what I have 
shown regarding gender).  
One key area where the contradiction between inheritance and merit is blurred 
in interview narratives is that the ‘confidence’ and ‘soft skills’ which are taught in 
private school are narrated as crucial for climbing the career ladder in finance and in 
law. Those who have these skills are economically evaluated as doing and being 
inherently better (Skeggs, 2004a; Khan, 2008). However, some respondents actually 
question the social process of privilege and confidence or express concern over the 
advantages afforded by private education.  
 
Figure 5.2 Views on the importance of background for obtaining top incomes  
 
Note: For one participant, it was not possible to assign a category due to missing data. 
 
During my interviews, family background came up spontaneously, whereas 
gender and ethnicity were prompted. In regard to participants’ backgrounds; 6 
voluntarily explained that they attended private schools, even though it was not 
included in the interview topic guide, and a further 2 have public profiles which state 
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that they attended prestigious private schools. Further, only one-third of individuals 
(n=11) indicate that from their perspective, they have not been socially mobile.  
Even though a majority of participants refer to family background 
spontaneously, many do not mention background when discussing differences in 
income, and top incomes and wealth (Figure 5.2). Overall, about one-third of 
participants view background as important, another third sees high social class 
background as enmeshed with virtuous values, and the final third does not mention 
background in the interview (hence, it is assumed that this is not considered as very 
important). Of the economic evaluators, 11/20 either do not mention background or say 
that it does not matter (8 and 3 respectively), 8/20 explain that “the right family” 
matters but hard work is more important or present social class as enmeshed with social 
value, and only 1/20 explains that background matters. Social evaluators, on the other 
hand, explain that background matters (8/10), or see it as enmeshed with value (1/10).  
What is left implicit in those interviews, in which social background was not 
discussed as relevant for top incomes and wealth, may have been addressed by the 
participant who explains that family background does not prevent access to high paying 
jobs because of efficient hiring practices (in investment banks). He mentions, referring 
to his employer: 
 
We’re very efficient at hiring people from a multitude of backgrounds, so you could have 
been in a poor Indian family, and still make it at [his investment bank]. So, you don’t 
necessarily need to be from a privileged background (Interview transcript 1). 
 
Hence, it is ability which is seen to matter most, not privileged backgrounds. On the 
other hand, participants who highlight structural inequalities, refer to the importance of 
socio-economic background and location of birth as key predictors of someone’s 
income (n=7). A hedge fund manager explains: 
 
The single biggest factor in someone’s income is where they were born; clearly, I’m not 
telling you anything you don’t know (Interview transcript 16). 
 
These contrasting narratives show that there are vast differences in the awareness of 
structural disadvantages by participants. A finance professional, who is currently re-
evaluating whether he wants to stay in the industry, explains that the right names and 
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background are important. I have previously discussed how this participant critiqued 
the idea of meritocratic economic evaluation, explaining that at the top “it’s almost a 
game”. His narrative highlights the importance of social class, and relationships: 
 
[The difference in incomes] has very little to do with your productivity, or what you’re 
producing or anything, or any connection with reality, it’s all ah... it becomes a... who 
can you work with, are you a nice person to work with, do you know the right people, do 
you have the right names and background to where people trust you well enough, 
that they are willing to allow you in, into their circle and once you’re in the circle, it 
actually can become very difficult to get out of the circle… and these are the people that 
are the high income [earners] (Interview transcript 2, emphasis added). 
 
This view contrasts with the economic theory of marginal productivity at the top, and 
with the literature on skill-biased technological change. Even though participants 
acknowledge that privileged backgrounds make the path to success easier, many insist 
that structural barriers can be overcome with hard work, or that hard work is the most 
important factor (Littler, 2013). For instance, a respondent who went to private school 
and currently runs a family office mentions while discussing inequality that even 
though background certainly affects people’s chances in life, working hard is most 
important for success: 
 
So much of people’s positions in life boil down to being born to the right family […] But 
I think at the end of the day, that if you, if you don’t work hard, or if you don’t push 
yourself into the right positions, you won’t, you won’t achieve anything (Interview 
transcript 12). 
 
Hence, though a privileged family background is narrated as advantageous, it is hard 
work which counts; even those from wealthy backgrounds, still need to work hard. 
Another entrepreneur explains for instance that even though coming from a wealthy 
family makes success easier, there are “people who break out of the social structure; it 
depends on how hungry people are to change path” (Written notes from interview 24 
which was unrecorded at request). During the interview, the entrepreneur reflected on 
his own story of success, explaining that he had to build up social contacts on his own, 
as he was disadvantaged by his middle class background. Further, a couple of 
participants refer to stories of privileged individuals who were unable to get ahead 
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because they did not apply themselves, as an example for this idea (see also Savage, 
2015c).  
The reason why many participants do not experience a contradiction between 
privileged backgrounds and merit is because the two are often seen as entangled 
(Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). Participants perceive coming from a middle or upper middle 
class background as a “good” morally valuable family background108, as it is seen as 
conducive to and associated with a good work ethic, which means working hard. 
Hence, evaluations of class are enmeshed with moral evaluations (Skeggs, 2004a). 
Similarly, social networks and contacts are also perceived as associated with 
trustworthiness and integrity. For instance, a successful fund manager is quite open that 
his “background of having the right contacts” enabled him to get into his economically 
successful position. He explains how his father… 
 
[…] got me an interview there and the fact that they knew him and they trusted him, I 
think integrity in our business is extremely important and the fact that they trusted him 
meant that they were prepared to give me the benefit of the doubt (Interview transcript 
21). 
 
This narrative highlights how family contacts are viewed as important for relationships 
and trust, which can be transformed into economic value.  
Meanwhile, a financial entrepreneur, who explains that he did not experience 
any obstacles to success even though he is from a poor background, acknowledges that 
family background makes a difference. However, he sees it as entangled with cultural 
capital, work ethic and educational merit: 
 
It is probably fair to say that people come from well-off backgrounds ah, which I didn’t, 
but people that do, probably have a better chance at education, a strong middle class 
background you will be encouraged more in education, education is absolutely vital in 
my view, building a work ethic, I think that happens better in some families than in 
others, I think if you’re born into a dysfunctional family, single parent family or 
whatever, that’s tough. Um, but there are still opportunities out there (Interview 
transcript 13). 
                                                 
108 With the exception of those participants who view their middle or upper middle class background as 
disadvantaged compared to others from privileged backgrounds. 
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A barrister, who is proud that her parents and grandparents bestowed a hard work ethic 
onto her, refers to this entanglement in a similar way stating that: 
 
I really believe in background and family background and that kind of determines where 
you might go. Not just, maybe not in economic success but just kind of getting the act 
together, getting a job and working hard (Interview transcript 25). 
 
Similarly, a barrister who went to private school also demonstrates how family 
background translates into merit:  
 
I would imagine that [family background] has enormous effect; my family was […] it’s 
all relative right… but I would say that my family was pretty comfortably, sort of 
wealthy, not fantastically rich […] pretty comfortably off. You know went to private 
school […] I don’t know how it works in Austria but in this country the best schools 
probably are fee paying schools […] which is just not accessible to, erm, people who 
aren’t from a relatively comfortable background… I think that was a big advantage; I 
think that if you come from, erm, more wealthier background, my mum was able to stay 
at home […] that gave me a more, erm, stable home environment […] I didn’t have to 
work myself ever so I didn’t have to give up time, I could spend my time you know 
working and/or doing things that were extra-curricular activities that were helpful to 
university applications and stuff like that […] so I think that having wealthy parents are 
advantageous for those reasons […] there are other reasons, other benefits, I think that 
coming from a stable background, [with] high expectations and sort of hard work is 
seen as a good thing and by hard work I mean hard academic work […] just 
anecdotally, I would imagine that life’s easier if you’re relatively well off (Interview 
transcript 20, emphasis added). 
 
The quote shows the contradiction that hard work actually means not working, but 
study and extracurricular activities. It also introduces the theme that private schools are 
viewed as necessary for facilitating economic advantages (see Khan, 2008; 2011). 
 
Private schooling: Translating economic advantage into cultural capital and economic 
value 
A key way in which structural advantages are mentioned as entangled with merit is in 
reference to private schooling, which is seen to bestow ‘confidence’ (n=5) (similar to 
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Khan’s (2011) ‘ease’) and other skills which are necessary to be viewed as of economic 
value. Education (n=18), in particular, private schooling and associated social networks 
(n=10), is narrated as important for being economically successful. Crucially, private 
schools are narrated as bestowing economic advantages because they are creating more 
talented, articulate, confident individuals (see Khan, 2008; 2011). Privately educated 
individuals are viewed as having superior networks (social capital), and confidence 
(embodied cultural capital). Those participants who mention that they attended private 
school (n=6) describe their experiences as having aided their economic success.  
Continuing the narrative of a barrister, illustrates why private schooling is seen 
as economically advantageous:  
 
Being a barrister is a knowledge industry so people come to me for my expert, my 
supposed expertise; [Success as a barrister is] a function of being educated… and […] 
other skills, so soft skills i.e. being able to speak to people and get on with people […] 
and there’s also, there’s some performance element in […] speak[ing] in court […] I 
imagine that both of those are also a function you know, of the [private] schools that I 
went to, the [Oxbridge] universities I attended… I’m sure there’s a genetic component to 
those kind of things as well […] but yeah I would imagine that the vast majority of the 
reason why I’ve been successful is education […] to the extent that I have a degree of 
confidence and I am articulate and those are, you know, it’s a degree of interesting 
performance […] that’s not education in the formal sense […] You go to a school where 
[…] you’re asked to speak a lot from a young age… you’re likely […] to be more 
articulate  (Interview transcript 20, emphasis added). 
 
Mocking his own expertise as performed, he explains that it is precisely this 
“interesting performance”, learnt in private school, which is economically valuable. In 
line with this idea, there are a couple of participants with extremely high incomes, who 
explain that they consider themselves as having been “pretty average”. They stress that 
their private education gave them a “level of confidence” which helped them succeed. 
Interestingly, they openly criticize the advantages afforded by private schooling, calling 
it a “terrible system”. A successful fund manager explains his own success: 
 
Having a private education tends to make one more confident than one would be 
otherwise […] You know, particularly if you’re not […] outstanding, I think if you’re 
outstanding, you know, it’ll come to anyone. But if you’re average, I consider myself 
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pretty average, I think having a private education has certainly, you know, given me a 
level of confidence that you… you very often don’t get in the State system. Now you 
come from Austria and you don’t have this terrible sort of private schooling system do 
you? (Interview transcript 21). 
 
There is an interesting contradiction between a critique of the private school system and 
the acknowledgement that it has been beneficial for personal success, as well as the 
conviction that private schooling is the best and therefore the only viable choice for the 
education of one’s children. For instance, one financial entrepreneur, whose public 
record shows that he has financially supported the Conservative Party, goes as far as 
proposing the abolishment of private schools to address the problem of “pretty crappy” 
state schools: 
 
We should get rid of private schools completely. Um, which they won’t but they should. 
Then you have, you know, if I couldn’t have just written a cheque and my children had 
to go to the school where I lived, I’d make sure the school was good. […] I’d go there 
until it was sorted out. […] I’d give my own money and make it good (Interview 
transcript 18). 
 
This quote demonstrates the extraordinary agency of the extremely wealthy. It also 
shows how private schools are seen as the logical extension of market thinking; parents 
pay for better services, and private schooling is a key way of transferring economic into 
cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) which is in turn expected to yield future economic 
returns. Therefore, even though private education is criticized, it is still perceived as the 
only viable option for education. Private education is narrated as a necessity due to its 
importance for elite accumulation (Savage, 2014). As a result, many participants 
acknowledge that economic capital is advantageous for educational outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
Privilege at the top of the income and wealth distributions is intersectional (Skeggs, 
1997; Crenshaw, 1989) because it is disproportionately, white, male and privately-
educated. In line with this, many participants view inequalities of gender, ethnicity and 
class as intersecting issues. Some acknowledge their advantages. However, the focus 
on accumulation means that participants seek to sustain their privilege through actions; 
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for instance, by sending their children to private school or arguing that it is not their 
role to change the status quo. For many participants, there is no contradiction between 
meritocratic beliefs and the overrepresentation at the top of those who perform 
masculinity, are white and who come from privileged socio-economic backgrounds, 
because structure becomes naturalized (Bourdieu, 1998; 2010 [1984]; Butler, 1999; 
Khan, 2008; Savage, 2015a). Bodies with these markers of privilege are evaluated as 
more economically valuable.  
I have shown that the performance of femininity is in contradiction with the 
performance of privilege, and that femininity is evaluated as economically less 
valuable. Making money and taking risk is viewed as aligned with masculinity. Gender 
becomes naturalized, as women are seen as self-selecting out of top income jobs in 
order to pursue more feminine pursuits including looking after their family 
(Glucksberg, 2016a). The City of London is narrated as having changed in regard to 
gender and ethnicity, with more diverse, international work environments seen as the 
new norm, despite evidence that there has been little, if any, change (McDowell, 2010; 
Atkinson et al., 2016). Economic evaluation is entangled with ‘race’ in stereotypical 
ways; those of Asian backgrounds are viewed as successful because they are racialized 
as having quantitative skills or talents.  
Finally, a third of participants acknowledges that class, referred to as socio-
economic background, is important, but two-thirds of participants view class as either 
entangled with merit, not important or not central enough to be mentioned. A key factor 
which participants stress is the ‘confidence’ inherent in individuals who were privately 
educated; this confidence is seen as crucial for economic success. In Chapter 7, I will 
show how private education is related to views on what it means to be rich. The reason 
why the privileges of those with economically advantaged backgrounds are not 
generally seen as in contradiction with meritocratic beliefs is that the two issues 
become enmeshed with the educational and personal merits of the advantaged. Those 
who perform confidence are viewed as having soft skills and talent (Khan, 2008), 
making differences in income seem natural.  
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Chapter 6  Relative (dis)advantage: The perspective from the top 
Introduction 
The vast economic inequality at the top of the income and wealth distributions is 
important for how inequality is perceived by those at the top. In Chapters 4 and 5, I 
have explored participants’ views on the causes of inequality. Now, I will analyse the 
perspective from which they view inequality, focusing on participants’ subjective social 
location and social comparisons with others. Social comparisons are important for 
perceptions of inequality, because inequality is made sense of in the context of social 
relations with others (Irwin, 2015). How do those with top incomes, many of whom 
also own top wealth, perceive their own position in an unequal society? Investigating 
this question by considering how they see themselves compared to others is 
fundamental for researching how economic inequality is experienced (Runciman, 1966; 
Rose, 2006; Irwin, 2015).  
A characteristic of income and wealth distributions is that they have a positive 
skew, with long right-hand tails which have expanded over time (Piketty, 2014, p. 601; 
Godechot, 2016). Individuals situated at the “right” tail of the distributions, i.e. top 
income earners (and those with top wealth) are in social contact with or aware of others 
who are likewise situated at the top. In their daily lives they are surrounded by vast 
absolute inequality (see Khan, 2015) because the differences between top income 
earners (and between those with top wealth) are much higher than those between 
individuals situated in the middle of the distribution.  
Based on my interview data and the economic literature which highlights vast 
economic inequality at the top, I argue that the top income earners in this study 
experience inequality from the position of relative (dis)advantage. When looking up, 
participants experience relative disadvantage, based on Runciman’s (1966) relative 
deprivation, as a result of economically wide-ranging upward social comparisons with 
socially close and distant others. Upward social comparisons include comparisons with 
others in their organizations, at competitor firms, in the City of London, friends and 
family, people with more valuable property and socially distant others known to 
participants via the media (most notably entrepreneurs and to a lesser extent, 
footballers, celebrities, aristocrats and people on the rich list).  
Asking participants about their own subjective social location, and who is doing 
better than them (as did Runciman, 1966), generates a lot of data in the form of 
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narratives of relative disadvantage. However, most participants are also aware of their 
advantage, drawing on economically downward social comparison with “the general 
population” or “the average earner”, their parents and siblings. In the case of social 
evaluators, participants experience relative advantage with reference to public sector 
employees who are seen to provide a more important social contribution. Therefore, I 
argue that top income earners experience relative (dis)advantage. 
Due to the skew at the top of the distribution, social comparisons with socially 
close others may nevertheless be wide-ranging in economic terms. The economically 
wide-ranging social comparisons, which participants of my study draw upon, are in 
contrast to Runciman’s (1966) and Irwin’s (2015) research on the general population or 
working and middle class participants respectively, which found little evidence of 
relative deprivation as a result of narrow-ranging social comparisons.  
The experience of relative (dis)advantage is relevant for how those at the top of 
the distribution perceive economic inequality. Firstly, the concept of relative 
(dis)advantage explains why participants’ perceptions of their own subjective social 
location are skewed, specifically why they underestimate their social location, and their 
own incomes, compared to everyone else. As I will address in the next chapter, relative 
(dis)advantage also explains participants’ skewed perceptions of what high incomes are 
and what richness means. Further, the concept is useful for understanding participants’ 
perceptions of levels of inequality; specifically, why they tend to overestimate top 
income and wealth shares (see Chapter 8). Finally, surprisingly, the experience of 
relative disadvantage is generally seen in a positive light; as an aspiration to do better 
economically due to the cultural process of economic evaluation, which views those 
who create most financial value as the best. Therefore, inequality is viewed as 
something which can be overcome, through hard work and perseverance (Littler, 2013). 
Hence, many participants view inequality as an incentive to do better, rather than as 
concerning. 
The experience of relative (dis)advantage may therefore provide a cultural 
explanation for increasing inequality at the top. Social comparisons by micro-level 
actors do not occur in a cultural vacuum, but are based on culturally shared 
understandings of how worth is evaluated. As discussed in Chapter 4, the criteria for 
evaluation are foremost economic. Taking into account the cultural process of 
evaluation helps to connect social comparisons at the micro-level to the broader macro-
level inequality (Lamont et al., 2014). The experience of relative disadvantage might be 
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a driver of economic inequality because upward social comparisons with others at the 
top may lead to a striving for further accumulation (Savage, 2014), as those with the 
highest amounts of economic capital are evaluated as the best. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide context for the analysis of participants’ 
perceptions of high incomes and richness as well as inequality (addressed in Chapters 7 
and 8 respectively). To this end, findings from the short interview survey and the 
interviews will be discussed focusing on participants’ subjective social location (Evans 
and Kelley, 2004) and social comparisons with reference groups (Runciman, 1966; 
Irwin, 2015; Pettigrew, 2015). These qualitative findings contextualize the related 
survey findings that participants’ subjective social locations are skewed. I will then 
address variation in the sample, focusing on gendered evaluation and outliers at the top. 
Finally, I will discuss how relative disadvantage may constitute a driver of inequality. 
 
Interview survey findings: Subjective social location of participants  
To investigate how participants understand their subjective social location, they were 
asked the following ISSP survey question: In our society there are groups which tend 
to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Here is a scale 
that runs from top (10) to bottom (1). Where would you put yourself now on this scale? 
This question acted as a transition from the open-ended interview to the questionnaire-
style section. Respondents were told that the upcoming questions form part of 
nationally-representative surveys. As was the case throughout the interview, 
respondents did not just give a short, numeric answer but elaborated on their reasoning; 
in this case why they choose a certain number. Generally, respondents found it difficult 
to answer this question because they were not sure what aspect the question was trying 
to measure. Was it income, wealth, education or happiness? Respondents were 
encouraged to answer in regard to what they thought was important and could 
subjectively place themselves according to multiple aspects. As the interview was 
framed in regard to top incomes and wealth, many participants referred to economic 
evaluative metrics. 
Only one-third of participants placed themselves as being in the top group of 
society (Figure 6.1), even though all participants are among the top 1 percent of income 
earners, the highest socio-economic group (NS-SEC1) and have degree-level education 
(apart from two participants). The median assessment of their subjective social location 
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is 8; demonstrating that participants’ perceptions are skewed towards the middle. An 
explanation may be that there is a tendency for people to see themselves in the middle 
of the social hierarchy due to a ‘reference group’ effect (Evans and Kelley, 2004). The 
reference groups of participants in this sample, which mainly consist of others at the 
top, may distort “the ‘subjective sample’ from which they generalize to the wider 
society and from which [they assess their] subjective location” (Ibid., p. 4). 
 
Figure 6.1 Subjective social location of research participants 
 
Note: Comparative data for respondents in Great Britain are from the ISSP 2009.  
 
However, comparing the distribution of participants’ responses with the 
nationally representative ISSP survey for Great Britain shows that participants’ choices 
are towards the upper end. This demonstrates awareness of social advantage (Figure 
6.1). Further, Evans and Kelley (2004) found that internationally and in Britain, only 1 
percent of respondents perceive themselves as being in the highest stratum of society, 
and only a further 1 percent perceives themselves as being in the second highest group. 
Hence, participants are actually much more likely than the general population to view 
themselves in the top group of society. As Evans and Kelley (2004, p. 29) found, “a 
person’s subjective social location partly reflects reference-group forces drawing 
everyone towards the centre, and partly reflects [awareness of] actual social 
inequalities”. Therefore, while participants’ upward social comparisons with reference 
groups may lead them to underestimate their own subjective location, the comparison 
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with the distribution of responses by the general population highlight that the 1 percent 
are aware of their advantage. 
 
Social comparisons: Relative (dis)advantage  
Asking participants questions which invite social comparisons allows them to articulate 
their own positioning, providing a fruitful avenue for exploring their subjective 
experience of socio-economic inequality (Irwin, 2015). After participants were asked to 
rate themselves on a scale from 1-10 as previously described, participants who did not 
rate themselves as a ‘10’ were asked who they view as a ‘9’ or ‘10’ in society and were 
asked whether there is anyone who is doing noticeably better than themselves and their 
family (following Runciman, 1966). I created a deductive code for the concept of 
relative (dis)advantage, a key theme in the interview data. Inductive sub-codes 
consisting of the specific reference groups, with which participants compared 
themselves, were assigned to this deductive code. I will draw on these codes throughout 
this chapter (Appendix 3).  
I argue that participants make sense of and narrate their position with reference 
to their relative disadvantage; they vividly refer to their disadvantage when ‘looking 
up’ to others who have higher income or are wealthier (Khan, 2015). Hence, 
participants can portray their own income and wealth as comparatively low and as 
normal (Sherman, 2017a). As a result, rather than making them feel worse, their 
relative deprivation actually makes them feel better (Ibid.). Participants narrate that 
they are relatively disadvantaged compared to co-workers, colleagues and other parents 
at their children’s schools. The interview data also includes comparisons to clients, 
managers and colleagues. In particular, those who are most economically advantaged, 
draw on economically wide-ranging upward social comparisons with socially and 
geographically distant others, including named entrepreneurs, billionaires and 
philanthropists. 
Examples of relative (dis)advantage include the narrative of a senior executive 
of a financial firm who is aware of his relative advantage because he has been “featured 
on various rich lists”, but evaluates his annual income (income group £401k-1m) as 
relatively disadvantaged compared to other staff at his firm, as well as his own previous 
earnings:  
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[My income is] low in this [name of financial company] alone [...] If I look at investment 
managers [here], I look at our senior corporate staff, I mean I know that within the City 
of London, that is less than I earned in [year] at [name of investment bank] [...] I am 
earning less income-wise than I did [many] years ago. So, there must be a lot of people 
earning more than me in the City of London (Interview transcript 6). 
 
Hence, even though he is aware of his advantage compared to the general population, 
he sees his income as low compared to others with whom he is in close social contact. 
The vast economic inequality within London is often referred to. A finance professional 
at a hedge fund explains to me that she is aware that her assessment of a high income, 
“earning millions”, is skewed by the environment that she is in and by the people which 
she deals with at work. She is aware that her income would be considered as high in 
different environments, specifically the area where she grew up: 
 
High income to me is probably earning millions. That’s partly because I see a lot of 
people who I have contact with on a daily basis who do [earn millions]. [However] I’m 
in London in an environment [with vast differences in income and wealth] but if I go 
back to where I grew up then I’m definitely a high earner (Interview transcript 29).  
 
This quote highlights that the participant is clearly conscious of her relative 
(dis)advantage. Some participants refer to their own advantage with British self-
mocking humour. For instance, the financial executive, who explained his income of a 
few hundred thousand pounds is “low” in his firm, adds the following: 
 
I am one of the very few people in the UK I am sure who hasn’t had a pay increase for 
eight years [laughs] but nobody is crying any tears for me! [hahahaha! laughs more] 
(Interview transcript 6). 
 
Hence, participants are clearly aware of their relative (dis)advantage. Relative 
(dis)advantage is experienced not only in regard to income, but also with respect to 
wealth. The importance of wealth relative to income (Piketty, 2014. p. 192) is often left 
unaddressed in social science studies on economic inequality, but is intuitive for 
participants. For instance, a senior banker employed by a prestigious investment bank 
compares himself with the parents of the other children in his children’s school. During 
the interview, while we sip tea in a café near his workplace, it is evident that he is very 
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interested in reflecting on the skewed nature of the economic inequality which 
surrounds him; he repeatedly refers to vast differences in wealth among the rich in 
London as “intriguing” or alternatively as “terrifying”. The participant is somewhat 
aware of his own advantage; he knows that his income, which is close to one million 
pounds, means he is “fairly well off” and that he has benefited from the increases in 
asset prices. However, he is acutely aware of his relative disadvantage comparing his 
economic position to others’ “differentiating” wealth. The investment banker explains 
his perspective as follows: 
 
It’s difficult to kind of contextualize [if the top 1 percent are doing much better 
nowadays than they used to], I mean what defines the top 1 percent; it’s like £100,000 
income which does not feel that great. I think there is a much greater distinction between 
those with asset wealth; income wealth is very different to asset wealth. My kids are at 
school, in a very nice school in [a prestigious area in London]. I feel like I’m fairly well 
off, and I earn multiples of the hundred thousand. But, I feel very poor in the context of 
the classmates that [my kids] have […] Their parents can spend a lot more time with 
them, because none of them really work, or some of them work but it’s working on their 
own terms, they might run a hedge fund, but they can take the kids to school […] I’d say 
nine or ten of [their] classmates’ parents have over £100 million, and that I think is just... 
differentiating. That to me feels wealthy, but earning a hundred thousand just doesn’t 
feel particularly wealthy. And I think that’s where we see the kind of big change [...] 
there are a lot more people within London who have a £100 million [assets] (Interview 
transcript 1).  
 
His experience of relative (dis)advantage illustrates the importance of wealth for 
richness, the theme of the next chapter. Further, he draws a clear distinction between 
income and wealth, a distinction which will be discussed in Chapter 8. His narrative is 
also similar to Irwin’s (2015, p. 12) research finding that participants “often revealed 
awareness of their situatedness in respect of the wider social context, whilst […] 
providing a more detailed account of their proximate circumstances and immediate 
concerns”. While participants are aware that they are advantaged in the wider social 
context, what predominantly matters to them in their daily lives, in an environment 
with vast absolute income and wealth differences, are social relationships and social 
comparisons with others at the top. For instance, the investment banker, by sending his 
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children to a private school in a prestigious area in London, is required to go out for 
dinner with the other rich parents. He explains that even though he earns well… 
 
… spending £300 on dinner is a big ticket item, but by definition these guys [who have 
£100 million in assets] will go to the nicest restaurants, and £300 is… they do not even... 
they do it like I buy a Starbucks coffee, but I appreciate that someone on £40 thousand 
thinks about it, they think about buying a Starbucks coffee like I think about buying a 
£300 meal... but there is a level beyond that, which is like, just do what you want 
really… which is intriguing (Interview transcript 1). 
 
Like other participants, he compares himself to socially close others, who are vastly 
more advantaged in economic terms, while at the same time acknowledging that he is 
comparatively advantaged. In crucial contrast to Irwin’s (2015) study, the top income 
earners in my study often and vividly referred to spontaneous comparisons with 
socially or geographically distant ‘others’. These include predominantly entrepreneurs, 
billionaires and philanthropists, other top earners, successful sports people and other 
celebrities, people on the rich list and individuals with valuable London property. It is 
possible that respondents draw upon social comparisons beyond their immediate 
circumstances and experiences in order to make sense of their own position in an 
unequal and hierarchical society in which they are situated at the top end.  
For instance, a successful senior executive in a large financial company (gross 
annual income group £5-50m) chooses to present his wealth in a “modest” way and 
himself as “ordinary” (Miles et al., 2011) by highlighting his disadvantage compared to 
Bill Gates, whom he greatly admires. In response to the question how high his net 
worth is he explains: 
 
I am not poor, I am not... I would be in the category who people would regard as having 
high net worth but I would not put a figure on it, I think that’s a private matter […] Yeah, 
I am not full of myself, I am up the top end, but I’m not Bill Gates (laughs)… nor 
anything close to it (Interview transcript 4). 
 
The narrative demonstrates that the finance executive is clearly aware of his advantage, 
but prefers to highlight his relative disadvantage compared to the richest individual in 
the world. Entrepreneurs are greatly admired by participants, as I will now discuss.    
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Entrepreneurs as those in the ‘top’ group of society 
Those who are viewed as in the ‘top’ group of society are generally entrepreneurs who 
have achieved extreme wealth. Entrepreneurs, including philanthropists and billionaires 
who derive their wealth from entrepreneurial activity, are the single most mentioned 
answer category and the most common economically upward social comparison, 
although other top earners and successful sports stars are mentioned as well. Many 
respondents refer to entrepreneurs (n=11), billionaires, philanthropists or oligarchs 
(n=4) as people who do better than themselves while there are limited references to the 
‘upper class’ or the aristocracy (n=4) (see Savage, 2015c). Named entrepreneurs 
include Warren Buffet, Richard Branson, James Dyson, Mark Zuckerberg, Larry 
Ellison, Bernie Ecclestone, Steve Jobs and, most prevalently, Bill Gates, who is praised 
for his philanthropic efforts109 (McGoey, 2012). Notably, almost all of the admiringly 
referred to entrepreneurs are Anglo-Saxon white males110. Exceptions are female 
entrepreneurs who are in direct competition with the entrepreneurs in the sample. As I 
have argued in Chapter 5, it is individuals with intersectional privilege who are viewed 
as economically valuable.  
The finding that participants employ economic criteria of evaluation and justify 
worthiness in market terms (discussed in Chapter 4) explains why entrepreneurs are 
narrated as the most valuable actors (Hall and Lamont, 2013). As I have argued, many 
participants see the distribution of economic resources as reflecting social contribution 
(as in marginal productivity theory; McGoey, 2017; Stiglitz, 2015a). Hence, 
entrepreneurs are greatly admired, not simply for their vast wealth, but for their social 
contribution. The following quotes by a former senior investment bank executive and 
two fund managers respectively highlight this finding: 
 
• I certainly admire people who built things from scratch and create something, it’s 
great […] I’ve got no issues with people making a lot of money, I’m all in favour of 
that, it’s great, as long as you are creating wealth, creating jobs, I think that’s great, 
but I object to some of the practices paid out to people who are not doing that 
(Interview transcript 13). 
                                                 
109 Participants also mention the Candy brothers, the Waltons and various hedge fund managers. 
110 The same applies to the sports stars mentioned. 
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• I wish I could have been an entrepreneur […] I think every society needs 
entrepreneurs because the benefit for the society is so huge, and you need to have 
that. Whether it is a Facebook or a Google whatever it is [...] you need people to wake 
up and have these amazing ideas (Interview transcript 10). 
• [My former colleague] who runs [a hedge fund]. He’s a brilliant, brilliant man. And 
he’s built a business from scratch... and he’s had intellectual capital and now 
according to the Sunday Times Rich list he’s got gazillions, whatever it is and I think 
that’s right […] it’s just hard work and intellectual capital; monetized and good for 
him [...] fantastic... so […] you absolutely mustn’t think that I am saying everyone 
who’s made some money is some kind of crook, I’m just saying that there’s a lot of 
people in finance who have done excessively well at other people’s expense 
(Interview transcript 8). 
 
Entrepreneurs are greatly admired, and their excessive income and wealth is generally 
seen in a positive light. Their economic rewards are viewed as reflecting their 
contribution. Further, entrepreneurial efforts are often juxtaposed with top incomes by 
financial intermediaries or CEOs; whose incomes are not necessarily seen as deserving. 
I address this moral distinction in Chapter 8. The admiration for entrepreneurs helps to 
contextualize the finding that there are outliers at the top who experience little relative 
disadvantage; namely entrepreneurs with extremely high incomes. Next, I will discuss 
this and other variation in the sample.  
 
Variation in the sample: Differences by wealth, income, gender and evaluative 
metrics  
There is a weak positive relationship between participants’ gross annual income or net 
worth, and their subjective social location. This is unsurprising given that many 
participants evaluate worth in economic terms. There is less variability among those 
with wealth of approximately £3m and up compared to all others; those with highest 
wealth are more likely to self-rate as being part of the ‘top’ group of society (Figure 
6.2). There is also less variability in subjective social location between those with 
incomes over £5m compared to all others (Figure 5.1, Chapter 5).  
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Figure 6.2 Subjective social location of participants by net worth (log scale) 
 
 
On average, female respondents assign themselves a lower rank in the hierarchy, their 
median answer is 8 compared to 9 for males. Women also have lower gross annual 
income and lower wealth than male respondents, but women rate themselves lower than 
men with comparable income or wealth. The gender difference in the interview study is 
much larger than that observed by Evans and Kelley (2004) who found that males place 
themselves approximately 0.17 points higher than women, although my sample is 
certainly not representative of individuals in the top 1 percent. As I have argued, (self-) 
evaluation is gendered, indicating that this finding may be related to the patriarchal 
character of ‘elite’ environments (Glucksberg, 2016a). Likewise, the qualitative data 
shows that there are slight differences in the social comparisons upon which men and 
women draw; women are more likely to engage in upward social comparisons with 
nobility, actresses and pop stars, whereas men are more likely to compare themselves 
with white male footballers, other sports stars and their friends. However, all 
participants draw on social comparisons with entrepreneurs. There are 7 participants, 
whose narratives do not include references to relative disadvantage. The vast majority 
of these participants are social evaluators (6/7) who stress their comparative advantage 
to the general population. 
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Variation in the sample: Outliers at the top 
Most research participants expressed feelings of relative disadvantage; however, those 
with incomes in the very top category (£5-50 million) are acutely aware of their 
advantage and engage in few upward comparisons of an economic nature. 
Economically successful entrepreneurs or fund managers in the finance industry with 
extremely high gross annual incomes of £5m and higher (n=6) are generally aware that 
they are at the very top end of the spectrum. However, one participant in this category 
claims that he is a 7 to himself, but a 10 to the [person] on the street, and another 
explains that his multi-million pound income is “high but not super high” compared to 
other hedge fund managers in his field. 
The survey findings demonstrate that only among those with extremely high 
annual incomes, the median response to where they view themselves in society is ‘10’ 
(Figure 6.3). There is more variability in subjective social location among the other 
income groups. Hence, there are clear outlier effects at the top (see Savage, 2014). The 
six participants with income in the highest category are all male, bar one exception 
white, and with the exception of one fund manager, entrepreneurs. As discussed, 
entrepreneurs are admired by participants; so it may not be surprising that this group 
view themselves as at the top of society.  
 
Figure 6.3 Subjective social location of participants by gross annual income 
 
Note: Data from the survey of research participants. Please note that a participant with income 
£5-50m whose subjective social location is plotted as 8.5 mentioned that he is a 7 to himself, 
but a 10 to the [person] on the street. 
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Therefore, in my interview sample, income is related to subjective social location. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, there are outlier effects in the GBCS, whereby respondents’ 
probability of self-identifying as ‘upper middle’ or ‘upper class’ increases dramatically 
with higher household incomes after taxes. This implies that a more granular analysis at 
the top, beyond decile groups, which are usually the focus of research, might be 
fruitful. 
The vast absolute differences at the top of the distributions therefore matter for 
analyses of subjective social class and self-perceived social location. Those with 
extremely high incomes are aware that they are advantaged, more so than those with 
very high incomes. Participants’ assessments of their subjective social location 
illustrate that many of the finance entrepreneurs and hedge fund managers with 
extremely high incomes do not experience relative disadvantage. Asked about their 
subjective social location, and who is doing better than them they answer: 
 
• Yeah, well, I mean I’d be in the top 1 percent, of whatever basically (Interview 
transcript 15). 
• Of course, if you’re talking about income, or wealth in particular, I’m obviously at the 
top of that (Interview transcript 16). 
• I think I am right on the right-hand tail... the only data point I’ve got is, as you’re 
probably aware, I’m in the Sunday Times Rich list (Interview transcript 17). 
 
In an environment with vast economic differences, only those situated at the very right-
hand tail, confidently assert that they are at the top. A fund manager, who is a social 
evaluator and the only non-entrepreneur among those with extremely high incomes, 
acknowledges that his own income is very high. He questions his high earnings by 
drawing on a social, rather than economic, upward social comparison. Assessing his 
own subjective social location, he explains: 
 
Yeah well okay I’d well [Laughs] okay I… I’d put a one [the top group] but with a very 
strong proviso that I’d expect there to be a huge number of people in that group. Who 
would be people who would be looking after say relatives, or something like that or 
handicapped children in terms of how well I’m rewarded for what I do; I’m extremely 
well rewarded for what I do. So whereas they’re not rewarded for what they do. So if you 
do it on a reward thing, relative to what I do, I’d probably be at the bottom of the pile 
because I’m excessively rewarded for what I do (Interview transcript 21). 
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Like this fund manager, half of the participants with extreme incomes (£5-50m) are 
social evaluators. Asked whether there is anyone else doing better than themselves and 
their family, these social evaluators explain that they do not know of anyone who does:  
 
• Well that’s impossible, as I say I mean it’s the universe I inhabit is a really strange 
universe, so yeah there’s a few hundred people like me in London, I suppose but I 
don’t know any of them and I don’t speak to any other hedge fund managers, so I 
don’t know, basically is the answer. I don’t know, never really occurred to me to be 
honest (Interview transcript 15). 
• Not really no. Not financially (Interview transcript 21).  
• No, I don’t care less… couldn’t care less, no (Interview transcript 16). 
 
While these social evaluators do not engage in any upward social comparisons, a hedge 
fund manager on the Sunday Times Rich list states that it is not just economic power 
which is important for being in the ‘top’ group of society, but that political influence is 
also important by drawing on an ‘upward’ comparison to those who he perceives as 
politically powerful. While he acknowledges his economic advantage, he argues that 
“on the metric of political influence” he ranks in the middle, and not at the top. As I 
will address, participants generally do not view the experience of disadvantage as 
concerning; in line with this finding the hedge fund manager explains that he is 
“intensely relaxed” about his disadvantage compared to other politically powerful 
individuals, reminiscent of Peter Mandelson’s New Labourite assertion that he is 
“intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich as long as they pay their taxes” 
(Joyce and Sibieta, 2013). However, social evaluators with extremely high incomes 
generally do not engage in economically upward social comparisons.   
The economic evaluators among those with extreme incomes are more likely to 
draw on upward social comparisons. This group explain that they are relatively 
disadvantaged, and that they see this as an incentive or a driver to do better111. A hedge 
fund manager and another financial entrepreneur, explain that looking upward provides 
incentives, which encourages financial success. The financial entrepreneur, who I 
visited in his company, explains in response to my question about his subjective social 
                                                 
111 With the exception of a hedge fund manager, who is an economic evaluator with extremely high 
income. He is clear that no-one is doing better than him, answering that he is feeling “great” about 
that, “proud, you know, I mean why wouldn’t you feel good?” (Interview transcript 17). 
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location, that his answer will be very skewed. To himself, he explains, he is a 7, but to 
the [person] on the street he would be a 10. Further, the gap between 7 and 10 reflects 
where he is now and where he wants to be; it is about ambition. Therefore, he will 
never see himself as a 10, because there is always more to achieve. Explaining that the 
context of the interview is about money, he offered to provide some numbers. To him, 
he explains, 8s and 9s are people with £1 billion; and to be a 10 someone needs to hold 
over £10 billion. However, he asserts, once he has reached £10 billion, he will aspire to 
£20-30 billion, as “it is about driving forward” (written notes of Interview 24). This 
narrative highlights the competitiveness of evaluations of worth, and how participants 
aspire to be ‘the best’ (i.e. those ‘creating’ the most economic value). His comparative 
context, the world of his entrepreneur and philanthropic friends, is viewed as an 
aspiration to do better.  
Similarly, a hedge fund manager explains that his multi-million pound income 
is “high but [..] not super high” compared to others in his field:  
 
If you take sheep farmers in Inverness I’d probably be pretty high. Probably the highest 
(Laughs!) […] But I’m not competing with a sheep farmer in Inverness and nor is he 
competing with me. And he likes his lifestyle, living on the Moors and looking at the 
beautiful weather every day and the shitty stones, and well he likes all that. I don’t like 
that (laughs) (Interview transcript 18). 
 
This narrative highlights that it is the social comparisons within his field which matter 
to him; comparisons with others whom he is in competition with, i.e. other 
entrepreneurs. These examples of economic evaluators demonstrate that even at the 
very top some participants experience relative (dis)advantage, and aspire to do better 
financially. As I will show, participants commonly view the experience of relative 
disadvantage as an aspiration to do better. However, most at the very top do not 
experience relative disadvantage. A couple of respondents in the highest income group, 
drawing on narratives relating to competitive markets, compare themselves with 
footballers and other sports stars to explain their advantage with the ‘scarcity value’ of 
their talent and their ‘unique pricing power’ (as discussed in Chapter 4). This is in line 
with the economic literature which explains increasing top incomes as resulting from 
skill-biased technological change which allows exceptionally educated and talented 
 185 
individuals to draw a superstar income (Mankiw, 2013). Hence, those at the very top of 
the economic distribution are the most talented, most valuable individuals. 
 
Relative disadvantage as aspiration and driver 
Relative disadvantage resulting from social comparisons with richer others is made 
salient by the cultural process of economic evaluation, whereby individuals’ worth is 
evaluated through economic achievement. Participants’ views demonstrate a moral 
imperative to achieve economic success (in the form of Weber’s (2003 [1905]) The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism). This evaluative process is based on the 
culturally-shared idea that ‘the market’ is a neutral and fair judge of who is ‘best’. The 
market is seen to determine who is ‘best’ based on who creates the highest financial 
value. It is through this process that upward social comparisons become a driver of 
inequality at the top, because those even further up the skewed distribution are viewed 
as having attained their position based on ‘rational’, market-based evaluations of merit 
(and therefore as deserving) (McCall et al., 2014; Lamont, 2012; Bourdieu, 1998).   
As evaluations of worth are made in market terms, the magnitude of someone’s 
net worth or someone’s assets under management form a basis for social comparisons 
(Sweezy, 1964). For instance, when asked about who is doing better than him, a hedge 
fund manager refers to his relatively (dis)advantaged position in the hedge fund market:  
 
I’d say we’re running about [X] billion in assets. We’ve done reasonably well [but, other 
hedge fund managers and competitor firms] are actually running [X+10, X+15, X+20] 
billion dollars. So in terms of […] their shareholding in their companies and the income 
they’re generating, it will be a multiple of what we’re achieving here (Interview 
transcript 23).  
 
Hence, the amount of money under management forms the basis of comparison for this 
hedge fund manager. Further, this experience of relative disadvantage is portrayed in a 
positive light. In general, participants are keen to stress that they do not begrudge those 
who are doing better, in particular the entrepreneurs who are greatly admired. For 
instance, a financial professional explains: 
 
I don’t feel bitter towards the people who are better off and obviously I am excluding 
myself in this one. Me, above me. I don’t feel bitter that, that they’re doing better out 
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of it. Maybe I should be, I don’t know but I don’t, I don’t feel really bothered by it 
(Interview transcript 7).  
 
Similarly, the financial entrepreneur who aspires to owning £10 billion and expects that 
once he has achieved that he will aspire to £20-30 billion, explains that he intentionally 
makes friends with people who are incredibly wealthy, compared to whom he is 
relatively disadvantaged, because he sees these relationships as an incentive to 
accumulate more. He explained that one cannot choose their family but can choose 
their friends. This application of the market logic means that unequal outcomes among 
friends are seen as an aspiration to do better.  
Often when upward comparisons are made and disadvantage is expressed 
during the interviews, this is seen as something to aspire to, a motivator based on 
admiration for entrepreneurs who have taken risk and created wealth and jobs. As I will 
show in the next chapter, this discourse is in contrast to the discourse of ‘elite struggle’, 
whereby participants complain about the vast and increasing house prices in London 
and the cost of private schooling.  
The positive discourse surrounding personal disadvantage as a result of 
inequality at the top is reminiscent of Khan’s (2015)  argument that the economic world 
surrounding ‘elites’ is one that is different to all others because it is characterized by 
wage-growth and increasing mobility. Therefore, the inequality which participants 
perceive around them is generally not seen as concerning. As a result, participants do 
not portray their relatively disadvantaged position due to the skew at the top as 
concerning, because they see themselves as able to move and climb the hierarchy. 
Continuing the narrative of the successful investment banker who compares himself to 
the other parents at his child’s school demonstrates how economic disadvantage is 
talked about as something that can be overcome through competing and masculine 
aspiration:  
 
£100 million is a lot of money, but it’s not a ridiculous amount of money. It’s an 
achievable amount of money. I know that sounds ridiculous but you could start from zero 
and get to £100 million within 20 years, I am fairly confident. I’ve seen enough clients. 
If you’re really good, and you are really passionate and you’ve got drive, I think you can 
be a good guy and get them (Interview transcript 1). 
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Due to the cultural process of economic evaluation, relative disadvantage was not 
bemoaned but considered a positive driver do better economically, and as something to 
reach towards. For instance, an investment banker who mentions higher earners as 
those who do better than him explains that those in the top groups, who are a ‘9’ or ‘10’ 
are “aspiration and that’s probably my inherent work ethic” (Interview transcript 14). 
However, some participants, even when they themselves do not express feelings of 
relative disadvantage, explain how others experience relative disadvantage, stressing 
that comparisons at the top have gotten out of hand, and that there has been a ratcheting 
up at the top: 
 
I don’t think you want to penalize entrepreneurialism but I think what’s wrong is when 
people are paying themselves using comparators… you’re a CEO of a company now and 
everyone just looks [at] the top one hundred CEO levels, everyone says they want to be 
in the top quartile and so there’s been a ratcheting up over the last twenty years, which 
has got nothing to do with how well that company’s performed (Interview transcript 21). 
 
This idea that top-end social comparisons result in a race to the top has been 
demonstrated by DiPrete et al. (2010) who argue that executive pay has increased due 
to ‘leap-frogging’ at the top, which results in an increase in inequality. The fund 
manager, who believes that if there were more women in top positions there would be 
less focus on “money, money, money” explains that [stock] options, “the favoured 
fashionable way of remunerating” senior management, posed no downside risk and 
allowed “these guys” to make an “awful lot of money short term” which... 
 
... has developed and fuelled a culture... so basically other people have come in behind it 
and gone, Well, he got this. He was paid five million a year. I want to be paid five million 
a year because if I don’t get paid five million a year, it’s implying that I’m not as good 
as he was [...] I’m ever better so I must be paid more. Instead of going no-no-no-no, it’s 
not just about pay. It should be about your achievements for the company […] But no, 
it’s become, How am I recognized for all my hard work? It’s because... That’s how I’m 
paid. And I think that culture [of almost competitive salaries, getting bigger and bigger 
and bigger] needs to sort of step back a bit (Interview transcript 22). 
 
This competition at the top is narrated as particularly salient in London by a senior 
executive at a hedge fund: 
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There’s something about being in London that makes people a bit more, that increases 
the desire to be wealthy; I think when you’re surrounded by it. Maybe it’s a bit more 
competitive or something (Interview transcript 28). 
 
Relative disadvantage and inequality at the top is hence viewed by many participants as 
an incentive and motivator to do better competitively, as those at the top of the income 
and wealth distributions are evaluated as the best.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have argued that the skews at the top of the distributions, i.e. the vast 
differences in income and wealth within the top 1 percent, are important for 
understanding the perspective of top income earners. Participants are aware of broader 
societal inequalities, but are particularly conscious of vast differences at the top end of 
the distribution. They engage in economically wide-ranging social comparisons, to both 
socially close and distant others (including colleagues, friends and family, but also 
entrepreneurs, philanthropists and celebrities). Consequently, they experience what I 
term relative disadvantage, based on Runciman’s (1966) concept of relative 
deprivation. Participants narrate this relative disadvantage as important in their daily 
lives, while acknowledging their advantage compared to the general population. Hence, 
their experience of inequality combines these disparate perspectives and is one of 
relative (dis)advantage. 
While my data shows that participants draw on social comparisons with socially 
close others (Runciman, 1966; Irwin, 2015), these comparisons may nevertheless be 
wide ranging in economic terms. In further contrast to Runciman’s (1966) and Irwin’s 
(2015) study, participants also draw on economically wide-ranging social comparisons 
with distant others112. Runciman’s investigation into income satisfaction found that 
respondents used a narrow range of social comparisons because they compared 
themselves to others in similar situations. As a result, respondents experienced little 
relative deprivation and were unaware of the extent of the income range or inequality 
more generally (Rose, 2006). Hence, Runciman (1966) argued that his findings 
explained why inequality is tolerated and sustained. In contrast, I find that due to the 
                                                 
112 My findings are also in sharp contrast to research on disadvantaged communities by Mckenzie 
(2015) and Shildrick and MacDonald (2013) whose analysis points to close points of social comparison. 
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experience of relative disadvantage at the top, participants appreciate and even 
overestimate inequality. However, this heightened awareness of inequality at the top 
does not necessarily translate into vast concern about levels of inequality, as I will 
discuss in Chapter 8.  
 There is variation in the data. Those with extremely high incomes (£5-50m) 
experience little relative disadvantage even though some of the richest individuals, 
employing economic evaluative criteria, see their own wealth as relatively 
disadvantaged and aspire to accumulate more. Within the group of incomes below £5m, 
a ‘knowing’ display of significant economic advantage as being distant from one’s own 
position was frequent, though this was mediated by an awareness of their comparative 
advantage in the wider context of the general population. So, there is ‘upward looking’ 
but also recognition of their advantaged social position. The few participants, who do 
not narrate some form of relative disadvantage, are almost all social evaluators 
(presumably because their evaluative metric is not exclusively economic).  
Surprisingly, disadvantage resulting from upward comparisons is not seen as 
concerning, but instead is perceived as an incentive and aspiration to do better 
economically. Crucially, participants view themselves as able to move up the 
distribution by accumulating more (Khan, 2011). Economic evaluative criteria, which 
justify worth in market terms, based on the belief that market competition determines 
merit, mean that entrepreneurs are viewed as in ‘the top’ group of society. Hence, 
inequality is experienced from a position of relative disadvantage which generally 
values those with top incomes and wealth, the entrepreneurs, philanthropists and wealth 
creators, as people to aspire to. This finding helps to contextualize perceptions of 
inequality. Highlighting their relative disadvantage allows participants to frame their 
own incomes as comparatively low (Sherman, 2017). Further, relative (dis)advantage 
explains why participants’ perceptions of high incomes and richness are skewed (as I 
will discuss in the following chapter), and why they overestimate the levels of 
economic inequality (Chapter 8).  
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Chapter 7  Perceptions of high incomes and richness  
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that it is precisely the skew at the top of the 
distributions and the social comparisons which individuals make (i.e. how they see 
themselves relatively to others), which is important for understanding how those with 
top incomes and/or wealth perceive their subjective social location in an unequal 
society, and by implication, economic inequality. In this chapter, I will explore what a 
high income means to participants and how much net worth they view as being 
required for a family to be considered as being rich in the UK. Hence, richness in this 
chapter is defined by wealth113 rather than income (Keister, 2014). High incomes and 
richness are narrated as ‘relative’; specifically, compared to others at the top instead of 
the general population.  
Perceptions of high incomes and richness are highly skewed towards the right 
tail of the distributions as a result of participants’ relatively (dis)advantaged position. 
Consequently, many participants do not view themselves as earning high incomes or as 
being rich (cf. Toynbee and Walker, 2008), apart from those with extremely high 
incomes and wealth. Like their views on subjective social location, participants’ views 
towards high incomes and richness are skewed due to social comparisons. Participants’ 
insistence that high incomes and richness are ‘relative’ concepts, is contextualised by a 
key theme which emerged from the interview data, which I term ‘elite accumulatory 
struggle’ (Skeggs, 2004a; Savage, 2015a).  
The theme of ‘elite accumulatory struggle’ includes narratives of the difficulty 
of buying large family homes in central London due to the high property prices, in 
particular in participants’ preferred areas of North, and even more so, West London 
(Cunningham and Savage, 2015). Here, younger participants refer to age related 
differences in housing wealth by drawing on social comparisons with others who have 
bought their London homes, 5, 10 or 25 years ago (Hills et al., 2015). The second 
narrative corresponding to the theme of elite accumulatory struggle includes 
participants’ concerns over paying for private education for their children, and 
sometimes for their imagined future children, which is seen as a necessity. A further 
emergent theme, which can be seen as the counterpart of the ‘struggle’ to accumulate 
                                                 
113 The wealth data refers to non-pension wealth (Hills et al., 2015). 
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capitals, is the idea of high income or richness as freedom and absence from worry. 
Hence, many participants define richness as generating income without having to work; 
as freedom from worries about accumulation and the strains of the labour market. 
Hence the rich are those who have achieved individual ‘decommodification’ (Esping-
Andersen, 1990).  
I firstly discuss the survey results including participants’ views on high incomes 
and richness, and their estimates of the median income and the threshold for the top 1 
percent. I then discuss participants’ perceptions of high incomes and richness as 
‘relative’ concepts, referring to my qualitative interview findings. Income and wealth 
are often addressed jointly and as interrelated in interview narratives, perhaps because 
it is the combination of the two which contributes to the resources which people have at 
their disposal (Townsend, 1979). For instance, “a substantial part of income [by owner-
occupiers] is not paid in rent and so, if there is no mortgage, is released for other forms 
of consumption” (Ibid., p. 338). Further, as there is much overlap between the themes 
which emerged regarding what a high income and what a rich family mean to 
participants, I will present the findings of these different concepts jointly. I then address 
how ‘elite accumulatory struggle’ can contextualize participants’ skewed perceptions 
and the idea of richness as ‘freedom’ from worrying about accumulation and the strains 
of the labour market. Building on these interview findings and Atkinson’s (2006) 
definition of the ‘rich’ as those who are decommodified, I propose a relative definition 
of richness at the end of this chapter.  
 
Interview survey findings: Attitudes towards high incomes and richness 
The survey data collected during my interviews shows that participants’ views on high 
incomes and richness are skewed, and very different from the actual distribution of 
incomes and wealth among the general population. Participants’ numeric answers to 
what a high income is to them were extremely high, with a median answer of £200k 
and an average answer of £721k (cf. Toynbee and Walker, 2008). This compares to 
BSA data on the general population (from 2009, cited in Rowlingson et al., 2012) 
which shows that the average response to what constitutes a high income was £41k 
(and £48k by those with highest household incomes of £44k and higher). On average, 
participants’ answers to what constitutes a high income are lower than their actual 
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incomes; the median income among participants is £346k and the average income is 
£4.2m. 
The median response in my sample to how much net worth a family needs to be 
rich in the UK was £3m, and the average response was £9.4m. In comparison, the 
median net worth among respondents is £2.9m and the average net worth is £37m. Like 
the distributions of actual incomes and net worth of participants, the distributions of the 
perceptions of high incomes and richness are right skewed. However, there is more 
variation among participants’ financial positions, than among their views114. 
Nevertheless, there is a lot of variation in numeric answers to the question regarding 
what constitutes a high income (Figure 7.1).  
 
Figure 7.1 Participants’ income and perceptions of a high income 
 
Note: This graph excludes data for one outlier who stated a high income is at least £10m. There 
is also missing data because not all respondents indicated a number; some preferred to give a 
qualitative answer only (n=4).  
 
                                                 
114 While the standard deviation of participants’ incomes is £10.2m, the standard deviation of 
responses to what a high income is, is £1.9m. Further, while the standard deviation of participants’ net 
worth is £70.3m, this falls to £17.3m for responses to the question of what it means to be a rich family 
in the UK. 
 193 
There are only two participants who indicate a figure below £100k. On the other 
hand, one participant, whose answer is an outlier and therefore excluded from the 
graph, indicated that his personal understanding of a high income is 8 or 9 figures 
(greater than £10m). Hence, the answers range from £60k to greater than £10m. There 
is no correlation between participants’ own incomes and their views on what a high 
income is (Figure 7.1).  
Comparing participants’ own numeric assessments of what counts as high 
income to their gross annual income, shows that only about half of the sample have 
high incomes according to their own definition (Figure 7.1). Specifically, excluding 
missing data for 3 participants, there are 16 participants whose own income is high 
according to their own definition, and 11 whose income is not high. Even though all 
participants have incomes within the top 1 percent of the distribution, only those with 
incomes higher than £1m consistently view their own income as high (with the 
exception of the outlier). This mirrors the finding discussed earlier, that only those with 
extremely high incomes consistently position themselves as part of the top group in 
society. Of those with incomes between £5-50m, almost all (5/6) have a high income 
according to their definition. These findings compare to data on the general population 
which showed that in 2009, only 4 percent consider themselves to be earning a high 
income (Rowlingson et al., 2012). Hence, those in the top 1 percent are much more 
likely to indicate that their income is high compared to the general population (their 
income is also much higher). 
There are vast differences in views of high incomes between participants, in 
particular between social and economic evaluators. The latter indicated much higher 
figures on average (Table 7.1). Due to an outlier, I focus on the median; data for the 
average responses are provided for illustrative purposes. These results need to be 
interpreted very cautiously due to the small sample size, and the non-random nature of 
the sample. In regard to participants’ age, those in the oldest age group who are in their 
50s and 60s provided the highest median response, £332k, which is about 70 percent 
higher than those in the youngest age group who are in their 20s and 30s. Further, the 
median response to what a high income constitutes is approximately twice as high 
among females, although the average is higher among male participants (due to the 
outlier). Participants, who indicate they have not been socially mobile, provided a 
median response which is almost 2.5 times higher than the socially mobile. 
Additionally, those with incomes in the middle bracket (£401k-5m) provide the highest 
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median answer to what a high income is to them (£600k). Their answer is about three 
times as high as those in the lowest and highest income group115. The largest difference 
is between economic and social evaluators; the former’s median response, £500k, is 
five times as high as the median response of social evaluators. 
 
Table 7.1 Perceptions of high incomes 
 
Note: 3 respondents did not provide a number but only a qualitative answer. There is missing 
data for social mobility for one participant. Another mentioned that US$1m is a high income.  
 
In regard to quantifying what it means to be a rich family in the UK, some 
respondents stated that it is not about a number but a lifestyle people choose. As 
                                                 
115 This finding is somewhat different from a Gallup poll which showed that in the US in 2003 the 
median answer to what amount of household income is required to be rich increased with respondents’ 
household income (van Treeck, 2014). Specifically, for those with incomes <$30k, the dollar amount 
required for a household to be rich was US$74k, for those with incomes US$30K–50k it was US$100k 
and for those with incomes US$50k and higher it was US$200k. 
What is a high income?
Income group n Average Median
140-400k 16 332,813                200,000                          
401k-5m 5 599,130                600,000                          
5-50m 6 1,858,333            225,000                          
Gender
Female 8 535,081                460,325                          
Male 19 799,474                200,000                          
Evaluation type
Social evaluators 10 216,500                100,000                          
Economic evaluators 17 1,017,979            500,000                          
Age Group
20s and 30s 13 1,132,358            200,000                          
40s 7 346,429                225,000                          
50s and 60s 7 332,143                332,143                          
Self-identified Social Mobility
Socially Mobile 17 887,979                200,000                          
Socially Stable 9 466,667                500,000                          
All answers 27 721,135                200,000                          
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discussed, of the 19 respondents who estimate how much net worth a family needs to 
be rich in the UK, the median response is £3m and the average response is close to 
£10m. Hence, participants’ numeric answers of how much net worth a family requires 
are very high. The answers range from £750k to £75m. Comparing participants’ 
responses of what rich means to them with their actual personal net worth shows that 
there is a threshold of approximately £5m, over which participants see themselves as 
rich according to their own definitions. There are even fewer participants who perceive 
themselves as rich than view their incomes as high (n=8116). There is a weak positive 
relationship between respondents’ net worth and views on the net worth of a rich 
family, with a correlation coefficient of 0.23 (Figure 7.2). 
 
Figure 7.2 Participants’ net worth and perceptions of a rich family 
 
Note: This graph excludes data for one outlier who indicated that a rich family is worth £75m. 
 
Again, there are vast differences between social and economic evaluators (Table 7.2). 
Economic evaluators are less likely than social evaluators to put a figure on what a rich 
family means to them, and the median response among those who do respond is £10m, 
                                                 
116 Missing data n=9, hence 13 participants do not view themselves as rich. 
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which is 9 times higher than the median response of the social evaluators (£1.1m). 
However, the sample is very small. There is hardly any difference between male and 
female participants and the socially mobile groups’ median response (net worth of 
£3m) is 50 percent higher than the median answer of those who indicate that they were 
not socially mobile. In regard to participants’ age, those in the youngest and oldest age 
groups provided the highest median response (£3.3m and £3m) compared to the 
middle-aged group who views a rich family as one with assets of approximately £1m. 
There is a strong positive economic gradient in views. Specifically, participants in the 
lowest wealth group (below £1.4m) provide the lowest median answer to what a rich 
family is to them (approximately £1.4m). Those with wealth in the middle group (£1.4-
49m) provide a median response of £3m while those with wealth in the highest bracket 
(£50-250m) provide the extreme answer of £10m. In contrast to the finding regarding 
high incomes, there is a positive relationship between participants’ wealth group and 
their views on what net worth is necessary for a family to be considered rich in the UK. 
 
Table 7.2 Perceptions of a rich family 
 
Note: There is missing data because not all respondents indicated a number (n=10). 
What is a rich family in the UK?
Wealth group n Average Median
below 1.4 million 8 3,368,750            1,350,000                      
1.4-49 million 6 6,250,000            3,000,000                      
50-250 million 6 20,645,833          10,000,000                    
Gender
Female 5 8,120,000            3,500,000                      
Male 15 9,848,333            3,000,000                      
Evaluation type
Social evaluators 9 2,480,556            1,100,000                      
Economic evaluators 11 15,090,909          10,000,000                    
Age Group
20s and 30s 10 12,560,000          3,250,000                      
40s 5 4,545,000            1,100,000                      
50s and 60s 5 8,000,000            3,000,000                      
Self-identified Social Mobility
Socially Mobile 13 10,198,077          3,000,000                      
Socially Stable 6 5,125,000            2,000,000                      
All answers 20 9,416,250            3,000,000                      
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Hence, compared to the incomes and wealth of the general population, the views of 
participants of what constitutes high incomes and a rich family are extremely high. 
Therefore, a majority of participants do not consider themselves as being rich, and only 
about half view their own income to be high. There are vast differences according to 
participants’ preferred evaluative metrics, with economic evaluators indicating much 
higher figures for what a high income, and a rich family means to them, than do social 
evaluators.  
 
Interview survey findings: Participants’ estimates of the median income and the 1 
percent threshold 
Participants overestimate both the median earnings of someone working full-time and 
the cut-off for the top 1 percent of the income distribution. According to data from the 
Office for National Statistics based on the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE), the median full-time gross annual earnings was £27,215 in 2014117. The 
average response to the question regarding what the median earnings of those working 
full time in the UK was £37k (median response £30k), hence on average participants 
overestimated this statistic by approximately 37 percent (and the median participant 
overestimated the measure by 10 percent).  
At the same time, participants highly overestimate the threshold for the top 1 
percent of income earners. The average response to the question regarding how much 
an individual working full time needs to earn to get into the top 1 percent of the 
distribution was £368k and the median response was £200k. Hence, on average 
participants overestimated the income threshold for the top 1 percent (which in 
2012/13118 was £150k) by almost 150 percent. Specifically, the average response 
regarding the income threshold for the top 1 percent was in the ballpark of the actual 
income threshold for the top 0.1 percent (which in 2012 was £403k according to the 
WWID by Alvaredo et al., 2016). However, the median response overestimated the 
threshold only by approximately one-third.  
                                                 
117 In 2015, the statistic was £27,615 (very similar to 2014). I chose to use 2014 for comparison because 
I conducted my fieldwork between May 2015 and March 2016 so the 2014 data would have been the 
most recently available (on average). 
118 I chose data from the 2012-13 tax year as these would have been the most recently available 
(approximately). SPI data covers individuals who have some liability to income tax (rather than those 
working full time, as in the question I asked participants). 
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Some participants are aware that their perceptions are skewed or “out of touch” 
(n=5) often with reference to the City of London, similarly to Sherman’s (2017) 
wealthy New Yorkers. A hedge fund manager for instance cannot believe that the top 1 
percent threshold is as “low” as I told him, adding that it is “shocking” that he views it 
as low. Further, a financial manager (annual income between £140-400k) feels not 
“particularly special or well off” but caveats that “I live in London, I work in finance, 
so my sample is probably skewed towards the top of that” (Interview transcript 7). 
Some respondents are also highly conscious of the skew at the right-tail of the 
distribution and actively try to make sense of it, demonstrating awareness of the 
increasingly differentiated and demarcated structure of economic inequality at the top 
(Savage, 2014). A senior executive, who was annoyed that he forgot what the median 
was, explains that he was told this figure at a breakfast with Financial Times 
correspondents just before the general election. He remembers though that the figure 
was “just way below what anybody would have expected” (Interview transcript 6). 
Participants also underestimated where their own income lies on the income 
distribution. Hence, similarly to Bamfield and Horton’s (2009) focus group 
respondents, my participants thought that high salaries were much more common than 
they are. As a result, participants generally overestimate economic inequality as 
measured by top income and wealth shares (as I will discuss in Chapter 8).  
 
High incomes and richness as ‘relative’ concepts 
Generally, what is a high income? was a difficult question for the interviewees. Often, 
respondents explained firstly that it is a tricky question, laughed briefly or nervously or 
asked for clarification (n=11). Then, participants explained what a high income means 
to them, stressing that a high income is relative (n=20), dependent on the living cost in 
London (n=8), someone’s life stage, geographic location, the people with whom they 
“mix with” and what people “choose” to aspire to. Similarly, participants explained that 
it is difficult to say what a rich family is or even that it is a “silly” or alternatively 
“interesting” question (n=9) before explaining that a rich family is relative (n=12) and 
context dependent, specifically whether a family lives in London and owns property 
(n=11). Participants stress that it is about keeping up with your circle, and who you 
“choose” to be your point of comparison. Many explain that their points of reference, 
be it co-workers, clients, friends or named entrepreneurs, affect their views. These 
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social comparisons mean that many participants do not consider themselves as rich or 
as having a high income.  
For some, high income refers to a number necessary to sustain a certain 
“lifestyle”, which includes most notably owning a large house in Central London and 
paying for their children’s private education. For other participants, high income is “not 
a number” but an aspiration to work towards (n=6). Participants referring to the latter 
narrative insist that we should care about the fairness of the process through which top 
incomes are constituted, rather than on the fairness of the outcome, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. Likewise, some participants also view high incomes as a choice that people 
make, as a trade-off between having a high income career and a good work-life balance 
(n=6), and as hard work (n=3).  
High incomes and richness are viewed as relative not based on comparisons with 
the general population, as in Townsend’s (1979) authoritative conceptualization of 
relative poverty, but based on the lifestyle, income and assets of other rich individuals. 
A hedge fund manager and social evaluator (income group £5-50m) explains that 
defining a high income is difficult because: 
 
… obviously [it] depends what you want. You know, I come from a low income family 
[Note: middle class]. And so for me, I always get shocked with my colleagues, that some 
of them I would consider to be earning very high incomes, and they consider themselves 
to be not high income at all, because they have lifestyles, that mean they spend just 
ludicrous amounts of money on things that I would never consider spending money on. 
And so I think it very much depends which kind of circles you are in basically 
(Interview transcript 15, emphasis added).  
 
Hence, high income is narrated as depending on a person’s social network and their 
consumption choices. Similar to many other participants, he explains that the relativity 
of what a high income means to people is particularly pertinent in London: 
 
London, isn’t the London it was 15 years ago […] because of the influx of international 
wealth, particularly from the Middle East, Russia, China, etcetera, there is now a real sort 
of; I would disparagingly say Eurotrash type sort of, milieu within London, where these 
are children or grandchildren of very, very rich families internationally who spend 
money like crazy. And so, if you’re a British person trying to compete with that, you 
do need, they perceive that a million pounds a year isn’t really a lot of money 
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because they have so many commitments to spend on basically. And if they marry 
someone who is from that sort of social class, then a million pounds would see them 
bankrupt [...] because they’d spend that just on entertainment and stuff like that, but I’m 
not in that class so [...] that kind of thing wouldn’t apply to me (Interview transcript 15, 
emphasis added). 
 
Hence high incomes are explained to be relative to others’ comparative reference 
groups who may lead an excessive, decadent lifestyle. Similarly, a financial 
entrepreneur (annual income bracket £401k-1m; net worth £5-49m) who is an 
economic evaluator explains: 
 
What is a rich family? Yeah, richness is I think a sort of relative thing, isn’t it, to a 
large extent […] some people, who have got a lot more sort of wealth than I have, would 
not necessarily regard themselves as rich (Interview transcript 13, emphasis added). 
 
In these narratives by entrepreneurs, it is others who are relatively disadvantaged and 
therefore have skewed perceptions of what it means to be rich and have a high income. 
However, many participants also conceptualize their own perspective in this way; high 
income is described as something to work towards. Reflecting on what a high income 
means to her, a barrister (income group £140-400k) and economic evaluator explains 
that high income depends on someone’s life stage and who is their comparison group. 
For her, colleagues are a key point of reference. She highlights that her perception of 
high incomes increased over her career:  
 
So I do think that going forward your view of what a high income is does increase and 
certainly now […] I think I make a lot of money but I don’t actually think my income’s 
that high because I look at what other people around me make and they probably make a 
lot more so […] probably a million that’s when I think okay you’re really high income 
now, but I’m not there yet (Interview transcript 25). 
 
High income is therefore viewed as something to aspire to, and as achievable. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, participants rarely begrudge those who they see as doing better 
economically. An exception is a financial advisor, also an economic evaluator, who 
articulates his frustration when explaining that a high income is relative: 
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[There are] a few sort of layers […] a high income is probably half a million a year or 
something but that, then there’s quite a lot of people like that and then there’s; as soon as 
you cross a million it’s a bit different and then if you cross ten million then you’re in 
the… I heard someone say the other day that they needed 20 million a year to live on... 
right and you would [want to] throttle them (Interview transcript 8). 
 
This narrative highlights that participants’ perceptions of high incomes are skewed; 
according to the WWID (Alvaredo et al., 2016) there are few individuals (less than 0.1 
percent119) who earn half a million pounds a year or more (in 2012).  
Some participants are aware that the skew at the top of the distribution distorts 
their perceptions of high incomes and richness. The following narrative of a London-
based barrister in her twenties (annual income group £140-400k) illustrates this: 
 
I don’t perceive what I earn at the moment necessarily that high, like it’s… I know it’s 
good but it’s not… it’s very good compared to my contemporaries from school, but I 
don’t perceive it as being super high […] Two hundred thousand a year is where you 
starting to look like a really high… but then my perception is a bit skewed because the 
kind of people that end up being my clients are like millionaires. I don’t see what people 
in my chambers earn, which puts a lot of them in the 1 percent [as] really quite high 
earning because our clients are really quite high earning people. One of my clients […] 
he’s being sued for over a million pounds and he says I don’t want to go all the way to a 
big trial because it’s going to be stressful, [he doesn’t] want the hassle. He’s like can I 
just try and give them a hundred and fifty grand just to go away? […] then your 
perception of what a really high earning person earns starts to get skewed (Interview 
transcript 27). 
 
Therefore, the participant is aware that she is doing well compared to her peers from 
school but views her own income as not quite high compared to her wealthy clients. 
Her perspective of relative (dis)advantage means that her views of what high income 
and richness constitutes, is skewed towards the extreme right-hand tail of the 
distribution. Further, upward comparisons allow her to frame her income as not 
“necessarily that high” (Sherman, 2017a). 
 
                                                 
119 The top 0.1 percent of those working full time were approximately 22,800 people in 2015. 
 202 
Elite accumulatory struggle  
A key theme in the data is ‘elite accumulatory struggle’, most notably expressed 
through the very high prices of London property and the private education market. The 
discourses in the data are reminiscent of Skeggs’ (2003) conceptualization of the 
accumulative self, which increases its value through the acquisition of cultural, social, 
economic and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986). These pursuits to accumulate, help to 
contextualize the finding that high incomes and richness are viewed as relative 
compared to others at the top. A finance professional and economic evaluator (income 
group £140-400k) discusses accumulatory “struggle” as important for explaining what 
a high income means to him: 
 
Probably £200,000 or £250,000 a year, something like that. […] I am thinking from the 
point of view of living in London, with house prices and mortgages, and particularly 
with children. If you want to send your children to private school, I think you have to 
think about what it costs and then add tax on top of that, to have anything left over it’s 
gonna be hard to struggle on, it’s gonna be hard to exist on £100,000 or £150,000. 
You know if, you’re gonna have to make lifestyle choices […] beneath that (Interview 
transcript 8, emphasis added). 
 
Expectations of capital accumulation, both cultural and economic, explain why 
participants’ views of what it means to have a high income, or be a rich family, are 
skewed towards the right tail. I will discuss this ‘struggle’ for London property and 
private education in turn.  
 
Elite accumulation: London property 
Participants explain that high London property prices skew perceptions of what 
constitutes high incomes and rich families. The specificity of London, and in particular 
its high property prices, were referred to in every interview, even by the three 
participants who are located outside of London, similar to Sherman’s (2017) findings in 
New York. London’s vast living costs (n=8) as well as high house prices (n=5) are seen 
as affecting what it means to have a high income. Respectively, whether a family lives 
in London (n=12) or owns London property (n=11) is narrated as affecting whether 
they are rich. Hence, geographic location or London property prices are often referred 
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to as key factors for why what a high income means to participants, or to other people 
like them, is relative.  
The long run shift from agricultural land to urban property (Piketty, 2014, p. 
115) provides an important clue for understanding contemporary ‘elites’ (Savage, 
2014). Instead of being part of landed society, they are predominantly based in ‘elite’ 
urban centres such as London (Ibid.; Cunningham and Savage, 2015). Acknowledging 
that “income from capital becomes dominant at the level of the top 0.1 percent in 2007, 
as opposed to the top 1 percent in 1929” (Piketty, 2014, p. 302), I argue that for those 
with top incomes, rents from property ownership are important, in the form of owners’ 
equivalent rent, returns on capital through a rental return and capital gains (Piketty, 
2014; Glucksberg, 2016b; Fernandez et al., 2016).  
The ‘elite struggle’ for prime London real estate is addressed by Glucksberg’s 
(2016b) ethnographic work on ‘super-gentrification’ and ‘displacement’ in London’s 
rich neighbourhoods. Glucksberg argues that the London housing crisis is accelerated 
by what is happening at the highest levels of the real estate market. She traces the 
involvement of different ‘elites’ in the housing market, including rental investments, 
capital storage (see also Fernandez et al., 2016), transnational family homes and 
intergenerational wealth transfers. Due to national and international wealth being 
poured into the London real estate market, some rich individuals including ‘old’ elite 
families can no longer afford to live in the areas they perceive as desirable. 
Consequently, they move to other areas, which in turn results in waves of gentrification 
and displacement further down the property market (Glucksberg, 2016b). In this 
process, elite actors’ efforts to accumulate occur from a perspective of relative 
(dis)advantage.  
In many instances, interviewees explain what a rich family means to them by 
narrating an image first, and then proceeding to calculate how much net worth such a 
family would need, illustrating that ideas of richness are not dependent on the general 
population but on the lifestyle of the rich. A senior executive in a financial firm for 
instance explains that property prices are a key mediating factor for what it means to be 
a rich family: 
 
It is such a hard question […] it all relates to property prices right. So if you are living in 
London and you have a four bed-roomed house in Central London, that’s probably going 
to be in Zone 1, £10 million broadly (Interview transcript 26). 
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So participants’ perceptions of richness fundamentally depend on property prices. We 
know that wealth is much more unequally distributed than income (Hills, 2013; Piketty, 
2014), and that there is inequality within as well as between age groups. Changes in 
wealth between 2006-08 and 2010-12 have been to the detriment of younger 
households, while the wealth of older age groups has increased (Hills et al., 2015). 
Housing wealth is thus linked to age. While participants of all age groups refer to the 
importance of London property prices, it is the younger respondents who feel relatively 
(dis)advantaged about their position in the housing market. Indeed, younger age groups 
have seen their wealth120 fall between 2006-08 and 2010-12, while those aged over 55 
saw their wealth increase (Hills et al., 2015). However, inequalities in wealth are not 
simply a question of age-related differences which could be explained by life cycle 
savings patterns (Hills and Bastagli, 2013; Piketty, 2014, p. 21). There are vast wealth 
inequalities within different age groups as well as between; and inequalities in wealth 
between age groups have increased in the period after the financial crisis (Hills et al., 
2015). 
As I will show in Chapter 8, younger participants compare themselves to the 
previous generation, or others in their profession who are 5 or 10 years older, who 
unlike themselves were able to buy homes in desirable areas, for instance in St John’s 
Wood. The following two quotes are by participants in their 30s, who like those in their 
20s, see their own position as disadvantaged compared to those who have managed to 
“get on the property ladder” earlier and hence benefitted from the rise in housing 
prices. A London barrister, who exclaimed that my question regarding what it means to 
be a rich family in the UK is “silly”, explains: 
 
No offence but in the UK it is a pointless question […] A family who is worth say five 
hundred thousand pounds in most parts of the UK is doing just fine. Someone who’s 
worth five hundred thousand pounds in London, is not going to be exceptionally well off, 
they’re going to be […] this may almost sound ridiculous to someone who doesn’t have 
[that amount of money]… but what can that buy you? That can buy you a one and a half 
bedroom flat in [desirable area in London] which is a kind of mixed area […] there’s 
gangs of teenagers from council estates on the street I live in so it’s not Notting Hill or 
Hampstead. But everyone sees this relatively (Interview transcript 19, emphasis added). 
                                                 
120 The wealth data refers to non-pension wealth (Hills et al., 2015). 
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A rich family is therefore seen as dependent on location, and house prices. Further, the 
narrative demonstrates that London is viewed as different from the rest of the UK (or 
even as not part of the UK). Mortgage payments are also narrated as affecting 
perceptions of what it means to have a high income. A senior financial executive 
explains that due to her mortgage payments on her London property, she does not 
perceive her own income as high: 
 
Yeah, this is the very interesting thing that I was thinking about when I agreed to do the 
research because it is so subjective isn’t it? And I thought god, really, really? Do I 
really count? And then almost in my head, I think god am I crazy to think I don’t count? 
It’s really difficult. Given we are doing this anonymous, I earn about £0.5 million a year, 
[…] I never feel that I’ve got very much money because I think as your income increases 
you take on, more stuff so I just got an enormous mortgage now that doesn’t feel like 
I’ve got any, it doesn’t feel like I am suddenly drowning in disposable income, it just 
feels like it all goes (Interview transcript 26, emphasis added). 
 
While these narratives could be viewed as making excuses for being very well off, or as 
underplaying advantage to escape feelings of moral conflict (Sherman, 2017a), 
economic evaluators do not narrate high incomes or wealth as requiring justification. 
On the contrary, their relatively (dis)advantaged position, in a system in which those 
who are best get rewarded by a meritocratic market, simply means that they are doing 
well and aspire to do much better. In the same vein, participants seek to equip their 
children with the cultural and social capital necessary to succeed in this meritocratic 
market, and they see this struggle as a right and a necessity, rather than as something 
that warrants justification.  
 
Elite accumulation: Private education 
Private education, the second key emergent theme corresponding to ‘elite accumulatory 
struggle’, is seen as a necessity by most participants and as a key part of what it means 
to be a rich family in the UK. Private schooling is viewed as necessary for providing 
children with the best start in life. Research by Macmillan et al. (2015, p. 487) 
demonstrated “that privately educated graduates are a third more likely to enter into 
high-status occupations than state educated graduates from similarly affluent families 
and neighbourhoods, largely due to differences in educational attainment and university 
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selection” and “although the use of networks cannot account for the private school 
advantage, they provide an additional advantage and this varies by the type of top 
occupation that the graduate enters”. The interviewees of my study are convinced that 
private education provides advantages mainly due to the instilling of ‘confidence’, but 
also due to available networks. Considering private education as a necessity is 
explained as affecting participants’ views of high incomes and richness. For instance, a 
barrister and economic evaluator (income group £140-400k; net worth group £1.4-5m) 
draws the following picture of a rich family in the UK: 
 
You need to have a big house, go on nice holidays, send your 2 or 3 kids to private 
school and have money left over to spend on frivolities like artwork or whatever, go to 
the theatre, going out to posh restaurants, indulging a habit like buying expensive wine 
… a really nice house in a nice area probably gonna cost you 3 million pounds I’d have 
thought, 3, 4 million pounds so I imagine, just 5 million quid you’d be a wealthy family 
with assets (Interview transcript 20). 
 
Like many other participants, he imagines what a rich family is in qualitative terms, 
and then proceeds to calculate the net worth needed to facilitate a particular lifestyle. 
These calculations generally do not take into account the distribution of resources in the 
UK. For instance, an economic evaluator (income category £140-400k) whose children 
attend a private school asserts that politicians on the left do not recognize the struggle 
of the aspirational earners: 
 
When you are talking about the squeezed middle classes it’s all very well, but for 
[former Labour Party leader] Ed Milliband what’s rich is 50 thousand a year. Give me a 
break, 50 thousand isn’t that much more than the median and how will you afford paying 
for two kids in a private school? […] It is crazy, it is completely misrepresenting 
people’s aspirations. You are not driving Ferraris because you earn 50 thousand a year. 
[…] and then you just go up one step on the aspirational spectrum, say I want private 
education, and it is a 150 [£150k]... and then you don’t have to have three kids if you 
can’t afford it... but anyway... and suddenly you’re into your higher echelons and you are 
still not saving any money at the end of the year, you are not accumulating any capital 
you’re just shovelling it out for education (Interview transcript 8). 
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This narrative highlights how ‘elite accumulatory struggle’ is removed from any 
consideration about the distribution of income among the general population. Another 
economic evaluator, in an uncommon attempt of considering the distribution of income, 
explains that three to four times average income seems to be a high income. This figure 
could be lower, if the state education system was “decent”, they explained, but “if you 
got to start paying education fees and things like that a hundred thousand isn’t very 
much” (Interview transcript 20). Often, participants raise concerns that the costs for 
private education have increased; explaining that prices range from £25-100k per child. 
The narratives surrounding ‘struggles’ for private education have been discussed, in a 
serious manner, in a 2015 Telegraph article121 entitled “We earn £190k a year. Do we 
need to sell our flat to afford private school fees?”. Hence, participants’ extreme 
aspirations can explain their skewed perceptions of high incomes and richness. Having 
discussed aspirations towards accumulation, I will now discuss the counterpart 
narrative: aspirations for freedom from worrying about accumulation, and the idea 
which follows, that richness is about ‘decommodification’. 
 
Richness: “Freedom” to do what you would like to do and “no more worrying” 
When participants talk about what it means to be rich, many respond with a detailed 
qualitative explanation which often includes being able to spend without thinking about 
it122 (n=3) and having freedom (n=2) from worry about money (n=3). For instance, a 
senior executive in a financial firm (gross income £401-1m; net worth £1.4-4.9m) 
explains that she worries a lot about her finances. Reflecting on what a rich family 
means to her she defines it as being comfortable and not having to worry: 
 
The problem is the definition of rich. If I changed that to comfortable... and if I define 
that as not having to worry about money, I worry about money all the time. If I defined it 
[like that], I think mortgage free, having savings, having a pension, got children, […] 
probably 20 million quid. […] No more worrying. […] Security. (Interview transcript 
26, emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
121 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/pensions/12000288/We-earn-190k-a-year.-
Do-we-need-to-sell-our-flat-to-afford-private-school-fees.html.   
122 This was also mentioned by Sherman’s (2017)  participants. 
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Therefore, richness is described as freedom from any further accumulation concerns. A 
hedge fund manager (gross income £5-50m; net worth £50-250m), who describes 
himself as socially mobile like most entrepreneurs with extreme wealth, has reached 
this desired state of freedom from worrying about future accumulation. He explains that 
being a rich family is: 
 
... not really a numeric number. I mean the thing about being wealthy is that at some 
level you don’t have to worry about being rich… sorry you don’t have to worry about 
buying things. You can just buy them, you can just have them. And that brings a very 
high class problem on its own, which is if you can just buy something then you just buy 
it. Or which one do you just buy. I went to the Geneva motor show about... this year in 
fact. Geneva motor show is known for having literally every car; a fantastic display of 
supercars. You know, Ferraris, Lamborghinis, Bentleys and more... just unbelievable 
cars. And I realized as I was walking around that I could buy anyone of them that I 
wanted. But that didn’t really help because you then have to choose obviously. It is a 
very difficult thing to do [...] I mean obviously I can’t, I don’t know, buy Belgium... 
but within reason being wealthy means buying almost anything that you can 
reasonably want (Interview transcript 17, emphasis added). 
 
This narrative highlights that richness is defined as not having to worry about spending, 
as being able to buy almost anything. Hence, comfort and ‘ease’ (Khan, 2011) is the 
‘other’ of the competitive market. Similarly, a barrister, also an economic evaluator, 
explained that her idea of richness is being able to go on a shopping spree, buy as many 
designer items as she likes without worrying about the financial implications. This is 
how another young professional explained her own high income:  
 
I never imagined I would make as much as I make at the moment […] High income is 
one where I spend a month’s salary on a holiday and don’t think about it, where suddenly 
I can fly business class and I don’t have to think about it, where I’m on holiday and my 
boyfriend goes ah we should take a plane over the crater and we just go yeah here’s the 
credit card (Interview transcript 25). 
 
Not thinking about spending money is therefore part of having a high income. A 
financial entrepreneur (net worth group £5-50m) took this further when he explained 
that not having to worry, in the long term, is an indication of being wealthy: 
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[A rich family is one where] you can make the choices, that you would ideally like to 
make without having to worry about the financial implication, you can’t necessarily do 
exactly what you want to do, you can’t go and buy 10 thousand acres of estate in 
Oxfordshire or Gloucestershire, but you got enough money not to have to worry about 
your long term, [“you don’t have to worry about where next year’s income is 
coming from”], you haven’t got to worry about saving for a rainy day, all those sort of 
things, so, I can’t put a figure on that, but for me it’s all about having that comfort, of 
knowing you’ve got enough to support yourself, your family, children potentially and 
live the lifestyle that you want […] that translates to a different number for different 
people… for me that’s not a massive amount of money, for some people it might be 
hundreds of millions of pounds (Interview transcript 13, emphasis added). 
 
Not having to worry is therefore an indication of richness. Most of the richest 
individuals in the sample, hence aim to transmit this “not having to worry” to their 
children: 
 
I’m ambitious to make more [money] always […] for me it is just to enable us as a 
family to build our asset base further, to make sure that the next generation and the one 
beyond that are gonna be comfortable, and well educated and be able to live in, you 
know a decent house […] so, you work backwards from there, the sort of money that I 
would regard but I, so I think it depends a little bit on the individual, the family 
circumstances, the ambitions, age […] I think sort of financial security in a general 
sense […] for us as a family that means making sure our children and 
grandchildren are well looked after, and are well educated and all those sorts of things, 
[which] as a family we value, without having to worry (Interview transcript 13, 
emphasis added). 
 
Participants’ stories indicate a search for security, a state without worry about future 
accumulation. Extending the notion of richness as security and absence from worry, I 
will now discuss the related theme that some participants view richness as 
‘decommodification’, and hence the release from the strains of the labour market.  
 
Decommodification: Living off capital income 
Approximately one-third of participants conceptualize a rich family as one that can live 
off their capital income, in other words, as a family which does not need to work 
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(n=11). A senior investment banker, who compares himself to the parents of the other 
children at his child’s school, explained this to me. He seems very interested in 
thinking about what a rich family in the UK means to him and appears to enjoy the 
thought process surrounding this question. His friends, he explains, often think about 
how much money they would need to stop working and live off their assets (see 
Godechot, 2016). The banker’s idea of richness is “having generated income, without 
the need for working” (Interview transcript 1). This does not necessarily mean that 
people stop working, potentially due to the sense of worth ‘elites’ derive from their 
‘hard work’ (Sherman, 2017a).   
A hedge fund manager (gross income £5-50m; net worth £50-250m) also 
defines “wealthy” as being able to live off capital income, but adds that someone who 
is rich can transfer this freedom from commodification in the labour market to their 
children. He explains that to him richness is:  
 
Participant: That whatever money you leave to your children is potentially 
transformative (inaudible). Does that make sense? […] If you can leave 
enough money to your kids that your kids never need to work, then 
you are wealthy. It’s very hard to put a figure on that, but […] if you’ve 
got a twenty year old kid and you leave them... five million pounds […] I 
would say it’s that kind of level, where you can leave your child millions 
of pounds not hundreds of thousands of pounds.  
Interviewer:  Hmm… and then the children would have the freedom... 
Participant:  … to do what they want, yes (Interview transcript 17). 
 
This quote reflects the idea that richness means decommodification for themselves and 
their children. This discourse is reminiscent of Piketty’s (2014, p. 154) argument that 
we may return towards a ‘patrimonial’ type of society in which a small part of society 
inherits enough so they do not have to work (Savage, 2015b). The decommodified 
economic ‘elites’ can be conceptualized as a ‘new aristocracy’ (Savage, 2015c), 
because they do not need to engage with the labour market. 
 While participants discuss the individual pursuit of decommodification, Esping-
Andersen (1990) analysed the level of decommodification provided by different 
welfare state regimes. Decommodification “refers to the degree to which individuals, or 
families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market 
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participation” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 37). Esping-Andersen argued that there are 
three ideal-typical welfare state regimes: liberal, corporatist and social democratic 
welfare states, depending on the level of decommodification as well as the social 
stratification of its social policies. The liberal model, which includes the UK123, is one 
where the welfare state offers low levels of decommodification to its citizens and where 
individual responsibility is stressed. Hence, participants’ perceptions of richness as 
being able to decommodify themselves, need to be considered in the broader context of 
a liberal regime. In this climate, aspiring to richness is viewed as virtuous, as the rich 
are seen to fulfil their individual responsibility for providing for themselves.  
Atkinson (2006, p. 3) also puts decommodification at the heart of defining the 
‘rich’ by proposing a definition of this group as those with wealth high enough so that a 
person “could live off the interest at an average standard of living”. Therefore, the rich 
are “those individuals whose wealth exceeds 30 times mean income” because at an 
expected return “of 3⅓ [percent] per annum this level of wealth generates an amount 
equal to mean income per person”. As participants in my study do not consider living at 
an average standard of living as adequate (in fact many explain that they cannot 
imagine how those with median incomes get by), I suggest a complementary definition 
of ‘extreme richness’ which is consistent with the perspective of the rich. The 
extremely rich are individuals whose wealth exceeds 30 times the threshold of the top 1 
percent of the income distribution. In 2012, the rich according to this definition were 
those with wealth in excess of £3.5m (£118k x 30). This number is reasonably close to 
the median answer of my participants of what a rich family means to them (£3m). 
Assuming a return of 3⅓ percent per annum, a person with £3.5m in 2012 could live 
off the interest at the standard of living of someone whose income places them just 
within the top 1 percent of the income distribution. Those who are (extremely) rich, 
according to this definition, have a standard of living similar to or better than those at 
the bottom of the top 1 percent. The latter, who predominantly derive their income 
from labour, are viewed as being rewarded on the basis of merit.  
 
                                                 
123 Note that the UK was not unambiguously categorized as liberal in Esping-Andersen’s (1990)  
typology. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that top income earners’ views of what high income and 
richness means are skewed, and that their views demonstrate an absence of regard for 
the distribution of income and wealth among the general population. I will build on this 
finding in the chapter that follows; the final empirical chapter. Participants state that 
high incomes and richness are relative, depending on the situation, aspiration and 
location of a person. Economic evaluators’ views on what constitutes high incomes and 
richness are much higher than those by social evaluators. This may be unsurprising 
because economic evaluators explain that inequality, high incomes and richness are 
incentives to do better. A key theme to emerge from my analysis is ‘elite accumulatory 
struggle’, which can help explain participants’ skewed perceptions of high incomes and 
richness. Accumulatory struggle is narrated through two key themes: the London 
property market and the market for children’s private education. The experience of 
economic inequality is therefore one whereby participants strive towards the 
accumulation (Savage, 2014) of economic and cultural capital.  
Being rich was narrated as freedom from worrying about further accumulation. 
These views generally do not take into account the distribution of income and wealth 
among the general population. Extending this notion, some participants view richness 
as being able to live off capital income and decommodifying oneself from the market 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). The most economically advantaged participants state that 
this freedom to do and buy whatever they like, and the freedom from financial worry, is 
something they aim to pass on to their children. Therefore, based on Atkinson’s (2006)  
pioneering work and my qualitative data, I have suggested a complementary definition 
of the rich (from the perspective of the rich). Participants’ aspirations need to be seen in 
the context of a liberal, residual welfare state, in which decommodification offered by 
the state is low and where individual responsibility is stressed (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). In the conclusion, I will address the contradictions that arise between narratives 
of meritocratic top incomes resulting from hard work in a competitive market, and 
discourses of decommodification, effectively the release from the strains of the market. 
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Chapter 8 Perceptions of economic inequality and policies to tackle it 
Introduction  
In this chapter, I analyse participants’ perceptions of economic inequality and how 
these perceptions relate to views on policies to ameliorate inequality. The two topics 
are discussed as interrelated in this final empirical chapter because participants often 
and spontaneously resorted to discussing policy preferences as a way of expressing 
their views on inequality. I asked participants how high they think top income and 
wealth shares are and how high they think they ought to be, respectively. A majority of 
participants, the economic evaluators, chose not to engage with the question of how 
high top income (and wealth shares) ought to be; they insisted that they cannot answer 
this question. Levels of inequality, they explained, should be determined by market 
forces. Only a minority of participants, the social evaluators, engaged with the 
question. Bar one, all of these participants answered that top income shares should be 
lower. The discourses upon which economic evaluators draw are based on liberal 
conceptualizations of markets (Fourcade and Healy, 2007). Beliefs in neutral market 
forces, and top incomes as a reflection of economic contribution (discussed in Chapter 
4), explain why most respondents perceive economic inequality not as an issue to be 
tackled, but as a natural and hence inevitable result of neutral market forces.  
I will firstly define the key concepts from the point of view of the participants, 
discussing their perceptions of wealth compared to income. Income and wealth are 
perceived as interrelated. Generally, wealth is perceived as more important than 
income, because of the significance of property and the “freedom” that capital provides 
(through capital income and as a safety net). I will then explore participants’ 
perceptions of economic inequality, demonstrating that participants highly overestimate 
levels of income and wealth inequality. This may be due to their experience of relative 
disadvantage (discussed in Chapter 6). Generally, top income and wealth shares are 
perceived as having increased, especially top wealth shares. However, many 
participants do not perceive increases in inequality as concerning because the 1 percent 
are viewed as creating economic value. This applies in particular to income inequality. 
Income inequality is generally seen as less concerning than wealth inequality due to 
beliefs that the labour market is meritocratic (discussed in Chapter 4). However, 
instead of drawing on moral distinctions between super-managers and rentiers (Piketty, 
 214 
2014, p. 264), participants distinguish between deserving entrepreneurs and potentially 
undeserving managers, bankers and traders.  
Then, I discuss how narratives of market competition relate to participants’ 
views on policies to tackle inequality, comparing their views with attitudes among the 
general population. Due to their belief in markets, economic evaluators narrate the 
market as being best placed to determine levels of inequality. Therefore, market 
incomes should not be interfered with. Instead of inequality, these participants state that 
addressing poverty and raising the absolute living standards at the bottom of the 
distribution should be the focus of policymakers (cf. Reis, 2005). However, participants 
are slightly more likely than the general population to indicate that the government 
should redistribute.  
 
Participants’ perceptions of wealth compared to income 
Firstly, many participants narrate wealth and income as interrelated. One explanation 
for this was discussed in the previous chapter; what a high income means for 
participants is viewed as dependent on a person’s wealth, and in particular, their 
property assets. The economic value of property is described as closely linked with 
location and participants did not tire of detailing the specificity of London property 
prices. Recall the narratives outlined in Chapter 7 whereby participants’ incomes are 
portrayed as not high enough because of London’s high housing prices and the 
narrative of the senior executive who considers her own income as not high because “it 
feels like it all just goes to the [enormous] mortgage”.  
In regard to relative importance, participants generally perceive wealth to be 
more important than income124. This reflects economic research which has shown that 
wealth is incredibly important, not only because wealth is even more unequally 
distributed than income, but also because of its vast and increasing importance relative 
to income and due to its historical accumulatory nature (Hills and Bastagli, 2013; 
Piketty, 2014; Savage, 2014; Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015). For instance, the 
senior executive with the high mortgage explains that “[p]robably wealth is more 
important because it gives you more freedom” (Interview transcript 26).  
                                                 
124 Exceptions are the accounts of two entrepreneurs who explain respectively that the distribution of 
wealth is not very important for social division and that wealth inequality is simply a result of fate. 
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Hence, while many social science studies still neglect the study of wealth, its 
importance is clear for my interview participants. As discussed in Chapter 1, social 
science studies which do not account for wealth, leave a large part of economic 
inequality unaddressed because the ratio of capital to national income in the UK in 
2010 was approximately 5.5:1 (Piketty, 2014; Savage, 2014). Further most sociological 
research on class does not take wealth inequality into account, economic research on 
inequality focuses on income inequality due to data issues with measuring wealth and 
most social policy research on poverty is likewise focused on income (Alvaredo et al., 
2015). Therefore, a large part of social science research on inequality misses what is 
intuitive for my interview participants: that wealth is crucial for richness, family 
comfort, social status, children’s life chances125 as well as future capital income and 
relatedly, decommodification from the labour market.  
For some interviewees, particularly the entrepreneurs among the sample, 
accumulating wealth was stated as the most important aspect about high incomes. A 
successful entrepreneur explains that the key issue is not income, rather the focus 
should be on net worth. He acknowledged that income from employment matters for 
CEOs, but explained that for entrepreneurs it is capital gains, i.e. growing one’s assets, 
which counts126. He added that it is always important to be worth more (written notes 
from interview 24). Similarly, a junior entrepreneur who runs a family office explained: 
 
I don’t really see income necessarily as a measure of something that’s important, 
you’ve got to view it in a sort of absolute sense where you’re combining income and 
you’re combining capital as well, so it’s about your total wealth, how much has your 
total wealth grown (Interview transcript, 12, emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, wealth is viewed as key by participants. Reasons mentioned include that 
wealth facilitates future capital income and therefore allows individuals (and in cases of 
extreme wealth, individuals, their children and grandchildren) to decommodify 
themselves from the labour market (as discussed in Chapter 7).  
                                                 
125 Wealth has been shown to be important for life chances as it bestows far reaching advantages onto 
those with high wealth and their children (Keister, 2014).   
126 Here it is important to distinguish between realized and unrealized capital gains; the latter are not 
taxed hence can be accumulated more easily. 
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Views on the evolution of top income and wealth shares 
The distribution of income and wealth in a given society is not static, hence when 
studying perceptions of economic inequality, it is also important to consider how 
historic changes are perceived. This is particularly relevant for top income and wealth 
shares, which have increased considerably in the UK since the 1980s (as detailed in 
Chapter 1). Generally, participants explained that they know or have the impression 
that top income and wealth shares have been increasing.  
Top wealth shares in particular are seen as increasing. When asked whether the 
top 1 percent of wealthiest individuals are doing better nowadays than they used to, 
most participants agree and provide explanations for why they perceive this to be the 
case. Reasons highlighted include that “clearly anyone with financial assets has seen 
the value of those go up as money is being printed” (Interview transcript 11). In other 
words, “the owners of assets, so equity prices, land prices, property prices have all gone 
crazy, since 2007, and the top 1 percent massively disproportionately owns those assets 
and so has therefore disproportionately benefitted [as] a result of quantitative easing127” 
(Interview transcript 15). Other participants referred to the increase in the “average 
house price” (Interview transcript 14), the “asset boom” (Interview transcript 19), the 
“low interest rate environment [which] has fuelled the asset bubble” and hence 
“benefitted more those people who’ve been able to accumulate capital and re-invest it” 
(Interview transcript 22).  
Another reason highlighted as explaining why the wealthiest 1 percent are doing 
better nowadays, is that they are narrated as being able to access higher returns because 
“FCA regulations” mean “that only sophisticated individuals can [invest and] get 
higher returns” (Interview transcript 1). A finance professional explains: 
 
Once you have a certain core amount of capital… You can suddenly access better 
services, better advice, better tax structuring… you can access whole different tranches 
of asset classes, which means that your income is all just accelerating (Interview 
transcript 9). 
 
                                                 
127 Quantitative easing is related to central banks’ monetary policies. Further, the guidelines for central 
banks’ objectives are set by governments.  
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Hence, top wealth shares are seen as increasing due to the disproportionate ability of 
the wealthiest to grow their assets (Piketty, 2014). However, increases in wealth 
inequality are not necessarily seen as concerning as I will discuss.  
Top income earners, defined as the top 1 percent of income earners, are also 
viewed as doing better nowadays (18/30). While a majority of participants indicated 
that top income earners do better nowadays (compared to others), other participants 
responded that they did not believe that this is the case. Some explain that pay levels 
have come down in the City since the financial crisis mainly due to increased 
regulation and “scrutiny on pay” (n=8). For instance, a fund manager reflects128: 
 
In the financial sector, it certainly has not broadly been true over the last few years since 
the financial crisis [that the top 1 percent are doing better nowadays], there’s been 
something of a freeze in incomes certainly […] from what I’ve seen across the financial 
sector despite some of the high levels of bonus, would be below were they are 10 years 
ago, below even the sort of 1, 2 percent rises that are being put through in teaching, 
public sector, other areas (Interview transcript 11). 
 
Similarly, an investment banker explains that in addition to more regulation, “higher 
competition”, “automation” and a “global efficient labour market” mean that top 
incomes have come down: 
 
For example, if I was doing my same job, if I was in the same position, 10 years ago, I 
would be earning double to what I am earning now. And the reason why it has come 
down is, that there has been more scrutiny on pay, banks, there has been more regulation, 
there’s more costs, and there are more people willing to work for [less, particularly in 
low income countries] (Interview transcript 1). 
 
Hence, these participants explained that the 1 percent are not doing better nowadays 
due to increased competition and regulation. However, according to data from the 
WWID (Alvaredo et al., 2017), while the share of the top 1 percent of total income in 
the UK decreased from its peak of 15.4 percent in 2007 and 2009 to 12.6 percent in 
2010, by 2013 the share had already recovered to 14.5 percent (by contrast, the share 
                                                 
128 Participants are not referring to owner’s equivalent rent here, only to income from labour (and in 
some cases to income from capital). 
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was 9.8 percent in 1990). Other participants who point to pay decreases in the financial 
sector, acknowledge though that top income earners have increased their share of total 
income in the long run.  
Meanwhile, other participants explained that only those at the very top (for 
instance the top 0.1 or 0.01 percent) are doing better nowadays. Of the 6 participants 
who mentioned this, 3 excluded themselves as being at the very top. Data from WWID 
shows that from 2002 to 2012, the share of the 0.1 percent in total income remained 
almost unchanged (4.5-4.6 percent), although the level varied considerably within this 
period, peaking in 2009 at 6.5 percent (Alvaredo et al., 2017).  
Top income earners are also considered by some participants as not doing as 
well as previously due to increasing property prices. They explain this by discussing 
their relative disadvantage compared to those with housing wealth, in particular the 
older generation who purchased property earlier. A barrister explains that “the lower 
half of the top 1 percent”: 
 
… can’t be doing as well as they used to because […] they’re the people who only one 
generation ago bought their houses in Chelsea and Notting Hill and St. John’s Wood and 
that’s what matters really, what do you want to do with your money? You want to buy a 
nice house, you want to send your kids to a private school maybe (Interview transcript 
15). 
 
Another barrister similarly refers to relative disadvantage compared to others in her 
profession of an earlier generation to explain that top income earners cannot be doing 
better than they used to: 
 
It’s probably not right [that top income earners are doing better nowadays than they used 
to] because I look at people in my chambers who are twenty years ahead of me; they all 
had a house by the age of thirty-five or even by the age of thirty and their house has gone 
up like three times in value so I’m not sure I agree with that (Interview transcript 25). 
  
Above discussion illustrates that top wealth shares, and to a lesser extent top income 
shares, are generally perceived as increasing by participants. If participants do not 
perceive those with top incomes and wealth as doing better than before, they often 
explain this with reference to their relatively disadvantaged position. I will now address 
moral judgements of top income and wealth shares. 
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Concern for top wealth shares compared to top incomes 
There is generally more concern for inequality of wealth compared to inequality of 
income, although a few participants believe that wealth inequality “is what it is” and 
does not matter that much. The reason why income inequality is often perceived as less 
concerning is because income is viewed as more deserved due to meritocratic reasons 
(discussed in Chapter 4). As all participants have an income which places them in the 
top 1 percent of the distribution, it may not be surprising that they are more concerned 
about wealth than income inequality. However, two-thirds of participants also have 
assets which, broadly approximated, put them in the top 1 percent of the wealth 
distribution (n=20/30)129. Further, those with top wealth are also generally more 
concerned about wealth inequality than those with only top incomes.  
Talking about increasing top income shares, social evaluators explain “that’s a 
bad thing” (Interview transcript 16), “it’s wrong” (Interview transcript 22), “it’s likely 
to cause growing resentment” (Interview transcript 21) or that it makes them “feel 
pretty bad actually [because they] would prefer a society that was much more 
equitable” (Interview transcript 9). However, increasing income inequality is not 
necessarily perceived as concerning by economic evaluators because top income 
earners are seen as creating economic value. An entrepreneur explains:  
 
The difference in income has increased markedly even in the time that I’ve been around 
because it’s not just the UK, it’s a global phenomenon [...] I can understand why it’s 
happened in the sense that people who are, well the sort of people I described, you know 
the well-educated, smarter people, energetic, ambitious, they are able to, to create value 
for others, I think they have become increasingly valued themselves (Interview transcript 
13). 
 
Similarly, a chief executive explains that top income earners are doing better nowadays 
due to their businesses performance and increased competition at work and “therefore, I 
think the rewards today reflect that and I think that’s fine” (Interview transcript 4). 
Hence, as the top 1 percent are perceived as creating economic value, their increasing 
share of total income is justified. The chief executive, who explained that economic 
                                                 
129 As discussed in Chapter 2 with reference to Hills et al. (2015). 
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evaluation processes justify top incomes, is nevertheless debating whether increasing 
top incomes are a concern: 
 
[I did not feel bad for paying my staff very high bonuses because it was based on 
performance, however,] I’d be the first to say that far too many people have ended up 
being paid a lot of money and not actually doing such a great job... and I can understand 
why that has caused real tensions. It’s one thing having a small number of people who 
are performance based, but the world has got so stretched now […] and I don’t have […] 
a solution to it (Interview transcript 6). 
 
Even though pay was narrated as a reflection of contribution, and therefore justified, 
this participant also acknowledged that performance pay can lead to greater inequality, 
which may not be desirable. Income inequality is generally perceived as less 
concerning than wealth inequality, and in some cases as necessary to overcome 
inequalities of wealth. For instance, a senior investment banker states that it would be 
better if the share of the top 1 percent in total income was higher, the only participant to 
do so, because: 
 
... if you can see a path to being wealthy, you don’t mind people being wealthy […] if 
there’s a dream that you could be that person [then people are happy] but if people never 
have that choice, then it is pretty debilitating, because by definition I think we’re gonna 
end up with people who are very wealthy because they can grow assets at 10-15 percent 
per annum, and people who will never be that wealthy, who’ll never get there (Interview 
transcript 1). 
 
Drawing partially on Piketty’s (2014) analysis that returns are highest at the top of the 
distribution, meritocratic top incomes, which people can “choose” to have, are 
explained as an important way to overcome inequalities of wealth. Another reason for 
why income inequality is perceived as less concerning than wealth inequality is that 
some respondents, including a young investment banker, view income as productive 
compared to “captive” wealth (Interview transcript 14). According to this economic 
concept, referred to also by Piketty (2014), “[taxing wealth] makes more sense than 
taxing income” (Interview transcript 14). Another participant, a financial professional, 
explained this as follows: 
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I have less of a problem with top income than I do with top wealth. The reason being 
[…] from my own experience of coming from a family that had very little wealth, but 
had a lot of potential for income, and they created a lot of income which helped build 
wealth. So, I don’t have a problem with people making a lot of money. Where I do have 
a problem is with a huge amount of accrued wealth because […] I have concerns from an 
economic perspective, that a huge amount of accrued wealth sitting around, is actually 
not put to productive use  […] it is inefficient […] morally it is a difficult one too […] 
the problem is that [a] billionaire earns 40 million pounds in interest and he will only 
logically spend a couple of million pounds a year, and the rest of that only either just 
goes to accrue more wealth, or literally sits in cash, neither which is particularly good 
from an economic perspective. So for me, I would rather favour targeting the wealth than 
the income [with tax] (Interview transcript 2). 
 
Hence, top wealth is seen as not “productive” and hence economically “inefficient”, 
which is why the participant favours wealth taxes over income taxes.   
For some participants, concern for wealth inequality is stronger than for income 
inequality, because of their experience of relative disadvantage compared to individuals 
with a higher level of (property) assets (as discussed). This applies in particular to those 
whose incomes are within the bottom 90 percent of the top 1 percent. Another barrister 
extended this way of thinking, and went even further, asserting that wealth inequality is 
the issue rather than income inequality:  
 
[It’s a] mistake but the media, the government, they talk about wealthy people and then 
they say people who are earning over a hundred thousand pounds a year. This is 
ridiculous; this is completely missing the point. […] all the inequality is about wealth 
inequality […] obviously there’s a time factor. And income inequality can lead to wealth 
inequality. So income inequality is not completely irrelevant, but the problem is wealth 
inequality. Maybe I would say that, because I’m not wealthy and I have a high income 
(Interview transcript 19). 
 
While this particular participant views wealth inequality as the real issue, there are also, 
as discussed, a couple of participants who state that wealth inequality is not relevant. 
While social evaluators in particular express concerns, stating that differences in wealth 
are “profoundly unhealthy for society” (Interview transcript 3), other participants, 
including a few high net worth individuals, assert that wealth inequality currently is not 
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higher in Britain than it was 100 or 150 years ago, or that they prefer the capitalist 
system over the feudal system and communism. Overall though, wealth inequality is 
generally perceived as more concerning than income inequality. Top incomes are often 
portrayed as meritocratic, in contrast to accrued wealth, which can be undeserved.  
  
Sources of income and moral distinctions: Entrepreneurs vs ‘super-managers’  
Participants’ narratives include moral distinctions between different types of income 
“depending on its source [and] intended use” (Zelizer, 2011, p. 91). In economics, a 
key distinction is between income from capital and income from labour130 (Piketty, 
2014). Those with top incomes derive their income from labour (and)/or from capital; 
they can be ‘super-managers’ (and)/or ‘rentiers’ respectively with different moral 
implications (Piketty, 2014). In the economic literature, top earning ‘super-managers’ 
are often seen as more meritorious (Ibid.). Distinguishing between income from labour 
and income from capital is important because the time and effort involved are clearly 
different (Keister, 2014). For this reason, top incomes from labour are sometimes 
portrayed as more deserving than top incomes derived from capital, even though in the 
neoclassical theory of the marginal productivity of income distribution both of these 
forms of income are regarded as a reflection of social contribution (McGoey, 2017). 
Instead of drawing on moral distinctions between super-managers and rentiers 
as suggested by Piketty (2014), participants draw distinctions between deserving 
entrepreneurs (who “create wealth” by building their asset base through capital income) 
and employees including “bankers” and “CEOs” (who are not necessarily deserving 
because their income from labour may be derived from being part of “a cabal”, or 
because they are “greedy” bankers). This discourse of “wealth and job creation”, which 
champions the pursuit of increasing economic value without any consideration for the 
distribution of wealth is sometimes termed neoliberal (Harvey, 2007). Further, 
respondents stress that entrepreneurs “take risk” and are therefore deserving of their 
income and wealth. As discussed in Chapter 6, entrepreneurs are the most admired 
group of people, and viewed as those in the ‘top’ group of society. 
An example of the distinction between deserving entrepreneurs and 
“questionable” bankers or traders is the narrative of an investment bank executive. He 
                                                 
130 This distinction is often neglected in the sociological literature (Keister, 2014). 
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is very fond of entrepreneurs who have “vision” and “brilliant ideas” but critical of 
bankers because: “They don’t take risk; they believe they take risk. It’s not their 
money”. He elaborates: 
 
Richard Branson, is a very successful person, and is very rich. But he took some amazing 
risk on how he developed his business world. And [he] could have lost everything of his 
own money. The trader doesn’t lose his [sic] own money ultimately; it is your money 
and my money […] or whatever the government is putting in it […] That’s a huge 
difference […] you have to be impressed that [Richard Branson]’s been very successful, 
he’s been very well rewarded, he has a beautiful island wherever it is, and he can do 
whatever he wants but, he must have had a few sleepless, sleepless nights. Whereas a 
trader, nobody likes traders at the moment because ultimately they are viewed as playing 
with somebody else’s money […] whatever you do [as a trader] you win, ultimately, and 
you get paid and if you don’t get paid at the end of the year then you leave and you go to 
another firm where you negotiate a better package, with a better formula, and you start 
again (Interview transcript 10). 
 
Hence, risk taking is defined as putting one’s own capital at risk by using it for 
entrepreneurial activities. Both traders and entrepreneurs derive their money from 
quantifiable economic evaluation processes; either through a formula or market 
revenue. However, only entrepreneurs are viewed as taking personal risk, therefore 
entrepreneurial top income is seen as morally superior, a common theme in the data. 
The finance executive quoted above compares himself with entrepreneurs, whom he 
very much admires, throughout the interview. Ultimately, the entrepreneur is narrated 
as more deserving than the trader:  
 
[Talking about high incomes] I would say anybody that makes 200 thousand pounds 
above I think it’s really nice, anybody making over a million, you are either an 
entrepreneur and you have taken a lot of risk in your vision and you should be making 
that money, I don’t have a problem with that, or you are a trader and I have a question 
mark here, on do you deserve that? (Interview transcript 10) 
 
Hence, top incomes from entrepreneurship are deserved, but top incomes from trading 
not necessarily so. Another participant, an entrepreneur, agreed with this notion, but 
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took it further asserting that top income shares are not “relevant to discuss” if they 
include income from entrepreneurship:  
 
I think there’s a very big difference between someone who puts their own money at 
risk… and I should take those out completely of any survey I ever did. You know if 
you’re employed by British Petroleum. Okay, you didn’t put one single dollar at risk. 
Okay then why should you earn twenty million a year and the lowest guy [sic] earns 
seven thousand a year. It’s kind of ridiculous. [However] if you’re prepared to put your 
own money at risk there should be… it’s not even relevant to discuss that equation [top 
income shares]. I take all the risk. I put all of my money in to this company; I’ve 
borrowed against my house. I sold my house […] Okay, I put my money in. Well, I 
should be rewarded for that (Interview transcript 18). 
 
Therefore, in contrast to managers’ incomes, his vast entrepreneurial income is 
deserved because he has put his own capital at risk. Similarly, another financial 
entrepreneur argues that entrepreneurial “wealth creation” should be rewarded, but 
“reward for failure” by managers is not justified: 
 
I’ve got no problems with people making huge amounts of money, particularly if they 
are entrepreneurial, they built businesses, created a lot of value, created a lot of 
employment, and all the rest of it, but I object rather more to people who get paid a lot of 
money for really doing [a] pretty sort of regular job [hence their income] is quite difficult 
to justify and I think there are cases in this industry as well where we are probably 
overpaying people (Interview transcript 13). 
 
It is this comparison of managers with entrepreneurs which shows that the discourse of 
managerial income as economically evaluated, market based and therefore justified in 
pursuit of shareholder value (discussed in Chapter 4) is also questioned by participants, 
in particular by entrepreneurs. As the previously quoted entrepreneur notes: 
 
In public companies… where you’re getting these huge differences, it’s pretty obscene 
what the top guy gets. But that’s back to supply and demand. You know how many 
really good people are there? And if you’re the shareholder you basically want to get the 
best return for your shares. [However if] the stock markets go up they [the managers] all 
look okay. When they’re going down they’re all idiots […] so it’s nothing to do with 
them (Interview transcript 18). 
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This quote demonstrates that top incomes by managers are not necessarily seen as a 
reflection of their marginal productivity. Entrepreneurial incomes on the other hand are 
viewed as a reflection of contribution.  
A further moral distinction drawn upon by participants, though mentioned less 
often, is between capital income from personally created versus inherited wealth (n=3). 
The former is viewed as more meritorious. However, as we have seen, participants also 
aim to provide for their children; some even state providing for their family as a 
motivation to pursue top incomes (see also Sherman, 2016). Income from capital is 
narrated as deserved when the assets from which income is derived have been 
accumulated by participants themselves through income from labour or 
entrepreneurship. For instance, a City entrepreneur (Interview transcript 3) explained 
by drawing on the discourse of personal hard work and skill (discussed in Chapter 4) 
that he would perceive himself as deserving of capital income if he had worked to build 
up that capital; for instance, if he bought a couple of properties to rent out. While his 
own income from capital is viewed as deserved, those who are deriving capital income 
from inherited wealth are not deserving. The reason provided, that there is no skill 
involved in letting advisers manage your money, also applies to renting out property. 
Hence, participants’ views about the deservingness of income and wealth are 
contradictory. The main moral distinction however, which participants draw on during 
the interviews, is between deserving entrepreneurs, and not necessarily deserving 
managers and CEOs. 
 
Preferences for economic inequality: Is the distribution of income relevant? 
To explore perceptions of and preferences for economic inequality, I asked participants 
in turn how high they think top income and wealth shares are in the UK, and how high 
they think they ought to be. On average, participants indicated that they think the share 
of the top 1 percent in national income is 34 percent (median=30 percent; n=19131), 
when the actual figure was 14.5 percent in 2013. Participants further guessed on 
average that the share of the top 1 percent in total wealth is 47 percent (median=40 
percent, n=14) when it was approximately 20-25 percent in 2008-2010 (data from 
                                                 
131 There is missing data because many participants declined to answer this question; it seemed as if 
some did not want to answer a ‘test’ question. 
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Alvaredo et al. (2015)). Therefore, participants highly overestimate top income and 
wealth shares. The over-estimation of inequality at the top is consistent with their 
upward comparisons. 
When asked how high top income shares ought to be, a majority (approximately 
two-thirds; n=19) indicated they cannot or do not want to answer this question, because 
‘the market’ should determine levels of economic inequality. These participants 
‘disengaged’; they did not wish to discuss or opine on top income and wealth shares. 
For them, inequality is not an issue because it is justified for ‘meritocratic’ reasons 
and/or because top income and wealth shares are not relevant. For some participants, 
top income and wealth shares are not seen as relevant because poverty, or inequality 
measured by the Gini coefficient, should be the focus. Hence, these participants, the 
economic evaluators, explain that we should not concern ourselves with issues of 
distribution, but focus on maximizing the wealth “for all” by encouraging wealth and 
job creation. Economic evaluators disagree with the political choice of measuring 
inequality with distribution tables and top income and wealth shares (Atkinson and 
Piketty, 2007; Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014).  
Therefore, when asked survey questions regarding income differences and 
government redistribution, the majority of economic evaluators, who disengaged with 
top income shares, explained that it should not be the government’s responsibility to 
reduce income differences between the rich and the poor (n=13/19) (Figure 8.1). On the 
other hand, those participants who are interested in top income and wealth shares and 
engage with the question regarding how high these measures ought to be, conceptualize 
inequality as an issue of distributive justice. They are the social evaluators who 
perceive inequality as a political issue and indicate that top income shares should be 
lower, stating that they prefer a more equal distribution (n=9132). As a result, almost all 
social evaluators indicate that it is the government’s responsibility to reduce income 
differences between the rich and the poor (Figure 8.1). Meanwhile, only one-third of 
the economic evaluators indicate that it is the government’s responsibility to reduce 
income differences. There is one economic evaluator who is an exception because he 
engages with top income shares; however, he asserts that top income shares should be 
                                                 
132 There are 10 social evaluators, but only 9 participants who indicate that top income shares ought to 
be lower. There is one social evaluator who explained that he “hasn’t really thought about” how high 
top income shares should be, rather than engaging with the question. However, he explained that top 
wealth shares should be lower.  
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higher and that it is not the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences 
between the rich and the poor. In the following sections I will discuss the differences 
between social evaluators who engage and economic evaluators who do not engage 
with top incomes and wealth; I will begin by considering disengagement. 
 
Figure 8.1 Engagement with question how high top income shares ought to be 
 
 
Note: For one respondent, group assignment was not possible.  
 
Disengagement with top income shares 
The two-thirds of respondents who do not engage with the question regarding how high 
top income shares ought to be, explain this with reference to discourses which stem 
from the neoclassical economic theory of the marginal productivity of the income 
distribution which, under the assumption of free competition, conceptualises incomes 
from both labour and capital as reflecting contribution (with implicit moral 
assumptions) (McGoey, 2017)133. Emergent themes include that the market is best 
placed to determine levels of inequality, a belief in trickle-down economics, that levels 
of distribution are not of interest and that poverty, rather than inequality should be our 
concern. These narratives will be addressed in turn.  
                                                 
133 In some cases, participants’ narratives may be viewed as neoliberal discourses; for instance in 
Harvey’s (2007) definition, neoliberalism is the doctrine that market exchange is an ethic in itself, 
capable of guiding all human action. 
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Firstly, participants explain that they themselves would not want to determine top 
income shares, because the market should determine levels of inequality. For instance, 
a financial entrepreneur explains: 
 
I wouldn’t begin to make choice on that [how high top income shares should be] […] the 
market will find a level, I actually don’t know what it is, the top 1 percent it’s probably 
sort of 30 or 40 percent […] we live in a free, democratic, open, capitalist society, a 
huge reason for the success of this country and I wouldn’t […] begin to say well, only 10 
percent of the wealth should be owned by 1 percent of the people […] it’s the sort of way 
it evolves, and I’ve got no problems when people, as I say, create huge wealth for 
themselves, a Richard Branson type person, great, I’m over the moon that he has created 
a lot of money […] a lot of jobs […] centrally-planned economies might do that sort 
of thing […] I suspect in China […] they’ve got even more extremes there […] the way 
we operate our economy here is reasonably successful in dispersing incomes where we 
don’t have deep levels of poverty across vast tracks of the country […] so, no I 
couldn’t really begin to answer this question and wouldn’t want to (Interview transcript 
13, emphasis added). 
 
Due to beliefs in markets, this participant explained that he would not wish to engage 
with issues of distribution, such as top income shares. A financial entrepreneur 
summarizes this idea: 
 
I believe in capitalism and I believe in market forces […] I don’t believe [in] 
government intervention [because it destroys] incentives for people to work […] to start 
companies […] employ people and create worth […] you can actually kind of end up 
with a greater degree of equality, [but] the average level of wealth across the economy is 
significantly depressed […] So to me you can either end up in an environment such as 
frankly we have in the UK or we have in the US, where […] there’s a distinct very kind 
of sharp disparity […] But there are [these] incentives [explains that Jeremy Corbyn’s 
policies would destroy incentives] (Interview transcript 23). 
 
Hence, economic evaluators explain that inequality, the unequal distribution of 
resources, is not an issue. Reasons provided are reminiscent of ‘trickle-down’ or liberal 
‘laissez faire’ economics (Wisman, 2013) which posits that ‘growing the pie’ 
(increasing GDP) instead of addressing how it is divided via government intervention 
will make everyone better off in the long run. However, some assert that the focus 
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should be on poverty reduction at the bottom of the distribution instead. These 
participants state that measuring inequality by looking at the top of the distribution is 
not very useful, implying that they do not perceive their own top incomes (and wealth) 
as part of a broader societal issue. For instance, the hedge fund manager, who referred 
to a football analogy to establish that top incomes are a reflection of talent, explained 
self-assuredly that inequality measured by the Gini coefficient has decreased over the 
last 20 years and that he does not care about how resources are distributed: 
 
So, I sort of completely refute […] that inequality has risen for the vast majority. It is 
however true that the very, very top 1 percent, or actually even the 0.1 percent, the ratio 
of them to the 10th percentile has gone up. So the very, very wealthy have got wealthier. 
That is true. Now, the [..] question [is] does that make the 99 percent worse off? And the 
answer is no […] Look, I don’t care about inequality, what I care about is that 
everyone is getting wealthy at some rate. The wealthier I get the better it is for 
everyone else because I pay a fantastic amount of taxes (Interview transcript 17). 
 
This quote illustrates that the unequal distribution of economic resources as measured 
by top income shares is not seen as concerning by economic evaluators. This view does 
not acknowledge that distribution, at a given point in time, is a zero sum. Instead, those 
with top incomes and wealth are portrayed as contributing to society through the 
creation of wealth and through paying taxes. Hence, their extreme economic advantage 
should be celebrated, just like the achievements of the (white, male) sport stars to 
whom respondents compare themselves. When discussing the distribution of income 
with participants, 6 respond that I should instead look into how much tax the 1 percent 
pays; many citing The Telegraph134 or Daily Mail135 articles which state that 30 percent 
of (income) taxes are paid by the top 1 percent. These participants disregarded 
differences in ability to pay, and other forms of taxation, which are regressive. For 
instance, a senior executive reminds me that: 
 
… people look at the amount somebody earns, [but] they don’t typically look at the 
amount of tax that that generates, so I think the more you earn, the more tax you pay, 
                                                 
134 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/tax/10368203/Top-earners-to-pay-third-of-
all-income-tax-despite-rate-cut.html 
135 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2451686/Top-1-earners-pay-THIRD-income-tax-year.html 
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which is fine […] but I don’t think people ever get any credit for the sort of contribution 
they make (Interview transcript 4). 
 
Crucially, part of the majority of respondents who do not engage with the question 
regarding how high top income shares should be, view poverty as separate from 
inequality (n=5), and stress that the bottom of the distribution is much more important. 
Therefore, poverty is not an issue of distributive justice, i.e. it is not seen as the result 
of the unequal distribution of resources. This finding is in contrast to Reis’ (2005) work 
which has demonstrated that Brazilian ‘elites’ acknowledged the interrelationship 
between the concepts of inequality and poverty, and that they generally considered 
inequality to be more concerning and problematic than poverty.  
A finance professional explains that instead of focusing on the top of the 
distribution, we should attend to the bottom. “Excessive numbers of people in abject 
poverty” would concern him, but he does not resent the rich, from which he excludes 
himself. His quote, which may loosely rest on Rawls’ (1971, p. 75) ‘difference 
principle’, illustrates his belief that matters of distribution are not of great concern if 
they benefit the least-advantaged members of society: 
 
I think the most important thing to look at [concerning the increasing gap between high 
and low earners] is the absolute level of living standards of the low. Erm, and my 
understanding of that’s improved. So obviously I’d like to see the low increasing as 
much as the high. But that, for me that would be secondary to the absolute level of the 
low improving (Interview transcript 7). 
 
Hence, the absolute living standard of the poor is viewed as separate from, and more 
important than, economic inequality. This view is shared by a barrister, who illustrates 
that from his perspective, policy intervention should focus on ensuring adequate living 
standards at the bottom, rather than equalizing economic inequalities:  
 
Assuming fairness in the way in which people earn money, I don’t think there’s a 
threshold [for top income shares] that is right or wrong […] that’s quite a big 
assumption but […] I have no problem with J K Rowling who wrote a book and was 
incredibly successful earning a vast, vast amount of money […] I have a problem with 
[bankers who gain even though their banks lose money] […] I don’t feel that there’s a 
level that’s right or wrong […] people should be free to earn as much money […] as 
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they want. That said it seems to me that there’s an obligation on society to provide 
everyone with a safety net and so it’s reasonable to take from those richest people an 
amount of money necessary to pay for the safety net […] but the aim of that is not to 
equalize the difference, the aim of that is just to pay for things that need to be paid 
for (Interview transcript 20). 
 
Therefore, economic evaluators who “wouldn’t begin to make a choice” on how high 
top income shares should be are not concerned about the unequal distribution of 
material resources. Economic inequality is not an issue but “abject” poverty or no 
safety net at the bottom would be concerning. This finding is in line with Sklair’s 
(forthcoming) ethnographic work on philanthropy in Brazil. Economic evaluators’ 
views contrast with research on inequality which has shown that “larger top shares” in 
a country tend “to go together” with higher poverty (Atkinson, 2015, p. 25). Further, 
while poverty levels in the UK have been reduced over the last twenty years (while top 
income shares have generally increased), relative levels of poverty are now higher than 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Atkinson, 2015). Despite evidence which shows that top 
income shares and levels of poverty are part of the same distribution, economic 
evaluators choose to view those two measures as separate by insisting on the 
importance of the ‘absolute’ level at the bottom. Hence, while high incomes and 
richness are seen as ‘relative’, poverty is viewed as absolute. 
 
Engagement with top income shares 
I now turn to the group of social evaluators who discuss and opine on top income 
shares, indicating that top income shares should be lower (n=9). These participants also 
refer to discourses of the free market and incentives, but stress issues of social justice 
and fairness. For instance, a hedge fund manager would prefer levels of top income 
shares to “be chopped in half” because: 
 
I mean no one could describe what I earn, or what people in my company earn as being 
fair. I mean it’s just the market, it’s literally just a pure Malthusian sort of outcome in 
terms of what the market can bear basically [...] Is it fair? No, it’s not fair and so 
therefore it should be taxed, and so I should pay much higher levels of tax [...] But I 
think I’m a minority of one, amongst hedge fund managers (laughs). Because I am sure 
they would say they all deserve it but how can you say you deserve it, it’s ridiculous! 
(Interview transcript 15). 
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Similarly, an investment bank executive explains that top income shares in the UK are 
“slightly better” than in the US (where they are higher), referring to a news story from 
2007 in which a trader at Goldman Sachs received about US$50 million as a bonus. He 
compares the trader’s contribution with the contribution of a surgeon and concludes 
that it is not fair: 
 
Now, I am sure he is or she is a very brilliant person, but is that person worth 50 million 
in that year? No. How much does a surgeon get that is going to save you or me by doing 
a bypass operation, replacing my hips, changing my shoulders? (Interview transcript 10). 
 
Therefore, while economic evaluators view top incomes as a result of a neutral market, 
and hence the distribution of resources as not concerning, social evaluators are 
concerned about the vastly unequal distribution of resources, often with reference to 
occupations which are seen as socially valuable, such as the medical profession (as 
discussed in Chapter 4). As a result, social evaluators explain that top incomes shares 
should be lower. 
 
Preferences for economic inequality: What about the distribution of wealth? 
As discussed, there is more concern for inequality of wealth than there is for inequality 
of income; though the two are often discussed as interrelated. It is therefore difficult to 
disentangle the two for analysis. Slightly more respondents state that they would prefer 
lower top wealth shares (n=12) than state they prefer lower top income shares (n=10). 
However, many chose not to answer this question, for the same reasons discussed in 
regard to top income shares: because the market is the preferred mechanism for the 
distribution of economic resources (n=17)136. Participants’ explanations for why it is 
better not to interfere with top wealth shares include that the current capitalist system in 
the UK is better than previous feudal systems or the aristocracy (n=3), and better than 
systems in place in other (communist or authoritarian) countries. References are made 
to China, Cuba and Zimbabwe (n=2). A junior entrepreneur who runs a family office 
explains that in Great Britain:  
                                                 
136 Another similar finding relates to the responsibility of the rich, which is seen as more important than 
the distribution of wealth: “Yeah. So in a way any… anything on wealth it’s as much as how it’s used as… 
as to what the sizes are” (Interview transcript 21). 
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… so much of the country was always controlled by a small number of people and that’s 
actually got better. Now, okay, you read something like Piketty, he’s saying it’s now 
getting worse, but actually, at least there is nothing to stop someone if they work hard 
from getting a piece of that action, you know, whereas if you weren’t born into the right 
family, you had no job, you were [going to] be a serf (Interview transcript 12). 
 
A hedge fund manager is sceptical of attempts which focus on achieving a fairer 
distribution of income and wealth because in his view, market forces will result in the 
best outcome: 
 
Of course on the one hand one can argue a case that wouldn’t it be fairer to have income 
and wealth evenly distributed […] wouldn’t it be wonderful to achieve that… but I 
believe that if you actually […] try to engineer that, once again, you can actually kind of 
destroy incentives […] I mean you end up with (laughs) […] what’s happened in 
Zimbabwe (Interview transcript 23). 
 
This narrative relates to an emergent theme that inequality “is what it is” and that no 
matter what system there is, there will always be inequality. Illustrative of this 
perspective, a financial entrepreneur states that wealth inequality is “the normal cycle 
of life”. In addition, among the minority of participants who are more concerned with 
top income than top wealth shares, the prevalent reason is that “wealth inequality just is 
what it is”. For instance, an entrepreneur explains that wealth inequality is “almost 
relating to fate a bit” because “property markets could fall, equity markets could fall, 
and everybody is a bit poorer again, but so be it”. He states 
 
I think the income thing, the disparity is such that you feel there is a sort of inherent 
unfairness […] whereas, if you are in the fortunate position of having some assets, and 
they haven’t gone up in value or you have invested them wisely, so be it. I mean, it’s 
just the way it is […] they might have tried to invest prudently and sensibly, or you 
might have been a bit lucky […] you could argue that anybody owning a house in 
London they have been rather lucky or you know whether they are born and bred or 
whatever, but […] I don’t have great concern about that, I mean this, is the same the 
world over, it’s always been the same; we’re never gonna have an equality of either 
income or wealth, and I am not suggesting on the income side there should be anything 
like equality, that’s never gonna work (Interview transcript 13). 
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Therefore, even though participants generally view wealth inequality as more 
concerning than income inequality, some participants view wealth inequality as “fate” 
and therefore avoid questions of fairness (Bamfield and Horton, 2009).  
 
Views on policies and what can be done 
In this final section, I will analyse how participants’ perceptions of economic inequality 
relate to their views on policies to alleviate economic inequality. As already alluded to 
in the previous section, the dominant discourses of market forces, incentives and wealth 
creation mean that only a minority of participants desire “a genuine shift in the 
distribution[s] of income [and wealth] towards less inequality” as proposed by 
Atkinson (2014, p. 619).  
Participants’ policy preferences are important because they are powerful. Four 
of the participants have donated significant amounts to political parties, ranging from 
tens of thousands to hundreds of thousand pounds (average of approximately £300k)137. 
There is evidence for extensive political engagement among participants of this study; 
most, if not all participants, seem to confidently have a ‘right to speak’ (Laurison, 
2015; Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]) about political matters. Respondents are happy to discuss 
their views on policies and what they believe should be done, including optimal 
taxation, wealth and income taxes, incentives, education, among other issues.  
Policy preferences reflect market discourses. Market forces are viewed as best 
placed to establish levels of inequality, and a few participants state that the market will 
regulate economic inequality (n=3). Others explain that legislation cannot be the 
solution because people (the rich) will game the system anyway (n=6). For instance, 
taxation levels which are perceived as too high are seen as incentivizing tax avoidance: 
“We’ve got to avoid a situation where income tax levels get to the level that people 
start looking for ways of getting round it” (Interview transcript 21)138. Incentives are 
often referred to as important and endangered by government intervention. Taxes 
which are too high are viewed as destroying incentives (n=7), and as encouraging 
talented people to leave the country (n=6). A couple of respondents even stated that 
they themselves would leave the country if taxes increased (n=2). Incentives for 
                                                 
137 These include donations to major political parties and a national campaign. 
138 This statement is related to a discourse prominent in the Thatcher era. 
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entrepreneurial wealth creation and individual job seeking were also seen as important 
(n=9). For instance, a senior executive in a financial company asserts:  
 
I can remember when top rates of tax was 95p in a pound, [hence all] smart, clever, 
entrepreneurial people went and moved to America […] where their contribution was 
more valued. Now, we have a top rate of tax of 40-45 percent which means you can keep 
most of it, I am in favour of that. I think if people work hard, they deserve to be well 
rewarded […] I think some of the social inequalities are addressed through wealth 
creation, not all of them, now, I mean, I think the last election here was a very clear sort 
of proposition, do you believe in wealth creation as a means of addressing some of the 
social inequalities, or do you believe that social inequalities are addressed by taking 
money from there and giving it there… that’s a disincentive for people to create wealth! 
(Interview transcript 4, emphasis added). 
 
Hence, inequality is a result of people working very hard, and is best addressed by 
creating incentives for “wealth creation”. Within the sample, only a minority are 
critical of the discourse surrounding incentives (n=6). A hedge fund manager, even 
though he strongly believes in ‘free markets’, ‘capitalism’ and ‘incentives’ argues that 
“you’re very incentivized, even if you had half of what you had currently, if you’re in 
the top 1 percent” (Interview transcript 15). Further, a couple of social evaluators 
mention that they would prefer more redistribution, but that it is difficult to oppose the 
current ideology and political discourse (n=2). These views are a minority of the 
sample. 
To illustrate the differences of my sample compared to the general population, I 
will now turn to the survey responses of my participants. Population data comes from 
the 2012 BSA survey (British Social Attitudes: The 30th Report, 2013). My data shows 
that compared to the general population participants are less likely to indicate that the 
gap between those with high incomes and those with low incomes is too large and less 
likely to agree that it is the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences 
between the rich and the poor. However, participants are comparatively more likely to 
agree that the government should redistribute income from the better off to those who 
are less well off (Figure 8.2).  
Of the interview participants, 69 percent perceive the gap as “too large”, 
compared to 82 percent of the public. Whereas 33 percent of interviewees indicate that 
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the gap is “about right” only 14 percent of the public does so (not shown in figure). 
While 48 percent of interviewees agree or strongly agree that it should be the 
government’s responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the 
poor, 69 percent of the public do so. Note that this question was interpreted as 
concerning the government’s responsibility to reduce differences in market incomes 
(for instance through pay caps or minimum wage policies). 
 
Figure 8.2 Attitudes to the income gap, reduction of income differences and government 
redistribution 
 
However, 55 percent of the top income earners in this study either agree or strongly 
agree with the statement the government should redistribute income from the better off 
to those who are less well off compared to just 41 percent of the public. Therefore, a 
majority of participants opposes government interference with differences in market 
incomes, in line with market beliefs. Nevertheless, a slight majority acknowledges that 
redistribution is necessary to provide vital public services including health care, 
education and to tackle poverty.  
 
Conclusion 
In this final empirical chapter, I have firstly shown that for many participants, wealth is 
generally perceived as more important than income because of property prices and the 
perceived “freedom” that high levels of wealth provide through capital income. The 
narratives of relative disadvantage compared with others who are wealthier, including 
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those of earlier generations or those from wealthy families, highlights the importance of 
wealth which is often ignored in social science studies. Further, top incomes are 
generally perceived as more deserving than top wealth due to beliefs that the labour 
market is meritocratic. However, moral distinctions between super-managers and 
rentiers are rarely drawn upon. The main moral distinction narrated by participants was 
between deserving entrepreneurs and those deemed to be not necessarily deserving 
employees, including bankers and CEOs. Meanwhile, most participants view those with 
top incomes and wealth as doing better nowadays than they used to, in particular those 
with top wealth. Further, some participants explain that top incomes have come down 
since the financial crisis.  
In regard to policy preferences for addressing inequality, a majority of 
participants state that the market is the best mechanism to determine levels of 
inequality, reflecting the strong beliefs in markets which I have introduced in Chapter 
4. According to this view, matters of distribution should not be a concern; instead the 
focus should be on raising the living standard at the bottom through incentives for 
wealth and job creation. As a result, less than half of the participants agree that it is the 
government’s responsibility to reduce differences in (market) incomes. However, a 
slight majority agrees that government should redistribute income; to provide public 
services and tackle poverty, which is stressed by some as more important than tackling 
inequality.  
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Conclusion 
The purpose of my research was to analyse how those at the top of the distribution, the 
top 1 percent, understand economic inequality, and their place and role in it. Thus, I 
explored how participants understand the recent turning of the tables in social science 
research on economic inequality; whereby top income and wealth shares now play an 
important role, complementing a more traditional focus on poverty or summary 
measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient. The focus is on how much the 
richest take in terms of income and how much they own in terms of wealth relative to 
everyone else. My study is an empirical investigation on how the rich perceive this 
political choice. In this concluding chapter, I summarize my findings and discuss the 
limitations and implications of my research. My qualitative fieldwork in the City of 
London139 investigated how participants perceive inequality as measured by top income 
and wealth shares. To frame my qualitative work, I commenced the PhD study with an 
analysis of survey data to explore how those at the top of the economic distributions 
perceive meritocracy and their social class.  
 
Findings from the GBCS 
Data analysis of the GBCS demonstrates that meritocratic views towards what is “most 
important for career success” are prevalent among all respondents, but particularly so 
for those with the highest household incomes and wealth. Generally, the meritocratic 
items ‘level of education’, ‘hard work’ and ‘personal ambition’ were most frequently 
selected. Respondents across the income spectrum in the GBCS are highly likely to 
indicate that these meritocratic items are most important for career success; however, 
the rich are even more likely to select these items and ‘natural ability’ than are all 
others140. My latent class analyses show that it is justified to distinguish between a 
majority of GBCS respondents who select ‘education’ and other ‘meritocratic’ items as 
most important for career success141 and a minority who choose ‘education’, in addition 
                                                 
139 In addition to my fieldwork (interviews and focus groups), I have followed the debates surrounding 
inequality in the media, including how Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty, 2014), and Social 
Class in the Twenty-First Century (Savage, 2015c) were received. 
140 As discussed, the GBCS data is useful because a disproportional amount of those with top incomes 
and high household wealth engaged in a classed performance of completing the survey; although the 
GBCS is not representative of the general population. 
141 This finding applies to the two-class, three-class and four-class solutions of the latent class analyses. 
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to ‘social reproduction’ items, which included ‘social class’, ‘coming from a wealthy 
family’ and ‘accent’. Hence, those with top household incomes have heightened 
meritocratic views, although these views are common throughout the distribution of 
GBCS respondents. 
The GBCS is advantageous because its wealth of rich respondents allows us to 
observe the granularity at the very top of the income and wealth distributions. Standard 
survey data on the other hand only allows for the exploration of the top decile group. 
This allows us to differentiate between the attitudes of those with the highest household 
incomes and wealth from those whose income and wealth is merely high. For example, 
in addition to attitudes towards what is important for career success, the GBCS also 
provides relevant data regarding subjective social class. Descriptive statistical analyses 
of participants show that the higher a respondent’s household income, the more likely 
they are to indicate that they are part of the upper middle or upper class. Further, the 
higher a participant’s wealth and income, the more likely they are to select meritocratic 
items as important for career success. These findings demonstrate the importance of 
accounting for differences at the top of the distributions, which is often overlooked by 
surveys which do not permit an analysis of variation within the most advantaged 
participant groups. 
 
Qualitative interview and survey findings 
Turning to my qualitative fieldwork, the lack of available data to address my research 
question required the collection of original data. To this end, I conducted 30 qualitative 
interviews with individuals who earned top incomes. The data collected includes 
narratives relating to income differences, top incomes and wealth, as well as survey 
data on participants’ knowledge of the income and wealth distribution, their income 
and wealth and policy attitudes.  
 
Limitations 
Before I discuss my findings, I need to stress the limitations of the qualitative interview 
sample.  Due to the non-random selection of participants and the small sample size, I 
cannot infer my findings to the population of top income earners in the UK. While 
there is no bias towards LSE graduates among the interview sample, there may be 
sampling and social desirability bias, because participants who view top incomes as a 
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relevant issue may have been more likely to agree to be interviewed, and because 
participants may have adjusted their answers in conversation with a sociologist, 
respectively.  
Participants have been sampled by virtue of them earning top incomes (either 
through employment, self-employment or entrepreneurship). Therefore, even though 
many participants also have wealth which places them in the top 1 percent of the 
distribution, and some have extremely high fortunes, none of the participants currently 
derive their top incomes exclusively from capital income. A further limitation is that I 
have only talked to top earners themselves, excluding their partners who might hold 
different views, as investigated by Glucksberg (2016a) and Sherman (2017). Due to the 
focus of the study on perceptions towards top incomes and wealth, sampling 
participants whose income places them within the top 1 percent of the income 
distribution, i.e. ‘economic elites’ rather than institutionally operationalized ‘elites’ 
(Reis and Moore, 2005), is justified however.  
While a lack of ethnographic data does not allow me to compare what people 
say they do with what they actually do (Khan and Jerolmack, 2013) or to observe 
whether and how participants’ views change over time (Skeggs, 1997), the advantage 
of conducting interviews is that I was able to interview participants in a variety of 
industries and professions; people who are employed, employers and self-employed in 
finance, law and consulting. Further, it allowed me to talk to participants with a wide 
range of incomes and wealth. Most importantly, interviews are a suitable method to 
investigate perceptions of inequality (Reis and Moore, 2005). 
As with other qualitative studies on ‘elites’, I am not able to generalize my 
findings; however, my findings are theoretically relevant and can inform future 
hypotheses and representative studies. Specifically, my study shows that participants’ 
views on how top incomes come about, i.e. how they are produced, are fundamental for 
their perceptions of economic inequality and policies towards tackling it. My study 
showed that ways of thinking about market outcomes are related to views on whether 
the government should reduce income differences.  
While I find in my sample that there is a significant minority of top income 
earners who are social evaluators, I cannot generalize this finding to the broader 
population. The non-random sampling method, and small-scale of my study does not 
allow this inference to be made. It could be the case that social evaluators are 
overrepresented in my sample. For instance, Page et al. (2013) found that the wealthy 
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in their study (residents in the Chicago-area who are among the top 1 percent of US 
wealth-holders), though they express concern about inequality, are much more likely 
than the general public to oppose government action to redistribute income or wealth. 
My findings are the opposite; participants are actually slightly more likely than the 
general population to agree that the government should redistribute incomes (though 
they are less likely to agree that it is the government’s responsibility to reduce income 
differences due to strong beliefs in market outcomes). However, BSA data from 2012 
shows that a significant minority of those in managerial and professional occupations 
supports government redistribution, though they are less likely to do so than those in 
working class professions (38 compared to 46 percent) (Pearce and Taylor, 2013).  
Further, Rowlingson et al. (2012, p. 11) have found that while those with higher 
incomes are much less likely to support redistribution, data from the BSA suggests that 
there is also “a fair degree of altruism rather than self-interest in the higher income 
population”. My findings are compatible with these latter nationally-representative 
studies. 
Despite these limitations, which are related to the difficulty of accessing those 
with top incomes and wealth, the data, its analysis and resulting research findings 
nevertheless constitutes a contribution to the field as I will discuss. Importantly, the 
challenges I faced in collecting this data reinforces the argument that the type of data 
collected by our national statistical agencies is a political choice. Rather than focusing 
on the dynamics at the top of the income and wealth distributions, policy makers have 
placed much emphasis on monitoring those at the bottom (Savage and Williams, 2008). 
My research acts as a small step towards redressing this imbalance. 
 
Economic evaluation 
Turning to my findings, the cultural process through which participants evaluate top 
incomes and wealth is fundamentally based on economic principles; hence I term it 
economic evaluation. I argue that it is precisely these practices through which 
participants make sense of top incomes (and wealth). These principles stem from the 
discipline of economics, whose key domain of study is markets. In economics, markets 
are viewed as the most efficient way to allocate scarce economic resources (Slater and 
Tonkiss, 2000). For participants, market principles explain top incomes and differences 
in incomes more generally. The cultural process of (economic) evaluation is part of the 
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wider cultural process of rationalization, a key feature of the modern, bureaucratic 
organization (Lamont et al., 2014). Rational principles, which rose hand in hand with 
monetarization and the emergence of modern market societies (Slater and Tonkiss, 
2000), aim to maximize efficiency and are generally perceived as neutral and fair 
(based on merit) (Lamont et al., 2014). In my interviews, participants explain that 
neutral market forces determine who is ‘best’ based on who creates the highest 
financial value. 
Descriptions of resource allocation processes within organizations are common 
in my interviews. Processes referred to include formulas and metrics which are used to 
divide up economic value within a firm. For instance, an investment banker’s salary 
and bonus consists of a share of the ‘financing cost saved’ which their team has 
achieved for clients, a trader’s bonus is based on a ‘formula’ of revenue generated and 
a hedge fund manager derives their revenue based on the ‘2 and 20’ fee structure142. 
The prime manifestation of economic evaluation is the performance culture in the City 
of London. This culture is based on performance-based pay, ranking (categorization) of 
staff and the firing of a certain percentage of ‘underperforming’ staff. As a result, 
participants internalize evaluations of their economic value. The ruthlessness of the 
performance culture creates insecurities and explains why some participants aim for 
decommodification in order to relieve themselves from the strains of the market. 
The evaluative practices which are narrated as determining a person’s economic 
value legitimize economic reward. Categorization in the form of rankings, metrics and 
formulas feed into legitimation, because the market, an abstract neutral force, 
determines who is ‘best’. Top incomes in the professions of participants are viewed as 
the result of who has done best in (financial) markets by creating the most economic 
value for clients and shareholders. For example, participants generally view those even 
further up the skewed distribution, in particular entrepreneurs, as having attained their 
position based on ‘rational’, market-based evaluations of merit and therefore as 
deserving. Further, performance-pay has been shown to be related to increasing top 
income shares (Atkinson, 2015). Meanwhile, participants aspire and struggle to 
advance their position, appearing to follow a moral Weberian imperative to achieve 
economic success. Importantly, participants see themselves as being able to change 
                                                 
142 Hedge funds typically earn fees which are calculated as two percent of all assets under management 
and 20 percent of all the profits generated.  
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their position within this unequal market structure (see also Khan, 2008). Therefore, 
inequality at the top is generally not perceived as negative for their lives; rather it is 
viewed as an aspiration to achieve more economically.  
The cultural process of economic evaluation explains why the market is seen as 
rewarding hard work. When talking to participants about why there are differences in 
income and wealth, and what qualities are needed for high incomes, two-thirds of 
respondents mention hard work as a key factor. The discourse of hard work includes 
determination and persistence, long working hours and working smartly and efficiently. 
Income differences are often narrated as reflecting hierarchies of skills and talent 
(Bamfield and Horton, 2009), while liberal market economies are viewed as 
meritocratic, because neutral market forces reward hard work and talent. However, a 
one-third minority of participants, the social evaluators, question whether the market is 
the best instrument to determine the value or contribution of an individual to society; 
specifically with comparisons to the “low” incomes of teachers, doctors and nurses 
despite their important contributions to society. 
Participants favour individualistic over structural explanations to explain 
inequality (Khan, 2008), but acknowledge structural barriers and the importance of 
luck. The representation at the top is one of white, male privilege, highlighting that the 
conditions of possibility for being positioned at the top are ‘intersectional’ (Crenshaw, 
1989; Skeggs, 1997; Atkinson et al., 2016). Participants are aware of intersectional 
inequalities, but many do not see a contraction between these inequalities and the idea 
that the market is a neutral merit-determining instrument. Why are visible structural 
inequalities in top income professions compatible with the idea that market competition 
determines merit and economic value? The reason is that the process of economic 
evaluation itself is gendered, racialized and classed. White, male and privately educated 
individuals are perceived as creating the most economic value. So even though women 
and ethnic minorities are still clearly underrepresented in top income occupations, 
participants highlight that there has been a change towards a (more) meritocratic City.  
The process of economic evaluation is gendered because performances of being 
a top earner (and of privilege, Khan, 2008) tie in seamlessly with performances of 
masculinity, but present challenging contradictions for performing femininity. The 
competitive performance culture is narrated as masculine; as ruthless, calculative and 
therefore suitable for confident, self-advocating leaders. This presents a contradiction 
for performing femininity, which includes caring for others (Perrons, 2014), 
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underestimating one’s skills and exercising self-critique. While Glucksberg’s (2016a) 
ethnographic work showed that ‘elite’ women’s labour is often unrecognized, even by 
themselves, Sherman’s (2017) interview data highlighted that female partners of top 
earners often stress their hard work ethic as paramount, just like their top income 
earning partners. According to my survey data, women in my sample consistently self-
rate lower than their male peers and they also own comparatively much less wealth. 
The masculinity of the economic evaluation process rationalizes the 
underrepresentation of women among the top 1 percent. Women are seen as ‘choosing’ 
to focus on their families rather than on making money; as self-selecting out of top 
jobs. While gender is not perceived as restrictive to top incomes; having a family is 
(though this applies only to women). As a result, women’s economic disadvantage is 
naturalized.  
In addition to being gendered, the process of economic evaluation is racialized. 
The trusted norm at the top is not only male but also white. Those who self-rate as part 
of the top group in society are white male entrepreneurs with extreme wealth. The blue-
blooded history of financial services in the UK, in particular for investment banking 
(McDowell, 1997), and the colonial history of the UK including a financial services 
sector which thrived on the slave trade, including the Bank of England and Lloyds, 
contextualises why white male faces are the trusted norm in the field and hence why 
they are evaluated as economically most valuable. 
Finally, the gendered, racialized economic evaluation process is also classed. 
For many participants, there is no contradiction between meritocracy and an 
overrepresentation of privileged, privately educated individuals at the top. This is 
because private education is viewed as providing superior skills, most notably 
confidence, which are narrated as entangled with economic value. Private education 
therefore enables children to inhabit their capital legitimately143. Private schools are a 
logical extension of market thinking because participants use their capital to provide a 
market-based education for their children, which is expected to deliver future returns. 
Economic evaluation is classed, because those of privileged, privately educated 
backgrounds are seen as economically valuable (Skeggs, 2004a; 2014). As the process 
of economic evaluation means that those who create the highest financial value are 
                                                 
143 It allows them to carry the freedom of never having to rely on the labour market for their income, 
through a performance of hard work and ‘ease’ (Khan, 2008). 
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viewed as the best, and because there are vast economic differences between people at 
the top, many participants experience relative disadvantage. 
 
Relative (dis)advantage 
Individuals in the top 1 percent are surrounded by vast absolute economic inequality 
due to the strong skew of the income and wealth distributions. The economic inequality 
between those at the top means that when individuals compare themselves with others 
at the top, the economic circumstances of these other people are often very different 
compared to their own. An example is a young barrister who compares herself with 
colleagues who are twenty years older, have bought their London homes many years 
ago and now own expensive houses which are unaffordable for her. Hence, at the top of 
the distributions, an individual’s comparative reference group is often very different in 
economic terms from their membership reference group, resulting in relative 
disadvantage. I coded all social comparisons which participants drew on either 
spontaneously or when asked to identify who is doing better than them. Social 
comparisons with reference groups shed light on participants’ perceptions of high 
incomes and richness which are, unsurprisingly, skewed. They also explain why, when 
asked to indicate their subjective social location on a scale from one to ten, only one-
third of participants indicate that they belong to the top group.  
Runciman (1966) concluded that inequality was sustainable because relative 
deprivation in the UK was limited as respondents’ comparative reference groups tended 
to be the same or similar to their membership reference groups (their social class). In 
contrast, I argue that the differentiation at the top means that the rich today will almost 
invariably experience relative disadvantage and that this constitutes a potential driver of 
economic inequality at the top. 
My qualitative interview data shows that participants experience economic 
inequality from a position of relative (dis)advantage; they experience relative 
disadvantage in their daily lives as a result of ‘upward’ social comparisons with 
reference groups which are wide-ranging in economic terms while being conceptually 
aware that they are relatively advantaged compared to the general population. Hence, 
those at the top experience their position in a contradictory two-fold way: within their 
social space at the top (in which they almost always have someone much richer than 
them to aspire to) and in society overall (in which they are advantaged). In their daily 
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lives, participants experience relative (dis)advantage compared to reference groups 
which matter to them, especially those whom they “compete” with, while being aware 
that they are relatively advantaged compared to wider society. 
 The surprising finding was that relative disadvantage and vast inequality at the 
top was seen in a positive light by many participants. This is because those who are 
perceived as doing better, in particular entrepreneurs and philanthropists are narrated as 
an inspiration, motivation and as an incentive to do better and “create wealth” and 
“jobs”. The positive framing of relative disadvantage contradicts with participants’ 
accounts of elite struggle in regard to private education and London homes; for instance 
younger participants feel disadvantaged in the property market compared to older 
colleagues who bought their London property earlier and participants who have or plan 
to have children complain about the high cost of private schooling. Private education is 
seen as a necessity because it is standard practice in their social group of reference; not 
going to private school would put their children at a relative disadvantage. Even though 
participants are also inconvenienced by the experience of relative disadvantage the 
discourse that those who do better economically are an aspiration, and incentive, is 
powerful.  
 There are outliers among my sample concerning relative (dis)advantage. We 
have also seen outlier effects in the GBCS data on subjective social class; the 
probability of identifying as upper middle or upper class increases exponentially with 
household income. There is one category of interviewees for whom the concept of 
relative (dis)advantage does not consistently apply: white, male entrepreneurs with 
incomes of £5m and higher who have built their own financial companies and have 
extreme wealth. These participants self-place in the top group of society and make 
limited upward comparisons, at least of an economic nature. When they engage in 
social comparison, it is often with socially-distant others; with white, male sports stars 
in football or cycling and with named entrepreneurs. Participants explain the extreme 
wealth of famous sports stars and entrepreneurs with reference to economic concepts 
related to competition such as the “scarcity value” of their talent and “unique pricing 
power”. The process of economic evaluation explains why entrepreneurs and those 
with top incomes are generally admired and aspired to; the idea is that the market 
rewards them for their merit. 
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Skewed perceptions of the distribution, high incomes and richness 
Based on my interview data, participants’ perceptions of their own social and economic 
standing are skewed, and result from the vast economic inequality at the top of the 
distribution which surrounds them in everyday life. Even though all participants’ 
incomes are in the top 1 percent of the distribution, many do not consider their income 
to be high (one-third), except those whose income is extremely high, and many do not 
consider themselves as rich (over one-third), except those who are extremely rich. This 
skewed perception affects how participants perceive the income distribution. They 
overestimate the median income and highly overestimate the threshold for the top 1 
percent. Even though participants are aware of broader inequalities and their own 
advantage, they are particularly conscious of, and overestimate, differences at the top of 
the distribution. Interestingly, many participants are aware that their perception is 
skewed. 
When asked what ‘a high income’ and ‘a rich family’ means to them, 
participants answer that these concepts are relative. Unlike in authoritative definitions 
of poverty however, top incomes and richness are not viewed as relative compared to 
the median or wider society, but as relative to others with top incomes and wealth. 
Whereas poverty is defined by Townsend (1979, p. 31) as relative to the “amenities 
which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to 
which they belong” richness is narrated as relative to the amenities which are 
customary among the rich. This explains why participants’ numeric estimates of high 
incomes and richness are extremely high; the median response to what a high income 
means to participants is £200k (average = £721k) and the median response to what it 
means to be a rich family is £3m (average = £9.4m).  
 Whether someone has a high income or is rich is narrated as relative to 
someone’s peer group, family and friends and as highly dependent on where a person 
lives; specifically, whether someone lives in London. These narrates are contextualized 
by two key themes related to what I term ‘elite accumulatory struggle’; participants 
narrated the difficulty of acquiring suitable homes in London due to high property 
prices in the capital and the ‘struggle’ of paying for private education for children. 
Respondents were keen to stress that the steepness of London property prices and the 
cost of private education affects the meaning of high incomes and richness. A gross 
annual income of £150k is not viewed as high if the person is paying for private 
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schooling for their children. Based on Atkinson’s (2006) pioneering work and my 
findings on perceptions of high incomes and richness, I propose a relative definition of 
richness (from the perspective of the rich).  
 
A definition of relative richness 
In the context of ‘elite accumulatory struggle’ being rich means having the freedom 
from worrying about money and further accumulation. For some, being rich requires 
being able to live off income from capital; to decommodify themselves from the labour 
market. The richest individuals in the sample plan to bestow this freedom from the 
strains of the market to their children and future generations. The freedom of the rich to 
pursue long-term intergenerational wealth transfers (Glucksberg, 2016a) is in stark 
contrast to the experience of insecurity and the necessity of focusing on short-term 
money management by those who are ‘getting by’ (Mckenzie, 2015; Summers, 2016). 
Participants’ aspirations to decommodify and relieve themselves from the strain of the 
market need to be analysed as rooted in the competitive environment of the City of 
London and the UK, a liberal welfare state which stresses individual responsibility for 
personal welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
The definition of the ‘rich’ proposed by Atkinson (2006, p. 3) likewise puts 
decommodification at its heart. The rich are “those individuals whose wealth exceeds 
30 times mean income” because at an expected percentage return “of 3⅓ [percent] per 
annum this level of wealth generates an amount equal to mean income per person”. A 
person with this amount of wealth “could live off the interest at an average standard of 
living”. Decommodification is important for how the top 1 percent perceive richness; 
taking their perspective into account is justified because of their disproportionate 
political influence and ability to shape perceptions of what it means to be rich. As 
participants in my study do not consider living at an average standard of living as 
adequate, in fact, many explain that they cannot imagine how those with a median 
income get by, I build on Atkinson’s definition of the rich and suggest a 
complementary definition of ‘extreme richness’. Assuming an expected rate of return 
on capital of 3⅓ percent, I operationalize the extremely rich as individuals whose 
wealth exceeds 30 times the threshold of the top 1 percent of the income distribution. In 
2012, the rich according to this definition are those with wealth of £3.5m (£118k x 30). 
This number is consistent with the median answer of participants of what a rich family 
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means to them (£3m)144. A person with this amount of wealth can live off the interest at 
the standard of living of someone whose income places them just within the top 1 
percent (who predominantly derive their income from the labour market and hence are 
viewed as meritorious). Importantly, there is a contradiction between the desire for 
decommodification and the liberal discourse of meritocratic hard work as an 
explanatory factor for differences in incomes. 
 
Perceptions of economic inequality 
Top incomes and wealth (as well as high incomes and richness) are often narrated as 
interrelated and sometimes referred to interchangeably in interviews. However, when 
prompted about the difference between the two, most participants explain that wealth is 
more important because of the freedom it provides due to its ability to generate income 
and the importance of property for feelings of security. Wealth is important for 
participants because of its accumulatory nature (Savage, 2014); entrepreneurs for 
instance often perceive wealth accumulation as the most important aspect of top 
incomes. Wealth is seen as vital for participants because its facilitation of capital 
incomes allows individuals (and in case of extreme wealth individuals and their 
children) to achieve decommodification from the labour market. While some social 
science studies on economic inequality focus narrowly on income rather than wealth 
inequality, the importance of wealth is intuitive for participants.  
Due to experiences of relative disadvantage, participants overestimate levels of 
economic inequality. To explore preferences for economic inequality and how it is 
understood, I asked participants in turn how high they think top income and wealth 
shares are in the UK, and how high they think they ought to be. On average, 
participants thought top income and wealth shares were much higher than they actually 
are. Further, most participants indicated that they know or perceive top income and 
wealth shares as increasing; in particular top wealth shares. They are aware of the 
advantages of the rich due to increased asset prices and property values as a result of 
quantitative easing. Further, some acknowledge that the rich benefit from higher returns 
(as argued by Piketty, 2014). However, participants’ heightened awareness of 
                                                 
144 I did not instruct participants to include or exclude the value of primary residence in their estimates; 
however, in their calculations most include the value of homes. However, there are others who 
mention that for them richness is about “liquid” assets only. 
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inequality compared to the general population does not necessarily translate into vast 
concerns about inequality.  
 
Comparing income and wealth inequality 
Many participants perceive top incomes as more deserving due to the idea that market 
incomes are meritocratic. In line with this, some participants explain that wealth 
inequality is morally more concerning, although there are some participants who 
explained that wealth inequality “is what it is” and therefore does not matter very 
much. Based on these findings, we would expect that participants draw a moral 
distinction between deserving super-managers and undeserving rentiers, similar to 
arguments put forward by Piketty (2014, p. 264). Instead, participants draw distinctions 
between deserving entrepreneurs who “create wealth” by building their asset base and 
employees, including “bankers” and “CEOs”. Employees are seen as not necessarily 
deserving, because their income from labour may be derived illegitimately from being 
part of “a cabal”, or because they are “greedy” bankers or they happen to be lucky and 
manage a company which was already successful. Both entrepreneurs and employees 
draw these distinctions.  
 The market logic and the process of evaluation are important for understanding 
why entrepreneurs are narrated as most deserving. The economic concept of risk taking 
justifies top incomes; people who take risk, and are successful should get rewarded 
according to this perspective. It is in comparison to entrepreneurs that the economic 
evaluation of employees based on market determined merit is sometimes questioned; 
both traders and entrepreneurs earn money based on quantifiable economic evaluation 
derived from a formula or market revenue respectively, but the latter are seen as more 
deserving because of personal risk taking. Nevertheless, risk as a form of 
precariousness, is something which participants aim to release themselves from through 
the accumulation of extreme wealth. These pursuits of extreme wealth need to be 
considered in the context of a liberal welfare regime in the UK which provides a very 
limited safety net to its citizens.  
Economic evaluation, and liberal ideals of the market as a neutral merit-
determining force, in which competitive individuals are incentivized to take risks and 
strive for accumulation for the benefit of all, help to explain preferences for inequality. 
Specifically, many participants state that the distribution of resources itself is not an 
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issue. When asked how high top income shares ought to be, a majority (approximately 
two-thirds) indicated they cannot or do not want to answer this question, because ‘the 
market’ should determine levels of economic inequality. These ideas are derived from 
the neoclassical theory of the marginal productivity of the income distribution, which 
posits that income from labour and income from capital reflect the social contribution 
of individuals (McGoey, 2017). These participants do not appreciate the turning of the 
tables in research on economic inequality and disagree with the political choice of 
measuring inequality with distribution tables and top income and wealth shares. They 
explain that we should not concern ourselves with issues of distribution, but focus 
instead on maximizing wealth “for all” by encouraging wealth and job creation.  
Economic growth is stressed as more important than the distribution of income 
and wealth. Many participants perceive there to be a contradiction between economic 
growth and equality, with maximization of the former given primacy. Inequality, the 
distribution of economic resources, is not an issue; it is justified for ‘meritocratic’ 
reasons and/or because top income and wealth shares are not relevant. Rather, poverty 
or the standard of living at the bottom should be the focus instead. These ideas contrast 
with social science studies which demonstrate that higher top income shares tend to go 
together with greater levels of poverty (Atkinson, 2015), that income inequality and 
poverty are closely correlated in advanced economies (Karagiannaki and McKnight, 
forthcoming) and that poverty is a distributional issue (Townsend, 1979). Participants’ 
concerns with poverty is reminiscent of Rawls’ (1971, p. 65) difference principle which 
posits “that the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they 
work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged 
members of society”. Therefore, a majority of participants does not perceive the 
unequal distribution of resources, as measured by top income shares, as an issue. 
 In addition, the moral distinctions of many participants do not focus on the 
magnitude of individuals’ fortunes, but on how wealth was acquired and how it is used. 
Wealth acquired through entrepreneurship is most legitimate; but in any case it is 
important that people should not “lie and cheat about it”. Bankers’ bonuses are not 
concerning because of their magnitude compared to general incomes, except if they 
have been acquired illegitimately, illegally, or by being part of “a cabal”. Further, how 
wealth is used is stressed as important; the rich are seen to have a responsibility to 
society. Philanthropic endeavours are viewed as a favourable development by many; 
and by some even as a way of addressing inequality. This finding is similar to 
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Sherman’s (2017) study of wealthy New Yorkers. She found that her extremely affluent 
participants discussed their wealth in regard to ‘affect’ (one should feel grateful and 
lucky rather than entitled to wealth) and ‘behaviour’ (people should not behave 
ostentatiously but restrain their consumption). These moral distinctions distract from 
issues of the unequal distribution of resources. 
 
Views on policies to tackle inequality  
Whether top income and wealth shares are viewed as relevant is important for 
participants’ policy preferences. In my study, whether a participant engages with top 
income and wealth shares or dismisses them as not relevant helps to explain their views 
on policy intervention. Unsurprisingly, the majority of those respondents who are not 
concerned about issues of distribution think that it should not be the government’s 
responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor. However, 
those participants who are interested in top income and wealth shares and engage with 
the question of how high they ought to be conceptualize inequality as an issue of 
distributive justice. They perceive inequality to be a political issue and indicate that top 
income shares should be lower145. 
Compared to the general population, participants are less likely to indicate that 
the gap between those with high incomes and those with low incomes is too large and 
less likely to agree that it is the government’s responsibility to reduce (market) income 
differences. However, participants are comparatively more likely to agree that the 
government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well 
off. Hence, the government should not get involved in reducing income differences146, 
but should focus on redistributing to the poor. Income is narrated as more productive 
than wealth; hence there is some support for wealth taxation for economic reasons. In 
line with Piketty (2014, p. 525), these participants view a wealth tax as an incentive to 
use capital efficiently. 
 
                                                 
145 With the exception of one social evaluator. 
146 Income differences were interpreted as differences in market incomes.  
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Contradictions, liberalism and the decommodified social class  
On one hand, participants highlight that markets reward hard work. On the other hand, 
participants describe the struggle for or the pleasure of decommodification. 
Decommodification includes relieving oneself and one’s children and grandchildren 
from the strains of the labour market through capital accumulation of such magnitude 
that the expected future returns provide complete “freedom” from worrying about 
money and accumulation. The idea that hard work is what should be rewarded contrasts 
with seeking to provide for future generations. Khan (2008) highlights a similar 
contradiction in his theory of the ‘performativity of privilege’ which entails the 
somewhat contradictory, though compatible processes of performing ‘ease’ in acting in 
one’s position while mobilizing ‘hard work’ to explain one’s position. For Khan 
(2008), managing these conflicting elements refers to the difference Tocqueville 
observed between democracy and aristocracy; the democratic frame of ‘hard work’ 
contrasts with the aristocratic disposition of ‘ease’. A key contradiction in my data is 
that for several participants the purpose of meritocratic top incomes is to live off capital 
income to achieve ‘freedom’ similar to Khan’s ‘ease’.  
The implication of my study for the study of social class is that a tiny fraction 
of society is part of a decommodified social class. This class is united by their relief 
from the strains of the labour market, though divided economically by a vast internal 
differentiation and demarcation (Savage, 2014). Further, due to the experience of 
relative (dis)advantage, this class is unlikely to see themselves as part of a 
homogeneous privileged decommodified social class (Ibid.). Like the aristocracy 
however, individuals and families in this class are fundamentally different in social 
class terms and in their liberty from those who must rely on the labour market for their 
livelihoods. Unlike the aristocracy however, this class is not based on birth and title, 
but perceived as meritocratic; as consisting of ‘meritocrats’ rather than capitalists or 
‘rentiers’. Nevertheless, participants’ achievements of and aspirations towards 
decommodification mean that we may be returning towards a ‘patrimonial capitalism’ 
(Piketty, 2014, p. 154), with a ‘new aristocracy’ in formation (Savage, 2015c). London 
property and private schools are important markers of status. By providing ‘confidence’ 
or ‘ease’, which is viewed as enmeshed with economic value, private schools allow 
children of the decommodified social class to inhabit their capital legitimately. My 
work demonstrates a contradiction within the liberal ideology; it claims to protect 
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individual liberty and provide “freedom” for all, but essentially only does so for those 
with capital. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview topic guide  
 
Interview Topic guide
Interview consent 
forms
Introduction to research and signing of consent forms including 
explaining interview process and questionnaire to respondents
Research questions Topic Topic guide Question derived from:
Introductions
Career trajectory
Firstly, as a way of background, can you tell me a bit about what you 
do now and how you got to the position you are in? 
Promt: Your career trajectory / How did you achieve your economic 
success?
How do individuals with 
top incomes understand 
income inequality?
Reasons for 
inequality
1) In general, why do you think there are differences in income? 
2) Why do you think that some people have higher incomes than 
others?
3) What kind of people have very high incomes? Prompt: Do you 
think gender  / ethnicity  play a role/are important?
4) Why do you think there are people who live in need? 
Prompt: People who have low income?* 
BSA 2009, Question 875
Drawn on GBCS Question 45 (what 
is important for career success)
BSA 2009, Q874
Is there an 'othering' of 
riches, as identified by 
Dean and Melrose (1999)?
Thresholds for ‘high-
income’
and 'rich'
1) What is a 'high income' to you?
Explaining: "Thinking about a person living on their own, how large 
would their income have to be before you would say they had a high 
income?"
And again, thinking about a person living on their own, how small 
would their income have to be before you would say they had a low 
income?*
2) And when you think of income, do you think of individual or 
household income?
3) And having talked about income, how much net worth does it take 
for a family to be a "rich family in the UK? 
BSA Question 911
BSA Question 915
As per advice by Stephen Jenkins
Adapted from Chin's question on a 
"rich family in America" 
Knowledge about and 
perceptions of income 
inequality
Recent increases in 
top income 
1) “Some people say that top income earners, defined as the top 1 
percent of income earners, are doing much better nowadays and 
that their incomes have risen comparatively to others." What do you 
think about this?
2) There is a lot of talk about the 1 percent. How high do you think is 
the share of the top 1 percent in total income? How high do you think 
it ought  to be?
Stimuli for interested participants: Data by Piketty (2014) shows that 
the income share in Anglo Saxon countries taken by the top 1 percent 
of income earners has been increasing since the 1980s. In the UK in 
2010, the share of the top 1 percent in total income was 14%. What 
do you think of this? 
1) Adapted from Runciman (1966) 
Question 10a 
Adapted from Chin (forthcoming)
Interested interviewees were given 
data on income and wealth 
inequality in the UK by Piketty 
(2014)
Knowledge about and 
perceptions of wealth 
inequality
Recent increases in 
top wealth 
1) Having discussed top incomes, let's talk about top wealth shares. 
2) Again, “some people might say that those with top wealth are doing 
much better nowadays and that their wealth has risen comparatively 
to others." What do you think about this?
3) How high do you think is  the share of total net worth held by the 
wealthiest one percent? How high do you think it ought  to be?
For insterested participants: Research by Piketty shows that in the 
UK in 2010 the share of the top 1 percent in total wealth is almost 
30% and the share of the top 10 percent is 70%. What do you think of 
this?
Adapted from Runciman (1966) 
Question 10a
Runciman (1966)  Question 10b
Adapted from Chin (forthcoming)
Views on income vs wealth 
inequality 
Comparing income 
and wealth 
inequality 
What do you think about top income shares compared to top wealth 
shares? (Promt:  What do you think about inequality of income 
compared to inequality of wealth?)**
Which comparative 
reference groups are 
individuals referring to + 
are they the same as their 
membership reference 
group (Runciman, 1966)?
self-assigned social 
location + 
Reference groups:
 In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and 
groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Here is a scale that runs 
from top (10) to bottom (1). Where would you put yourself now on this 
scale?
Do you think there are any other sorts of people doing noticeably 
better at the moment than you and your family?
If yes: What sort of people do you think are doing noticeably better?
What do you feel about this, I mean do you approve or disapprove of 
this?
ISSP 2009: Question 10a
Adapted from Runciman (1966) 
Question 9a)
Question 9b)
Question 9c)
Do respondents believe in 
meritocracy or is there 
awareness of 
misrecognition? (Skeggs 
1997) 
Meritocracy; 
fairness economic 
outcomes 
THIS SECTION WAS ONLY APPLICABLE IF BELOW THEMES DID 
NOT COME UP BEFORE (WAS RARE)
1) ‘Thinking about top wage income earners, do you think their 
salary is generally a fair reflection of their contribution to their 
company or organisation? 
3) What about top capital income earners?
Adapted from Bamfield and Horton 
(2009)
Survey questionnaire After survey questionnaire: Before we finish, is there anything else 
which you think is important for my research which we have not 
discussed yet?
Thanks for participating. Who might be other people that would have 
insights on this?
Questions in grey were not neccesarily asked
* these questions were  dropped after the first 10 interviews, because participants were uncomfortable answering them.
** These questions were added after about a third of the interviews, as it became apparent that the comparison is of interest.
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Appendix 2: Interview survey questionnaire 
 
Q In Britain, some households are financially better off than others. Of every 100 
households in this country how many would you say were financially better off than 
yours? ____________________ 
 
Q Where do you think your income is on the income distribution?  
 
 top 0.1%☐ top 1%☐ top 10%☐ remaining 90%☐ 
 
Q Thinking of everyone in the UK working full-time, about how much would someone 
need to earn each year before tax to get into: 
   
  The top half of the distribution? ____________£ 
  The top 1% of the distribution? ____________£ 
 
Q Thinking of income levels generally in Britain today, would you say that the gap 
between those with high incomes and those with low incomes is  
 
…too large, about right,  or, too small? 
 ☐ ☐  ☐  
 
Q On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility 
to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor? 
 
Definitely Probably Probably Definitely     
should be should be  should should  
   not be not be 
 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  
 
Q Please tick one box for the following statement to show how much you agree or 
disagree with it.  
Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well 
off 
 
  Agree  Neither agree             Disagree  
Strongly Agree  nor disagree  Disagree strongly  
 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Q Do you consider yourself as having been socially mobile?  
 No ☐ 
Yes, upward ☐ 
Yes, downward ☐ 
 
 
Q What subject did you study at university? _________________________________ 
 
Q What is your highest level of education? Postgraduate degree  ☐ 
Undergraduate degree  ☐ 
No degree-level education  ☐ 
I am still in education  ☐ 
 
Q Please give an approximation of your net worth       £_________ 
 
Q Please give an indication of your gross annual income from all sources £_________ 
(Including bonus) 
 
Q Do you live with a partner?  Yes☐ No☐ 
 
Q Do you have children?  Yes☐ No☐  If yes, how many? _____ 
 
 
Interviewer to fill-in:  
 
Name   __________________________ 
 
Age range __________ 
 
Gender __________ 
 
Ethnicity  __________ 
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Appendix 3: List of codes  
 
Code name Sources References
0 Career trajectory and own economic success 14 23
0 Position, description of job and career trajectory 16 16
Educational qualifications 5 6
Entrepreneurial (self-employed, employed) work provides autonomy, control 9 11
Family pressure to do well economically 2 2
Hard work, driven, discipline, ambition, getting things done, (risk taking) 5 9
History of banking; Big Bang, deregulation, english merchant banks vs US investment banks 3 5
Interested in own work_enjoys job_work as hobby_intellectually stimulating 7 9
Knowledge, broad knowledge base (generalist skills) 1 1
Leading, implementing programmes 1 1
Self employed barrister; Chambers get a lot of good work 2 3
Story of mobility at beginning of interview 1 3
Taking up of and identifying the opportunity 6 9
Was fortunate, happy accident 3 3
1.1_Explaining differences in income and top income; own income 0 0
2_1 Entrepreneurship; (entrepreneurial ideas) 6 7
2_1 Geography, London 3 3
2_1 Having or spotting opportunities 4 5
2_1 Industry, right profession, your company, career choice  (finance; banking; hedge funds, the bar) 11 20
2_2 Arbitrary, intangible, game at the top, ruthless, unethical, unpleasant; cheating, limited nepotism 9 15
2_2 Banking culture, wrong incentives 1 5
2_2 people driving own compensation_always wanting to earn more 3 7
2_2 Short termism 5 5
2_2_ Level of experience 1 1
2_3 People recruit people like themselves 2 2
2_3 Questions_fairness of, reflects on own high income 7 9
2_4 Knowing what's possible, through mentoring, environment 8 16
2_4 social networks, contacts, relationships 15 24
2_Age_difficulty for older workers, they could get paid less 1 1
2_Capitalism 2 2
2_earning to provide for family, children, grandchildren 5 6
2_Genes, genetics; something you inherit 4 5
2_top (own) income not real life; outsite of the normal 5 5
2_z Luck 16 23
2_z By chance 1 1
Being able to get into a position where you have the chance to show that you are good 1 1
Being fortunate to find a job one enjoys, because then you are more likley to do it well 2 2
Background 17 29
2_background influences ambition, opportunity set, can cap own abilities 2 2
2_being helped by capital; family financial support 2 3
2_Circle of wealth, the wealthy can privatley educate children, familiarity with business 2 2
2_spoilt children are not successful 3 4
2_story of rich, spoilt child doing well 2 2
Background enmeshed with motivations and economic value 2 4
Education 18 32
2_education even more important now 3 3
2_education is pre-requisite, difficult without degree 4 6
2_education less important for respondent (was not huge differentiator) 1 1
2_need top 1 percent education; prestigious, top, Oxbridge education, brand name education helps 8 9
2_private school was good, but respondent also decisive about what to do 1 1
2_private schooling is an advantage (in finance industry) as norm 2 2
2_private schooling provides confidence, soft skills, articulation.. 7 7
2_there are educational opportunities 1 3
Ethnicity 16 19
2_1 Changed a lot or it is CHANGING, there is more diversity 7 8
2_1 Ethnicity should not make a difference, but maybe still can 1 1
2_2 b more difficult for ethnic minorities, for black women, ethnicity affects opportunities 5 5
2_2 barriers to entry for different ethnicities, unconscious bias, implicit racism 4 5
2_2 Ethnicity is more of a disadvantage than gender 1 1
2_b Difficult to answer because participants are white (middle class ) norm, majority 2 3
2_Ethnicity makes no difference 6 6
2_Ethnicity makes no difference but gender does 1 1
2_Participant reflects on own ethnicity 1 1
2_Positive discrimination 2 2
2_Respondent makes racist comments 1 3
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Code name Sources References
2_self selection, no applications received from ethnic minorities 2 2
2_St There are more Asian, Chinese rather than Blacks or Pakistani 2 2
2_Stereotype Asian and others, numeracy skills, statistical and technical skills 6 6
2_stereotypes counterexamples Asian community in America 1 1
Ethnicity, Gender, Class Intersectionality (white male privatley educated norm) 8 12
2_Diversity, (corporation tries to achieve) 6 12
2_Diversity_Meritocracy recruiting the brightest individuals, international workforces 3 3
2_easier if people fit the mould better (with people who are there already) 1 1
Gender 28 126
1 Changed (a lot or slowly), change in the City, more women in senior roles, working as barristers 12 19
1 Gender of any importance 0 0
2_Gender should not be relevant (but unfortunatley still is) 1 1
2_Gender_more difficult for women (for black women), no equality, women not promoted to top 9 14
2_Gender_states they do not cause barriers (are not implicated) 3 3
2_No blocks or barriers for women, gender not a problem, gender has no impact 7 8
2_No gender discrimination at the bar, in pay, in finance 4 8
2_No impact in entrepreneurial setting, gender does not matter, you start with a blank sheet 1 1
2_Not straightforward question 2 2
2_Women, wonders if there is a gender pay gap in their industry 1 1
2 woman mentions finds it tricky to speak to senior guys in company, women need to be brave 2 2
2_Challenge to recruit females (propoportion CVs), desperate to recruit them, positivley discriminate 8 10
2_Gender and economic evaluation, it is about what is best for the firms success, shareholder value 4 4
2_Man is against quotas 1 1
2_Man is pro quotas 1 1
2_Gender and family 0 0
2_Gender Clash between meritocratic hard work and children 1 1
2_Gender differences combining parenting a career, women more difficult, men can sacrifice home life 2 4
2_Gender_ will hire a nanny 1 2
2_Gender_issue, problem of pregnancy and materinity (pay) 3 3
2_Gender_maternity leave was not an issue 1 1
2_Gender_need one partner staying at home (can be husband, man), otherwise can be bad family 5 5
2_Gender_single earner family 3 3
2_Gender_women to put family first 4 5
2_Men learning how to share demands that children place 1 1
2_Women can choose, gender not restriction, having a family is, women do not have to have children 6 6
2_Women have to make tough choices 1 2
2_Gender_SELF SELECTION, mathematical technical jobs, think hedge funds toxic, not right degrees 9 12
2_Gender_WORK all encompassing_single minded focus needed, wife support; women shared respons. 5 7
2_Industry (hedge funds)  is male dominated 1 1
2_Men talking about own male privilege 2 2
2_Mentions PROPORTION of females in their teams or companies 9 10
2_women mentioning female role models 1 1
2_Women to stick together, learn and network with each other, get better at networking 4 5
2_Women underrepresented historically, less opportunity to discuss pay, had to push for their income 1 2
2_Wonders why there are less women at the top 1 1
Gender stereotypes, gendered assumptions 0 0
2_Gender_stereotyping general, different skills 10 14
2_Men confident, advocate for themselves agressivley, great at taking on extra opportunity 3 4
2_Men network better, (old boys) over going out, drinking; not appropriate for women, mothers 3 3
2_Men, authority and weight of those at the top, better able to exert power 2 2
2_Risk taking, difficult for women; domestic support helps 3 3
2_Risk taking, male staff, admire male entrepreneurs 5 7
2_woman respondent doubts themselves, pushes and hence works becomes better 1 2
2_Woman talking about she or he, most likely he 2 2
2_women are more self critical, less (self) confident, (can't be overconfident) 3 5
2_women better managers, better investors, more productive, more flexible 3 3
2_women don't measure success just in money, money is not be all end all, did not pursue career to make money 3 4
2_women find it more challenging to push, to advocate for themselves, to ask for pay rises 2 2
2_women like being number twos, right hand man of a leader, not leaders, work as part of team, add value to teams 2 6
2_women like working for people with moral and ethical pricinples, integrity, team 2 3
Meritocracy 0 0
2_a hard work ethic, smart or efficient work, hard work in general 20 40
2_ability, talent, you need to be very good 5 7
2_ability_top 1 percent, the very, very best candidates are recruited, selective recruitment 4 6
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Code name Sources References
2_barriers to entry (in hedge funds, for barristers) 2 3
2_barrister process is merits based; fair, but difficult (need top education and degrees) 2 3
2_competition for the limited jobs available, competition in industry 3 3
2_competition increased, bright is not enough, need good CVs 3 6
2_d getting promoted for taking on more responsibility 1 2
2_d_making sacrifices for longer term rewards 2 7
2_Drive to want more; hunger, ambition, determination 6 8
2_EVALUATION financial value_revenue-; market-based; formulas (categorization; metrics + rankings) 18 39
2_company good brand, taking share of value produced 1 1
2_income generators vs service providers 1 1
2_Market be clever about it 1 1
2_Shareholder value, generating strong returns for the end client 5 5
differences between how men and women make evaluation work for them 1 1
differences in evaluation in different industries 2 2
market is headhunters 1 1
2_EVALUATION PERFORMANCE BASED pay, performance culture, incentivisation; motivation 8 24
PERFORMANCE CULTURE pressure, insecure, can be fired for making mistakes, entrepreneur out of business 4 4
2_f questions EVALUATION categorizations (metrics and rankings) 4 4
2_own income based on abstract work 1 1
2_MARKET forces, supply and demand; global competition for staff (economistic) 6 10
2_Risk_High risk, high reward; Deserves own income, as has taken risk (fairness) 7 8
Trade off_work life balance_working 24_7 14 21
Qualities needed 0 0
2_a_resilience, stress resistant, persistence 3 3
2_ambitious, driven, goal-oriented, consistently applying themselves, strategic, tenacious 8 16
2_good common sense, good humour not just straight As, not just technical skills 2 2
2_m Self-starting 5 6
2_motivated, wanted to do things 5 6
2_negotiate salary, being able to advocate for oneself 1 1
2_not be scared of talking to judges, be brave in male dominated industry 2 2
2_not too highly educated; for a trader 1 1
2_Participant (and those at top) would not get job nowadays (due to increased competition) 1 2
2_Q Generalist skills 1 1
2_Quant skills, scientific training and applying it to finance 3 4
2_smart thinking_intelligence_analytical skills_academic results, top education 8 11
2_Social skills, building relationships, soft skills, communication skills, self assured, confidence, intangible 13 19
2_taking risk 4 8
2_Team worker 1 1
1.1_People on low incomes, people in need, poor people 14 21
1.1.2_Median, cannot imagine living on it 1 1
1.1_Poverty as a problem solved in UK 1 1
1.2_Thresholds for high income and rich 0 0
A high income is 0 0
0_A high income is_difficult to say_laughter; sighing, breathing out, pause, asks for clarification 11 15
2_a choice that people make (choosing career rather than work life balance) 6 10
2_a high income driven by tax bands, once you fall into the high income tax bracket, top 5 percent of distribution 4 4
2_a high income is an element, measure of success 3 4
2_a high income is an Incentive to work hard, create wealth and jobs, contribution to firm 2 2
2_a high income is hard work 3 4
2_a high income is i, something to aspire to 4 6
2_a high income is_depends on age; career grade; always gets higher 5 6
2_a high income is_Maintaining a lifestyle; keeping up with peer group 2 4
2_A high income is_relative, subjective, depends on context (lifestyle requirements, location, industry) 20 28
2_being able to save 2 3
2_compares with asset of named indivual (extreme upward comparison) 2 3
2_does not think about it 1 1
2_London_Depends on living cost in London, London bubble 8 10
2_London_does not feel income is high as all goes to morgage 2 2
2_London_has high or reasonable income but not high enough as cannot afford a house in London 1 3
2_London_You can afford expensive cultural items, you earn huge amount but you cannot afford house 2 2
2_Respondent interested in cut-off (for this study) 3 3
2_Respondent is not sure if they have a high income 3 3
2_worry about earning the pounds not counting pennies 1 1
2_would not do job if it was not for the money 1 1
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2_You get used to the money 1 1
lifestyle 5 5
Means not having to worry, about spending, security, no financial stress, do what you like (decadent lifestyle, holidays) 8 15
Money is not a driver (intellectual challenge is), but an aside, not be-all and end-all (if flexible working hours) 2 3
Next generation and the one beyond are comfortable 1 1
Not a number 4 4
Number (income) 19 25
Would be lower if there was not the need to pay for private education fees 3 4
A low income is 9 9
A rich, or wealthy family (person) is 1 1
A rich family is_difficult to say, sighs, hard, interesting question 9 9
A rich family is_easy to say compared to high income 2 2
A rich family_is relative, depends on context (location, London, where in London) 12 17
Deccomodification_not necessary 1 1
Decommodification_wealth to generate income_freedom to work less, rich not want to live off median income 11 13
Definition changes over time_always higher 1 2
Depends on number of children in family (cost of private schooling) 1 1
Depends on property assets (London), increase in house prices 11 15
does not think about assets; assets less important than income 3 3
Freedom and choice 2 2
High net worth individuals have paid off morgage, rich families have property, property ownership 3 4
It is more normal, more necessary to have a high income, be a millionaire 1 2
lifestyle, big house in London, nice holidays, private school, (health care), theatre, restaurants, artwork, wine, 7 13
Liquid net worth is important 1 2
Not a number; state of mind 1 1
Not having to worry about buying things, about spending money, does not think about spending 3 3
Not having to worry about money; (changes definition to comfortable) 3 6
Number (income) 4 5
Number (wealth) 13 15
Prefers definition of comfortable or wealthy rather than rich 1 2
Respondent does not think they are rich (or high up the wealth distribution) 4 5
Would still worry even if participant was rich by own definition 1 1
household vs individual income 18 18
1.3_Recent increases in top INCOME 0 0
1_1 Top 1 percent of income earners are doing better 18 21
1_1 Top income earners not doing as well as they used to as increasing London house prices, private school fees 7 8
1_1 Top incomes have come down (since financial crisis) 4 4
1_1 Top incomes have not increased for all, tiny minority (the super-high earners, the wealthy, are doing better) 6 9
1_1 Top incomes not important; inequality has gone down 1 1
1_1_2 More reporting in the Media, current spotlight on high earners is unfair 3 4
1_1_2 More scrutiny good as financial sector was too big, excessive risks were taken 2 2
1_1_2 More scrutiny, regulation or change since financial crisis, now harder to earn high income 8 12
1_1_2 Part of one percent are squeezed, participant annoyed about discourse of 1 percent, need to break down 2 2
1_2 Top income shares NOT seen as an issue of distribution, top earners do not take away from others 6 8
1_3 Top income earners doing better is not a bad thing 2 3
1_3 Top incomes not morally concerning (there is not a threshold for level that is right or wrong) 2 2
1_4 Concerned about top income earners doing better, it is a bad thing, it causes problems 9 11
1_5 Torn about recent increases in top income 1 1
2_2 Historical perspective it is less unequal now (either this is seen as good, or no moral judgement is made) 2 3
2_2 History, Socially acceptable, imported from US 2 2
2_2 Reflects on reasons for recent increase, taxation, financialisation, social norms 1 1
2_2 Reflects on reasons_share options, incentive bonus culture, greed and excessive risk-taking 1 1
2_3 It could be dealt with politically, but everyone is aspirational 2 2
2_3 Net incomes after taxes matter 1 1
2_3 Now incomes are well spread 1 1
2_3 The .1 percent are the people who make the UK businesses work 1 1
2_3 Top income earners who are doing well are very few people anyway; they are not relevant 2 3
2_3 You should look at tax paid by top 1 percent, trickle down 9 10
2_4 Respondent does not have a view, is aware does not answer question 2 2
2_4 Respondent does not know answer to question 4 5
2_4 Respondent is aware their opinion is biased due to them living in London 1 1
2_4 Respondent states that people should be free to earn a lot of money (if they fulfill obligation of safety net) 1 1
reaction to top one percent in total income is 14% 6 6
Share of top 1 percent in total income is 19 22
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Code name Sources References
Share of top 1 percent in total income should be 25 29
Share of top 1 percent in total income_it is what it is, its inevitable 4 4
1.4 Recent increases in top WEALTH 0 0
1_1 Top 1 percent of wealth holders are doing better 14 17
1_2 The very top are doing better, not the others (r larger than g) 1 2
2_From historical perspective it is (maybe) less unequal now 2 2
2_Proliferation of magazines, articles about the rich 1 1
2_The wealthy are doing better, current generations gets help, tax planning, inheritance, gifts 1 1
2_When the one percent gets wealthier it does not make others worse off, wealth inequality no have negative effect 2 3
Explanations for recent increases, incl rising property, asset prices, interest rates 8 9
Generational issues, related to increase in (London) house prices 1 2
It is as much about how wealth is used as it is about the share (ref Bill Gates blog post) 1 1
More social mixing now 1 1
Opportunity is what matters 1 1
reaction top one percent of wealthiest 30%, top 10 percent 70% 16 16
Respondent does not know what would be fair but advocates high income and inheritance taxes and see what we get 2 3
Respondents states they do not know answer to question 3 4
Share of top 1 percent in total wealth is 17 19
Share of top 1 percent in total wealth should be 15 18
Share of top 1 percent in total wealth_it is what it is 7 8
Socially concerning but personally thinks if you make money you; next generation should enjoy 2 3
There has been a clampdown on the wealthy people doing well because it is so merits based 1 1
Wealth inequality is concerning, increase in top wealth is wrong, issue social cohesion 2 3
1.45_Fairness 8 9
1.4_2_Fairness of top incomes questioned 7 8
1.45_view that people who make money (are wealthy) deserve it because they work hard and pay a price 3 3
1.45_INEQUALITY 1 1
1.4_2 Can give moral opinion on policy solutions, but there is economic answer to this 1 2
1.4_2 Capitalism better than communism 1 1
1.4_2 Discussion about inequality 2 3
1.4_2 Distinction between barristers and people in law firms (cultural) 1 1
1.4_2 Inequality as such not concerning if people are responsible and ethical 1 1
1.4_2 inequality, wealth differentials much more acceptable if wealth used for community, for philanthropy 2 3
1.4_2 Moral distinctions_deserving and undeserving; Entrepreneur vs trader; banker, employee 6 11
1.4_2 Moral distinctions_industry vs banking 2 2
1.4_2 No moral judgement about inequality 2 2
1.4_2 Preference for more equality (social cohesion) 6 8
1.4_2 Respondent does not have a view 1 2
1.4_2 There is more polarisation, rich get richers and the poor are poorer 1 1
1.4_2 To address inequality, to affect change, we need different people at the top 1 1
1.4_2 Wealth concentration means relative economic contribution is less (wealth not productive) 1 1
1.4_2_Inequality vs poverty; focusing on the bottom is important (or minimum wage) 5 9
1.4_2_Positive aspects; wealth creation; charity; rising tide lifts all boats 4 8
1.5_INCOME vs WEALTH conceptualisation 2 3
2_1 Capital, wealth is more important compared to income 5 9
2_1 Capital, wealth is not so important (income is more important) 2 5
2_1 Different for those people who have assets, income is on top 1 1
2_2 Less problem with top income than top wealth 7 8
2_2 Less problem with top wealth than top income 1 1
2_3 Mismatch between wealth and income in this country, respondent lives in workers house 1 1
2_3 Top income shares decreasing is bad, as people need dream of wealth 1 1
2_Aware wealth more unequally distributed 1 1
difficult to disentangle wealth and income, distinguish between top wage income and top capital income earners 4 4
Income from earned vs inherited wealth 3 4
It is possible to change your position in world, every generation to get opportunity to succeed 2 3
Respondent has high income but cannot afford a nice house in London 1 1
Respondent personally interested in wealth inequality and argues it is more important than income inequality 1 3
Top income shares are productive, or needed as incentives, compared to captive wealth (inefficient) 4 4
Top incomes are more visible (hence bad) 1 2
z_Reflects on OWN WEALTH 1 1
1.6_Self perceptions and reference groups 1 1
Survey Q 1Self-rating 30 30
Survey Q 1Who is doing better than them 21 22
Survey Q Approve or dissaprove of those doing better 11 11
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Survey Q How many financially better off 30 32
Survey Q Income on income distribution 25 25
Respondent interested in where they are on income distribution 1 1
Survey Q Median and top one percent 26 36
1.7_2 Cycle, hamster wheel, rat race 5 5
1.7_2 London changed, influx of international wealth, there is so much wealth in London 2 2
1.7_2 people out of touch, divorced from anyone who is poor 4 4
1.7_2 shocked, respondent surprised about being out of touch 5 6
1.7_2_Specificity of London 11 18
1.7.2_thinks of moving out of London 1 1
1.7_Social COMPARISONS 1 1
Advantage_downward social comparison 0 0
Average person, the population, a lot of people for whom £35-40k is not a low income 6 8
Average wage, income, person on 3 4
c Accountants 1 1
colleagues who are five years younger 1 1
Contemporaries from school 1 1
Families on lower or middle incomes who did not benefit from asset price increases 1 1
Family_family abroad (who might call respondent rich) 1 2
Family_parents 2 2
Family_partners 2 3
Family_siblings 6 8
Friends 7 13
Has contributed more than unemployed person (as a non Brit) 1 1
Has given 2 pounds per person to everyone in the UK 1 1
Has given support to about four families on benefits with their taxes (they have done calulation) 1 1
Medical staff; doctors 5 6
No one in their profession and age group makes more than they do 1 1
Other immigrants globally (domestic workers in Asia) 1 1
Peope where they lived in Essex 1 1
People further down the scale, they probably begrudge the wealth of those who do better than them 1 1
People who aren't from a relativley comfortable background 1 1
Staff 1 1
Those who are not focused on money and have fantastic lifestyle, can be happy without being wealthy 1 1
Disadvantage_upward social comparison 1 1
(Dis)advantage 19 40
(Dis)advantage as incentive_motivator_positive_relaxed about disadvantage, entrepreneurialism to be encouraged 15 29
(Dis)Advantage as prohibiting understanding for wider inequality, for feeling wealthy 2 2
(Dis)advantage as, does not care about people doing better, does not think about it; is not affected negativley 3 4
(Dis)advantage in London, increases peoples desire to be wealthy 1 2
(Dis)advantage_Aware of skew at top of distribution 5 8
(Dis)advantage_Aware perception is skewed (by own industry, by clients, by people in daily contact) 4 9
(Dis)advantage_Life at the bottom of the one percent completley different to .1 and super rich 1 1
(Dis)advantage_respondent has high income but not a lot of wealth 1 1
(Dis)advantage_those who do better make trade offs, are more worried about money 2 5
(Dis)advantage_would only feel inferior if someone at their level in their industry did better 1 1
2_Does not judge people on the basis of whether they make money 1 1
Barristers who earn more money than respondent, who are doing more interesting cases 1 2
Billionaires (philanthropist) 3 5
CEOs (finance and technology) 2 2
City of London 4 4
Client(s) of respondent 2 4
Colleagues who are in investment side of hedge fund, from privileged backgrounds, or on their (trading) floor 3 6
Entrepreneurs; (businessmen), who made a lot of money 11 13
Footballers 4 4
Friends 4 4
Lawyers, head of chambers, QCs 3 3
Lo Popstars, actors, famous people, writers 3 5
Lord, Knight, Rockstar_Duchess of Camebridge, money elite Dames and Dukes (the aristocracy) 5 6
Men have typically done more financially; men who were able to afford houses when only they worked 2 2
Named indivdiuals 4 12
Oligarch 1 2
Other hedge fund managers (founders, CIOs) who are running many billion dollars more 1 1
Other parents at childs school 2 3
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Code name Sources References
Other professionals 1 1
People (at senior level in) private equity sector 1 1
People eminent in their fields, medicine, law, judges, nobel prize 1 2
People from established families, whose parents have more money, from privileged background 4 5
People in a different social circles, a social set (gala dinners, black tie events) are of no interest to respondent. 1 1
People on rich list 4 5
People who are smarter, have more glamourous and exciting jobs 1 1
People who do better in terms of wealth, (instead of income) 2 2
People who have influence and power 1 1
People who have made a lot of money 2 2
People who have nicer, larger, more expensive houses, who bought property 5, 8, 10 years ago 5 12
People with fewer money problems 1 1
Flat comparison 1 2
academic, professor, university researcher 1 3
Bankers, those working at Goldman Sachs 2 3
colleagues for whom one million pounds is not a high income (compete with international wealth) 2 2
Family_Parent 1 1
Family_Wife's or husbands family, who have lower morgages (outside london), who are more comfortable 2 3
Footballers 2 2
Friends 2 3
Named individuals (other entrepreneurs, tech start ups) 1 1
Other hedge fund managers, leaders of competitor companies 2 2
Other people on rich list 3 3
Politicians no problem with them being paid more money 1 1
Public service staff; teachers; doctors, people who care for relatives or handicapped children (moral) 5 8
Someone at bank of England (who should live in Kensington) 1 2
1.9 Accumulation, elite thriving Savage 0 0
2_Elite perpetuation 2 4
2_Human nature to always want more; always wanting more 2 3
2_private schooling, public schools 10 17
2_Tax avoidance of the rich 3 5
2_Wealth for the next generations.. 2 2
Afraid of losing wealth 1 1
Elite struggle 6 8
Social class, professional social class 4 4
Wealth as difficult_spotlight, right to privacy; income should be private 2 2
Wealth elite instead of aristocracy, 2 now it is better compared to the class system 5 6
Wealth elite we may return to feudal times (like Piketty) 1 1
Wealth, success as responsibility 6 6
Wealthy social class (coded from int 7) 4 5
1.9_Philanthropy 3 3
Critical of Philanthropy; does not work, is for show off 2 2
Decisions by philanthropists or corporates better researched than government decisions 2 2
Incentives for philanthropy or giving away money by the government are positive (tax breaks) 4 5
Neither philanthropy nor government involvment, social attitude needs to change 1 1
Personal charity 2 2
Personal investment in businesses of young people 1 1
Personal philanthropy 5 7
Personal philanthropy, or philanthropy of their business 2 2
Philanthropic people do not give enough compared to US 1 1
Philanthropy as justification for increased wealth differentials 2 2
Philanthropy in additionto state_not instead of state 3 3
Philanthropy may not affect wealth distribution in UK, might try to provide health care in poorer parts of the world 1 1
Philanthropy should be made easier_incentives for philanthropy 2 3
Positive of philanthropy, philanthropy as redistribution 7 7
1.9_Policy solutions 0 0
2_Government has role to play to reduce income differences (but so do society and corporates) 3 3
Does not know how to solve inequality 2 4
Earnings cap (banker bonus cap) good 1 1
Earnings caps are not good 1 1
Education 5 9
Force those with a certain net worth to run a charitable foundation 1 1
Gov Taxaton 4 6
_Not government involvement, but social atittudes need to change, more women in the workplace 1 1
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Code name Sources References
_Private welfare class_ as discussed by John Hills and Tania Burchardt 3 3
1_ High earners should be taxed more 4 4
1_ High earners should be taxed much more (higher marginal rate of tax, moral reason) 3 6
1_Inheritance and capital taxes are good but need to be applied to all due to competition 1 1
1_Taxation better than charity (hedge fund managers like himself should be taxed more) 1 1
1_There should be high(er) inheritance tax 3 6
2_Against inheritance taxes 1 1
2_Participant is happy to pay tax, even though it is a lot of tax to be paying 47 percent 1 1
Against taxing and punishing wealthy people, against taking from wealthy to redistribute to the poor 2 3
Discusses appropriate income tax rates 3 3
Everybody needs to pay tax, and people should not feel like others are avoiding it 1 1
High taxes affects the disposable income of the person at the lower end of the 1 percent 1 1
High taxes harm the economy 1 1
Historically, high taxation came along with less equality 2 2
If income tax rates too high, over fifty percent including NI, people will look at ways of not paying tax 1 3
If taxes too high (destroys) no incentives; diminishing impact; Laffer curve 7 8
If too high people or their capital leave country 6 6
If too high respondent would leave the country 2 2
Mansion tax bad or not good; (better adjust council tax) 3 3
Participant benefits from being non dom which they think is a stupid, unfair loophole 1 1
Participant does not like paying taxes but aware necessary 2 2
Philosophical reasons for high top marginal tax rates (Rawls) 1 1
Property taxes are difficult because people's high incomes have already been taxed 1 1
Rich need to pay for safety net; taxes not to equalise difference but to pay for what needs to be paid 1 2
Taxation for all British citizens even if they work abroad 1 1
Taxes as punishing hard workers 1 1
There are too many concessions, including ISAs which benefit the well off 1 1
There should be a housing tax 1 1
Wealth should be taxed more (than income) 3 8
Wealth tax_respondents talks about it 1 1
Grammar schools for social mobility 1 2
housing policy 1 1
Immigration policy benefited the rich 1 1
Incentives, aspirations to work hard, to create wealth; create jobs; wealth creators; need to remain 9 18
Government can create incentive schemes for firms taking on additional employees 2 2
Incentives for income are justified, but not for wealth 1 1
Incentives for the poor is what government should do (rather than taxing rich) 1 1
Incentives is conservative blueprint 1 1
Incentives not necessarily cash 1 1
Incentives would still be there even if share of top one percent was lower 1 1
Incentives would still be there even if tax was (much) higher 1 1
Negative incentive if just government redistributes 1 1
Inequality not a problem, but might be indicative of society where rich do not pay enough tax 1 1
Inequality will or may lead to revolution or rebellion 2 2
Legislation not solution; (can't regulate; people will game) 6 7
Market to regulate inequality; shareholders to play role, corporates to play role 4 7
Middle ground 3 3
minimum wages, to ensure minimum rises rather than slapping the top down 2 2
Pay for employees should be in shares, long term and more based on value created 1 1
Pro QE 1 1
Redistribution 6 7
Redistribution good but difficult politically, seeks to understand this 3 3
Right-wing media against redistribution 1 2
Survey 1 gap between those with high and those with low incomes 27 27
Survey 2 government to reduce income differences 28 29
Survey 3 government to redistribute 27 29
1.9_Respondent demographic 0 0
0 Political opinions 4 4
0_other survey items_education 21 29
0_Respondents income 22 23
0_Respondents net worth 26 27
0_Was respondent socially mobile 21 21
1.9_Respondents background 7 9
2 _Anything else that is important 17 19
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Code name Sources References
Additional industry information 1 1
Reflects on changes in Social norms, which have changed since 2008 1 1
Respondent interested in research method 1 1
Respondent is interested in understanding why inequality cannot be addressed in the UK context 1 1
Whether I draw a distinction between men and women, adds more information in regards to gender differences 1 1
2_Experience of mobility, aware due to parents being teachers, academics 2 3
2_Experiences of social mobility 11 15
3_2 participant concerned about anonymity 3 3
3_2 states my sample will be biased (as only those who suceeded are interviewed) 1 1
3_2 thinks is unusual for hedge fund mangers, thinks opinion is unusual, bias in my sample 2 4
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Appendix 4a: Word cloud comparison of male and female participants  
 Word cloud for male participants (n=22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Inclusion criterion: case occurrence at least 5; frequency at least 60. Cluster within n = 50 
words. 
 
 Word cloud for female participants (n=8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Inclusion criterion: case occurrence at least 3; frequency at least 30. Cluster within n = 50 
words. 
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Appendix 4b: Word cloud comparison of income groups 
Cluster map income group £140k up to £1m (n= 21) 
 
Note: Inclusion criterion 5 cases and 60 occurrences. 
 
Cluster map income group £1m-£50m (n= 9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Inclusion criterion 2 cases and 30 occurrences. 
 
